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Introduction: 
India became free in 1947 and the Constitution was adopted in 1950. It is 
extraordinary that the tramers of the Indian Constitution, who suffered most because 
of the Preventive Detention Laws, did not hesitate to give Constitutional sanctity to 
the Preventive Detention Laws and that too in the Fundamental Rights chapter of the 
Constitution. Some parts of Article 22 are not Fundamental Rights but are 
Fundamental Dangers to the citizens of India for whom and allegedly by whom the 
Constitution was framed, to usher in a new society, with freedom of expression and 
freedom of association available to all. 
In 1950 itself, a Prevention Detention Act was piloted by Sardar Patel, who 
said that he had several '"sleepless nights'" before he could decide that it was necessary 
to introduce such a Bill. And in 1950, under this Act, ordinary disturbers of order and 
peace were not arrested, but a political leader of A.K. Gopalan's eminence was 
an-estcd. Even from that initial action, it was evident that these Acts were meant to 
curb political dissent, and that legacy has been and is being followed. 
From the time the country secured its Independence till 1977, except for a 
period of nearly two years from 1969-1971, free India had the dubious distinction of 
having these extraordinary, mischievous and 'unlawful' laws throughout. 
It is worth bearing in mind that no other civilized country, including Britain 
which brought Preventive Detention laws here, felt compelled to introduce such laws 
during peace time. Even during the last World War, most European countries and the 
USA, who were all directly involved in the war, had no such law. During the War, 
England introduced a Preventive Detention Law to the effect that a person could be 
detained only on the subjective satisfaction of the Home Minister of Great Britain and 
not on the subjective satisfaction of a puny magistrate, as it the case here. Further, 
only one person. Sir Osward Mosley, a rabid Nazi, was detained under this Act. In 
1971, because of tremendous political tumioil which resulted in assassinations and 
destruction all over Ireland, the British Government introduced PD Act for Ireland. 
But it immediately fornied a committee headed by Lord Gardiner to probe and to find 
out if it was necessary to have such an Act even in Ireland. The Gardiner Committee 
Report reads: '"Preventive Detention can only be tolerated in any democratic society 
in the most extreme circumstances. It must be used with the utmost restraint and 
retained only so long as it is strictly necessary" 
Our Constitution, since its enactment, has had a peculiar feature; the 
fundamental rights guaranteed under it allow preventive detention without trial. 
Article 22 after providing that any person an^ested must be produced before a court 
within 24 hours of airest tenders this almost nugatory by pennitting the state to 
preventively detain persons without any judicial scrutiny. 
The debates in the Constituent Assembly shows that the need to provide for 
preventive detention was generally accepted, albeit reluctantly. The observations of 
Alladi Kjishnaswamy Ayyar, a distinguished jurist, are typical: he described 
preventive detention a necessary evil because, in his view, there were people 
detemiined to undemiine the sanctity of the Constitution, the security of the State and 
even individual liberty. 
What the members tried to do was not to prohibit preventive detention but to 
incorporate safeguards against its abuse in the Constitution by limiting the period, by 
giving effective powers to the advisory board to review detention orders, etc. This 
they failed to get. It was left to Parliament to prescribe the period and even that limit 
was flouted in spirit by the device, often adopted, of serving a fresh detention order a 
few hours after releasing the detenu, advisory boards had no power to go into the 
merits of the detention. 
The solution is simple; scrap all laws of preventive detention. It is, however, 
difficult to see that happening in the near future. I would suggest a first step which 
would remove some of the more undesirable features of preventive detention. The 
only justification for preventive detention is to safeguard society from persons who 
are out to destroy it. If that is the justification and that is the only justification 
officially given, let it be provided that all those detained under any detenfion law be 
kept either in the ordinary jails or in special detention centres run by the jail 
authorities. 
Such a change does not require fresh legislafion. Both the National Security 
Act and Cofeposa authorise the State to specify the place and conditions of detenfion. 
The state must be directed to ensure that detenus must be taken to ordinary jails 
within 24 hour of detention and be kept there. In the past that was the pattern of 
preventive detention. Thousands of nationalists rounded up by the British during the 
Indenendence movement were so detained. 
NO order of detention can be passed to aid tlie police or other authorities to 
investigate crime or other offences; what justifies to investigate crime or other 
offences; what justifies a detention is the satisfaction of the appropriate authority that 
the detention of a particular person in necessary. Once a detention order is passed, 
that is the end of the matter as far as the detaining authorities are concerned. 
That being so, the detaining authority must have no access to the detenus. 
Even after such a change since the laws will enable the detaining authorities to 
detain without trial persons believed to be indulging in grave anti-social activities the 
object, and ostensibly at least, the only object of such laws can still be achieved. 
The authorities should have no objection to such a change. 
The state cannot have any rational objection to such a change. Both the 
National Security Act and Cofeposa merely authorise detention of persons who see. 
It is argued, a danger to society if free. If the state does object to such changes it will 
expose its true motive and also the manner in which detention laws are being abused, 
persons are detained so as to extract information from them. 
Statement and Objective of Problem: 
The researcher will endeavour to examine the role of the Supreme Court of 
India since 1950 till date in cases of Preventive Detention. The objective of the 
problem is to see where the Supreme Court misinterpreted the provisions of the 
Constitution of India and failed to serve as a custodian of a personal liberty of the 
citizens of India who created themselves the institution of Supreme Court for the 
protection of fundamental rights. The Supreme Court duiing emergency paiticularly has 
failed to come up with the expectation of the people of India and acted as an agency of 
the Central Government and delivered judgements for wining the favour of the 
Government of India and the usurpers of the power of the people in the garb of Law. 
There is perhaps no authoritative definition of expression 'Preventive 
Detention' (PD). The expression traces its origins in the language used by the Lord 
Justices in England while examining the nature of detention under the war time 
provisions of the Defence of Realm Consolidation Act, 1914 which was enacted 
during the First Worid War The key word in the expression is the adjective 
'Preventive' which is used in contradistinction to 'Punitive', PD is thus not a punitive 
but a precautionary measure which has the rather pious object of not to punish a man 
for having done something wrong but to intercept him before he does it and to prevent 
him from doing it. 
Protection against Arrest and Detention: 
Article 22 of the Constitution of India is as below: 
(1) No person who is an-ested shall be detained in custody without being infonned, as 
soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest nor shall he be denied the right to 
consult, and to be defended by, a legal practitioner of his choice. 
(2) Every person who is arrested and detained in custody shall be produced before the 
nearest Magistrate within a period of twenty-four hours of such airest excluding the 
time necessary for the journey from the place of airest to the Court of the Magistrate 
and no such person shall be detained in custody beyond the said period without the 
authority of Magistrate. 
(3) Nothing in Cls. (1) and (2) shall apply-
(a) to any person who for the time being is an enemy alien; or 
(b) to any person who is arrested or detained under any law providing for 
preventive detention. 
(4) No law providing for preventive detention shall authorise the detention of a person 
for a longer period than two months unless and Advisory Board constituted in 
accordance with the recommendations of the Chief Justice of the appropriate High 
Court has reported before the expiration of the period of two months that there is in its 
opinion sufficient cause for such detention: 
Provided that an Advisory Board shall consist of a Chaimian and not less than 
two other members and the Chainnan shall be a serving Judge of the appropriate High 
Court and the other members shall be serving or retired Judges of any High Court. 
Provided further, that nothing in this clause shall authorise the detention of 
any person beyond the maximum period prescribed by any law made by Parliament 
under sub-clause (a) of CI. (7). 
Explanation - In this clause "appropriate High Court" means -
(i) in the case of the detention of a person in pursuance of an order of 
detention made by the Government of India or an officer or authority 
subordinate to that Government, the High Court for the union tenitory of 
Delhi. 
(ii) In the case of the detention of person in pursuance of an order of detention 
made by the Government of any State (other than a Union Territory) the 
High Court for that State; and 
(iii) In case of detention made by the administrator of a union territory or an 
officer or authority subordinate to such administrator, such High Court as 
may be specified by or under any law made by Pariiament in this behalf 
(5) When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law 
providing for preventive detention, the authority malcing the order shall, as soon as 
may be, communicate to such person the gi'ounds on which the order has been made 
and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the 
order. 
(6) Nothing in CI. (5) shall require the authority making such order as is referred to in 
that clause to disclose facts which such authority considers to be against the public 
interest to disclose. 
(7) Parliament shall by law prescribe -
(a) the maximum period for which any person may in any class or classes of 
cases be detained under any law providing for preventive detention; and 
(b) the procedure to be followed by an Advisory Board in an inquiry under 
CI. (4)". 
2. Constitutional changes - Clause (4) of this Article has been substituted for the 
original CI. (4); and the original sub-clause (a) of CI. (7) omitted, and the original sub-
clauses (b) and (c) thereof re-lettered as (a) and (b); and the words CI. (4)" occurring 
at end of sub-clause (b) thereof, have been substituted for the original words "sub-
clause (a) of CI. (4)" by Sec. 3 of the Constitution (Forty-Amendment) Act, 1978. 
3. Analogous Provisions - Analogous to Article 22, are the following provisions in 
other Constitutions: 
DANZIN: Article 74 (4) - The liberty of the person shall be inviolable. No limitation 
or deprivation of personal liberty may be imposed by the public authority, except by 
virtue of the law. 
Persons who have been deprived of their liberty must be infomied at the latest 
on the following day on what authority and on what grounds the deprivation of liberty 
has been ordered. Opportunity must immediately be given them to lodge objections 
against such deprivation of liberty. 
EIRE: Section 40 - (1) The State guarantees in its law to respect, and as far as 
practicable by its laws to defend and vindicate the personal rights of the citizen. 
(2) The State shall by its laws protect as best it may, from unjust attack and, in the 
case of injustice done, vindicate the life, person, good name and property rights of 
every citizen. 
WEIMER GERMANY: Article 114 - Personal Liberty is inviolable. No 
encroachment on or deprivation of personal liberty by any public authority is 
pemiissible except in virtue of a law. 
Persons, who have been deprived, of their liberty shall be infomied - at the 
latest on the following day - by what authority and on what grounds the deprivation 
of liberty has been ordered: Opportunity shall be given to them without delay to make 
legal complaint against such deprivation. 
JAPAN: Article XXXIV - No person shall be arrested or detained without 
being at once infomied of the charges against him or without the immediate privilege 
of counsel; nor shall he be detained without adequate cause; and upon demand of any 
person such cause must be immediately shown in open court in his presence and the 
presence of his counsel. 
YUGOSLAVIA: Article 5 - The liberty of the individual shall be guaranteed. 
No person may be subjected to any judicial interrogation, or placed under arrest, or be 
in any other way deprived of his liberty, save as provide by law. 
No person may be placed under arrest for any crime or offence whatever save 
by order of a competent authority given in writing and stating the charge. This order 
must be communicated to the person airested at the time of artest or the latest within 
twenty four hours of the arrest. An appeal against the order for arrest may be lodged 
in the competent court within three days. If no appeal has been lodged within this 
period, the police authorities must as a matter of course communicate the order to the 
competent court within the twenty-four hours following. The Court shall be bound to 
confirm or annual the arrest within two days from the communication of the order, 
and its decision shall be given effect forthwith. 
Public officials who infringe these provisions shall be pemiitted for illegal 
deprivation of liberty. 
On examining these provisions of Article 22, we find that Clauses (1) and (2) 
give three very valuable rights to detenus (other than those detained under the law of 
PD), namely: 
i. Right of being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds of arrest; 
ii. Right to consult and be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice; 
iii. Production before the nearest magistrate within 24 hours of such arrest. 
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Clause (3) of Art. 22 however expressly take away the safeguards of clauses (1) 
and (2) of Article 22 in respect of a person arrested or detained under a law 
providing for PD. In its place the detenu under PD has the somewhat niggardly 
substitute protection as provided by clauses (4) and (5) of Article 22. Collectively 
these clauses provide that in case of PD: 
(i) The detenu shall not be detained beyond 3 months unless the Advisory 
Board (duly constituted) reports prior to the expiration of 3 months that 
there is in its opinion sufficient cause for such detention (as against 
production within 24 hours before a magistrate). 
(ii) The detenu is to be furnished, as soon as may be, the grounds for his 
detention. 
(iii) The detenu is to be provided the earliest opportunity of making a 
presentation against the order of detention (as against the right of 
consulting and being defended by a legal practitioner). 
As we pointed out earlier, the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 (PDA) 
continued to be on the statute book till 1970, being re-enacted seven times in the 
process. In 1971 the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, (MISA) began its reign, 
and gained considerable notoriety till it was finally repealed in 1977. During the 
period 1977 to 1980, for the first time there was no central law of PD in the Indian 
Republic. Once again in 1980 the National Security Ordinance was promulgated and 
the reign of PD laws was re-established over the Republic. In December, 1980, the 
NSA was enacted and consequently the ordinance was repealed. 
Secfion 3 of NSA gives the Central Government the power to detain any 
person if the government is 'satisfied' that it is 'necessary' to do so with a view to 
prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to any one or more of the 
following interests of the State: 
(i) Defence of the State 
(ii) Relation of the State with foreign power 
(iii) Security of the State 
(iv) Public order; and 
(v) Maintenance of supply of services essential to the community. 
Since none of these concepts are capable of being defined with any great 
degree of certainty and definiteness, the scope of abuse is admittedly colossal. 
Section 8 of the NSA states that the grounds of detenfion must be communicated to 
the detenu, in no case later than ten days from his arrest. Secfion 9 deals with the 
constitution of the Advisory Boards contemplated in Article 22. This also raises a 
question of some concern. 
The Constitution (44"' Amendment) Act, 1978, sought to amend clause (4) of 
Article 22 to provide that an Advisory Board shall be constituted, in accordance of the 
recommendations of the Chief Justice of the appropriate High Court. The Advisory 
Board was to consist of a Chairman, and two other members. The amendment 
proposed further that the Chaimian shall be a serving judge of the appropriate High 
Court, and the other members may be either the serving or retired High Court Judges'. 
The amendment seeks to amend clause (4) of Article 22 and to reduce the period of 
detention without obtaining the approval of the Advisory Board, from the present 
three months to only two months. Though the amendment was passed on June 10, 
1979 it remains un-notified and has not yet been brought into force. 
Section 8 of the NSA which was enacted after this constitutional amendment 
was passed, contemplates a composition of the Advisory Board in which even those 
persons who were never appointed judges of the High Court may be members, and 
where the Chief Justice of the appropriate High Court has no role to play in 
constituting the Advisory Board. Section 8 is therefore clearly in disharmony with the 
Constitutional Amendment. Surely bringing into force the relevant provisions of the 
Constitutional Amendment will not weaken the hands of the State in its quest for 
maintaining security and public order. And, more importantly, it will prove to be a 
crucial check on the possibility of Executive lawlessness in applying the NSA. 
Like the NSA itself, both the amendments made to the NSA have been made 
by promulgating ordinances, which were issued in April and June 1984. This again is 
cause for concern. To begin with, it is not contemplated under the scheme of our 
Constitution that ordinances should be used as a supplant for the legislative power of 
the Parliament. On the contrary, such an exercise of ordinance making power is quite 
opposed to the ideals and spirit of the Constitution. We believe that the President who 
promulgates ordinances as a supplant for the legislative power of the Parliament 
violates his 'Oath of Office' under Aiticle 60 of the Constitution, by violating his 
solemn promise that he will endeavour to the best of (his) ability to preserve, protect 
and defend the Constitutions. 
Equally, such a President also violates his Fundamental Duties as a citizen of 
the Republic under clause (a) of Article 51A of the Constitution, namely, the duty to 
abide by the Constitution and respect its ideals and institutions. 
The new ordinance (No. 5 of 1984) was promulgated in April 1984 and sought 
to amend the NSA in its application to the State of Punjab and the Union Territory of 
Chandigarh. An Act along similar lines for amending the NSA in its application in 
those areas ws passed by the Parliament in May, 1984 (May Amendment). This May 
Amendment amended section 8 of NSA, so that under exceptional circumstances a 
detenu may now remain in jail for fifteen days without knowing the grounds of 
detention. Similarly, under section 10 and 11 of the NSA, the period within which a 
detenu's case had to be refen-ed to the Advisory Board for obtaining the Board's 
approval (for his detention beyond three months) was extended from three weeks 
from his arrest to four months and two weeks and, likewise, the period for the 
submission of the report by the Board was extended from seven weeks to five months 
and three weeks from the date of the detention of the detenu. This means that a 
detenu may now be made to undergo imprisonment for a period of nearly six months, 
even if his detention is ultimately found by the Advisory Board to be entirely 
unjustified and bad in law. 
The May Amendment also provides that in the case of persons detained prior 
to April 3, 1985 they could be so detained for a maximum period of two years as 
opposed to one year in section 13 of the unamended Act. Therefore, we find that the 
May Amendment further whittled down the already niggardly protection or safeguard 
a person has under the Indian laws, when he is detained under the PD laws. The only 
saving feature of this Amendment, if there is one, is that its operation was specifically 
limited to Punjab and the Union Territory of Chandigarh, and that it was enacted at a 
time when violence had touched an all time high in Punjab. This may not justify the 
NSA Amendment, but it surely provides a background which cannot be wished away 
while discussing the May Amendment. 
The next ordinance which sought to amend the NSA was promulgated in June 
1984 (June Ordinance). It has two disquieting aspects: 
(1) It was promulgated about 2 weeks after the successful culmination of 
Operation Bluestar at the Golden Temple, and 
(2) It was not restricted to Punjab alone, but was operative throughout the 
tenitory of India (excluding Jammu and Kashmir to which even the 
NSA does not apply). 
The main purpose of the June Ordinance seems to be to introduce in the NSA, 
amendments which are in pari material (or similar) to the amendments which had 
already been introduced in the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of 
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Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (COFEPOSA). These two amendments introduced by 
the June Ordinance need special mention. 
Preventive Detention in India is a Constitutional Tyranny 
India is one of the few countz'ies in the word whose Constitution allows for 
preventive detention during peacetime without safeguards that elsewhere are 
understood to be basic requirements for protecting fundamental human rights. For 
example, the European Court of Human Rights has long held that preventive 
detention, as contemplated in the Indian Constitution, is illegal under the European 
Convention on Human Rights regardless of the safeguards embodied in the law. 
South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre (SAHRDC), in its submission to the 
NCRWC in August 2000, recommended deleting those provisions of the Constitution 
of India that explicitly pemiit preventive detention.' 
Specifically, under Article 22, preventive detention may be implemented and 
infinitum - whether in peacetime, non-emergency situafions or otherwise. The 
Constitution expressly allows an individual to be detained - without charge or trial -
for up to three months and denies detainees the rights to legal representation, cross-
examination, timely or periodic review, access to the courts or compensation for 
unlawful arrest or detention. In short, preventive detention as enshrined under Article 
22 strikes a devastafing blow to personal liberties. 
It also runs afoul of international standards. Article 4 of the Intemafional 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) - which India has ratified -
admittedly permits derogation from guaranteeing certain personal liberties during a 
state of emergency. The Government, however, has not invoked this privilege, nor 
could it, as the current situation in India does not safisfy with standards set forth in 
Article 4. 
If preventive detention is to remain a part of India's ConstituUon, it is 
imperative that its use be confined to specified, limited circumstances and include 
adequate safeguards to protect the fiandamental rights of detainees. Particular 
procedural protections are urgently needed (i) to reduce detainees' vulnerability to 
torture and discriminatory treatment (ii) to prevent officials misusing preventive 
detention to punish dissent from Government or from majority practices; and (iii) to 
prevent overzealous government prosecutors from subverting the criminal process. In 
1. Human Rights Features voice of Asia Pacific Human Rights Network 
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pursuit of these goals, SAHRDC made the following recommendations in its 
submission to the NCRWC. 
First, Entry 3 of List III of the Constitution of hidia, which allows Parliament 
and state legislatures to pass preventive detention laws in times of peace for "the 
maintenance of public order or maintenance of supply and services essential to the 
community", should be deleted. Assuming that preventive detention could be justified 
in the interest of national security as identified in Entry 9 of List I of the Constitution, 
there is still no compelling reason to allow this extraordinary measure in the 
circumstances identified in Entry 3 of List III. 
Second, lacking clear guidance from the Constitution, courts have apphed 
vague and toothless standards - such as the subjective "satisfaction" of the detaining 
authority test - to govern the implementation of preventive detention laws. If 
preventive detention is to remain in the Constitution, constitutional provisions must 
include well-defined criteria specifying limited circumstances in which preventive 
detention powers may be exercised - and these standards must be designed to allow 
meaningful judicial review of official's actions. 
Third, under Article 22 (2) every arrested person must be produced before a 
magistrate within 24 hours after arrest. However, Article 22 (3) (b) excepts preventive 
detention detainees from Clause (2) and, as a consequence, it should be repealed in 
the interest of human rights. AT present, detainees held under preventive detention 
laws may be kept in detention without any fonn of review for up to three months, an 
unconscionably long period in custody especially given the real threat of torture. At 
the very least, the Government should finally bring Section 3 of the Forty-fourth 
Amendment Act, 1978 into effect, thereby reducing the pemiitted period of detention 
to two months. Though still a violation of international human rights law, this step 
would at least reduce the incidents of torture significantly. 
Fourth, the Advisory Board review procedure prescribed by the Constitution 
involved executive review of executive decision-making. The absence of judicial 
involvement violates detainees' right to appear before an "independent and impartial 
tribunal", in direct contravention of international human rights law including the 
ICCPR (Article 14 (1) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 10). 
The Constitution must be amended to include clear criteria for officials to follow, and 
subject compliance with those standards to judicial review. 
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Fifth, the Constitution provides that the detaining authority must refer to the 
Advisory Board where detention is intended to continue beyond three months. No 
provision exists for the consideration of a detainee's case by the Advisory Board more 
than once. Yet, periodic review is an indispensable protection to ensure that detention 
is "strictly required" and fairly administered. Hence, the Constitution should mandate 
periodic review of the conditions and tenns of detention. 
Sixth, detainees must receive detailed and prompt infonnation about the 
grounds of their arrest. Currently, the detaining authority is required only to 
communicate the grounds of detention to the detainee "as soon as may be" after the 
arrest. Article 9 (2) of the ICCPR provides that "[a] anyone who is arrested shall be 
infonried, at the time of arrest, of the reasons for his arrest and shall be promptly 
infomied of any charges against him". Detainees must be guaranteed a minimum 
period in which the grounds are promptly communicated to them, and be given 
information sufficient to pemiit the detainee to challenge the legality of his or her 
detention. 
Seventh, individuals held under preventive detention must be given the right to 
legal counsel and other basic procedural rights provided by Articles 21 22 (1) and 22 
(2) of the Constitution. Article 22 (1) of the Constitution, for example, guarantees the 
right to legal counsel, but Article 22 (3) (b) strips this right from persons arrested or 
detained under preventive detention law. Relying on these provisions, the Supreme 
Court stated, in A.K. Roy v. Union of India, that detainees do not have the right to 
legal representation or cross-examination in Advisory Board hearings. Contrary to 
India's constitutional practice, the U.N. Human Rights Committee has stated, "a// 
persons airested must have immediate access to counsel". Article 22 (3) (b) of the 
Constitution - denying detainees virtually all procedural rights during Advisory Board 
hearings - must be repealed. 
Eighth, Article 9 (5) of the ICCPR provides the right to compensation for 
unlawful detention, except during public emergencies. A similar provision creating a 
right to compensation is included in section 38 of the Prevention of Terrorism Bill of 
2000 (though the bill is otherwise effectively a reconstitution of the lapsed Tertorist 
and Disruptive Activities Prevention Act (TADA). The Law Commission charged 
with reshaping the antiterrorism legislation observed that Supreme Court orders have 
held that people are effectively entitled to compensation, in practice superseding 
India's reservation to Article 9 (5) of the ICCPR. In this light, the Government of 
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India should promptly withdraw its reservation of Article 9 (5) of the ICCPR and 
include a Constitutional provision guaranteeing the right to compensation, at lest for 
unlawful detention during peacetime. 
In keeping with the overriding spirit of the Constitution and with minimum 
standards of international human rights law, it is essential that the Constitutional 
refomis discussed above be adopted. The process set in motion by establishing the 
NCRWC provides a unique opportunity for such an important realignment of India's 
Constitution with prevailing international human rights standards. The key will be 
political willpower and the commitment to seeing justice done. 
Brief Facts of the Case were as under: 
Consequent on the Pakistani aggression, the President issued a Proclamation 
of Emergency on 3.12.1971 on the ground that the security of India was threatened by 
external aggression. By an order dated 5.12.1971 issued u/Art. 359 (1) of the 
Constitution, the right of 'foreigners' to move any Court for the enforcement of rights 
conferred by Arts. 14, 21 & 22 was suspended. 
In September 1974 the MISA was amended by Ordinance II of 1974 to 
include sub-section (c) in Sec. 3 (1) by which the right to detain was given as against 
smugglers and offenders under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947. On 
16.11.1974 the President issued a Declaration u/Art. 359 (1) suspending the right of 
persons detained u/s 3 (1) (c) of the MISA to move for enforcement of the rights 
confeiTed by Arts. 14, 21 and Cls. (4), (5), (6), (7) of Art. 22 of the Constitution. 
On 25/6/1975 in exercise of powers conferted by CI. (1) of Art. 359 the 
President declared that the right of any person including a foreigner to move any court 
for the enforcement of the rights conferted by Arts. 14, 21 & 22 and all proceedings 
pending in any Court for the enforcement of the above mentioned rights shall remain 
suspended for the period during which the Proclamations of Emergency made under 
Article 352 (1) on 3.12.1971 and on 25/6/1975 are both in force. The Presidential 
order of 27.6.1975 further stated that the same shall be in addition to and not in 
derogation of any order made before the date of the aforesaid order u/Article 359 (1). 
The President promulgated the amending Ordinances No. 4 & 7 of 1975, were 
replaced by the Maintenance of Internal Security (Amending Act), 1975 introducing a 
new Sec. 16-A and giving a deemed effect to Sec. 7 of the Act was on 25.6.1975. A 
new Sec. 18 was also inserted w.e.f 25.6.1975. 
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By the Constitution (Thirty-eighth Amendment) Act, 1975, Article 123, 213, 
239 (b), 352, 356, 359 & 368 were amended. Cls. (4) & (5) were added in Article 352. 
The above Amendment renders the satisfaction of the President or the Governor in the 
relevant Articles final and conclusive and to be beyond any question in any Court on 
any ground. The Constitution (Thirty-ninth Amendment) Act was published on 
10.8.1975, amending Arts. 71, 329 & 329 (A) and added Entries after Entry 86 in the 
9" Schedule and also the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 as item 92 in the 
above Schedule. All the amendments made by the Ordinance were given retrospective 
effect for the purpose of validating all acts done previously. On 25.1.1976 the said 
Ordinances were published as the Maintenance of Internal Security (Amendment) Act 
1976. 
Various persons detained u/s 3 (1) of MISA filed petifions in different HCs for 
the issue of the writ of Habeas Corpus. Also challenged the vires of the Ordinance 
issued by the President on 27.6.1975, as unconstitutional and inoperative in law and 
prayed for setting aside of the order and for directing their release immediately. In 
some of the cases, the petitioners challenged the validity of the Thirty-eighth and 
Thirty-ninth Constitution Amendment Acts. 
When those petitions came up for hearing, the Government raised a 
preliminary objection to their maintainability on the ground that in asking for release 
by issuance of a writ of habeas corpus the detenus were in substance claiming that 
they had been deprived of their personal liberty in violation of the procedure 
established by law, which plea was available to them u/Article 21 only. The right to 
move for enforcement of the right confeired by the Article having been suspended by 
the Presidential order dated 27.6.1975 the pefitions, according to the Government 
were liable to be dismissed at the threshold. 
The preliminary objections have been rejected for one reason or another by the 
HCs of Allahabad, Bombay, Delhi, Kamataka, M.P., Punjab and Rajasthan. Broadly, 
these HCs have taken the view that despite the Presidenfial order it is open to the 
detenus to challenge their detention on the ground that it is ultra vires, as e.g., by 
showing that the order on the face of it is passed by an authority not empowered to 
pass it, or it is in excess of the power delegated to the authority, or that the power has 
been exercised in breach of the conditions prescribed in that behalf by the Act. Some 
of these HCs have further held that the detenus can attack the order of detenfion on 
the ground that it is malajide, as for example, by showing that the detaining authority 
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was influenced by irrelevant considerations, or that the authority was actuated by 
improper motives. 
Questions involved: 
1. Whether, in view of the Presidential order dated 27.6.1975, under CI. (1) of 
Article 359, any writ petition is maintainable u/Article 226, before a HC for 
Habeas Corpus to enforce the right to personal liberty of a person detained 
under the MISA on the ground that the order of detention or the continued 
detentions, for any reason, not under or in compliance with MISA? 
2. If such a petition is maintainable, what is the scope or extent of judicial 
scrutiny, particularly, in view of the aforesaid Presidential order which covers, 
inter alia, CI. (5) of Article 22, and also in view of sub-section (9) of Section 
16-AoftheMlSA? 
Per majority: A.N. Ray, CJ., M.H. Beg., Y.V. Chandrachud and P.N. Bhagwati, JJ 
allowed the appeal of the ADM, Jabalpur with the following observations: 
The jurisdiction of the Court in times of emergency in respect of detention 
under the Act is restricted by the Act because the Government is entrusted with the 
task of periodical review. Even if the generality of the words used in Section 3 (I) of 
the Act may not be taken to sho^v an intention to depart from the principle in ordinary 
times that the Courts are not deprived of the jurisdiction where bad faith is involved, 
there are ample indications in the provisions of the Act, viz.. Section 16-A (2), 
proviso to Section 16-A (3), Section 16-A (4), Sections 16-A (5), 16-A (7) (ii) & 16-A 
(9) of the Act to bar a challenge to the detention on the basis of malafides. This Court 
said that an action to decide the order on the grounds of mala fides does not lie 
because under the provisions no action is maintainable for the purpose. This Court 
also referred to the decision in the Liversidge case where the Court held that the 
jurisdiction of the Court was ousted in such way that even questions of bad faith could 
not be raised. 
The production of the order which is duly authenticated constitutes a pre-
emptory answer to the challenge. The onus of showing that the detaining authority 
was not acting in good faith is on the detenu. This burden cannot be discharged 
because of the difficulty of proving bad faith in the exercise of subjective 
discretionary power vested in the administration. 
So long as the authority is empowered by law action taken to realise that 
purpose is not mala fide. When the order of detention is on the face of it within the 
power conferred, the order is legal. 
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The width and amphtude of the power of detention u/s 3 of the Act is to be 
adjudged in the context of the emergency proclaimed by the President. The Court 
cannot compel the detaining authority to give the particulars of the grounds on which 
he had reasonable, cause to believe that it was necessary to exercise this control. An 
investigation into facts or allegations of facts based on mala fides is not permissible 
because such a course will involve advertence to the grounds of detention and 
materials constituting those grounds which is not competent in the context of the 
emergency. 
1. In view of the Presidential Order dated 27.6.1975 under CI. (1) of Article 359 
of our Constitution no person has locus standi to move any writ petition 
u/Article 226 before a HC for Habeas corpus or any other writ or order or 
direction to enforce any right to personal liberty of a person detained under the 
Act on the grounds that the order of detention or the continued detention is for 
any reason not under or in compliance with the Act or is illegal or mala fide. 
2. Article 21 is the sole repository of rights to life and personal liberty against 
the State. Any claim to a writ oi habeas corpus is enforcement of Article 21 
and is therefore, barred by the Presidential order. 
3. Section 16-A (9) of the Act is valid. It is a rule of evidence and it is not open 
either to the detenus or to the Court to ask for grounds of detention. 
4. It is not competent for any Court to go into questions of mala fiides of the order 
of detention or ultra vires character of the order of detention or that the order 
was not passed on the satisfaction of the detaining authority. 
The appeals are accepted. The judgements of the High Courts are set aside. 
Justice Khann's dissent: 
A dispassionate analysis of the habeas corpus case reveals that the 
quintessence of the case lies with the dissent of IClianna J. and the decisions of the 
nine High Courts. Certainly the dissenting opinions will serve to the posterity as 
beacon lights in their strides towards the search and maintenance of the rule of law 
vi--a-vis rule of men. Shri Jayaprakash Narain had commented that the judgment in 
the habeas corpus case had put out the last flickering candle of individual liberty. 
Shri M.C. Chagla characterised the decision as '"the worst in the history of Indian 
Supreme Court". Shri V.M. Tarkunde, a former judge of the Bombay High Court and 
a leading member of the Supreme Court Bar labelled it as "judicial suicide". The 
majority could have taken a different view as was done by nine High Courts and the 
dissent of Shri Justice KJianna when they upheld the right of personal liberty and 
ruled that even in the absence of Fundamental Rights, "the state has got no power to 
deprive a person of his life and personal liberty without the authority of law. That is 
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the essential postulate and the basic assumption of the rule of law in every civilised 
society"." Justice Khanna's dissent aroused international interest in view of its 
importance and far reaching impact on the biggest democracy of the world. The 
foreign press and jurists acclaimed his dissent. The New York Times commented that 
'it deserved to be engraved in letters of gold'. A typical view was expressed by the 
same Newspaper as foliows: 
"Indian democrats are likely to remember in infamy the four judges who 
obediently overturned the decisions of more than half a dozen lower 
(High) courts who had ruled in defiance of the Government that the writ of 
the habeas corpus could not be suspended even during emergency But 
they will long cherish the lonely grounds, but it could have exposed in a 
limited way the procedural laxity, the arbitrary manner and the partisan 
motivations which appear by all accounts to have accompanied the 
mindless exercise of the draconian powers of detention". 
It should not be difficult to agree with the above views because in the absence 
of Article 21 in the Constitution, it would not mean that people of India have no right 
to live which is a natural right. Article 21 merely lays down that this right can be 
taken away by the State only according to law. If the State is allowed the arbitrary 
decision in this matter then the very purpose of incorporating it in the Constitution 
will stand self-defeated. Analysing and appreciating Justice Khanna's Judgement, 
Professor Raghavan commented: 
"the path breaking tone of the dissent is refreshing not only for the reason 
that it affirms the continidng validity of the Makhan Singh decision of the 
court inspite of the fact that the Presidential Order of June 1975 was in 
terms unconditional or absolute, but it sets our vision high enough to 
permit a wider and more informed perspective of the Constitutional 
commitment to defend basic freedoms.''. 
With this dissenting judgement, like Lord Atkin's dissent in the famous 
English case, Justice IClianna has come to be placed in the galaxy of celebrated judges 
who had always held dear the rule of law as against the pressures and temptations of 
the Government. It is well known that this judgement cost him the Chief Justiceship 
of the country. It can, therefore, be con-ectly assumed that this dissent will serve as a 
trend-setter in the Indian Administrative law and democratic jurisprudence. 
Nani A Palkhiwaia - Opposes Emergency: 
Nani A Palkhiwaia was the Counsel of Mrs. Indira Gandhi and he argued her 
case Indira Gandhi v. Shri Raj Narain and obtained a conditional order from the 
2. AIR 1976 SC 1241-1277 
3. Dr. L.M. Singhvi, "The Times of India", February 15,1978 
4. C.G. Raghvan, "Indian Constitution: Trends and Issues", p. 271 (ILI, 1978) 
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Supreme Court against the judgement and order of Allahabad High Court. Later he 
returned the brief of Mrs. Indira Gandhi and did not argue her appeal before the 
Supreme Court. He had written an article on the Proclamation of Emergency in this 
country which is being produced as under;^ 
"The Allahabad High Court had, in the month of June 1975, decided that 
the election of Mrs. Indira Gandhi to Parliament should be set aside. This 
meant that she would cease to be a member ofLok Sabha. With a potential 
risk to her Prime Ministership, Mrs. Indira Gandhi filed an appeal in the 
Supreme Court. 
Her application for interim relief was argued by me on June 23, 1975. 
Justice Krishna Iyer heard the application and passed the order of interim 
relief on the next day. The interim order was that pending the herring and 
final disposal of the appeal. Mrs. Gandhi could continue to sit in the 
Lok Sabha and participate in the proceedings in that House like any other 
member, and could also continue to be the Prime Minister of India. The 
evening of that very day (June 24, 1975), I saw Mrs. Gandhi at her 
residence and told her that the interim order was very satisfactory and she 
should not worry about the case since the judgement of the trial court did 
not seem to be correct on the recorded evidence. 
On the plane which 1 boarded to return to Bombay, I had a strange 
encounter which can be explained on the basis of preordination or 
precognition. You may call it clairvoyance or by any other name. I have 
related this meeting in the introduction to my book "We, the Nation ". 
To my great surprise, the Emergency was declared on the night of June 
25, 1975 (It continued till the late hours of March 20, 1977). I would like 
to to bring to the surface of my mind some of the recollections of those 21 
months of suffocation, formally called the "Emergency", which are 
indelibly etched in my memory. 
On the twentieth anniversary of the Emergency, let me, first of all, 
reiterate the nation 's gratitude to the men who suffered in diverse ways 
and whose sacrifices made the restoration of freedom possible. 
The first name which springs to my mind is that of Jayaprakash Narayan. 
Not since the time of Gandhiji, has moral force-personified by a frail 
individual - triumphed so spectacularly over the forces of evil. He 
changed decisively the course of history. One life transformed the destiny 
of hundreds of millions. 
It was Jayaprakash who talked of "total revolution ". He wanted to shake 
the people out of their apathy and lethargy and make them realise that 
they are the inheritors of resplendent heritage which holds them together, 
despite their difierences in caste and creed, region and language. I had 
the good fortune to have a long chat with him in Delhi before he 
administered the pledge at Rajghat on March 24, 1977 to the Members of 
Parliament "to uphold the inalienable rights to life and liberty of the 
citizens of our Republic. " 
Onfortunately, Jayaprakash passed away in October, 1977 and India has 
remained without true leadership since then. 
5. hidian Express, 25 June 1995 
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Only next to Jayaprakash, I would place Ramnath Goenka as the most 
feared opponent of the Emergency. 
Most newspapers, like most people, capitulated. The two national English 
papers which stood up were the Indian Express and the Statesman. 
Every newspaper had a Censor installed in the office who masqueraded as 
the editor and decided what should or shoidd not be published. I vividly 
recall the day, early in the Emergency, when Mr. V.K. Narasimhan, the 
Editor of the Indian Express, had written an editorial which the Censor 
did not allow to be published. Mr.'Narasimhan, with the concurrence and 
support of Ramnathji, published the paper with the space for the editorial 
left blank, so that the discerning reader might understand what was 
happening in the newspaper world. 
During the Emergency, I used to meet Ramnathji ojf and on. And I can 
say quite truthfully that I have never met a proprietor of a newspaper who 
had the courage and the public spirit of Ramnathji. He was a dedicated 
citizen who used his enormous power, as the proprietor of a national 
newspaper, for what he believed to be the good of the country. He acted 
on his conviction that the press shoidd never be a poodle of the 
establishment, but should act as the watchdog of democracy. He believed 
that a courageous and idependent press is the noblest servant of society, 
along with a coiwageous and independeitt judiciary. 
Ramnathji was against any form of tyranny by the state. He always 
adhered to the unshakable belief which he shared with Bernard Levin, 
that barbed wires will rust, stone walls will crumble, and the tyrant's club 
will shatter in his first. 
During the 21 months of the Emergency, when most papers and journals 
capitulated, Ramnathji asserted his independence at colossal personal 
cost. The Government laimched innumerable criminal prosecutions 
against him and his companies in different courts of India; but he faced 
the onslaught with terror-like tenacity. 
To the best of my memory, about 166,000 persons were detained without a 
trial in different parts of India for an indefinite period. Even their close 
relatives were not told about the place where they were detained. The 
people detained without a trial included prominent figures like 
Jayaprakhas Naraya, Morarji Desai and Kuldip Nayyar - and the humble 
and nameless who will never be known to gthe roll-call of honour. A 
hundred thousand petty tyrants mushroomed all over the country. 
I come to the next question. What has happened before - can it happen 
again? The answer is - undoubtedly yes. 
No period in the history of our Republic is of more educative value than 
1975 to 1977. George Santayana said "Progress far from consisting in 
change, depends on retentiveness. Those who cannot remember the past 
are col^demned to repeat it". If our basic freedoms are to survive, it is of 
vital importai7ce that we remember the happenings during the Emergency 
when the freedoms were suspended 
Coimtries which were integral parts of India in the days gone by -
Pakistan, Bangladesh and Burma (Myanmar) - have gone through periods 
of authoritarian rule; atid so have highly advanced coimtries like 
Germany which had a Constitution which guaranteed freedoms of the type 
we still enjoy today. (Hitler amended the German Constitution just as Mrs. 
Gandhi did in India and deprived the people of their freedoms). 
20 
Self-knowledge would dictate that we recognise three defects in our 
national character - lack of discipline and public spirit, lack of sense of 
justice and fairness, and lack of a sense of moderation and tolerance. It is 
these three defects in our character which made a cultured Prime Minister 
like Rjive Gandhi say publicly, more than once, that he would not hesitate 
to reimpose the Emergency if the circumstances demanded such a course 
of action, although it must be said to his credit that during the dark days 
of the Emergency, he kept himself totally aloof from the tyranny which 
stalked the land. 
The danger of a re-imposition of the Emergency is greater for a country 
like India where the society is feudal and caste ridden. I do not think 
casteism was ever more pronounced in the history of our Republic than 
during the recent past 
Today, India presents a picture of a great nation in a state of moral decay. 
The noble processes of our Constitution have been trivialised by the 
power-holders, the power-brokers and the power-seekers. Elections have 
been reduced to a horse race by contesting politicians- the difference 
being that the horse is highly trained. 
When we look around India today, we can hardly recognised it to be the 
same country in winch a dozen different civilizations of incredible nobility 
flourished over the last 50 centuries. This is the only country known to 
history where men of knowledge and learning had precedence over kings. 
What a sad contrast between Sri Aurobindo 's vision (Mother India is not a 
piece of earth, she is a Power, a Godhead) and the cesspool of 
degradation to which professionalpoliticiatis have reduced this country. 
I should like to reaffirm my finn conviction that it is not the Constitution 
which has failed the people, but it is our chosen representatives who have 
failed the Constitution. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar poignantly remarked in the 
Constituent Assembly that, if the Constitution which was given by the 
people imlo themselves in November 1949 did not work satisfactorily at 
any future time, we should have to say, not that the Constitution had 
failed, but that man was vile. 
Kuldip Naya/\ who to prison during Emergency, gave a description of tortures 
inflicted on political prisoners during Emergency. To quote from his book "The 
Judgment" -
• f t ' 
"Tortures of various types were carried out - stamping on the bare body 
with heeled 'ammunition' boots; severe beating on the soles of feet; 
rolling of heavy police lathis over shinbones, with a constable sitting on 
the lathi; making the victim crouch for hours in a fixed position; beating 
on the spine slapping both ears till the victim lost consciousness; beating 
with the butt of riffle; inserting live electric wires in the crevices of the 
body; stripping and making satyagrahis lie on slabs of ice, burning the 
skin with cigarettes or wax candles; denying food, water and sleep, and 
making the victim drink his own urine; suspending him in the air with his 
wrists tied at the back and putting him up s an 'aeroplane'. (The victim's 
hands were tied behind the back with a rope which was taken over a 
pulley attached to the ceiling and the victim was pulled up a few feet 
6. Mainstream, November 1979 
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above ground. He thus dangled in midair, hanging from his hands, tried 
at the back). 
"All this was done systematically - a team of ten to twelve constables 
would encircle a detenu and try one type of torture or the other. If it left 
visible marlis on the body or affected the prisoner's physical condition, 
the police did not produce him before a magistrate for fear of reprimand. 
If a search warrant was issued, the police woidd shift the victim from 
station to station. MIS A came to the authorities rescue since no judicial 
relief was available to those arrested under it. " 
Paradoxically, the highest Court of the land hearing a habeas corpus petition 
gave an astounding judgment on April 28, 1976, declaring that habeas corpus was not 
available to citizens of this country during that period. The judges did not stop at 
that. In spite of affidavit after sworn affidavit brought before them by responsible 
counsel indicating bmtal torture of detainees, Y.V. Chandrachud, the then Chief 
Justice of India, wrote in his judgment Counsel after counsel expressed the fear that 
during emergency, the executive may whip and strip and starve the detenu, and if this 
be our judgment, even shoot him down. Such misdeeds have not tarnished the record 
of free India and I have a diamond bright, diamond-hard hope that such things will 
never come to pass. 
The Supreme Court realised the serious consequences of its pronouncements, 
particulady those of its denial of the writ of habeas coipus in Shivakant Shukla 's case. 
The court began to rebuild its prestige and power. It created a wide "due process" 
jurisdiction which had been decisively rejected by the iramers of the Indian 
Constitution. Besides, it endeavoured to show that it was still the protector of the 
Western System of law and justice and that the emergency had not really done a 
lasting damage to its powers. It prepared itself to demonstrate that any exercise of 
power by the government could be reviewed by the courts on jurisdictional and other 
grounds. It was in this context that the Supreme Court was motivated to give a 
liberal interpretation to Article 21 and, in several cases after the internal emergency, 
stood firmly on the side of civil liberties. "The withering Article 21 which had been 
mauled severally by Gopalan and almost totally by Shivakant Shukla, was thus 
rejuvenated" in Maneka 's case. 
7. Rajeev Dhavan, On ihe Future of Western Law and Justice in India: Reflections on the 
Predicament of the Post-Emergency Supreme Court", Journal of the Bar Council of India, 
Vol 8, No. I, January-March 1981, pp. 71-73. 
8. O. Chinnappa Reddy, judicial Process and Social Change, Journal of the Indian Lavi? 
Institute, Vol. 25, No. 2, April-June 1983, p. 155. 
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The decision of the Court in Maneka Gandhi's case was one of immense 
constitutional significance, as it was the first major decision concerning; personal 
liberty since the Habeas Corpus case. "Maneka vibrates with humanism and single-
minded judicial dedication to the cause of human rights in hidia, still recovering fi'om 
the trauma of the suspension of civil liberties in 1975-77". This case gave the court a 
good opportunity to show its partisanship for Civil liberties and to declare that the 
"reality of liberty is not to be drowned in the hysteria of the hour" and the "hubris of 
power". It confidently ruled: "Governments come and go, but the fundamental rights 
of the people cannot be subject to the wishfUl value-sets of political regimes of the 
passing day".'" 
The seven-judge constitutional bench in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India 
examined the concept of personal liberty in general and the right to travel abroad in 
particular. In the case, the petitioner's (Mrs. Maneka Gandhi's) passport was 
impounded under Section 10 (3) (c) of the Passport Act, 1967. Provision in the Act 
was violative of Article 21 of the Constitution since it did not prescribe "procedure" 
within the meaning of that article and if it was held that procedure had been 
prescribed, it was arbitrary and unreasonable; and the impounding provision in the 
Act was also violative of Article 19 (1) (a) and (g),''' since it permitted restrictions to 
be imposed on the rights guaranteed by those provisions even though the restrictions 
were such as could not be imposed under Article 19 (2) and (6) 14 
9. Upendra Baxi, The Indian Supreme Court and Politics, Mehr Chand Mahajan Memorial 
Law Lectures (Lucknow: Eastern Book Company, 1980), p. 15L 
10. This was an evidence of the court's affirmation of civil liberties in unambiguous terms. 
11. Ibid. The seven judges' constitutional bench consisted of Beg, C.J., Y.V. Chandrachud 
(as he then was), P.N. Bhagwati (as he then was), V.R. Krishna Iyer, N.L. Untawalia, S. 
Murtaza Fazal Aii and P.S. Kalisam, JJ. 
12. Section 10 (3) reds; 
"The passport authority may impound or cause to be impounded or revoke a passport 
or travel document -
a) 
b) 
c) If the passport authority deems it necessary so to do in the interests of the 
sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of India, friendly relations of India 
with any other foreign country, or in the interests of general public". 
13. Article 19 of the Constitution of India reads: "Protection of Certain rights regarding 
freedom of speech, etc. 
(1) All citizens shall have the right -
a) To freedom of speech and expression, 
b) To practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business. 
14. Article 19 (2) of the Constitution of India reads: "Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) 
siiall affect tJie operation of any existing law, or prevent the state from making any law, 
in so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right 
conferred by the said sub-clause in the security of the state, friendly relations with 
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The Court examined these arguments and analysed the provisions in Part III of 
the Constitution, and discussed in detail earlier decisions on similar pleas. 
The following cases determine now, the change attitude of the Supreme Court 
of India in the matter of preventive detention. 
Object of Preventive Detention: 
Preventive detention is devised to afford protection to society. The object is 
not to punish a man for having done something but to intercept before he does it and 
to prevent him from so doing. 
Object of Preventive Detention - Not punitive but precautionary; 
A preventive detention "is not punitive but precautionary measure". The 
object is not to punish a man for having done something but to intercept him before he 
does it and to prevent him from doing it. No offence is proved, nor any charge is 
fomiulated; and the justification of such detention is suspicion or reasonable 
probability and there is no criminal conviction which can only be warranted by legal 
evidence. \n this sense it is an anticipatory action. Preventive justice requires an 
action to be taken to prevent apprehended objectionable activities. In case of punitive 
detention to person concerned is detained by way of punishment after being found 
guilty of wrongdoing where he has the fullest opportunity to defend himself, while 
preventive detention is not by way of punishment at all, but it is intended to prevent a 
person from indulging in any conduct injurious to the society. ^  
Different from punitive detention: 
Though the element of detention is a common factor in cases of preventive 
detention as well as punitive detention, there is a vast difference in their objective. 
Punitive detention follows a sentence awarded to an offender for proven charges in a 
trial by way of punishment and has in it the elements of retribution, deterrence, 
coiTectional factor and institutional treatment in varying degrees. On the contrary 
foreign states, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, 
defamation or incitement to an offence. 
(6) Nothing in sub-clause (g) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law 
in so far as it imposes, or prevent the state from making any law imposing, in the 
interests of the general public, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right 
conferred by the said sub-clause...." 
15. State of Punjab v. Siikhpal Singh, (1990) 1 SCC 35, 45: 1990 SSC (Cri) 1: AIR 1990 SC 231: 
1990 Cri LJ 584. 
16. Kubic Darusz vs. Union of India, (1990), 1 SCC 568, 582: 1990 SCC (Cri.) 227: AIR 1990 
SC605 
24 
preventive detention is an extraordinary measure resorted to by the State on account 
of compulsive factors pertaining to maintenance of public order, safety of public life 
and the welfare of the economy of the country.'^ 
Punitive and preventive detention- Distinction 
There is a vital distinction between these two kinds of detention. In case of 
'punitive detention', the person concerned is detained by way of punishment after he 
is found guilty of wrongdoing as a result of a trial where he has the fullest opportunity 
to defend himself, while 'preventive detention' is not by way of punishment at all, but 
it is intended to pre-empt a person from indulging in any conduct injurious to the 
society. In case of preventive detention, he is detained merely on suspicion with a 
view to preventing him from doing harm in fliture and the opportunity that he has for 
contesting the action of the executive is very limited. Having regard to this distinctive 
character of preventive detention, the restrictions placed on a person preventively 
detained must, consistently with the effectiveness of detention, be minimal. 
It has been said that the history of liberty has largely been the history of 
obsei^ vance of procedural safeguards. The procedural sinews strengthening the 
substance of the right to move the court against executive invasion of personal liberty 
and the due dispatch of judicial business touching violations of this great right is 
stressed. 
Personal liberty is by every reckoning, the greatest of human freedoms and the 
law of preventive definition are strictly construed and a meticulous compliance with 
the procedural safeguards, however technical, is strictly insisted upon by the courts. 
The law on the matter did not start on a clean slate. The power of courts against the 
harsh incongruities and unpredictability's of preventive detention is not merely 
'a page of history' but a whole volume. The compulsions of the primordial need to 
maintain order in society, without which the enjoyment of all rights, including the 
right to personal liberty, would lose all their meaning are the true justifications for the 
laws of preventive detention. The pressures of the day in regard to the imperatives of 
the security of State and of public order might, it is true, require the sacrifice of the 
personal liberty of individuals. Laws that provide for prevention detention posit that 
an individual's conduct prejudicial to the maintenance of public order or to the 
17. Pushpa Devei M. Jatia vs. M.L. Wadhawan, (1987) 3 SCC 367, 395: 1987 SCC (Cri.) 526: 
AIR 1987 SC 1748, 1987 Cri LJ 1888: (1987): 12 ECC 356. 
18. Francis Coralie MitUiii v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi, (1981) 1 SCC 608; 1981 
SCC (Cri) 212: AIR 1981 SC 746: (1981) 2 SCR 516:1981 Cri LJ 306:1981 MLJ (Cri) 331. 
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security of the State provides grounds for a satisfaction for a reasonable 
prognostication of a possible future manifestation of similar propensities on the part 
of the offender. This jurisdiction has been called a jurisdiction of suspicion; but the 
compulsions of the very preservation of the values of freedom, or democratic society 
and of social order might compel a curtailment of individual liberty. "To lose our 
country by a scrupulous adherence to the written law" said Thomas Jefferson "would 
be to lose the law itself, with life, liberty and all those who are enjoying with us, thus 
absurdly sacrificing the end to the means." This is, no doubt, the theoretical 
justification for the law enabling prevention detention. 
But the actual manner of administration of the law of prevention detention is 
of utmost importance. The law has to be justified by the genius of its administration 
so as to strike the right balance between individual liberties on the one hand and the 
needs of an orderly society on the other. But the realities of executive excesses in the 
actual enforcement of the law have put the courts on the alert, ever-ready to intervene 
and confine the power within strict limits of the law both substantive and procedural. 
The paradigms and value judgments of the maintenance of a right balance are not 
static but vary according as the "pressures of the day" and according as the intensity 
of the imperatives that justify both the need for and the extent of the curtailment of 
individual liberty. Adjustments and readjustments are constantly to be made and 
reviewed. No law is an end in itself 
The "inn that shelters for the night is not journey's end and the law, like the 
traveler, must be ready for the mon'ow". 
As to the approach to such laws which deprive personal liberty without trial, 
the libertarian judicial faith has made its choice between the pragmatic view and the 
idealistic or doctrinaire view. The approach to the curtailment of personal liberty 
which is an axiom of democratic faith and of all civilized life is an idealistic one, for, 
loss of personal liberty deprives a man of all that is worth living for and builds up 
deep resentments. Liberty belongs to what correspond to man's inmost self 
Under our Constitution also the mandate is clear and the envoy is left under no 
dilemma. The constitutional philosophy of personal liberty is an idealistic view, the 
curtailment of liberty for reasons of State's security, public order, disruption of 
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national economic discipline etc. being envisaged as a necessary evil to be 
administered under strict constitutional restrictions. 
Detenus to e kept separate from convicts 
If any of the persons detained under NSA are at present housed in the same 
ward or cell where the convicts are housed, immediate steps must be taken to 
segregate them appropriately."" 
hiteipretation of Prevention detention legislation 
Per Venkataramiah, J. 
The law of prevention detention is a hard law and therefore it should be 
strictly construed. Care should be taken that the liberty of a person is not jeopardized 
9 t 
unless his case falls squarely within the four comers of the relevant law. 
Preventive detention law, how to be construed 
Prevention detention for the social protection of the community is a hard law 
but, it is a necessary evil in the modern society and must be pragmatically construed, 
so that it words, does not endanger social defence or the defence of the community 
and at the same time does not infringe the liberties of the citizens. A balance should 
always be struck."' 
Review of Literature: 
There is lot of literature available on this subject. The main literature is from 
United States of America and the judgements of the Supreme Court of India and the 
judgements of the US Supreme Court and also the debates of the Constituent 
Assembly which frame the Constitution of hidia." The speeches delivered by 
eminent people during the framing of hidian Constitution are very important for 
writing this thesis. The following authors and books were also taken into 
consideration for writing this thesis: 
(i) Constituent Assembly Debates (Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat, 1946-50), Vols. 12. 
19. Ayyn v. State, of U.P., (1989) 1 SCC 374, 380 to 382:1989 SCC (Cri) 153: AIR 1989 SC 364: 
1989 CriLJ 991. 
20. A.K. Roij V. Union of India, (1982) 1 SCC 271: 1982 SCC (Cri) 152; AIR 1982 SC 710: 1982 
Cri LJ 340:1982 MLJ (Cri) 524. 
21. Vijay Ntvnin Singh v. State of Bihar, (1984) 3 SCC 14, 35:1984 SCC (Cri) 361: AIR 1984 SC 
1334:1984 Cri LJ 909. 
22. Raj Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, (1986) 4 SCC 407, 413:1986 SCC (Cri) 481: AIR 1986 SC 
2173:1986 Cri LJ 2042. 
23. Constituent Assembly Debate, Vol. 12 (1946-50) 
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(ii) Constitution of India (As Modified upto the 15 August 1983), (Government of 
India, Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs). 
(iii) Constitution of the United States of America (Washington: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1964). 
(iv) India, Constituent Assembly, Constitutional Precedents, third series, 2" ed., 1947 
(New Delhi, Manager, Government of India Press, 1948). 
(v) Draft Constitution of India, prepared by the Drafting Committee (New Delhi: 
Manager, Government of India Press, 1948). 
(vi) Law Commission, Fourteenth Report on Reform of Judicial Administration, 1958 
(Delhi: Manager of Publication, 1958), Vols. II. 
(vii) Shah Commission of Inquiry: Third and Final Reports, Chaimian, J.C. Shah 
(Delhi: Controller of Publications, 1978) Vols. III. 
(viii) Reports of Amnesty International (London: Amnesty International Publications, 
1975-1985). 
(ix) Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and Others, Constitutional Proposals of the Sapru 
Committee, the Sapru Report (Moradabad: Secretary, Sapru Committee, 1945). 
The researcher believes that the "Preventive Detention Laws" are draconian 
and such laws are anti democratic and the arch enemy of the rights to person liberty. 
Preventive Detention envisages detention without trial which is against the basic 
canons of criminal jurisprudence. The following questions emerge for consideration: 
(1) Whether Preventive Detention envisages detention without trial. 
(2) Whether during the war, England introduced Preventive Detention Law to the 
effect that a person could be detained only on the subjective satisfaction of the 
Home Minister in Great Britain and not on the subjective satisfaction of a 
Magistrate as in India. 
(3) Whether in absence of Preventive Detention Law the country during 1969-71 
ran with the help of ordinary laws smoothly. 
(4) Whether in India MISA was promulgated in the wake of Indo-Pakistan war 
and it continued during Emergency (1975-77) and was grossly misused against 
the Political adversaries? 
(5) Whether the Preventive Detention Laws have been misused. 
There is perhaps no authoritative definition of expression 'Preventive 
Detention' (PD). The expression traces its origins in the language used by the Lord 
Justices in England while examining the nature of detention under the war time 
provisions of the Defence of Realm Consolidation Act, 1914 which was enacted 
during the First World War The key word in the expression is the adjective 
'Preventive' which is used in contradistinction to 'Punitive', PD is thus not a punitive 
but a precautionary measure which has the rather pious object of not to punish a man 
for having done something wrong but to intercept him before he does it and to prevent 
him from doing it. 
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On examining these provisions of Article 22, we find that Clauses (1) and (2) give 
three very valuable rights to detenus (other than those detained under the law of PD), 
namely: 
(i) Right of being infonned, as soon as may be, of the grounds of arrest; 
(ii) Right to consult and be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice; 
(iii) Production before the nearest magistrate within 24 hours of such arrest. 
Clause (3) of Art. 22 however expressly take away the safeguards of clauses (1) and 
(2) of Article 22 in respect of a person arrested or detained under a law providing for 
PD. In its place the detenu under PD has the somewhat niggardly substitute 
protection as provided by clauses (4) and (5) of Article 22. Collectively these clauses 
provide that in case of PD: 
(i) The detenu shall not be detained beyond 3 months unless the Advisory Board 
(duly constituted) reports prior to the expiration of 3 months that there is in its 
opinion sufficient cause for such detention (as against production within 24 
hours before a magistrate). 
(ii) The detenu is to be furnished, as soon as may be, the grounds for his detention. 
(iii) The detenu is to be provided the earliest opportunity of making a presentation 
against the order of detention (as against the right of consulting and being 
defended by a legal practitioner). 
As we pointed out earlier, the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 (PDA) 
continued to be on the statute book till 1970, being re-enacted seven times in the 
process. In 1971 the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, (MISA) began its reign, 
and gained considerable notoriety till it was finally repealed in 1977. During the 
period 1977 to 1980, for the first time there was no central law of PD in the hidian 
Republic. Once again in 1980 the National Security Ordinance was promulgated and 
the reign of PD laws was re-established over the Republic. In December, 1980, the 
NSA was enacted and consequently the ordinance was repealed. 
Section 3 of NSA gives the Central Government the power to detain any 
person if the government is 'satisfied' that it is 'necessary' to do so with a view to 
prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to any one or more of the 
following interests of the State: 
(i) Defence of the State 
(ii) Relation of the State with foreign power 
(iii) Security of the State 
(iv) Public order; and 
(v) Maintenance of supply of services essential to the community. 
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Since none of these concepts are capable of being defined with any great 
degree of certainty and definiteness, the scope of abuse is admittedly colossal. 
Section 8 of the NSA states that the grounds of detention must be communicated to 
the detenu, in no case later than ten days from his arrest. Section 9 deals with the 
constitution of the Advisory Boards contemplated in Article 22. This also raises a 
question of some concern. 
The Constitution (44''' Amendment) Act, 1978, sought to amend clause (4) of 
Article 22 to provide that an Advisory Board shall be constituted, in accordance of the 
recommendations of the Chief Justice of the appropriate High Court. The Advisory 
Board was to consist of a Chairman, and two other members. The amendment 
proposed further that the Chainnan shall be a serving judge of the appropriate High 
Court, and the other members may be either the serving or retired High Court Judges'. 
The amendment seeks to amend clause (4) of Article 22 and to reduce the period of 
detention without obtaining the approval of the Advisory Board, from the present 
three months to only two months. Though the amendment was passed on June 10, 
1979 it remains un-notified and has not yet been brought into force. 
Section 8 of the NSA which was enacted after this constitutional amendment 
was passed, contemplates a composition of the Advisory Board in which even those 
persons who were never appointed judges of the High Court may be members, and 
where the Chief Justice of the appropriate High Court has no role to play in 
constituting the Advisory Board. Section 8 is therefore clearly in dishamiony with the 
Constitutional Amendment. Surely bringing into force the relevant provisions of the 
Constitutional Amendment will not weaken the hands of the State in its quest for 
maintaining security and public order. And, more importantly, it will prove to be a 
crucial check on the possibility of Executive lawlessness in applying the NSA. 
Like the NSA itself, both the amendments made to the NSA have been made 
by promulgating ordinances, which were issued in April and June 1984. This again is 
cause for concern. To begin with, it is not contemplated under the scheme of our 
Constitution that ordinances should be used as a supplant for the legislative power of 
the Parliament. On the contrary, such an exercise of ordinance making power is quite 
opposed to the ideals and spirit of the Constitution. We believe that the President who 
promulgates ordinances as a supplant for the legislative power of the Parliament 
violates his 'Oath of Office' under Article 60 of the Constitution, by violating his 
30 
solemn promise that he will endeavour to the best of (his) ability to preserve, protect 
and defend the Constitutions. 
Equally, such a President also violates his Fundamental Duties as a citizen of 
the Republic under clause (a) of Article 51A of the Constitution, namely, the duty to 
abide by the Constitution and respect its ideals and institutions. 
The new ordinance (No. 5 of 1984) was promulgated in April 1984 and sought 
to amend the NSA in its application to the State of Punjab and the Union Territory of 
Chandigarh. An Act along similar lines for amending the NSA in its application in 
those areas ws passed by the Parliament in May, 1984 (May Amendment). This May 
Amendment amended section 8 of NSA, so that under exceptional circumstances a 
detenu may now remain in jail for fifteen days without knowing the grounds of 
detention. Similarly, under section 10 and 11 of the NSA, the period within which a 
detenu's case had to be refeired to the Advisory Board for obtaining the Board's 
approval (for his detention beyond three months) was extended from three weeks 
from his an'cst to four months and two weeks and, likewise, the period for the 
submission of the report by the Board was extended from seven weeks to five months 
and three weeks from the date of the detention of the detenu. This means that a 
detenu may now be made to undergo imprisonment for a period of nearly six months, 
even if his detention is ultimately found by the Advisory Board to be entirely 
unjustified and bad in law. 
The May Amendment also provides that in the case of persons detained prior 
to April 3, 1985 they could be so detained for a maximum period of two years as 
opposed to one year in section 13 of the unamended Act. Therefore, we find that the 
May Amendment further whittled down the already niggardly protection or safeguard 
a person has under the Indian laws, when he is detained under the PD laws. The only 
saving feature of this Amendment, if there is one, is that its operation was specifically 
limited to Punjab and the Union Teiritory of Chandigarh, and that it was enacted at a 
time when violence had touched an all time high in Punjab. This may not justify the 
NSA Amendment, but it surely provides a background which cannot be wished away 
while discussing the May Amendment. 
The next ordinance which sought to amend the NSA was promulgated in June 
1984 (June Ordinance). It has two disquieting aspects: 
1) It was promulgated about 2 weeks after the successful culmination 
of Operation Bluestar at the Golden Temple, and 
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2) It was not restricted to Punjab alone, but was operative throughout 
the territory of India (excluding Jammu and Kashmir to which even 
the NSA does not apply). 
The main purpose of the June Ordinance seems to be to introduce in the NSA, 
amendments which are in pari material (or similar) to the amendments which had 
already been introduced in the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of 
Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (COFEPOSA). These two amendments introduced by 
the June Ordinance need special mention. 
Research Methodology: 
The researcher has adopted the Doctrinal Research Methodology and has read 
all the judgements of the Supreme Court of India from A.K. Gopalan vs. State of 
Madras and the Habeas Corpus judgement which was a shocking judgement during 
emergency and has also considered all the judgements after Habeas Corpus case after 
the withdrawal of emergency. The research is based on the law reports and other 
commentaries on the Constitution of India and other democratic countries. The 
research is from the books in the personal library of the researcher and the Supreme 
Court of India's Library, Indian Law Institute and other important news papers and 
journals. 
This study consist of six chapters, the Chapter First - ''Preventive Detention 
- Historical Perspective" is a theoretical and defines the concept of civil liberty in 
general as well as in the Indian Constitution. It discusses the different aspects of civil 
liberty and preventive detention. 
The Chapter Second - ''Habeas Corpus Suspension of the Fundamental 
Rights in emergency" - deals with the brief period of internal emergency (1975-1977) 
had exposed the in adequacy of judicial review as a safeguard against the misuse of 
powers by the Executive, Evidently due to certain constraints. The Court gave 
shocking judgement in the writ of Habeas Corpus case, ADM Jabalpur vs. Shivakant 
Shukla 's" 
The great jurist of India H.M. Seervai^ has met following comments on the 
judgement of Habeas Corpus Case -
"Anyone who reads and re-reads the four judgements -for they occupy 
306 pages of the Sup. Ct. Reports - will be filled with amazement that the 
24. AIR 1976 SC 1207 popularly known as Habeas Corpus case. 
25. H.M. Seervai, "Constitutional Law of India", IVth Ed., Vol. 2, Appendix - Part II, p.2208 
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four judges should not have asked the central question raised by the 
Habeas Corpus Case and, even more, that they should have failed to 
realize the implications of the first question which the Alt. Gen. 
formulated, and the concession which he made in answering that question. 
We will, therefore, consider the question raised by the Habeas Corpus 
Case independently of the discussion in the four judgments, and will refer 
to those judgements in the light of our independent discussion''. 
The Chapter Third deals with the - ''•Personal Liberty' and 'Preventive 
Detention - Articles 21 & 22", it estabhshes that Preventive Detention Laws are 
against the basic concept of Personal Liberty as enshrined under Article 21 of the 
Constitution of hidian. 
The Chapter Fourth - deals with the "Emergency excesses and Violation of 
Human Rights" and the detention of innocent citizens in the garb of Preventive 
Detention Laws. This is a very sad commentary on the laws of Preventive Detention 
and therefore, it is expedient in the interest of democracy that such laws should be 
repeal without any loss of time. 
The Fifth Chapter - deals with the "Role of Supreme Court of India after 
withdrawal of Internal Emergency - 1977 to date". The Supreme Court realised 
its mistake which it committed during Emergency and later it gave judgements to 
indicate its impartiality, independence and restore its lost prestige and confidence of 
the people of India. 
The Sixth Chapter - deals with the ''Conclusion and Suggestions" and the 
suggestions of the researcher is that in view of the past experience there is every 
likelihood that some people in povv'er may misuse preventive detention laws to 
perpetuate there anti-democratic rule. 
To conclude it is submitted that the Preventive detention is the arch enemy of 
the right to personal liberty. It envisages detention without trial which is against the 
basic canons of criminal jurisprudents. At times when the liberty of the individuals 
crosses the limit and threatens the very existence of the State and at that point of time 
it fails to control the enjoyment of individual's liberty, then the State uses the 
preventive detention measures. This measure is not unknown in the dictatorial and 
the democratic regimes; the capitalist, the socialist and the communist governments. 
However, there was a difference in the exercise of the said power; some countries 
tried to handle this measure carefully and cautiously. They adopted it casually and 
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only in grave situation affecting the very existence of the State. They used the 
measure indiscriminately in time of war and peace. And thus in such countries the 
right to personal liberty remained in eclipse. 
Now coming to the Indian experience, before hidependence, the British 
regime in order to establish a strong foothold in India used the preventive detention 
measure for an indefinite period, when Indian got independence the provincial 
legislatures enacted laws relating to preventive detention. Though the freedom 
fighters were aiming towards securing better rights to the citizens of Free India, yet it 
was unfortunate that the preventive detention measure at the central level was put into 
force immediately after the commencement of the Constitufion of India. Sardar Patel, 
who piloted the first Bill with respect to preventive detention, conceded that he had 
two sleepless nights before introducing such a Bill in Parliament. The Preventive 
Detention Act, 1950, was amended thrice to give sonie more protection to the person 
detained under the Act. In the beginning the Act was renewed every year; thereafter, 
every two years; and finally, every three years Parliament confinued the operafion of 
the Act. The Act of 1950 came to and ends in the year 1969. But thereafter no 
vacuum was created in the area of preventive detention. The state legislatures 
immediately passed laws relating to preventive detention. This state of affairs 
continued until the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971, came into force. This 
Act was amended thrice so as to impose more restrictions on the persons detained 
under the Act and to allow the executive a free hand in matters of prevenfive 
detention. On June 27, 1975, the Presidential order gave blanks power to the 
executive authority to deal with persons preventively detained. It imposed a blanket 
ban on the detenue to claim any safeguard against the measure. This resulted in the 
19 months emergency. During the period between 26-27 June, 1975 a large numbers 
of persons were put behind the bars without trial and without affording to them any 
basic safeguards. Brief survey of the Preventive Detenfion in this country shows that 
this law has been misused and innocent citizens oppose to be establishment were sent 
to Jail on fiimsy ground. Therefore, this law should be escarped and repeal. 
The Supreme Court of India during Emergency has failed to protect the rights 
of the citizens and has not been able to protect the cidzens from torture and ill 
treatment. In Kashmir the Preventive Detention Laws have been blatantly misused 
and the arbitrary arrest and detention of those peacefully voicing dissent is continuing 
in Jammu and Kashmir, India, with the Public Security Act (PSA) increasingly being 
used to punish those who criticise the government, Amnesty International warned 
34 
today. Political activists were detained and beaten last week following public protests 
over the killing of six women. Amnesty International is calling for the immediate 
release of those who remain in detention and considers them to be prisoners of 
conscience, held solely for the peaceful exercise of their right to freedom of 
expression and association. On 8 June 2001 an unidentified attacker threw a hand 
grenade at a group of women picnicking at a shrine in Chara-e-Sharief. Four women 
were killed outright and two more died later of their injuries. Local observes believe 
that the attacker was a member of the Special Operations Group (SOG) which is a 
division of the police created to deal with militancy. Amnesty hitemational urges the 
government of Jammu and Kashmir to immediately initiate an independent, impartial 
and transparent inquiry into this incident. Several associates of the Human Rights 
Front, including their patron Mr. Untoo, were taken from their homes at around 4:00 
a.m. on the 9"^  June and held in detention until that evening. At the same time 
members of the Islamic Students League were also picked up and placed in preventive 
detention. A two year detention order was issued for Shakil Ahmad Bakhsi, a student 
leader under the Public Safety Act. Dr. Hubbi, a leader of the All Parties Hurriyet 
Conference (APHC) and Vice-Chaimian of the Jammu and Kashmir People's 
Conference, and his wife attended a demonstration on Saturday 9 June. At the 
demonstration the couple were beaten by police and Dr. Hubbi was taken into 
preventive detention. A two year detention order was issued against Dr. Hubbi's who 
is now being held in Kotbalwal jail. There are reports that the home of Dr. Hubb's 
brother, Abdul Kabir Hubbi, was also raided by the SOG on the night of 12 June. Dr. 
Hubbi, who has no connections with the amied opposition, has served earlir periods in 
preventive detention, including eight months in 1999-2000 along with 25 other 
leaders of the APHC. Other APHC leaders including Shahidul Islam and Javed 
Ahmad Mir were also aiTested. Amnesty International has also seen reports that 
APHC leader Sheikh Abdul Aziz was stopped from attending the demonstration by 
the police at Awantipora and that, together with activists Mukhtar Waza, Zahoor 
Sheikh and Khalil Ahmad I<Chalil, he was beaten by Police. Amnesty International is 
concerned about the widespread use of excessive force by the police when detaining 
activists. In March 2001, Syed Shah Geelani, who is known to the authorities as 
having a serious heart disease, was pushed to the floor and beaten unconscious by 
police when he was being released from detention. Amnesty International is also 
concerned that the PSA continues to be abused in Jammu and Kashmir to detain 
opposition politicians. Al is aware of many cases of activist being held for years 
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without recourse to the judicial process. As most people detained under the PSA are 
denied access to lawyers and family members, they also run a high risk of being 
subjected to torture or ill-treatment. The Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act of 
1978 is the main law relating to preventive detention in Jammu and Kashmir and 
pemiits administrative detention without trial for a period of up to one year if a person 
is deemed likely to act in a way "prejudicial to the maintenance of public order" or up 
to two years if their actions are likely to be "prejudicial to the safety of the state". 
Integrity and unity of the nation depends on the quality of the judiciary to a 
great extent. The Supreme Court performance in the last decades has not been upto 
the expectation of the people of hidia. I subscribe to the view of Mr. Rajiv Dhavan 
when he says in his book "Justice on Trial: The Supreme Court Today", that the 
court has failed to fulfil its assigned role and that it is a "dying institution".^' The 
standard of Supreme Court of India has fallen for the reason that the judges are 
appointed in the High Court from the panels of the State and the judiciary does not 
attract talented woilhy lawyers for being appointed as Judge. A government panel 
advocate appointed in the High Court becomes a judge of the High Court then on the 
basis of seniority, he goes up to the Supreme Couit. So, most of the judges are 
politically committed the people in power and therefore, they deliver such judgements 
which can guarantee them jobs even after retirement from the Supreme Court of India. 
The existence of Supreme Court gives the people in general and the opposition 
groups in particular an easy feeling that there is an independent authority to check the 
arbitrary and extreme actions of the party in power and to uphold the constitution. An 
erosion of the authority of the court would deprive them of this sense of security and 
may entail political upheavals. By and large, the judiciary is still held in high esteem 
and its authority, impartiality and commitment to constitutional values is widely 
recognised. The judiciary being the guarantee of democracy, rule of law and human 
rights under our Constitution, any dilution of its authority or diminution of its status is 
bound to endanger the delicate balance of our republic. 
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In the beginning, the court denied freedom to Gopalan, but in the subsequent 
cases it stood firmly on the side of personal freedom and social progress and change. 
Even if one among the several grounds for detention was vague or irrelevant, it set the 
detenu at liberty. This progressive interpretation of law was virtually halted when. 
26. Amnesty International, 600 Pennsylvania Avenue SE, Washington, DC, 2003. 
27. Rajeev Dhavan, Justice on Trial: The Supreme Court Today, Allahabad: Wlieeler 
Publishers, 1980), p. 215. 
28. A.K. Gopalnn vs. State of Madras, 1950 1 SCR, 88 
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during the internal emergency, Shivakant Siikia 's case, the court rejected the writ of 
habeas coipus and shut its doors for such writs. This deviation from the 
unimpeachable standards of judicial review, for which there was a controlling 
authority in the Makhan Singh^" decision of the court, greatly damaged the credibility 
of the judicial system as a guardian of human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
However, the court soon asserted itself in the sphere of civil liberties and inade full 
use of the principles of natural justice and procedural fairness in the subsequent cases. 
The principle of procedural fairness was first enunciated in Bank Nationalisation 
and culminated in Maneka Gandhi's "'^  case. The court consciously gave judicial 
review a creative and civil libertarian content, and its activism revived public 
confidence in the judicial process. 
Independent of the Constitution, there is no sphere which is exclusively within 
the ambit of the executive and out of bound for the judicial branch. For practical 
puiposes, there may be such a sphere but its boundaries can never be really drawn, 
and it varies from society to society, depending upon the circumstances. The recent 
judicial activism of the Supreme Court may be justified in view of the increasing 
inefficiency of administration, lack of political will and societal apathy towards the 
plight of the poor and the weak. 
Those who operate the political system also play an important role in creating 
social harmony and promoting social justice. The success of a system largely depends 
on the human element that operates it. Even the best of systems fails to deliver the 
goods if it is operated by incompetent people, and even an archaic system can adapt 
itself to modem conditions and work satisfactorily if those in charge of it have a sense 
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of urgency, dedication and awareness of responsibility. 
The Preventive Detention Laws should not be used in a democracy and the 
submission of researches is all the acts and statutes which have been used for serving 
the interest of the people in power should be repeal, this will be in consciousness with 
the wishes of the founding father of the Constitution who believed in person liberty 
and a society established according to the rule of law. 
Recently the Supreme Court of India has granted compensation for Illegal 
Detenfion without trial for months or years is bad, for it takes away a slice of the 
29. A. DM. Jabalpur vs. Shivakant Shukia, AIR, 1976, SC 1207 
30. Makhan Singh vs. The State of Punjab, AIR, 1964, SC 381 
31. Rustoai Cavnsjee Cooper vs. Union of India, 1970 3 SCR, 530 
32. Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597 
33. H. R. Khanna, The Judicial System in the Dock-Il: Mediocrity of Talent, The Hindustan 
Times, 29 April 1980, p. 9 
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detenu's life; and the legal system which permits this outrage surely owes it to the 
detenue that he be compensated financially if his detention is declared illegal. Suits 
for damages for wrongfial imprisonment offer no remedies because the statutes 
sanctioning preventive detention protect the emng officials and the government. A 
safer remedy is that, while releasing the detenu, the Court should have the power to 
detemiine damages and award compensation. However, the Supreme Court hesitated 
to recognise the principle of monetary compensation for violation of fundamental 
rights, even though it acknowledged the inadequacy of conventional judicial remedies 
in such situations. 
Therefore, it is expedient in the interest of democracy that Preventive 
Detention Laws should be scarped and repealed forthwith in the interest of our Great 
Nation. 
34. A.G. Noorani, "Civil Liberties: Compensating the Wronged", Economic and Political 
Weekly, Vol. XVIII, No. 10, 5 March 1983, p. 336. 
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Introduction 
INTRODUCTION 
The physical conquest of India by the British started from 1757, when 
they defeated the then Nawab of Bengal at the Battle of Plessey. Pohtical 
conquest started soon thereafter from 1780, when the Britishers used the first 
Preventive Detention Law in India. From that time onwards, the alien rulers 
of this country passed eleven such laws till India became free in 1947. The 
most infamous of these Acts were the Bengal Legislation of 1918 and the 
Rowlatt Act 1919, under which pohtical dissenters were put behind the bars 
unceremoniously, and kept there indefinitely. During the last World War, the 
Defence of India Act was also passed, which was equally, or perhaps more, 
pemiciovis. 
The character of preventive detention has been added by the Supreme 
Court of Iiidia in 1950 in A. K. Gopalan's case, in the following terms: 
"Preventive Detention means no offence is proved nor any charge formulated 
and the justification is suspicion, or reasonable probability and not criminal 
conviction, which can he warranted by legal evidence". 
Regulation 18-B of Britain provided for preventive detention during 
the Second Ward War. A similar provision exists in the Internal Security Act 
in the USA to deal with war time contingencies. In our case the power for 
preventive detention flows from Entiy No.9 of the Union List and No. 3 of the 
Concurrent List appended to the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. Entry 
No. 9 provides for detention for reasons coimected with defence foreign 
affairs or security of India and Entry No. 3 for reasons coimected with the 
security of state, the maintenance of public order and maintenance of supplies 
and services of essential to the community. If any more grounds are needed 
for the purpose, the residuary provisions of Entry No. 97 of the Union List can 
always be summoned for help. Thus, the framers of the Constitution, in their 
wisdom, have placed near limitless power for preventive detention in the 
hands of the state. 
The only checks on this boundless authority are the Clauses 5 to 7 of 
Article 22 of the Constitution. The inadequacy of these safeguards has been 
brought into sharp focus by the case of Sanjay Dutt. Even presuming that his 
confession before the Police regarding the unlicensed gun is factually correct, 
the luckless Youngman's incarceration, rri all probability, would have been 
over by now, but for the TADA. Also, imagine what would have happened to 
him, had he not been a celebrity and the incident had occurred in Punjab. 
Perhaps, the founding fathers of the Constitution piously believed that 
the people's governments at the Centa-e and in the State will resort to 
preventive detention to deal with exti-aOrdinary situations only. 
Unfortunately, their hopes have been belied. Being obsessed with the threat 
of Communism to the country, the Government got enacted the Preventive 
Detention Act, 1950 in the very first year of the Republic. Over the yeas, it has 
got so habituated to the short cuts in the maintenance of public peace that it 
caraiot do without preventive detention even for a day. Availabilit)' of war 
time laws for routine peace keeping is too much of a temptation to abjure 
willingly. 
The victims of these sinister laws have been some of the most 
illustrious soons of the soil like A. K. Gopalan. Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia, 
Jayaprakash Narayan, George Fernandes and Bharat Ratna Morarji Desai. 
What a pity that at some point of time, the executive prepared the grounds for 
their detention suggesting that they were antinational individuals out to 
destroy the even keel of our community life. 
Preventive detention is a Union/Concurrent List subject. The primary 
initiative for passing the preventive detention laws rests with the Centre. Any 
responsibility for the misuse of these extraordinary statutes also accordiiigly 
devolves on the Union. It is time that the morbid effect of such laws on the 
liberty of the citizens is realized and these provisions are restricted in 
applicatioii to the genuinely disturbed situations. After all the general 
civilisational level of a country is measured in terms of the liberty that its 
citizens enjoy. 
India became free in 1947 and the Constitution was adopted in 1950. It 
is extraordinary that the framers of the Indian Constitution, who suffered 
most because of the Preventive Detention Laws, did not hesitate to give 
Constitutional sanctity to the Preventive Detention Laws and that too in the 
Fundamental Rights chapter of the Constitution. Some parts of Article 22 are 
not Fundamental Rights but are Fundamental Dangers to the citizens of India 
for whom and allegedly by whom the Constitutioii was framed, to usher in a 
new society, with freedom of expression and freedom of association available 
to all. 
In 1950 itself, a Prevention Detention Act was piloted by Sardar Patel, 
who said that he had several "sleepless nights" before he could decide that it 
was necessary to inh-oduce such a Bill. And in 1950, under this Act, ordinary 
disturbers of order and peace were not arrested, but a political leader of A.K. 
Gopalan's eminence was arrested. Even from that initial action, it was evident 
that these Acts were meant to curb political dissent, and that legacy has been 
and is being followed. 
From the time the countiy secured its Independence till 1977, except 
for a period of nearly two years from 1969-1971, free India had the dubious 
distinction of having these extraordinary, mischievous and 'unlawful' laws 
throughout. 
It is worth bearing in mind that no other civilized country, including 
Britain which brought Preventive Detention laws here, felt compelled to 
introduce such laws during peace time. Even during the last World War, 
most European counti'ies and the USA, who were all directly involved in the 
war, had no such law. During the War, England introduced a Preventive 
Detention Law to the effect that a person could be detained only on the 
subjective satisfaction of the Home Minister of Great Britain and not on the 
subjective satisfaction of a puny magistrate, as it the case here. Further, only 
one person. Sir Osward Mosley, a rabid Nazi, was detained under this Act. 
In 1971, because of tremendous political turmoil which resulted in 
assassinations and destiuction all over Ireland, the British Government 
introduced PD Act for Ireland. But it immediately formed a committee 
headed by Lord Gardiner to probe and to find out if it was necessary to have 
such an Act even in Ireland. The Gardiner Committee Report reads: 
"Preventive Detention can only he tolerated in any democratic society in the 
most extreme circumstances. It must he used with the utmost restraint and 
retained only so long as it is strictly necessary" 
Our Constitution, since its enactment, has had a pecuUar feature; the 
fundamental rights guaranteed under it allow preventive detention without 
ti-ial. Article 22 after providing that any person arrested must be produced 
before a court within 24 hours of arrest tenders this almost nugatory by 
permitting the state to preventively detaiii persons without any judicial 
scrutiny. 
The debates in the Constituent Assembly shows that the need to 
provide for preventive detention was generally accepted, albeit reluctantly. 
The observations of AUadi Krishnaswamy Ayyar, a distinguished jurist, are 
typical: he described preventive detention a necessary evil because, in his 
view, there were people determined to undermine the sanctity of the 
Constitiition, the security of the State and even individual liberty. 
What the members tiied to do was not to prohibit preventive detention 
but to incorporate safeguards against its abuse in the Constitution by limiting 
the period, by giving effective powers to the advisory board to review 
detention orders, etc. This they failed to get. It was left to Parliament to 
prescribe the period and even that hmit was flouted in spirit by the device, 
often adopted, of serving a fresh detention order a few hours after releasing 
the detenu; advisory boards had no power to go into the merits of the 
detention. 
Since 1950 the laws permitting preventive detention have not only 
increased quantitatively, they have changed qualitatively. In many cases they 
are used not to detain but in lieu of punishment. A person believed to be a 
smuggler would, after ti-ail, get a sentence, if convicted, of two or three years. 
Why not simply detain him for a year or two? 
Curiously, former,detenus who had suffered from such laws have not 
only abrogated them when they secured power, they have used them 
extensively. Congress leaders who had suffered detention under the British, 
during the 1937-39 periods did do away with many such laws but, after 
Independence, almost every province passed or extended such laws. In more 
recent years non-Congress governments have in general, enthusiastically 
availed of such laws. 
Our press is full of criticism of such laws; there is also criticism from 
distinguished Indians, from human rights groups both in India and abroad. 
There are at times, some "improvements" in these laws as when Janata 
Government amended Article 22 to introduce some safeguards against 
arbitrary detentions. But the laws remain. 
The ostensible justification for them is the growing violence in many 
parts of the country. It would be absurd, however, to suggest that such 
draconian laws have helped to solve the problem. They may have helped in 
ending terrorism in Punjab, but that such laws can never really solve a 
problen:! is proved by the situation in the north-east where violence has gone 
on for decades and by the experience in Kashmir where they have merely 
added to the alienation of the common people. 
The real reason for these laws is the attitude of the police and the 
bureaucracy. As far back as 1949 the Union Home Ministry had opposed 
giving more power to advisory boards because "it would not be possible for 
the executive to surrender its judgment to an advisory board". Sadly, this 
arrogant negation of the rule of law was accepted by the Constituent 
Assembly. And the executive has never budged; it has sought every 
opportunity to extend its power. 
Few of us realise how extensive is the power that is conferred by these 
laws on the executive. All that is required is the "satisfaction" of an officer 
that a particular person is engaged in disruptive activities. Perhaps those 
who drafted the law had in mind some sort of high-level objective internal 
examination before an order of detention was passed. That is certainly not 
the way the law has been implemented. 
Association with a person believed to be involved in anti-national 
activities can and has often resulted in detention orders being passed without 
any evidence whatever against the person himself. Persons have been 
detained at times merely because they were in the place where some 
disruptive incident occurred. Though the laws require that detention orders 
camiot be passed unless senior officers apply their mind, often those ofticers 
mechanically approve detention proposals put up by subordinates. 
There have also been numerous cases when detention orders have been 
passed because of a mistake, the wrong Singh or Desai get detained. 
Sometimes the hostility or personal malice of a senior officer results in a 
detention order. Once a detention order is passed the law confers no real or 
effective remedy to challenge it. The detenu can approach the advisory 
board. But advisory boards cannot go into the question as to whether the 
detention was justified. The courts have held that even they cannot go into 
the merits. The boards and the courts can only order the release of a detenue 
on teclinical grounds such as the supply of reasons of detention in time. And 
in such cases, the detenu can be detained afresh. 
No doubt, many who are detained have been involved in grave crimes; 
many, however, have been wholly imiocent. But even a person demonstrably 
involved in a crime deserves a fair trial; he is innocent unless proved guilt}', it 
is this principle which distinguishes a society governed by the rule of law 
from a community where lynch law prevails. 
The solution is simple; scrap all laws of preventive detention. It is, 
however, difficult to see that happening in the near future. I would suggest a 
first step which would remove some of the more undesirable features of 
preventive detention. The only justification for preventive detention is to 
safeguard societ}' from persons who are out to destroy it. If that is the 
justification and that is the only justification officially given, let it be provided 
that all those detained under any detention law be kept either in the ordinary 
jails or in special detention centr-es run by the jail authorities. 
Such a change does not require fresh legislation. Both the National 
Securih' Act and Cofeposa authorise the State to specify the place and 
conditions of detention. The state must be directed to ensure that detenus 
must be taken to ordmary jails within 24 hour of detention and be kept there. 
In the past that was the pattern of preventive detention. Thousands of 
nationalists rounded up by the British during the Independence movement 
were so detained. 
NO order of detention can be passed to aid the police or other 
authorities to uivestigate crime or other offences; what justifies to investigate 
crime or other offences; what justifies a detention is the satisfaction of the 
appropriate authority that the detention of a particular person in necessary. 
Once a detention order is passed, that is the end of the matter as far as the 
detaining authorities are concerned. That being so, the detaining authorit)' 
must have no access to the detenus. 
Even after such a change since the laws will enable the detaining 
authorities to detain without hial persons beheved to be indulging in grave 
anti-social activities the object, and ostensibly at least, the only object of such 
laws can still be achieved. The authorities should have no objection to such a 
change. 
The state camiot have any rational objection to such a change. Both the 
National Security' Act and Cofeposa merely authorise detention of persons 
who see. It is argued, a danger to society if free. If the state does object to 
such changes it will expose its true motive and also the mamier in which 
detention laws are being abused, persoiis are detained so as to extract 
information from them. 
If the change is made, one terrible feature of torture of detenus will 
come to an end. It is also possible that if the authorities camiot use detention 
to extiact information or v/reak vengeance, the number of detentions will 
come down. It will be a step towards a societ}' governed by the rule of law. 
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This study is confined to a discussion of the rights usually called civil 
liberty with a special reference to the "Right to Person Liberty" which are 
involved in cases of preventive detention. In this thesis the effort of the 
researcher is to study and evaluate only the role of the Supreme Court in 
safeguarding the person liberty of the citizens of India detained under 
preventive detention. We believed that an independent and strong judiciary 
can be the custodians of the person liberty of the citizens who are detained 
under preventive detention. Some of the questions which disturbed the 
minds of the citizens are whether the Hon'ble Supreme Court can provide the 
necessary safeguards to individual liberty and what are the prospects of the 
judiciary playiiig with key role in the protection of a civil liberty of the 
citizens? Can the court be relied upon when the non-judicial system has 
broken down? Whether the Supreme Court has failed during Emergency 
(1975-77) in protecting the rights of the citizens when they were sent to jail on 
non-existent groruids most arbitiary by the people in power to protect 
themselves from the public agitations. This is a part of the recent history that 
lot of excesses were committed on the innocent citizens in the garb of law by 
the adminishation at the instance of pohtical bosses in the states and the 
centre. This was the darkest period of Indian history when thousands of 
peoples were detained in the jail and died languishrng in the jail. There 
families starved and their children suffered heavily. 
Statement and Objective of Problem: 
The researcher will endeavour to examine the role of the Supreme 
Court of India since 1950 to 2010 in cases of Preventive Detention. The 
objective of the problem is to see where the Supreme Court misinterpreted the 
provisions of the Constitution of India and failed to serve as a custodian of a 
personal liberty of the citizens of India who created themselves the institution 
of Supreme Court for the protection of fundamental rights. The Supreme 
Court during emergency particularly has failed to come up with the 
expectation of the people of India and acted as an agency of the Central 
Government and delivered judgements for wining the favour of the 
Government of India and the usurpers of the power of the people iii the garb 
of Law. 
Review of Literature; 
There is lot of Hterature available on this subject. The main literature is 
from United States of America and the judgements of the Supreme Court of 
India and the judgements of the US Supreme Court and also the debates of 
the Constituent Assembly which frame the Constitution of India.^ The 
speeches delivered by eminent people during the framing of Indian 
Constitution are very important for writing this thesis. The following authors 
and books were also taken into consideration for writing this thesis: 
(i) Constituent Assembly Debates (Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat, 1946-50), 
Vols. 12. 
(ii) Constitution of India (As Modified upto the 15 August 1983), 
(Government of India, Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs). 
(iii) Constitution of the United States of America (Washington: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1964). 
(iv) India, Constituent Assembly, Constitutional Precedents, third series, 2"'' 
ed., 1947 (New Delhi, Manager, Government of India Press, 1948). 
1. Constituent Assembly Debate. Vol. 12 (1946-50) 
(v) Draft Constitution of India, prepared by the Drafting Committee (New 
Delhi: Manager, Government of India Press, 1948). 
(vi) Law Commission, Fourteenth Report on Reform of judicial Administration, 
1958 (Delhi: Manager of Publication, 1958), Vols. 11. 
(vii) Shah Commission of liiquiry: Third and Final Reports, Chairman, J.C. 
Shah (Delhi: Controller of Publications, 1978) Vols. III. 
(viii) Reports of Amnesty International (London: Amnesty International 
Publications, 1975-1985). 
(ix) Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and Others, Constitutional Proposals of the Sapru 
Committee, the Sapru Report (Moradabad: Secretary, Sapru Committee, 
1945). 
Besides D.D. Basu Constitutional of India & H. M. Seervai's book on 
Constitutional Law have also consulted. 
Hypothesis of the Problem: 
The researcher believes that the "Preventive Detention Laws" are 
draconian and such laws are anti democratic and the arch enemy of the rights 
to person liberty. Preventive Detention envisages detention without trial 
which is against the basic canons of criminal jurisprudeiice. The following 
questioiis emerge for consideration: 
(1) Whether Preventive Detention envisages detention without trial. 
(2) Whether during the war, England introduced Preventive Detention 
Law to the effect that a person could be detained only on the subjective 
satisfaction of the Home Minister in Great Britain and not on the 
subjective satisfaction of a Magistrate as in India. 
(3) Whether in absence of Preventive Detention Law the countr\' during 
1969-71 ran with the help of ordinary laws smoothly, 
(4) Whether m India MISA was promulgated in the wake of Indo-Pakistan 
war and it continued during Emergency (1975-77) arid was grossly 
misused against the Political adversaries? 
(5) Whether the Preventive Detention Laws have been misused. 
It is worth bearing in nmid that no other civilized counti'v, including 
Britain which brought Preventive Detention laws here, felt compelled to 
mti-oduce such laws during peace time. Even during the last World War, 
most European countries and the USA, who were all directly involved in the 
war, had no such law. During the War, England introduced a Preventive 
Detention Law to the effect that a person could be detained only on the 
subjective satisfaction of the Home Minister of Great Britain and not on the 
subjective satisfaction of a puny magistrate, as it the case here. Further, only 
one person. Sir Osward Mosley, a rabid Nazi, was detained under this Act. 
In 1971, because of tremendous political tiirmoil which resulted in 
assassinations and destruction all over Ireland, the British Government 
introduced PD Act for Ireland. But it immediately formed a committee 
headed by Lord Gardiner to probe and to find out if it was necessary to have 
such an Act even in Ireland. The Gardiner Committee Report reads:^ 
"Preventive Detention can only be tolerated in any democratic society in 
the most extreme circumstances. It must be used with the utmost 
restraint and retained only so long as it is strictly necessary." 
The British Government soon thereafter withdrew the PDA Act from 
Ireland, in spite of unabated violence there. 
In India the story is otherwise. It seems that our rulers cannot run this 
country with ordiiiary laws and have to bank heavily on these extraordinary 
Acts. A peculiar feature is that these Acts are almost always used against 
pohtical opponents and not against ordinary criminals or those who disturb 
public peace. As has been pointed out, from 1969 to 1971, there was no 
Preventive Detention Act in India. And in spite of that there was no problem 
in rumiing this country with the help of available ordinary laws. The MISA 
was brought in the wake of the Indo-Pakistan war of December, 197L The 
war was over in 16/17 days but MISA merrily remained on the Statute Book, 
and tdtimately during Emergeiicy it was placed in the Ninth Schedule of the 
Constitution, so that they could not be any challenge in a court of law to such 
an extraordmaiy, anti-people and vicious law.^ 
The researcher believes that all Preventive Detention Laws are 
antidemocratic and therefore, they should be repealed without any loss of 
time in the interest of democracy and individual liberty. 
Research Methodology: 
The researcher has adopted the Doctrinal Research Methodology and 
has read all the judgements of the Supreme Court of India from A.K. Gopalan 
vs. State of Madras and the Habeas Corpus judgement which was a shocking 
judgement during emergency and has also considered all the judgements 
after Habeas Corpus case after the withdrawal of emergency. The research is 
based on the law reports and other commentaries on the Constitution of India 
and other democratic countries. The research is from the books in the personal 
library of the researcher and the Suprenie Court of India's Library, Indian 
Law Iristitute and other important news papers and journals. 
This study consist of six chapters, the Chapter First - "Preventive 
Detention - Historical Perspective" is a theoretical and defiiies the concept 
of civil hberty iii general as well as in the Indian Constitution. It discusses the 
different aspects of civil libert}' and preventive detention. 
3. Shri Gobinda Mukhotv, Sr. Advocate Supreme Court in Mainstream, November 10,1979 
The Chapter Second - "Habeas Corpus Suspension of the 
Fundamental Rights in emergency" - deals with the brief period of internal 
emergency (1975-1977) had exposed the in adequacy of judicial review as a 
safeguard against the misuse of powers by the Executive, Evidently due to 
certain constraints. The Court gave shocking judgement in the writ of Habeas 
Corpus case, ADM jabalpur vs. Shivakant Shukla's ^  
The great jurist of India H.M. Seervai^ has met following comments on 
the judgement of Habeas Corpus Case -
"Anyone who rends and re-reads the four judgements -for they occupy 
306 pages of the Sup. Ct. Reports - xoill he filled With amazement that the 
four judges should not have asked the central question raised by the 
Habeas Corpus Case and, even more, that they should have failed to realize 
the implications of the first question which the Att. Gen. formulated, and 
the concession which he made in ansxvering that question. We will, 
therefore, consider the question raised by the Habeas Corpus Case 
independently of the discussion in the four judgments, and will refer to 
those judgements in the light of our independent discussion". 
The Chapter Third deals with the - "Personal Liberty' and 
'Preventive Detention - Articles 21 & 22", it establishes that Preventive 
Detention Laws are against the basic concept of Personal Liberty as enshrined 
under Article 21 of the Constitution of Indian. 
4. AlK 1976 SC 1207 popularly known as Habeas Corpus case. 
5. H.M. Seervai, "Constitutional Law of India", IVth Ed,, Vol. 2, .Appendix - Part 11, p.22C 
The Chapter Fourth - deals with the "Emergency excesses and 
Violation of Human Rights" and the detention of innocent citizens in the 
garb of Preventive Detention Laws. This is a very sad commentary on the 
laws of Preventive Detention and therefore, it is expedient in the interest of 
democracy that such laws should be repeal without any loss of time. 
The Fifth Chapter - deals with the "Role of Supreme Court of 
India after withdrawal of Internal Emergency - 1977 to date". The 
Supreme Court realised its mistake which it committed during Emergency 
and later it gave judgements to indicate its impartiality, independence and 
restore its lost prestige and confidence of the people of India. 
The Sixth Chapter - deals with the "Conclusion and Suggestions" 
and the suggestions of the researcher is that in view of the past experience 
there is every likelihood that some people in power may misuse preventive 
detention laws to perpetuate there anti-democratic rule. 
Therefore, it is expedient in the interest of democracy that Preventive 
Detention Laws should be scarped and repealed forthwith in the interest of 
our Great Nation. 

Chapter-I 
PREVENTIVE DETENTION - HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
It is beyond controversy that civil liberties are essential for the 
development of human personality as for the establishment of the democratic 
polit}'. Therefore, civil liberties should not be suppressed for they promote 
the common good of society.^ John Rawle vehemently states that liberty of an 
individual can be curtailed only for securing the equal liberty of others, and 
not for any other social or economic good. He says: "Liberty can be restricted 
only for the sake of liberty.^ For him, the basic liberties are so important that 
greater economic advantage can never justify their abridgement: they are the 
first condition of justice and all ameliorative measures have to be 
subordinated to them.^ 
There is perhaps no authoritative definition of expression 'Preventive 
Detention' (PD). The expression h-aces its origins in the language used by the 
Lord Justices in England while examining the nature of detention under the 
war time provisions of the Defence of Realm Consohdation Act, 1914 which 
was enacted during the First World War The key word in the expression is 
the adjective 'Preveiitive' which is used in contradistinction to 'Punitive', PD 
is thus not a punitive but a precautionarv measure which has the rather pious 
object of not to punish a man for having done something wrong but to 
intercept him before he does it and to prevent him from doing it. 
1, Thomas F.mcrson "Toward a general theor\- of V Amendment", Yale Law of.Iournal. Vol. 72. 
No.4, March 1963. p. 877. 
2. .lohn Rawle. A Theor\ of .lustice (O.xford: Clarendon Press, 1972), p. 302 
3.1bid, pp. 303-03 
One gets the feeling that the object is to save the detenu from punitive 
detention, because, if left free, the detenu might well commit an offence. 
What makes the power of PD awesome and offensive to the spirit of 
libertarian democracies is that it is meant to be used to detain a person even 
though no offence as yet has been proved against him, and in most cases even 
a charge has also not been formulated against him. The sole basis oi: such 
detention is that a suspicion or reasonable probability of such suspicion is 
entertained by the Executive to the effect that the detenu if let off would 
probably commit an specified kind of offence. It is interesting to note that the 
British House of Lords in one of its judgements on PD was of the view that 
the Executive may be trusted to exercise this 'discretion' with discretion. 
In the quest for harmonizing the individual rights and liberties on the 
one hand, and the security of the State and public order on the other, PD laws 
have a tendency to load the dice heavily against the individual's liberty. But 
then, perhaps, we may not be able to do away with these laws altogether, 
particularly in a heterogeneous and obviously fragile polity like ours. But we 
should always remind ourselves of the dictum of Charles Kempton Allen 
while dealing with PD laws: Throughout history the most terrible form of 
t\-'ranny has been forcing on one's fellow creatures what one believes to be 
good for them. 
In our country the erroneous belief that America does not have any PD 
laws is held in high esteem. This belief however is not totally misleading. 
Title 11 of the Internal Security Act, 1950 (the so called McCarran Act) which is 
the American counterpart to our National Security Act has been seldom, if 
ever, used against American Courts in a somewhat different garb of the 
American - Japanese cases during the Second World War. In the exercise of 
war powers, the Japanese-Americans residing in the U.S. West Coast were 
incarcerated, dispossessed and despatched to detention camps. This overtly 
racial discrimination (no such orders were issued against Americans of Itahan 
or Germ descent) was a backlash to the Pearl Harbour fiasco. 
The American Supreme Court in Korematsu v. U.S. (1944) upheld the 
constitutionaht)' of the relocation and detention programme, over a bitter 
dissent of Justice Murphy who characterised the governmental action as 
going over the 'brink of constitutional power'. What is really enlightening in 
this otherwise 'justly infamous episode' is the raison d'eti'e of the Executive 
for relocating and detaining the American-Japanese ir\ the first place. The 
argument was that 'the subversive threat posed by the Americans of Japanese 
descent on the West Coast was confirmed (sic) by the sinister absence of any 
overtly subversive activities in that area'. This is a truly classic example of 
how an Executive can behave when under pressures of the moment. 
The British experience with PD in the 20*'"' century has been largely 
limited to the exercise of war powers during the two world wars. Without 
doubt the most well known of British cases on PD has been the cases of 
Lwersidge v. Anderson'^ 
Under the apphcable law, the Secretary of State was given the power to 
detain any person in respect of 'whom the secretary 'had a reasonable cause 
4. (1942) AC 206. 
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to believe' that the person, loosely speaking, had committed in the past or was 
committiiig acts against public safety. The majority of the Law Lords held 
that it was not open to the Court to examine whether there was in fact a 
reasonable cause to beheve'. The fact that the Secretary thought that there 
was such a cause was enough for him to pass an order of detention. 
If this were all, Liversidge would never have achieved immortality. 
Iversidge was made immortal by the devastating dissent of Lord .Atkin. 
A Professor R,F.V. Hueston has said 'what seized the imagination of lawyer 
and layman alike was the passionate, almost wild rhetoric of the three 
concluding paragraphs' of that dissent. In one of these concludu"ig paragraphs 
Lord Atkin 'confessed' that he knew of only one authority that might justify 
the method of interpretation which found favour with the majority of the 
Mouse of Lords. He stated that authority thus: "When I use a word, Humpty 
Dumpty said in a rather scornful tone, it means just what I choose it to mean, 
neither more nor less". 
Both these dissents of Mr. Justice Murphy and Lord Atkin have a 
thread in common: they are stated in scathing language and exhibit an 
emotion of deep anguish which at times gives way to bitterness and sarcasm. 
This highlights the inherent suspicion that the Justices have felt against 
draconian measures like the PD laws. 
There is perhaps an added dimension to such dissent which is 
sometimes overlooked. At times, the dissenting justices, secure in the 
knowledge that the majority judgement has already 'safeguarded' whatever 
'public or national securit)' aspect' there was to the case, find themselves in a 
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position to give expression to the judiciary's generally held aversion to PD 
laws. These dissents are really directed and targeted at the Executive or the 
administrators of the PD laws, and, we suspect, also reflect the apprehensions 
of those justices who on the final weighing and balancing of comf)eting 
interests have found the scale to tip in favour of the PD laws. 
The PD was inti-oduced in the statute books of British India by 
amending the Defence of India Ct, 1858 during the first word war. Thereafter, 
the Rowlatt Act (popularly referred to as the 'No vakil, no appeal, no daleel' 
Act) was introduced. And, finally, came the Government of India Act, 1935 ,^ 
under this Act, the State was given the power of exercising PD for the reasons, 
loosely, of defence and external affairs. 
Then on November 26, 1949, we gave to ourselves our Constitution 
which came into force on January 26, 1950. In our Gonstitution itself, certain 
express provisions confer upon our Parliament exclusive legislative 
competence to make laws with respect to 'preventive detention for reasons 
connected with defence, foreigii affairs or the securit}' of India' (Item 9, List-I 
of the Seventh Schedule) and also concurrently with the State Legislatures 
with respect to 'Preventive detention for reasons connected with the security 
of state, maintenance of public order or the maintenance of supplies and 
services essential to the community. (Item 3, List III of the Seventh Schedule). 
Protection against Arrest and Detention: 
Article 22 of the Constitution of India is as below; 
(1) No person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being 
informed, as soon as ma)' be, of the grounds for such arrest nor shall he be 
5. 
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denied the right to consult, and to be defended by, a legal practitioner of his 
choice. 
(2) Every person who is arrested and detained in custody shall be produced 
before the nearest Magistrate within a period of twenty-four hours of such 
arrest excluding the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to 
the Court of the Magisti-ate and no such person shall be detained in custody 
beyond the said period without the authority of Magistrate. 
(3) Nothing in Cls. (1) and (2) shall apply -
(a) to any person who for the time being is an enemy alien; or 
(b) to any person who is arrested or detained under any law providing 
for preventive detention. 
(4) No law providing for preventive detention shall authorise the detention of 
a person for a longer period than two months unless and Advisory Board 
constituted in accordance with the recommendations of the Chief Justice of 
the appropriate High Court has reported before the expiration of the period of 
two months that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for such detention: 
Provided that an Advisory Board shall consist of a Chairman and not 
less than two other members and the Chairman shall be a serving Judge of the 
appropriate High Court and the other members shall be serving or retired 
judges of am' High Court. 
Provided further, that nothing in this clause shall authorise the 
detention of any person beyond the maximum period prescribed by any law 
made by Parliament under sub-clause (a) of CI. (7). 
Explanation - In this clause "appropriate High Court" m.eans -
(i) in the case of the detention of a person in pursuance of an order of 
detention made by the Government of India or an officer or 
authority subordinate to that Government, the High Court for the 
union territory of Delhi. 
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(ii) In the case of the detention of person in pursuance of an order of 
detention made by the Government of any State (other than a 
Union Territory) the High Court for that State; and 
(iii) In case of detention made by the administrator of a union territory 
or an officer or authority subordinate to such administrator, such 
High Court as may be specified by or under any law made by 
Parliament in this behalf. 
(5) When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any 
law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, 
as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the 
order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making 
a representation against the order. 
(6) Nothing in CI. (5) shall require the authority making such order as is 
referred to in that clause to disclose facts which such authority considers to be 
against the public interest to disclose. 
(7) Parliament shall by law prescribe -
(a) the maximum period for which any person may in any class or classes 
of cases be detained under any law providing for preventive 
detention; and 
(b) the procedure to be followed by an Advisory Board in an inquiry 
under CI. (4)". 
2. Constitutional changes - Clause (4) of this Article has been substituted 
for the original CI. (4); and the original sub-clause (a) of CI. (7) omitted, and 
the original sub-clauses (b) and (c) thereof re-lettered as (a) and (b); and the 
words CI. (4)" occurring at end of sub-clause (b) thereof, have been 
substituted for the original words "sub-clause (a) of CI. (4)" by Sec. 3 of the 
Constitution (Forty-Amendment) Act, 1978. 
3. Analogous Provisions - Analogous to Article 22, are the following 
provisions in other Constitutions: 
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DANZIN: Article 74 (4) - The liberty of the person shall be inviolable. No 
limitation or deprivation of personal liberty may be imposed by the public 
authority, except by virtue of the law. 
Persons who have been deprived of their liberty must be informed at 
the latest on the foUowmg day on what authority and on what grounds the 
deprivation of liberty has been ordered. Opportunity must immediately be 
given them to lodge objections against such deprivation of liberty. 
EIRE: Section 40 - (1) The State guarantees in its law to respect, and as far as 
practicable by its laws to defend and vindicate the personal rights of the 
citizen. 
(2) The State shall by its laws protect as best it may, from unjust attack and, in 
the case of injustice done, vindicate the life, person, good name and property 
rights of every citizen. 
WEIMER GERMANY: Article 114 - Personal Liberty is inviolable. No 
encroachment on or deprivation of personal liberty by any public authority is 
permissible except in virtue of a law. 
Persons, who have been deprived, of their liberty shall be informed - at 
the latest on the following day - by what authority and on what grounds the 
depnvadon of liberty has been ordered: Opportunity shall be given to them 
without delay to make legal complaint against such deprivation. 
JAPAN: Article XXXIV - No person shall be arrested or detained 
\\it)u)ui being at once informed of the charges against him or without the 
immediate privilege of counsel; nor shall he be detained without adequate 
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cause; and upon demand of any person such cause must be immediately 
shown in open court in his presence and the presence of his counsel. 
YUGOSLAVIA: Article 5 - The liberty of the individual shall be 
guaranteed. No person may be subjected to any judicial interrogation, or 
placed under arrest, or be in any other way deprived of his liberty, save as 
provide by law. 
No person may be placed under arrest for any crime or offence 
whatever save by order of a competent authority given in writing and stating 
the charge. This order must be communicated to the person arrested at the 
time of arrest or the latest within twenty four hours of the arrest. An appeal 
against the order for arrest may be lodged in the competent court within three 
days. If no appeal has been lodged within this period, the police authorities 
must as a matter of course communicate the order to the competent court 
within the twent^'-four hours following. The Court shall be bound to confirm 
or annual the arrest within two days from the communication of the order, 
and its decision shall be given effect forthwith. 
Public officials who infringe these provisions shall be permitted for 
illegal deprivation of liberty. 
On examining these provisions of Article 22, we find that Clauses (1) 
and (2) give three very valuable rights to detenus (other than those detained 
under the law of PD), namely: 
(i) Right of being uiformed, as soon as may be, of the grounds of 
arrest; 
(ii) Right to consult and be defended by a legal practitioner of his 
choice; 
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(lii) Production before the nearest magistrate within 24 hours of such 
arrest. 
Clause (3) of Art. 22 however expressly take away the safeguards of 
clauses (1) and (2) of Article 22 in respect of a person arrested or detained 
under a law providing for PD. In its place the detenu under PD has the 
somewhat niggardly substitute protection as provided by clauses (4) and 
(5) of Article 22. Collectively these clauses provide that in case of PD: 
(i) The detenu shall not be detained beyond 3 months unless the 
Advisory Board (duly constituted) reports prior to the expiration of 
3 months that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for such 
detention (as against production within 24 hours before a 
magistrate). 
(ii) The detenu is to be furnished, as soon as may be, the grouiids for 
his detention. 
(iii) The detenu is to be provided the earliest opportunity of making a 
presentation against the order of detention (as against the right of 
consulting and being defended by a legal practitioner). 
By virtue of clause (6), the authorit}' while communicating the grounds 
of detention may not disclose such facts, the disclosure of which the authorit}' 
may consider prejudicial to the public interest. While on Article 22, we may 
point out that the denial to such detenus of the right to consult and be 
defended by a legal practitioner of their choice, is an unnecessarily harsh 
provision which does not serve the interests of the State to any great extent. 
In our country, with the limited awareness of the ordinary citizen of his legal 
rights, it seems too much to expect that a detenu will be able adequately to 
exercise his right of representation granted under clause (5) of Article 22 
Avithout the help of a legal practitioner. 
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One way to remedy the situation could be, as pointed out way back in 
1960 by a noted constitutional pundit, by suitably amending the PD laws to 
provide such detenus expressly with the right of adequate representation by a 
legal practitioner. In the alternative, the Indian courts, as they have often 
done in the past, can strike a blow for justice, by reading into 'representation' 
ill clause (5), the detenu's right of being represented by a legal practitioner of 
his choice. 
In 1950, the Preventive Detention Act, (PDA) was enacted which was to 
be re-enacted seven times till 1970, for the duration of three years at a time. 
Almost immediately, the various provisions of the PDA were challenged 
before the Supreme Court in the leading case of A.K. Gopalan v. State of 
Madras^, Gopalan^ the petitioner had been detained under the PDA on 
grounds which the Court would not know, because section 14 of the Act 
forbade him from disclosing them to any Court. The entire argument on 
Gopalan's behalf had therefore to be directed against the constitutionality of 
the Act in abstracto. 
In a judgement which had a far reaching impact on Indian 
constitutional development, the majority upheld the validity of the PDA (with 
the sole exception of Section 14 of the Act). The majority in the Gopalan 
Court held that substantive freedom from imprisonment was guaranteed in 
Article 21 of the Constitution which says that 'no person shall be deprived of 
his life or personal libert}' except in accordance with procedure established by 
law'. 
6. AIR 1950 SC 27. 
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The majority then went on to hold that Article 21 did not leave it for 
the Court to enquire whether the 'procedure laid down' by the Legislature 
was just and proper. The judicial scrutiny under Article 21 was restricted to 
examining whether the procedure as laid down by the Legislature was 
properly observed by the Executive. We call this the Proposition I ofGopalan. 
The Gopalan majority also rejected the argument that in the laws of PD, 
Article 19 (1) (d) (which enshrined the 'freedom of movement throughout the 
territory of India) had any application. By analogy, the same would seem to 
hold good for all the other freedoms enshrined in Art. 19 (1). (These so called 
six lamps of liberty are the rights of freedom of speech, peaceable assembly 
without arms, formation of associations or uiiions, moving freely throughout 
the territory of India and residing in any part of India. Loosely speaking, 
reasonable restrictions may be placed by the State by law on these freedoms. 
The seventh lamp of liberty, namely the right to property was extinguished 
with great fanfare by the Constitution (44* Amendment) Act, 1978). 
We may point out that at the time of drafting the Constitution, when 
the Constituent Assembly decided not to mcorporate the 'Due Process Clause' 
in Article 21, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar introduced the draft form of the present 
Article 22 for the purposes of, as he said 'making, if I may say so 
compensation for what was done in passing Article 15'^  (present Article 21 of 
our Constitution)'. Dr. Ambedkar stated that while Article 22 might not 
satisfy those who believed in the absolute personal freedom of the individual, 
nonetheless, he claimed that it did contain the substance of the law of 'Due 
7. Constituent Assembly, Vol. 12 (1946-50) 
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Process'. Thus the traditions of 'Due Process' were to have emanated from 
Article 22, to compensate for the exclusion of 'Due Process' in Article 21. 
Manekn turns this upside down, as it seeks to identify the source of the 
emanation of this 'Due Process' in Article 21 itself, and to that extent Maneka 
tends to make the entire exercise of incorporating Article 22 in the 
Constitution somewhat futile. 
As we pointed out earlier, the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 (PDA) 
continued to be on the statute book till 1970, being re-enacted seven times in 
the process. In 1971 the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, (MISA) began 
its reign, and gained considerable notoriety till it was finally repealed in 1977. 
During the period 1977 to 1980, for the first time tliere was no ceiitral law of 
PD ill the Indian Republic. Once again in 1980 the National Security 
Ordinance was promulgated and the reign of PD laws was re-established over 
the Republic, hi December, 1980, the NBA was enacted and consequently the 
ordinance was repealed. 
Section 3 of NSA gives the Central Government the power to detain 
any person if the government is 'satisfied' that it is 'necessary' to do so with a 
view to prevent him from acting in any mamier prejudicial to any one or more 
of the followiiig interests of the State: 
(i) Defence of the State 
(ii) Relation of the State with foreign power 
(iii) Securit}' of the State 
(iv) Public order; and 
(v) Maintenance of supply of services essential to the community. 
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Since none of these concepts are capable of being defined with any 
great degree of certainty and definiteness, the scope of abuse is admittedly 
colossal. Section 8 of the NSA states that the grounds of detention must be 
communicated to the detenu, in no case later than ten days from his arrest. 
Section 9 deals with the constitution of the Advisory Boards contemplated in 
Article 22. This also raises a question of some concern. 
The Constitution (44"^  Amendment) Act, 1978, sought to amend clause 
(4) of Article 22 to provide that an Advisory Board shall be constituted, in 
accordance of the recommendations of the Chief Justice of the appropriate 
High Court. The Advisory Board was to consist of a Chairman, and two other 
members. The amendment proposed further that the Chairman shall be a 
serving judge of the appropriate High Court, and the other members may be 
either the serving or retired High Court Judges'. The amendment seeks to 
amend clause (4) of Article 22 and to reduce the period of detention without 
obtaining the approval of the Advisory Board, from the present three months 
to only two months. Though the amendment was passed on June 10, 1979 it 
remains un-notified ajid has not yet been brought into force. 
Section 8 of the NSA which was enacted after this constitutional 
amendment was passed, contemplates a composition of the Advisory Board 
in which even those persons who were never appointed judges of the High 
Court may be members, and where the Chief Justice of the appropriate High 
Court has no role to play iii constituting the Advisory Board. Section 8 is 
therefore clearly in disharmony with the Constitutional Amendment. Sure!\' 
bringing into force the relevant provisions of the Constitutional Amendment 
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will not weaken the hands of the State in its quest for maintaining security 
and public order. And, more importantly, it will prove to be a crucial check 
on the possibility of Executive lawlessness iii applying the NSA. 
Like the NSA itself, both the amendments made to the NSA have been 
made by promulgating ordiiiances, which were issued in April and June 1984. 
This again is cause for concern. To begin with, it is not contemplated under 
the scheme of our Constitution that ordinances should be used as a supplant 
for the legislative power of the Parliament. On the contrary, such an exercise 
of ordinance making power is quite opposed to the ideals and spirit of the 
Constitution. We believe that the President who promulgates ordinances as a 
supplant for the legislative power of the Parhament violates his 'Oath of 
Office' under Article 60 of the Constitution, by violating his solemn promise 
that he will endeavour to the best of (his) ability to presei"ve, protect and 
defend the Constitutions. 
Equally, such a President also violates his Fundamental Duties as a 
citizen of the Republic under clause (a) of Article 51A of the Constitution, 
namely, the dut\' to abide by the Constitution and respect its ideals and 
institutions. 
There is yet another objection to the use of ordinances for the purpose 
of promulgating laws like the PD laws, which seek to 'deprive' people of their 
'Hfe and personal libert}/' within the meaning of Article 21. This objection is 
based on the argument that the procedure estabhshed by law by which such 
deprivation can constitutionally be permitted can only be law as enacted by 
the legislature and not through ordinances. It is unfortimate that this 
contention which was raised in A.K. Roy did not get the attention it so richly 
deserved from the Court. By promulgating such laws by ordinances, which 
impose restrictions on Fundamental Rights (even if these restrictions are 
ultimately held on judicial scrutiny to be of the reasonable variety) the entire 
process of law making gets subverted. 
It is contemplated in the Constitution that before such laws are 
enacted, they will be debated on the floor of the House, and some kind of a 
national debate of sorts will be generated, thereby throwing up numerous 
points of view of various interest groups, whose interests are likely to be 
affected by such laws. The President or the Executive, howsoever wise or 
states manly they may be, cannot in vacuum get the bene!fit of these diverse 
poiiits of view of various iiiterest groups. 
Once an ordinance is already promulgated, and is then inti'oduced 
before the Parliament for its adoption and enactment by Parliament, much of 
the interest and debate which would have been generated if the Parliament 
had itself initiated the law may well be lost. Besides, since enacting such an 
ordinance can be expected to become a question of 'prestige' for the 
government, as a consequence, the flexibility in the accommodation of the 
various competing interests is unduly hampered. There is in other words an 
unnecessary pressure on the treasury benches to enact the ordinance into a 
legislative act without any substantial alteration, for to do otherwise may be 
taken to mean a loss of face for the governmeiit. 
The new ordinance (No. 5 of 1984) was promulgated in April 1984 and 
sought to amend the NSA in its application to the State of Punjab and the 
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Union Territory of Chandigarh. An Act along similar lines for amending the 
NSA in its application in those areas ws passed by the Parliament in May, 
1984 (May Amendment). This May Amendment amended section 8 of NSA, 
so that under exceptional circumstances a detenu may now remain in jail for 
fifteen days without knowing the grounds of detention. Similarly, under 
section 10 and 11 of the NSA, the period within which a detenu's case had to 
be referred to the Advisory Board for obtaining the Board's approval (for his 
detention beyond three months) was extended from three weeks from his 
arrest to four months and two weeks and, likewise, the period for the 
submission of the report by the Board was extended from seven weeks to five 
months and three weeks from the date of the detention of the detenu. This 
means that a detenu may now be made to undergo imprisonment for a period 
of nearly six months, even if his detention is ultimately found by the Advisory 
Board to be entirely unjustified and bad in law. 
The May Amendment also provides that in the case of persons 
detained prior to April 3, 1985 they could be so detained for a maximum 
period of two years as opposed to one year in section 13 of the unamended 
Act. Therefore, we find that the May Amendment further whittled down the 
already niggardly protection or safeguard a person has under the Indian laws, 
when he is detained under the PD laws. The only saving feature of this 
Amendment, if there is one, is that its operation was specifically limited to 
Punjab and the Union Territory of Chandigarh, and that it was enacted at a 
time when violence had touched an all time high in Punjab. This ma\' not 
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justify the NSA Amendment, but it surely provides a background which 
caraiot be wished away while discussing the May Amendment. 
The next ordinance which sought to amend the NSA was promulgated 
in June 1984 (June Ordinance). It has two disquieting aspects: 
(1) It was promulgated about 2 weeks after the successful 
culmination oi Operation Bluestar at the Golden Temple, and 
(2) It was not restricted to Punjab alone, but was operative 
throughout the territory of India (excluding Jammu and 
Kashmir to which even the NSA does not apply). 
The main purpose of the June Ordinance seems to be to introduce in 
the NSA, ameiidments which are in pari material (or similar) to the 
amendments which had already been introduced in the Conservation of 
Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 
(COFEPOSA). These two amendments introduced by the June Ordinance 
need special mention. 
First, a new sectiori 5-A has been added to the NSA. This section 5-A 
introduces a legal-fiction to the effect that even if an order of detention is 
based on several grounds, it shall be assumed to have been made separately 
on each one of those grounds. The intention obviously is to overrule the 
settled law on the point, (reiterated from time to tinie by the Supreme Court) 
namely, that the constitutional requirement of clause (5) of Article 22 must be 
satisfied in respect of each one of the grounds communicated to the detenu. 
In other words, the Court had held in case after case, that if any of the 
grounds that led to the satisfaction of the Executive for passing the order of 
detention is found to be 'irrelevant', 'non-existent' or 'vague', the entire order 
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of detention would be invalid, even if there may be other relevant grounds 
which were mentioned in that order. This is so on the basis of the salutary 
principle that one can never be certain to what extent the bad grounds 
operated on the mind of the Executive. 
Puttin,g it differently, the principle says that one can never be sure 
whether the detention order would have been made at all, if only some of the 
grounds referred to in the detention order were present before the Executive. 
This new section 5-A in the words of an Indian jurist attributes to the 
detaining authorit}' an intention which he may not have entertained, and 
makes it virtually impossible for the detenu to challenge his detention by 
pointing out (that each one) of the grounds on which he is detained (is) 
invalid for one reason or another. 
The second aspect of the June Ordinance which is disquieting is its 
amendment of Section 14 (2) of the NSA. The amended section 14 (2) now lays 
down that even after the expiry or revocation oi a detention order, a fresh 
order of detention may be issued, even if no new facts may have arisen. The 
section also states that the total period of detention, pursuaiit to the fresh 
order of detention will not exceed twelve months. V.M. Tarkunde, the noted 
jurist, has interpreted this to mean that 'eveii if a detention order is held 
invalid by a court of law, the detaining authority can revoke the said order 
and can make another detention order on the same grounds. 
It appears to us that the amended section 14 (2) is meant to apply only 
to those cases where either the period of detention specified m the original 
order has expired, or where it has been revoked suo oto (on its own) by the 
detaining authority. If on the other hand a detention order is struck down as 
invahd by a ruling of a Court of Law, then the effect of the order of the Court 
would be as if the order of detention was never passed in the first place. 
It follows, therefore, that the question of the detaining authority revoking 
such an order will not arise. For exhypothesi (by definition) only that may be 
revoked which is in existence? 
But what the amended section 14 (2) does say is that a person who is 
detained for a maximum period of oiie year under NSA, may once again be 
detained on the same facts for another year. This amendment of section 14 (2) 
also runs counter to the interpretation placed on clause (5) of Article 22 of the 
Constitution placed on clause (5) of Article 22 of the Constitution by the 
Supreme Court, namely, that the expression 'gromids' in case of a person who is 
being detained a second time cannot mean the same grounds based on the same 
facts which were the basis of passiiig the first detention order against him. 
There is yet another aspect to these two amendments introduced by the 
June Ordinance. They both seek to overrule settled judicial interpretations 
of constitutional provisions. In other words, they seek to introduce a 
constitutional amendment of clause (5) of Article 22. It goes without saying 
that such an amendment cannot be made, save and except in accordance with 
the procedure laid down in Article 368 for amending the Constitution. We 
therefore submit that on this ground alone these amendments sought to be 
introduced in the NSA by the June Ordinance are void and non-est. 
In any event there does not seem to be much justification in applying 
the June Ordinance throughout the territory of the Republic. If at all, the June 
Ordmance like the May Amendment should have been restricted in its 
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territorial applicability to those areas like Punjab, which are in the grip of 
communal tension and acute public disorder. Indeed, even in the post 
Operation-Blue star Punjab such an amendment may not be really necessary. 
But, be that as it may, surely it cannot be seriously contended that the 
security forces of the Republic are being imduly hampered in their quest for 
maintaining national unity, peace and communal harmony by reason of any 
unduly expansive freedoms of civil liberties and individuals rights. The 
reasons for the inability to contain this rising communal tension and acute 
pubhc disorder which is being witnessed in some parts of the Republic are to 
be fouiid elsewhere. 
It is true that with the enactment of NSA and the subsequent 
amendments brought in it, the position of the detenue has become quite 
vulnerable. And this obviously carmot but be a source of considerable concern 
and disquiet to any civil libertarian. However we would fail in our duty of an 
impartial assessment if we were to neglect the milieu in which these NSA 
provisions have been made. 
The NSA and subsequent amendments made in that Act were 
introduced against a backdrop of rising communal tension, terrorist violence 
and secessionist tendencies. Before passing a final verdict on the PD laws, 
there is also need for an appraisal of these provisions in terms of the long-
term perspective of Indian democracy. It may at times be necessary to 
tolerate laws which seem to be in disharmony with the constitutional ideals of 
human dignit)^ so that in the longer run the sensitive and fragile institutions 
of democracy may take roots. This need for tolerance may be all the more 
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acute in a third world democracy, with its pecuhar third world problems. 
And, therefore, a mindless comparison with the PD laws of the Anglo-
American democracies may not prove to be particularly apposite. 
But, on the other hand, unbridled executive discretion is not quite 
conducive to the development, or for that matter, the survival of democratic 
values and ideals. And that this unbridled discretionary power may have 
been granted for purposes which the grantees of the power (Parhament, in the 
case of PD laws) may honestly believe to be good may not help much. 
Professor Allen expresses this 'encroaching' natured of such power quite well: 
"....(Nobody) on earth can be trusted with power without restraint. (Such 
poxuer) .... Is of all encroaching nature, and its encroachments, more often 
than not, are for the sake of what are sincerely believed to he good and 
mdeed necessary objects." ^ 
Scope and Applicability: 
- Article 22 (1) The enforcement of the fundamental right under Article 22 
can be suspended by the Presidential order under Article 359, sub-clause 1 
during period while a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation. Yet, 
however, when the rights guaranteed under Article 22 are, to any extent, 
referred in another provision of a statute, for example, the Preventive 
Detention Act, 1950'' not included iii the Presidential Order as referring to 
detention under Defence of India Act, or Sec. 8 of the Maintenance of 
Internal Securit)' Act, 1971, the Presidential Order would not bar the 
enforcement of that statutory right, because even if Article 22 (5) were 
X. law in the Mnking, 7"' ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964) 
9. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar, AIR 1966, SC 740. 
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deleted from the Constitution, the said statutory provision would still 
remain on the statute book until repealed.^o 
The protection of Article 22 are not available against Regulations 
governing entry into and departure from India as also the presence in 
India of Pakistani infiltrators from across that cease fire line in Jammu & 
Kashmir border.^^ 
The soul of Article 22 is the fair chance to be heard on all 
particulars relied on to condemn the detenu to preventive confinement.^^ 
The protection of Article 22 extends to arrests made by executive or 
other non-judicial authority.^^ 
Person detained by customs authorities for interrogation and produced 
before Magistrate within 24 hours of his arrest, cannot complain of violation 
of Article 22 (l)i4 
Clause (1) - (a) Geiieral - Article 22 (1) embodies a rule which has 
always been regarded as vital and fundamental for safeguarding personal 
liberU' in a system government by rule of law.i^ 
Article 22 (1) - Right of arrested person to be defended b}' legal 
practitioner of his choice. In this regard Hidayatullah J. observed: 
"WJien our Constitution lays down in absolute terms and right to be 
defended by one's own Counsel, it cannot be taken away by ordinary law 
and it is not sufficient to say that the accused who was so deprived of tins 
right, did not stand in danger of losing his personal liberty. If he was 
!0. Addiiional District Magistrate w Shixkant Shukla. AIR. 1976. SC 1207. 
11. Anwar Aii Sarkar v. State of.l. & K., AIR. 197L SC.337. 
12. Bhut Nath Mehta v. State of Bengal. AIR. 1974. SC 806. 
13. Slate ot'M.P. v. Shobharam, AIR, 1966, SC. 1910. 
14. Sardar La.\man Singh Y. State, AIR, 1970. Bom. 79 
15. Madhu Limaye. In the matter of 1969, AIR. 1969, SC. 1014. 
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exposed to penalty he had a right to be defended by Counsel. If this were not 
so then instead of providing for punishment of imprisonment, penal laxes 
might provide for unlimited fines and it xoould be easy to leave the man free 
but a pauper. And to this end xuithout a right to be defended by Counsel. 
If this proposition were accepted as true we might be in the Middle Ages". ^ ^ 
Right to consult a legal practitioner can be availed of at the state of 
Police interrogation and test the police should incur a censure of 
conducting the interrogation in secrecy by physical torture. It is prudent 
on the part of the police to allow a lawyer to the person arrested. If he so 
wants at the time of interrogation. The accused has a right to consult his 
lawyer even at the stage of custodial interrogation. Articles 20 (3) and 22 
(1) may, in a way, be telescoped by making it prudent for the police to 
permit the Advocate of the accused, if there be one, to be present at the 
time when the accused is examined.i'' 
Article 22 (2) Officers who are the custodians of law and order should 
have the greatest respect for the personal liberty of citizens and should not 
flout the laws by stopping to such bizarre acts of lawlessness. Custodians of 
law and order should not become depredators of civil liberties. Their duty is 
to protect and not to abduct. 
Article 22 clauses (1) & (2) arrest of person - procedure to be followed. 
Justice Das observed: 
"Clauses (1) and (2) of Article 22 lay down the procedure that has to be 
followed when a man is arrested. They ensure four things; (a) right to be 
consult and to be defended by, a legal practitioner of his choice, (c) nglit to 
be produced before a Magistrate within 24 hours, and (d) freedom from 
detention beyond the said period except by order of the Magistrate".'''^ 
16. StateofM.P.v. Shobharam, AiR 1966. SC 1010. 
17. Nandini Satpathi (Smt.) v. P.L. Dani, AIR, 1978, SC. 1025. 
18. A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR, SCJ, 174. 
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Right to be informed of grounds of arrest: 
Article 22 (1) - Arrested people to be informed about grounds of his 
arrest - Petitioner at time of arrest by Police informed that arrest was under S. 
151, Criminal P.C. - Warrants also showing that petitioner was being 
remanded to jail custody for offences under Ss. 143 and 447 I.P.C. - Held there 
was no violation of Article 22 (1).^ ^ 
Clause (3) - Clause (3) operates as an exception or proviso to both Cls. (1) and 
(2) of Article 22 by enacting that CI. (1) and (2) do not apply to person who for 
the time being is an enemy alien or to any person who is arrested or detained 
luider any law providing for preventive detention. 
Thus, 110 person who is detained under any law, which provides for 
preventive detention, can claim the right to consult a legal practitioner of his 
choice or to be defended by him.^ o 
Clause (4) - (a) Law providing for preventive detention - Preventive 
detention is resorted to thwart future action,^ ^ and a law providing for 
preventive detention must satisfy the two tests, namely (i) that the protection 
offered under CI. (5) is complied with and (ii) that the procedure is just and 
reasonable22 and then such a law must satisfy the requirements of both 
Articles 19 and 22.23 
19. Pranab Chatterjee v. State of Bihar, 1970, 3 SSC 926 
20. A. K, Roy v. Union oflndia. MR. mi SC 710 
21. Vijay Kumar v. State of J & K AIR 1982, SC 1023. 
22. ICamla Kan\alal v. Stale of Maharashtra. 1981 1 SCC 748. 
23. iVIohd. Yu.suf Rather v. State of J & K, 1979 4 SCC 370 
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Preventive detention is a necessary evil in the modern restless society. 
But simply because it is an evil, it camiot be so interpreted as to be in-
operative in any practical manner.^'' 
Preventive Detention - Legislative Competency: 
Bearing in mind the provisions of Art. 22 read with Art. 245 and Sch. 7, 
List 1, Entry 9 and List 111, Entry 3, it is clear that the ParUament is empowered 
to enact a law of preventive detention (a) for reasons connected with defence 
(b) for reasons connected with foreign affairs, (c) for reasons connected with 
the security of India, and (under List 111), (d) for reasons connected with 
the maintenance of public order, or (f) for reasons connected with the 
maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community.^s 
Validity of Preventive Detention Act, 1950, MISA and 
other Acts: 
On a plain reading of the language of sub-sections (1) and (2) of S. 3 of 
the MIS Act 1971 the exercise of the power of detention is made dependent on 
the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority that with a view to 
preventing a person from actmg in a prejudicial maraier as set out in sub-
clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) of CI. (a) of sub-section (1), it is necessary to detain 
such person. 
The subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority is not wholly 
immune from judicial revievv^ability. The basic postulate is that the subjective 
satisfaction being a condition precedent for the exercise of the power 
24. Raj Kumai- Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1986 SC 2173 
25. .A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27 
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conferred on the executive, the court can always examine whether the 
requisite satisfaction is arrived at by the authority. 
A law of preventive detention, which falls within Art. 22, has also to 
meet the requirement opportunity to defend himself by engaging a civil 
lawyer through their help - No request made by accused to the Court 
material for being defended by lawyer of his and no such request turned 
down by the Court. Held there had been no denial of the right guaranteed by 
the Article.26 
Articles 22 and 136 - Arrest and detention of foreigner 
for purpose of deportation: 
Protection under Art. 22, if available - Non-production of detenu 
within 24 hours of his arrest before nearest Magistrate - Legality of detention 
- Order of High Court under S. 491, Criminal P.C. Declaring interim 
injunction against State from executing order of deportation pending disposal 
of his suit - Interference by Supreme Court. 
The two respondents, husband and wife, were arrested for 
non-compHance with an order of deportation passed against them. (3n the 
petition for habeas corpus filed by the respondents, the Judges of the High 
Coiu't coiifined their attention to the period viz from 1 p.m. on 25*'^  Julv, 1960 
to 2 p.m. on 27'^  July 1960 arid holding that during this period there had been 
a violation of the requirements of Art. 22 (2) of the Constitution, in that the 
respondents had not been produced before a Magistrate within 24 hours of 
the commencement of the custody, expressed their opuiion that the detention 
was illegal and directed the release of the respondents. The State of Uttar 
26. Ram Sarup v. Union oflndia, AIR J 965 SC 247 
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Pradesh preferred the appeal by special leave against the said order of the 
High Court. Subsequent to the filing of the appeal, the respondents filed a suit 
and obtained an injunction against the State from deporting them to Pakistan 
peiiding the disposal of the suit. 
Held (Per P.B. Sinha, C.J Ayyangar, Mudholkar and Venkatarama 
Aiyer, JJ, Subba Rao, J. Dissenting): That without pronouncing on the precise 
scope of Article 22 (1) or (2) in relation to an arrest and detention for the 
purpose of executing a lawful order of deportation, it could not be said in the 
circumstances of the case that during the period commencing from 1 p.m. on 
25-7-1960 the respondents were illegally detained 1960 the respondents were 
illegally detained for more than 24 hours without production before a judicial 
authority as required by Art. 22 (2). Even if Art. 22 (2) were constructed to 
require that a person arrested and detaiiied has to be produced before a 
Magistrate every 24 hours during his detention, in this case as the 
respondents were during "the second stage" produced before the High Court 
itself for suitable orders on the 25* and again on the 27*, the requirement was 
satisfied. Hence there was no justification whatsoever for the finding on the 
basis of which the High Court directed the release of the respondents. 
Per Subba Rao, J : - The case is not a fit one for exercising the 
extraordinary jurisdiction, under Art. 136 of the Constitution. The appeal has 
become anfractuous, for even if the State succeeds it cannot arrest the 
respondents till the disposal of the suit. Nor has the High Court decided any 
such important question of law as to cause some irreparable injury to the 
appellant unless the Supreme Court sets the matter right. An arrest and 
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detention for the purpose of deportation is not outside the scope of the 
Constitutional protection under Art. 22 (2). It is not permissible to read into 
that provision exceptions other than the two specific exceptions in CI. (3). As 
the respondents were not produced before the nearest Magistrate withiii 24 
hours of their arrest for the purpose of deportation, the arrest and detention 
were in contravention of Art. 22 (2) arid illegal.^'' 
Grounds of detention: 
Communication, contents, validity and purpose of grounds - Whereas 
non-communication of grounds amounts to a denial of opportunits' of making 
representation. In the grounds of detention, it is also essential to furnish the 
material particulars as to the date and time of activities regarding the basic 
acts as allegeci. The grounds furnished to the detenu cannot be said to be 
complete unless the documents, statements or other materials relied on in the 
grounds of detention and forming part of such grounds are also supplied to 
the detenu. What is meant is that grounds of detention must be furnished in 
their entiret)', with all the basic facts and material relied upon in those 
grounds. There is, however, no charm or magic in the words referred to 
'relied on' based on, etc. and all such words only indicate that certain 
documents have gone to make up the satisfaction of the detaining authorit)'; 
and therefore, even the documents which though not relied upon, but are 
simply referred to, have to be rnvariabh' suppUed to the detenu. In Munna 
Turn V. District Magi'^trnte, Lucknow, an inquiry report whereon reliance was 
placed by the detaining authorit}' was set aside. In Lachit Bardoli v. State of 
27, Slaie ol'UiTar Pradesh v. Abdul Samad, AIR 1962. .SC 1506. 
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Assam, the alleged statement made by detenu by admitting his guilt before 
police, was not communicated to him. This was held to have infringed 
detenu's fundamental right under Article 22. 
Supply of Documents relied upon: 
The law as to supply of documents as relied on the order of 
detention has been summarised in Mohd. Hussin v. Secretary to Government of 
Maharashtra^^ as follows; 
(a) The copies of all the documents which are relied upon in or which 
form the basis of the grounds of detention must be suppUed along 
with grounds of detention; 
(b) The documents which are not relied upon or do not form the basis of 
the detention order but which are merely referred to casually or 
incidentally as and by way of narration of facts in the grounds of 
detention need not be supplied to the detenu. 
(c) However, even such document, if the detenu requests for the same, 
have to be supplied to him for whether they are relevant to his defence 
or not, is for the detenu to decide and not for the detaining authority to 
judge. 
It is well settled that even if a document is not expressly referred to in 
the grounds of detention, the same has to be supplied when an express 
demand for the same has been made by the detenu and the same, in the 
opinioiT of the Court, is not irrelevant. 
However, as regards documents rehed 011 or referred to in the order of 
detention pan passu, it is the constitutional mandate obliging the detaining 
authority to supply such documents to the detenu so as to enable him to make 
an effective representation immediatel\' instead of waiting for the documents 
to be supplied with. In such a case, the question of demanding the documents 
28. AIR 
47 
is manifestly and wholly irrelevant and the infirmity in this regard will be 
violative of the constitutional safeguard, under Article 22 (5). Thus, where a 
list of smuggled goods as recovered from the detenu has been relied on in the 
grounds of detention, the non-supply thereof to the detenu will invalidate the 
detention. 
Formulation, framing and signing of the grounds by the detaining 
authority at about the time of making of the order of detention, is an 
important assurance and a safeguard inter alia on the question that there was 
material; that the said material was scanned and sifted; that the irrelevant. If 
any, was rejected, and the relevant alone relied upon that thereafter 
conclusions were drawn and grounds formulated there from; and that there 
was, thus, at the relevant time, a case for detention made out, although under 
the subjective but bonafide satisfaction of the detaining authority. Moreover, 
the grounds of detention have to be firm and affirmative without leaving 
anything to speculation. The again, the copies of documents and material in 
support of grounds of detention, must be supplied along with grounds of 
detention, otherwise the detention will become illegal. 
When in a case of detention, under Sec. 12-A of the Conservation of 
Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974, the 
grounds of detention were formulated contemporaneously and concurrently 
by the detaining authority at the time of passing the detention order and the 
basic facts or grounds did exist in formulated form at the time of detention 
and declaration, under Sec. 124 of the Act, was also made, it was held that 
there was compliance with the requirements of law. 
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The fact that the order of detention suffers from vagueness may 
although render an order of detention illegal, yet vague grounds have to be 
distinguished from the grounds being insufficient in particulars. In the latter 
case, the detenu will be entitled to claim further and better particulars. The 
grounds of detention must, therefore, specify not only the bare conclusions of 
facts but must contain also the basic facts and materials on which such 
conclusions are based, though the right of the detenu to be supplied with 
copies of statements or documents does not go to the same extent as in an 
ordinary criminal trial. 
Grounds of detention are all those allegations of fact which have led to 
the passing of the order of detention. In case such allegations vague or 
irrelevant, the detenu earns his release, and a division or dissection of the 
grounds of detention into introduction, background and the grounds is not at 
all warranted. The contents of grounds have to be self-sufficient and self-
explanatory. However, the non-mention of names of associates of the detenu 
does not render the grounds as vague. 
The inclusion even of one irrelevant or non-existent ground among 
other relevant grounds will be in infringement of the right of the detenu to be 
informed as soon as may be of the ground on which the order of detention is 
based, the reason being that the inclusion of even a single irrelevant or 
obscure ground among several relevant and clear grounds will preclude, the 
Court which cannot substiti.ite its objective decision for the subjective 
satisfaction of the detaining authority, from adjudicating upon the sufficiency 
of grounds. 
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A ground is said to be irrelevant when it has no connection with the 
satisfaction of the authority making the order of detention under the 
appropriate law. An order of detention cannot be sustained if the grounds of 
detention are vague or irrelevant. 
It is obvious that the word "ground" under Article 22 (5) of the 
Constitution means clear revelation of all basic facts and other materials 
which are taken into consideration by the detaining authority for coming to 
the conclusion that the detenue was likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the 
maintenance of pubhc order. 
Everything mentioned in the grounds for detention may not 
necessarily be the basis or the grounds for the satisfaction of the detaining 
authority that the detenu was likely to act in a manner prejudicial to 
maintenance of public order. It will, as pointed out by the Supreme Court, 
depend upon the circumstances and facts of each case as to whether a 
particular recital contained in grounds served oil the petitioner was or was 
not a ground on the basis of which the requisite satisfaction of the detaining 
authoritv' was based. 
Speaking on the point of vagueness, Jaswant Singh, J. said that 
vagueness is a relative term and the real test is to see whether the grounds are 
capable of being intelligently understood and sufficiently definite to enable 
the detenu to make an effective representation. If the grounds are self-
contradictory, the detenu would not be in a position to say anything beyond 
denying them, when there are no details or specific instances or description of 
the acts alleged. 
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Thumb-impression of detenu in token of his having received the 
ground of detention is not sufficient. 
During the period of Emergency, when a Presidential order under 
Article 359 (I) is in operation, there arises 110 question of furnishing any 
ground under Article 22 (5) to a detenu detained under Defence of India Act, 
1962 or the Rules thereunder. 
Vague grounds are invalid grounds; but a vague ground is only that 
grounds which is "incapable of being understood or defined with sufficient 
certainty'. Grounds when vague, will spell non-compliance with law. The test 
that grounds must not be vague applies to each ground, but the concept of 
vagueness is itself subject to clause (6) of Article 22. 
When an order of detention is based upon speeches made by the 
person sought to be detained, the detaining authority need not communicate 
to the person the offending passages or even the gist of such passages on pain 
of order quashed if it did not. If the time and place at which the speeches were 
alleged to have been made are specified and their general nature and effect is 
also stated the same would constitiite sufficient particulars to enable the 
person to make his representation. Omission to mention date and place as to 
the commissioii of an alleged activity on the part of the detenu will render the 
grounds as vague. 
Speeches referred to in ground No. 1 are mentioned as a part of the 
continuous course of conduct brought at by the remaining grounds. 
It may be that the detaining authority may have more particulars than 
the grounds, but the grounds must be the essential basis upon which the 
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detaining authority arrives at its satisfaction and makes the order of 
detention. 
Non-compliance with the conshtutional and the statutoiy provisions 
will invalidate the detention, hi case of conflict between statutory and 
constitutional provisions, it is the latter which shall prevail. It is incumbent 
upon the detaining authority under Article 22 (5) to disclose all facts which 
would enable the detenu to make a representation, against the order which 
has been passed depriving him of his liberty, and it would be for the Court to 
determine whether the facts disclosed are sufficient or not sufficient to give 
the detenu the necessary opportunit)' to make the representation under 
Article 22 (5). Vagueness of grounds is, therefore not an abstract notion, but is 
always to be examined by the test whether the grounds permit the detenu to 
make an effective representation. 
A detention without furnishing grounds is not lawful. But all this 
simply means that when the grounds served do not show or suggest that 
there are other grounds which led to the passmg of the order of detention, the 
detention cannot be challenged as invahd because some grounds have been 
withheld from him. The grounds furnished will be sufficient if they attaiiT the 
object to meet the charges in the grounds. Therefore, the right to receive the 
grounds is although independent, it is yet bound up and comiected with the 
right to make the representation. The grounds must, therefore, the 
communicated with sufficient clarity and precision, and the detenu will have 
right to obtain further details in case the particulars furnished are insufficient. 
The clarity and precision simply mean that the detaining authority should 
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make his meaning clear beyond doubt, without leaving the person detained to 
his own resources for interpreting them. 
A distinction must, however, be drawn between grounds and facts. 
The grounds are the basis of the allegation and the facts are the evidence on 
which the basis of the allegations is to be established. The grounds are based 
on and arise out of the facts. Even singly, far moe collectively, the grounds 
are conclusions drawn from available fact showing that the suspected 
activities of the detenu fall within the category of prejudicial acts. 
The grounds furnished to the detenu, consistently with the privilege 
not to disclose facts which are not desirable to disclose in public interest, 
should be as full and adequate as the circumstances permit and a departure 
from this desideratum will amount to a violation of Article 22 (5). 
A person detained by District Magistrate is entitled to claim fresh 
grounds of detention when his period of detention has been extended by the 
State Government. 
The copies of documents pertaining to the prior activities of the 
petitioner were not furnished to him to enable him to make any effective 
representation. This case then assumes the aspect of non-disclosure of all the 
grounds on consideration of which the detention order was passed. This 
would be violative of the constihitional provisions of Article 22 (5). 
X'agueness is, however, a relative term, because what may be vague in 
one cast' ma\' not be so in another. The question of vagueness has therefore, 
to be ultimately a question that has to be determined on a consideration of the 
cncumstances of each case. 
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The requirement as to sufficiency of grounds so as to enable the detenu 
to make a representation has to be satisfied with respect to each of the 
grounds commuiiicated to him subject of course to the privilege under 
Article 22 (6). Failure to satisfy this requirement even in respect of one 
ground will render detention unconstitutional. 
It is not correct to say that what clause (6) of Article 22 entitles the 
detaining authority is only to refrain from disclosing the detenu the evidence 
of the allegations. Grounds of detention cannot be said to be vague or 
indefinite merely because they do not contain the basis of these grounds. 
Vague ground does not stand on the same footing as an irrelevant 
grotmd. Therefore, merely because a ground is vague, it cannot be said that it 
is no ground at all. There can be no infrmgement of constitutional provisions 
if the detenu has been supplied with sufficient particulars as he raises an 
objection as to the ground being vague. 
Where in withdrawing certain particular from the detenu, the State 
takes recourse to clause (6) of Article 22, it is for the State to prove that the 
detaining authority was satisfied that it was not in the public interest to 
disclose same. 
It is not necessary to mention in the grounds the particulars in the same 
wa\' as they are mentioned in a charge of a criminal of.tence. Therefore, even 
if there is a challenge on ground of vagueness because of absence of certain 
particulars and facts which in the view of the Government could not be 
disclosed m the public interest, the order of detention will still be good, in 
cerldin circumstances, because it is for the Government to decide to what 
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extent ii-iformation could be furnished consistently with considerations of 
public interest. 
Where the grounds and reasons for detention were contained in the 
first paragraph of the order and the other paragraphs were only compendium 
of the facts and particulars on which the subjective satisfaction of the 
statutory authority has been based for coming to the conclusion mentioned in 
the first paragraph, any vagueness, irrelevancy or the like in the facts and 
particulars supplied in those other paragraphs, would not affect the vaUdity 
of the detention so long as the grounds furnished did not suffer from any 
such defect. Even otherwise, the question whether the vagueness or 
indefiniteness of the statement furnished to the detenu is such as to deprive or 
preclude him of the earhest opportunity to make a representation to the 
authorit}' is, however, a matter within the jurisdiction of the High Court. If 
the grounds supplied to the detenu are understandable by the detenu to make 
an effective representation, the grounds would be regarded as clear and 
unambiguous. The grounds camiot be said to be va,gue when on reading 
them, they are capable of being iritelligently understood. No hard and fast 
rule being possible to be laid down to determine vagueness or otherwise of 
the grounds, there is considerable authority to hold that an order of detention 
will fail even if one of several grounds as stated is found to be vague. 
Where the grounds supplied are so vague as to make the detention 
order void, the detenu has to be released. Grounds furnished within 
prescribed time but particulars of the grounds supplied thereafter withm such 
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time as not to conflict with detenu's right to make representation, are not 
illegal. 
The delay of 11 days in serving the detention order is not violation of 
Article 22 (5), if the delay was valid and for sufficient reasons. 
Failure of one or more out of General Grounds: 
The law is well settled that when one of several grounds on which the 
order of detention is based, fails, the entire order of detention has to be struck 
down. This well-accepted rule has one exception that where the grounds are 
separately indicated and instances to support each ground are also supplied, 
the failure of one of the grounds will not make the order of detention hable to 
the struck down. 
If the detention order has been passed on several grounds and if one of 
the grounds fails then the detention order can be sustained on other grounds 
provided the constitutional and statutory safeguards are observed in 
confirming the detention order on the said grounds. 
In Kriso Shah v. State of Bihar'^'^the statement in the order of detention 
was that it was passed with a view to preventing the petitioner from acting in 
a mamier prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and the maintenance 
of supplies and services essential to the community but the facts in one of the 
three grounds had referred to more than a stray and simple fracas arising out 
of a bottleneck on a public sti'eet and those in another ground had referred to 
an assault on a prblic servant. It was held that the order was bad because of 
failure of two out of the three grounds. 
29. AIR 1974 SC 156. 
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Since too many grounds may vitiate an order of detention if any one of 
them is irrelevant or non-existent, the authorities should, therefore, be careful 
to see that only the relevant and valid grounds are selected having a nexus 
with the object of the order of detention. Vagueness only one of several 
grounds may invalidate an order of detention, even if other grounds are 
justified. In Mehtah Ch.Chakrnborty v. State of Assam, one of three grounds was 
vague and another had not constituted a ground at all. The order of detention 
was set aside. 
Supplementary Grounds: 
When the authorities have only furnished details of the grounds of 
detention already suppHed, they cannot be treated as fresh or new grounds. 
If by supplementary grounds is meant additional grounds, i.e. conclusions of 
fact required to bring about the satisfaction of the Government, the furnishing 
of any such additional grounds at a later stage will amount to an infringement 
of the first mentioned right in Article 22 (5) as the grounds for detention must 
be before the Government before it is satisfied about the necessity for making 
the order and all such grounds have to be furnished as soon as may be. 
It is not permissible for the detaining authority to justify the detention 
by amplifying and improving the grounds originally furnished. It is not open 
to the detaining authority to furnish grounds in several instalments. 
The law is by now well settled that a detenu has two rights under 
Article 22 (5) of the Constitution: (1) to be informed, as soon as may be of the 
grounds on which the order of detention is made, that is, the grounds which 
led to the subjective satisfachon of the detaining authorit}', and (2) to be 
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afforded the earliest opportunity of mal<iiig a representation against the order 
of detention, that is, to be furnished with sufficient particulars to enable him 
to make a representation which on being considered may obtain relief to him. 
The inclusion of an irrelevant or non-existent ground, among other relevant 
grounds is an infringement of the first of the rights and the inclusion of an 
obscure or vague ground among other clear and definite grounds is an 
infringement of the second of the rights. Therefore in this view of the legal 
position if the grounds are vague and indefiiiite that would amount to an 
infringement of the second right of the appellant. 
A detenu was detained in February, 1950, but he did not receive the 
particulars of the grounds served in the middle of March, until towards end 
of July, 1950. The so-called supplementary ground by giving specific 
instances to support the general statement made earlier. It was held that the 
detenu had been given the grounds of detention "as soon as may be". 
The expression "as soon as may be" has to be interpreted as meaning as soon 
as circumstances permit. 
A delay of 14 days in furnishing the grounds was held not 
unreasonable in Maqdoom Mohiuddin v. State of Hyderabad^^. The delay in 
furnishing the grounds is otherwise a question of fact to be determined in 
each case and this does not exclude reasonable time for formulating the 
ground on the materials in possession of the authorities. 
The grounds of detention are required to be prepared soon after the 
detenticr. if not simultaneously with it or prior thereto, In Mohit Lai v. State, a 
delay of 22 days was not held unreasonable. 
30, 
Question of Language of the Grounds served on detenu: 
In case the grounds of detention are furnished in English which 
language the detenu does not know or understand, the absence of h-anslated 
copy either in the regional language or at least in Hindi being supplied to the 
detenu will amount to violation of Article 22 (5).3i A mere oral explanation, in 
Hindi, of the English version of grounds is not sufficient compliance of the 
mandatory requirement of Article 22 (5). Copy of detention order served in 
English with copy of grounds served in language known to the detenu does 
not handicap the accused in making representation. Similarly, when a 
content of detention order was traiislated by person sei-ving order into 
language understood by detenu, the order was held to have been properly 
served. Communication of grounds of detention in a language which the 
detenu does not understand is no communication. 
Grounds served m English rvuining into fourteen t}^ped pages and 
referring to activities over 13 years iii addition to a large number of court 
cases concerning the detenu and his associates, will amount to denial of right 
of being communicated the grounds when a translation in script known to 
detenu has not been furnished but only an oral explanation of such a 
complicated order has been made by the authorities. 
Where the detenu did not know the Hindi language and was 
conversant only with Gurumukhi script and the order and grounds of 
detention were not supplied in Gurum-ukhi language, the detention was held 
to be illegal as no opportunit}' was offered to detenu to make representation. 
31, Nainmal Pratap Mai Shah v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 2129 
59 
The Question of Language is material only when the 
detenu has been prejudiced in making effective 
representation. 
When detenu is illiterate, the grounds read out and explained to him is 
sufficient compliance of law. 
Opportunity of Representation: An opportunity of making 
representation means an early opportunity. 
Right of representation imphes the sufficiency of grounds to enable 
detenu to exercise his right to make representation. 
The right to make representation includes not merely to take exception 
to the grounds or show that the grounds are not enabling but also to take 
exception to the validity of the order of detention. This right accrues not only 
after he detenu is served with the copy of the grounds but also during period 
between commencement of detention and date on which grounds are 
communicated to him. 
Opportunit}' of representation will be held to have been denied when 
out of several grounds for detention, even if one was never communicated to 
the detenu, as also when the mtelligence report and other materials 
considered by that detaining authority in passing detention order have not 
been put forth before the detenu. 
Effec t ive O p p o r t u n i t y : The opportimity of making a representation to 
be an effective opportunity would be one which provides a real and 
meaningful opportunit}' to the detenu to explain his case to the detaining 
authority. Unless the materials and documents relied in the order of 
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detention are supplied to the detenu along with the grounds, the supply of 
grounds simpliciter would merely give an illusory opportunity to make a 
representation,32 invalidating the order of detention,^^ entitling the detenu to 
be released.3'* It is immaterial in this context, to contend that the detenu was 
aware of contents of documents.^^ 
The Home Secretary and Home Minister could act on behalf of the 
State Government and, therefore, it is immaterial whether the detaining 
authority or Home Minister disposed of the representation.^^ 
It is no every failure to furnish copy of a document referred to in the 
grounds of detention which amounts to an infringement of Article 22 (5). 
What renders an order of detention illegal is failure to furnish copies of such 
documents as were relied on by the detaining authority, rendering it difficult 
for the detenu to make an effective representation. 
Disposal of Representation: 
(i) Forwarding of representation: The representation of the detenu is 
to be forwarded for disposal of the same by the competent authority, 
Failure on part either of the Jail Superintendent or of the State 
Government to forward the representation of the detenu to the Central 
Government will render the detention illegal. '^' The representation 
made by the detenu must without any delay be forwarded by the 
person receiviiig the same to the concerned authority, and it should be 
death with by the authority receiving the same as expeditiously as 
32. Kanila Kanyalal v. State of Maharashtra 1981 1 SCC 748 
33. Kirit Kumar Chaman Lai Kundalya v. Union of India, 1981 2 SCC 436 
34. Abdul Azizv. Delhi Administration, AIR 1981 SC 1839 
35. Mehrunnisa \. State of Maharashtra, 1981 2 SCC 23. 
36. Raverdy Mare Germain Jules v. State of Maharashtra. AIR 1983 SC 311 
37. Rattan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1982. SC. 1 
possible. Only so much time, which is absolutely necessary, in the 
circumstances of a particular case, in the representation reaching the 
concerned authority and in dealing with the same, can be 
countenanced. The burden of showing that all the time consumed in 
dealing with the representation was necessary, in he circumstances of 
the case is upon the detaining authority. 
An un explained delay of 28 days in forwarding the representation is 
violative of Article 21 of the Constitution.^^ Where the representation of 
the detenu was not received by the Government, the qrtestion of its 
being sent to the Advisory Board and the contravention of Article 22 
(5) does not arise. 
(ii) Authority competent for disposal of representation: There is 
iiothing in the Scheme of Article 22 of the Conservation of Foreign 
Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act 1974 - which 
requires that the representation ought always to be considered by the 
appropriate Government notwithstanding the fact that the order of 
detention has been made by an officer specially empowered in that 
behalf the power to revoke the order of detention conferred on the 
State and the Central Government does not mean that the initial 
representation, which the detenu has a right to make, must, of 
necessity, be considered by the Government. The initial representation 
that a detenu has a right to make, on receipt of the grounds of 
detention, would ordinarily be addressed to the detaining authority 
which has taken a decision adverse to the detenu and which has to be 
persuaded to reconsider the same^ though it is undoubtedly open to 
the detenu to make a presentation requesting the appropriate 
Government to revoke the order of detention. However, the failure to 
submit the presentation, addressed to the detaining authority and 
considered by him, to the Government would not vitiate the detention 
order.39 
38. .kilia .lose Ma\ely \. Union ol'lndia, AIR 1992 SC 1.39 al p. 141 
39. Pushpa (Smt.) v. Union oflndia. AIR 1979 SC 1953 
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Where the representation of the detenu against his detention was not 
placed before the Advisory Board by the State Government, the appropriate 
GoverniTient, within the period prescribed under Sec. 10, the detention could 
not be sustained. It could not be said that as the representation was 
addressed to the Advisory Board it would be tantamount to making no 
representation for consideration of which an obligation was cast on the State 
Government, arid therefore, thee was no violation of the mandatory 
procedure prescribed under the law. 
Reasons for disposal of representation - Whether 
necessary: 
The order of the appropriate Government, rejecting the representation 
of a detenu, need not be a speaking order, but this does not mean that the 
Government can reject the representation in a casual or mechanical mamier. 
The Government must bring to bear an unbiased mind on the 
representation.^^ 
Delay in Disposal of Representation: 
Although no period of time is fixed for disposal of representation, yet, 
it should be disposed of without unreasonable delay. Delay made in the 
consideration of detenu's representation-ii or in any step leding to disposal of 
representation, will be fatal to the detention. Where here had been delay of 
one month arid five days in communicating representation of the detenu from 
41). John Martin v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1975, SC 775 
41. Khatoon Begum (Smt.)v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 1077 
jail to the detaining authority, it was held''^ that detention was rendered illegal 
because of contravention of right to representation. 
In S.M. Jnhubar Sathic v. State of Tamil Nadu'^^ in Conservation of 
Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974, Section 3 
(1) and 9 (1), the court considered the explanation and have also examined the 
original files. The respondents before disposing of the representation and 
sought clarifications thrice. A perusal of the original file placed before us 
reveals that the clarifications were sought in the usual bureaucrahc style only 
for the sake of clarification without there being any need for it. In these 
circumstances, it cannot be said that the representation was disposed of with 
promptitude. On the contrary, even the explanation offered by the 
respondents in their counter affidavit filed before the High Court indicates 
the lethargic attitude with which the presentation was taken up, dealt with 
and ultimately disposed of after seeking clarifications thrice on issues which 
did really not arise nor were there any necessity for seeking clarifications. 
The representation could have been disposed of without seeking clarification 
which obviously was sought to cover up the delay in prompt disposal of the 
presentation. 
Since the matter was not considered by the High Court in the right 
perspective, the impugned judgement cannot be sustained. The appeal is 
allowed. The judgement and order dated 15.12.1998 passed by the High Court 
is set aside and the detention order dated 4.11.1997 passed uiider section 3 (1) 
(i) of the Act as also the declaration made on 27.Tl.1997 under section 9 (1) of 
42. Tara Chand \. Stale of Rjasthan 1981. 1 SCC 416 
43. 
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the Act are quashed with the direction that the appellant shall be set a Hberty 
forthwith unless his detention is required in connection with some other 
case 
44 
Clause 7: Jurisdiction of Advisory Board: The Advisory Board is a forum 
where the detenu has the opportunity of canvassing even such allegations for 
which the court is not proper forum, such as examining the truth or falsity oi 
the material upon which the order of detention is based. 
No law providing for preventive detention can authorise the detention 
for a longer period than two months unless before expiry of the said two 
months, the Advisory Board constituted, under Article 22 (4) has reported as 
to the expediency of detention for a long period. But, the Supreme Court*^ 
holds, that the Government is not bound by such opinion and can revoke a 
detention order despite such opinion. 
The Government must have first considered the representation before 
forwarding it to the Advisory Board.•^ ^ 
Notice to detenu is not necessary for confirmation of order of detention 
by Government.*'' 
Preventive Detention in India is a Constitutional Tyranny 
India is one of the few countries in the word whose Constitution allows 
for preventive detention during peacetime without safeguards that elsewhere 
are understood to be basic requirements for protecting fundamental human 
44. Website: supremecourtonlinexom 
45. Deb Sadhan Roy v. State of West Bengal 1972 1 SCC 308 
46. Jayanarayan Sukul v. Stale of West Bengal, .MR 1970 SC 675 
47. Karim Bux v. State of J & K. AIR 1969 
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lights. For example, the European Court of Human Rights has long held that 
preventive detention, as contemplated in the Indian Constitution, is illegal 
under the Europeaii Convention on Human Rights regardless of the 
safeguards embodied in the law. South Asia Human Rights Documentation 
Centre (SAHRDC), in its submission to the NCRWC in August 2000, 
recommended deleting those provisions of the Constitution of India that 
explicitly permit preventive detention.^^ 
Specifically, under Article 22, preventive detention may be 
implemented and infinitum - whether in peacetime, non-emergency 
situations or otherwise. The Constitution expressly allows an individual to be 
detained - without charge or trial - for up to three months and denies 
detainees the rights to legal representation, cross-examination, timely or 
periodic review, access to the courts or compensation for unlawful arrest or 
deteiition. In short, preventive detention as enshrined under Article 22 strikes 
a devastatmg blow to personal liberties. 
It also runs afoul of international standards. Article 4 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) - which hidia 
has ratified - admittedly permits derogation from guaranteeing certain 
personal liberties dining a state of emergency. The Government, however, 
has not invoked this privilege, nor could it, as the current situation in India 
does not satisfy with standards set forth in Article 4. 
If preventive detention is to remain a part of India's Constitution, it is 
imperative that its use be coixfined to specified, limited circumstances and 
48. Human Rights Features voice of Asia Pacific Human Rights Network 
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include adequate safeguards to protect the fundamental rights of detai]:iees. 
Particular procedural protections are urgently needed (i) to reduce detainees' 
vulnerability to torture and discriminatory treatment (ii) to prevent officials 
misusing preventive detention to punish dissent from Government or from 
majority practices; and (iii) to prevent overzealous government prosecutors 
from subverting the criminal process. In pursuit of these goals, SAHRDC 
made the following recommendations in its submission to the NCRVVC. 
First, Entry 3 of List HI of the Constitution of India, which allows 
Parliament and state legislatures to pass preventive detention laws in times of 
peace for "the maintenance of public order or maiiitenance of supply and 
services essential to the community", should be deleted. Assuming that 
preventive detention could be justified in the interest of national security as 
identified in Entry 9 of List I of the Constitution, there is still no compelling 
reason to allow this extraordinary measure in the circumstances identified in 
Entry 3 of List III. 
Second, lacking clear guidance from the Constitution, courts have 
applied vague and toothless standards - such as the subjective "satisfaction" 
of the detaining authority test - to govern the implementation of preventive 
detention laws. If preventive detention is to remain in the Constitution, 
constitutional provisions must include well-defined criteria specifying limited 
circumstances in which preventive detention powers may be exercised - and 
these standards must be designed to allov/ meaningful judicial review of 
official's actions. 
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Third, under Article 22 (2) every arrested person must be produced 
before a magisti-ate within 24 hours after arrest. However, Article 22 (3) (b) 
excepts preventive detention detainees from Clause (2) and, as a consequence, 
it should be repealed in the interest of human rights. AT present, detainees 
held under preventive detention laws may be kept in detention without any 
form of review for up to three months, art unconscionably long period in 
custody especially given the real threat of torture. At the very least, the 
Government should finally brmg Section 3 of the Forty-fourth Amendment 
Act, 1978 into effect, thereby reducing the permitted period of detention to 
two months. Though still a violation of international human rights law, this 
step would at least reduce the incidents of torture significantly. 
Fourth, the Advisory Board review procedure prescribed by the 
Constitution involved executive review of executive decision-making. The 
absence of judicial involvement violates detainees' right to appear before an 
"independent and impartial hibunal", in direct conh'avention of international 
human rights law including the ICCPR (Article 14 (1) and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (Article 10). The Constitution must be amended 
to include clear criteria for officials to follow, and subject compliance with 
those standards to judicial review. 
Fiftli, the Constitiition provides that the detaining authority must refer 
to the Advisory Board where detention is intended to continue beyond three 
months. No provision exists for the consideration of a detainee's case by the 
Adxisor}' Board more than once. Yet, periodic review is an indispensable 
protection to ensure that detention is "strictiy required" and fairly 
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administered. Hence, the Constitution should mandate periodic review of the 
conditions and terms of detention. 
Sixth, detaiiiees must receive detailed and prompt information about 
the grounds of their arrest. Currently, the detaining authorit}' is required 
only to communicate the grounds of detention to the detainee "as soon as 
may be" after the arrest. Article 9 (2) of the ICCPR provides that "[a] anyone 
who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons for his 
arrest and shall be promptly informed of any charges against him". Detainees 
must be guaranteed a minimum period in which the grounds are promptly 
communicated to them, and be given information sufficient to permit the 
detainee to challenge the legality of his or her detention. 
Seventh, individuals held under preventive detention must be given the 
right to legal counsel and other basic procedural rights provided by Articles 
21 22 (1) and 22 (2) of the Constihition. Article 22 (1) of the Constitution, for 
example, guarantees the right to legal counsel, but Article 22 (3) (b) stiips this 
right from persons arrested or detained under preventive detention law. 
Relying on these provisions, the Supreme Court stated, in A.K. Roy v. Union 
of India, that detainees do not have the right to legal representation or cross-
examination in Advisory Board hearings. Conti-ary to India's constitutional 
practice, the U.N. Human Rights Committee has stated, "all persons arrested 
must have immediate access to counsel". Article 22 (3) (b) of the Constitution -
denying detainees virtually all procedural rights during Advisory Board 
hearings - must be repealed. 
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Eighth, Article 9 (5) of the ICCPR provides the right to compensation 
for unlawful detention, except during public emergencies. A similar provision 
creating a right to compensation is included in section 38 of the Prevention of 
Terrorism Bill of 2000 (though the bill is otherwise effectively a reconstitution 
of the lapsed Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Prevention Act (TADA). The 
Law Commission charged with reshaping the antiterrorism legislation 
observed that Supreme Court orders have held that people are effectively 
entitled to compensation, in practice superseding India's reservation to 
Article 9 (5) of the ICCPR. In this Hght, the Government of India should 
promptly withdraw its reservation of Article 9 (5) of the ICCPR and include a 
Constitutional provision guaranteeing the right to compensation, at lest for 
unlawful detention during peacetime. 
In keeping with the overriding spirit of the Constitution and with 
minimum standards of international human rights law, it is esseiitial that the 
Constitutional reforms discussed above be adopted. The process set in motion 
by establishing the NCRWC provides a unique opportunity for such an 
important reahgnment of India's Constitution with prevailing international 
human rights standards. The key will be political willpower and the 
commitment to seeing justice done. 
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STATE/ZidNT RoFERRuD TO'IN REPLY TO PAPJ. (a)' OF LOK SABFA 
UNSTARfiED QUESTION' NO,2555 DUH FOR /J'^ SWER ON 12.6.1993 
Statement_showing_the_Numb.ei: af_perions_ord£rici_t£ ^e_d£.taj.riel 
under the Droyisions_of the National Security. Aet,_1980 during_ 










































































































Note;- 1, The National Security Act, 1980 is not applicable to 
Je^ niu and Kashmir. 
The State Goverraients of jCer.aia, -/est Bengal, Arunachal 
Pradesh, and U.T.Adrainistrations of Dadr-a and f-'agar 
naveli, Lakshadweep, Pondicherry, and Daman and Diu 
have not invoked the provisions of NSA. 
statement referred to par t b) of Rajya Sa'bha Unstarred Question 
Wo.il99 for answer en 14.12.94. 
S.No. Narr.e of the S t a t e / Available information regarr^ing 
Dec.'9l Dec.'92 Dec.'93 Oct.'94 
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 
— — — — — •- — • • • • • • r ' — — * - - ^ — — -* — — — — — •" — — •- — •^ — — — -" — •" 
1. Andhra Pradesh 2418 
2. Arunachal Pradesh IC 
3. Assam 3919 
4. Bihar 56 
D. Gujarat 1514 
6, Haryana 356 
K.P. 2 
8, J&K 2-^ 49 
9, Karnataka 1 
10, Kerala 
11, Maharashtra 181 
1/- # !• 1 . : . I U 
13. Manipur 276 
14. Meqhalaya MA 
15. ^unjab . 2636 
16. Rajas i'han 97 
17. Tamil Nadu 139 
18. U.". 277 
19. ^Vest Bengal 1^ 11 







































*Infon!'.2tion is maintained only Quarterly and not monthly, and, hence 
the date for Oct, 1994 is not available, 
? '^975 persons, 17875 oersons and 24554 oersons were released on bail 
as on Dec.'91, Dec.'92 and Dec.'93 resnectively.' 
Note;- The orovisions of TADA are invoked by 19 States at present. 
Reply to part (a) and tb) of the Rsjya Sabha Starred Question 





























s/ No. of parsons 
arrested under 
TADA t i l l the 




to May 1995 
3 . 
7485 











































































TADA t i l l 
the 
repeal 






























TADA by the 
review comnittees 
^ ^ T A ^ TV \ r \ / U * « L i M w W V W ^ 










































































USO No. 3608 
No. of persons arrested 
under TADA till the 
repeal of the TADA 
Act/Cumulative from 

























J{a6eas Corpus Suspension of the TundamentaC 
^Hts in Emergency 
70 
Chapter-II 
HABEAS CORPUS SUSPENSION OF THE 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN EMERGENCY 
(ADM Jabalpur v. S. Shukla)i 
(Maintainability of Petition for Habeas Corpus During Emergency - MISA) 
The Proclamation of Emergency in the Country - Mrs. Indira Gandhi 
virtually made hash of Article 32 as without consulting the cabinet colleagues, 
she forced the President to sign the proclamation of emergency documents 
and under duress and in Gross violation of the provisions of Article 452 of the 
ConstilTjtion of India. 
Mrs. Indira Gandhi wrote top secret letter to the Hon'ble President of 
India which is on record of the Rashpati Bhawan and is herewith being 
reproduced below. It does not having any correspondence number: 
New Delhi 
June 25,1975 
Dear Rashtrapati Ji, 
As already explained to you a little while ago, information has reached 
us which indicates that there is an immiiient danger to the securit)' of India 
being threatened by internal disturbance. The matter is extremely urgent. 
1 would have liked to have taken this to Cabitiet, but unfortunately this 
is not possible tonight. I am, therefore, condoning or permitting a departure 
from the Government of India^ as amended up-to-date by virtue of my 
powers under 12 thereof. 1 shall mention the matter to the Cabinet first thing 
tomorrow morning. 
1. AI1U976SC1207 
2. Transaction of Business Rules 1961 
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In the circumstances and in case you are so satisfied, a requisite 
Proclamation order under Art. 352 (1) has become necessary. I am enclosing a 
copy of the draft Proclamation for your consideration. As you are aware, 
under Art. 352 (3) even when thee is an imminent danger of such a threat as 
mentioned by me, the necessary Proclamation under Art. 352 (1) can be 
issued. 
1 recommend that such a Proclamation should be issued tonight, 
however late, it may be, and all arrangements will be made to make it public 
as early as possible thereafter. 




Proclamation of Emergency 
In exercise of powers conferred by cl. (1) of Art. 352 of the Constitution, I, 
Fakhruddin Ali Ahmad, President of India, by this Proclamation declare that 
a grave emergency exists whereby the security of India is threatened by 
internal disturbance. 
New Delhi President 
June 25,1975 
The proclamation of Emergency was an a clips of the right of person 
liberty. My learned teacher Dr. M. Ghous commenting on the majority 
judgement in the habeas corpus case has criticised the judgment in the 
following words: 
"The emergency -jurisprudence on personal liberty brings into focus the 
fact that the Supreme Court was the guardian of democracy while nine of 
our High Courts performed the role of sentinel on the qui vive, so far as 
individual riglits were concerned. Tliese High Courts had only followed 
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the decisions of Supretne Court which the majority in Shukla's case was 
iinunlling to follozo and unable to override. These very decisions are 
enough to discredit and to discard Shukla." 
Brief Facts of the Case were as under: 
Consequent on the Pakistani aggression, the President issued a 
Proclamation of Emergency on 3.12.1971 on the ground that the security of 
India was threatened by external aggression. By an order dated 5.12.1971 
issued u/Art. 359 (1) of the Constitution, the right of 'foreigners' to move any 
Court for the enforcement of rights conferred by Arts. 14, 21 & 22 was 
suspended. 
In September 1974 the MISA was amended by Ordinance 11 of 1974 to 
include sub-sectioii (c) in Sec. 3 (1) by which the right to detain was given as 
against smugglers and offenders under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 
1947. On 16.11.1974 the President issued a Declaration u/Art. 359 (1) 
suspending the right of persons detained u/s 3 (1) (c) of the MISA to move for 
enforcement of the rights conferred by Arts. 14, 21 and Cls. (4), (5), (6), (7) of 
Art. 22 of the Constitution. 
On 25/6/1975 in exercise of powers conferred by CI. (1) of Art. 359 the 
President declared that the right of any person including a foreigner to move 
any court for the enforcement of the rights conferred by Arts. 14, 21 & 22 and 
all proceedings pending in any Court for the enforcement of the above 
mentioned rights shall remain suspended for the period during which the 
Proclamations of Emergenc}' made under Article 352 (1) on 3.12.1971 and on 
25/6/1975 are both in force. The Presidential order of 27.6.1975 further stated 
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that the same shall be in addition to and not in derogation of any order made 
before the date of the aforesaid order u/Article 359 (1). 
The President promulgated the amending Ordinances No. 4 & 7 of 
1975, were replaced by the Maintenance of Internal Security (Amending Act), 
1975 introducing a new Sec. 16-A and giving a deemed effect to Sec. 7 of the 
Act was on 25.6.1975. A new Sec. 18 was also inserted w.e.f. 25.6.1975. 
By the Constitution (Thirty-eighth Amendment) Act, 1975, Article 123, 
213, 239 (b), 352, 356, 359 & 368 were amended. Cls. (4) & (5) were added in 
Article 352. The above Amendment renders the satisfaction of the President 
or the Governor in the relevant Articles final and conclusive and to be beyond 
any question in any Court on any ground. The Constitution (Thirty-ninth 
Amendment) Act was pubUshed on 10.8.1975, amending Arts. 71, 329 & 329 
(A) and added Entries after Entry 86 in the 9*^  Schedule and also the 
Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 as item 92 in the above Schedule. 
All the amendments made by the Ordinance were given retrospective effect 
for the purpose of validating all acts done previously. On 25.1.1976 the said 
Ordinances were published as the Maintenance of Internal Security 
(Amendment) Act 1976. 
Various persons detained u /s 3 (1) of MISA filed petitions in different 
HCs for the issue of the writ of Habeas Coiyus. Also challenged the vires of the 
Ordmance issued by the President on '27.6.1975, as unconstitutional and 
moperative in law and prayed for setting aside of the order and for directing 
their release immediately. In some of the cases, the petitioners challenged the 
validity of the Thirty-eighth and Thirt}'-nmth Constitution Amendment Acts. 
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When those petitions came up for hearing, the Government raised a 
prehminary objection to their maintainabiUty on the ground that in asking for 
release by issuance of a writ of habeas corpus the detenus were in substance 
claiming that they had been deprived of their personal liberty in violation of 
the procedure established by law, which plea was available to them u/Article 
21 only. The right to move for enforcement of the right conferred by the 
Article having been suspended by the Presidential order dated 27.6.1975 the 
petitions, according to the Government were liable to be dismissed at the 
threshold. 
The preHiiTinary objechons have been rejected for one reason or 
another by the HCs of Allahabad, Bombay, Delhi, Karnataka, M.P. , Punjab 
and Rajasthan. Broadly, these HCs have taken the view that despite the 
Presidential order it is open to the detenus to challenge their detention on the 
ground that it is ultra vires, as e.g., by showing that the order on the face of it 
is passed by an authorit}' not empowered to pass it, or it is in excess of the 
power delegated to the authority', or that the power has been exercised in 
breach of the conditions prescribed in that behalf by the Act. Some of these 
HCs have further held that the detenus can attack the order of detention on 
the ground that it is mala fide, as for example, by showing that the detaining 
authorit)^ was influenced by irrelevant considerations, or that the authority 
was actuated by improper motives. 
Being aggriex'ed by the finding recorded by these HCs on the 
prelmimary pomt, the State Govts, and the Govt, of India have filed these 
appeals, some under certificates granted by the HCs and some by special 
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leave granted by this Court. The HCs of A.P., Kerala and Madras have 
upheld the preliminary objection. 
The arguments advanced on behalf of the respondents covered a wide 
range but they may be summarized thus: 
1. The object of Article 359 (1) and the effect of an order issued under it is 
to remove restraints agauist the Legislature so that during the 
emergency it is free to make laws in violation of the fundamental rights 
mentioned in the Presidential order. 
2. Under a Constitution which divides State functions into Executive 
functions must be discharged consistently with the valid laws passed 
by the Legislature and the orders and decrees passed by the Judiciary. 
The suspension of the right to enforce fundamental rights cannot 
confer any right on the Executive to flout the law by which it is bound 
as much ui times of emergency as in times of peace. Since thee is a 
valid law regulating preventive detention, namely, the MISA, every 
order of detention passed by the Executive must conform to the 
conditions prescribed by that law. 
3. Article 359 (1) may remove fetters imposed by Part III but it cannot 
remove those arising from the principle of rule of law or from the 
principle of the limited power of the Executive under the system of 
checks and balances based on separation of powers. 
4. The obHgation cast on the Executive to act in accordance with the law 
does not arise from any particular Article of the Constitution but from 
the inherent compulsion arising from the principle of rule of law which 
is a cential feature of the Constitutional system and is a basic feature of 
the Constitution. The suspension of the right to enforce Article 21 does 
not automatically entail the suspension of rule of law. Even during 
emergency, the rule of law is not and cannot be suspended. 
5. The Presidential order u/Article 359 (1) may bar the enforcement of 
fundamental rights mentioned in the order by a petition u/Article 32 
before the Supreme Court. But, the Presidential order cannot bar the 
enforcement of rights other than fundamental rights by a petition filed 
u/Article226intheHC. 
6. Common law rights as well as statutory rights to personal Hberty can 
be enforced through writ petitions filed u/Article 226, despite the 
Presidential order issued u/Article 359 (1). Similarly, contractual 
rights, natiiral rights and non-fundamental constitiitional rights like 
those u/Articles 256, 265 & 361 (3), can be enforced u/Article 226. 
Article 226 empowers the HCs to issue writs and directions for the 
enforcement of fundamental rights, "and for any other purpose". 
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7. The essence of the inquiry in a Habeas Corpus petition is whether the 
detentions justified by law or is ultra vires the law. Such an inquiry is 
not shut out by the suspension of the right to enforce fundamental 
rights. 
8. If the Presidential order is construed as a bar to the maintainabiHty of 
the writ petitions u/ArticIe 226, that Article shall have been amended 
without a proper and valid constitutional amendment. 
9. Article 21 is not the sole repository of the right to life or personal 
liberty. There is no authority for the proposition that on the 
conferment of fundamental rights by Part III, the corresponding pre-
=existing rights merged with the fundamental rights and that with the 
suspension of fundamental rights, the corresponding pre-existing 
rights also got suspended. 
10. Suspension of the right to enforce Article 21 cannot put a citizen in a 
worse position than in the pre-Constitution period. The pre-
Constitution right of libert}'^  was a right in rem and was totally 
dissimilar from the one created by Article 21. The pre-Constitiition 
right was merely a right not to be detained, save under the authority of 
law. 
11. Civil liberty or personal liberty is not a conglomeration of positive 
right. It is a negative concept and constitutes an area of free action 
because no law exists curtailing it or authorising its curtailment. 
12. Section 16A (9) of the MISA is u/Article 226 by creating a presumption 
that the ground on which the order of detention is made and any 
information or material on which the grounds are based shall be 
treated as confidential and shall be deemed to refer to matters of State, 
so that it will be against the public interest to disclose the same. 
13. Section 18 of MISA as amended by Act 39 of 1975 which came into 
force w.e.f. 25.6.1975 cannot affect the maintainability of the present 
petitions which were filed before the Amendment. 
14. The dismissal of writ petitions on the ground that such petitions are 
barred by reason of the Presidential order issued u/Article 359 (1) 
would necessarily mean that during the emergency no person has any 
right to life or personal liberty; and 
15. If the detenus are denied any forum for the redress of their grievances, 
it would be open to the Executive to whip the detenus to starve them, 
to keep them in solitary confinement and even to shoot them, which 
would be a starling state of affairs in a countiy governed by a written 
Constitution ha\ mg in it a Chapter on Fundamental Rights. The 
Presidential order cannot permit the reduction of Indian citizens into 
slaves. 
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The validity of the 38"^  and 39"^  Constitution (Amendment) Acts were 
not challenged by the respondents. 
Questions involved: 
1. Whether, in view of the Presidential order dated 27.6.1975, under CI. 
(1) of Article 359, any writ petition is maintainable u/Article 226, 
before a HC for Habeas Corpus to enforce the right to personal liberty 
of a person detained under the MISA on the ground that the order of 
detention or the continued detentions, for any reason, not under or in 
compliance with MISA? 
2. If such a petition is maintainable, what is the scope or extent of judicial 
scrutiny, particularly, in view of the aforesaid Presidential order which 
covers, inter alia, CI. (5) of Article 22, and also in view of sub-section (9) 
of Section 16-A of the MISA? 
Per majority; A.N. Ray, CJ., M.H. Beg., Y.V. Chandrachud and P.N. 
Bhagwati, JJ allowed the appeal of the ADM, Jabalpur with the following 
observations: 
The jurisdiction of the Court in times of emergency in respect of 
detention under the Act is restricted by the Act because the Government is 
entrusted with the task of periodical review. Even if the generality of the 
words used in Section 3 (1) of the Act may not be taken to show an intention 
to depart from the principle in ordinary times that the Courts are not 
deprived of the jurisdiction where bad faith is involved, there are ample 
indications in the provisions of the Act, viz.. Section 16-A (2), proviso to 
Section 16-A (3), Section 16-A (4), Sections 16-A (5), 16-A (7) (ii) & 16-A (9) of 
the Act to bar a challenge to the detention on the basis of malafides. This Court 
said that an action to decide the order on the grounds of malafides does not lie 
because under the provisions no action is maintainable for the purpose. This 
Court also referred to the decision in the Liversidge case where the Court held 
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that the jurisdiction of the Court was ousted in such way that even questions 
of bad faith could not be raised. 
The production of the order which is duly authenticated constitutes a 
pre-emptory answer to the challenge. The onus of showing that the detaining 
authority was not acting in good faith is on the detenu. This burden caiinot 
be discharged because of the difficulty of proving bad faith in the exercise of 
subjective discretionary power vested in the administration. 
So long as the authority is empowered by law action taken to realise 
that purpose is not mala fide. When the order of detention is on the face of it 
within the power conferred, the order is legal. 
The width and amplitude of the power of detention u / s 3 of the Act is 
to be adjudged iii the context of the emergency proclaimed by the President. 
The Court cannot compel the detauiing authority to give the particulars of the 
grounds on which he had reasonable, cause to believe that it was necessary to 
exercise this control. An investigation into facts or allegations of facts based 
on iiialfi fides is not permissible because such a course will involve advertence 
to the grounds of detention and materials constituting those grounds which is 
not competent in the context of the emergency. 
Conclusion: 
1. In view of the Presidential Order dated 27.6.1975 under CI. (1) of 
Article 359 of our Constitution no person has loais standi to move any 
writ petition u/Article 226 before a HC for Habeas corpus or any other 
v\'rit or order or direction to enforce any right to personal liberty of a 
person detained under the Act on the grounds that the order of 
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detention or the continued detention is for any reason not under or in 
compliance with the Act or is illegal or mala fide. 
2. Article 21 is the sole repository of rights to life and personal hberty 
against the State. Any claim to a writ of habeas corpus is enforcement of 
Article 21 and is therefore, barred by the Presidential order. 
3. Section 16-A (9) of the Act is valid. It is a rule of evidence and it is not 
open either to the detenus or to the Court to ask for grounds of 
detention. 
4. It is not competent for any Court to go into questions of mala fides of the 
order of detention or ultra vires character of the order of detention or 
that the order was not passed on the satisfaction of the detaining 
authority. 
Result: 
The appeals are accepted. The judgements of the High Courts are set 
aside. 
Justice Khann's dissent: 
A dispassionate analysis of the habeas corpus case reveals that the 
quintessence of the case hes with the dissent of Khanna J. and the decisions of 
the nine High Courts. Certainly the dissenting opinions will serve to the 
posterity as beacon hghts in their stiides towards the search and maintenance 
of the rule of law viz-a-vis rule of men. Shri Jayaprakash Narain had 
commented that the judgment in the habeas corpus case had put out the last 
flickering candle of individual liberty. Shri M.C. Chagla characterised the 
decision as "the worst in the history of Indian Supreme Court". Shri V.M. 
Tarkunde, a former judge of the Bombay High Court and a leading member 
of the Supreme Court Bar labelled it as "judicial suicide". The majority could 
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have taken a different view as was done by nine High Courts and the dissent 
of Shri Justice Khartna when they upheld the right of personal Hberty and 
ruled that even in the absence of Fundamental Rights, "the state has got no 
power to deprive a person of his life and personal liberty without the 
authority of law. That is the essential postulate and the basic assumption of 
the rule of law in every civilised society" .^  Justice Khanna's dissent aroused 
international interest in view of its importance and far reaching impact on the 
biggest democracy of the world. The foreign press and jurists acclaimed his 
dissent. The New York Times commented that 'it deserved to be engraved in 
letters of gold'. A typical view was expressed by the same Newspaper as 
follows: 
"Indian democrats are likely to remember in infamy the four judges xoho 
obediently overturned the decisions of more than half a dozen lower (High) 
courts who had ruled in defiance of the Government that the writ of the 
habeas corpus could not be suspended even during emergency But 
they unll long cherish the lonely grounds, but it could have exposed in a 
limited way the procedural laxity, the arbitrary manner and the partisan 
motivations xvhich appear by all accounts to have accompanied the 
mindless exercise of the draconian powers of detention" } 
It should not be difficult to agree with the above views because ii"i the 
absence of Article 21 in the Constitution, it would not mean that people of 
India have no right to live which is a natural right. Article 21 merely lays 
down that this right can be taken away by the State only according to law. If 
the State is allowed the arbitrary decision in this matter then the very purpose 
of incorporating it in the Constitution will stand self-defeated. Analysing and 
appreciating Justice Khanna's Judgement, Professor Raghavan commented: 
3. AIR 1976 SC 1241-1277 
4. Dr. L.M. Singhvi, "The Times of India", February 15,1978 
"the path breaking tone of the dissent is refreshing not only for the reason 
that it affirms the continuing validity of the Makhan Singh decision of the 
court inspite of the fact that the Presidential Order of June 1975 xvas in 
terms unconditional or absolute, but it sets our vision high enough to 
•permit a wider and more informed perspective of the Constitutional 
commitment to defend basic freedoms." P 
With this dissenting judgement, like Lord Atkin's dissent in the 
famous English case, Justice Khanna has come to be placed in the galaxy of 
celebrated judges who had always held dear the rule of law as against the 
pressures and temptations of the Government. It is well known that this 
judgement cost him the Chief Justiceship of the country. It can, therefore, be 
correctly assumed that this dissent will serve as a trend-setter in the Indian 
Administrative law and democratic jurisprudence. 
The appeals decided by the Sup. CI. in the Habeas Corpus Case arose out 
of habeas corpus applications filed by several detenus who prayed for their 
release from illegal preventive detention. A preliminary objection was raised 
by the Union and/or the State ("the State") that in view of the President's 
Order under Article 359 suspending the right of any person (including a 
foreigner) to move any court for the enforcement of his fundamental rights 
under Articles 14, 19, 21 and 22, the petitioners had no locus standi to 
maintain the petition, because, in substance, the detenus were seeking to 
enforce their fundamental right under Article 21, namely, that they should 
not be deprived of their personal liberty except by procedure established by 
law. The High Courts of Allahabad, Andhra Pradesh, Bombay, Delhi, 
Karnataka, Madras, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab and Haryana and Rajasthan, 
rejected this contention and held that though the petitioners could not move 
5. C.G, Raghvan, "Indian Constitution: Trends and Issues", p. 271 (ILI, 1978) 
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the Court to enforce their fundamental right under Article 21, they were 
entitled to show that the order of detention was not under or in compliance 
with the law or was mala fide. The consensus of judicial opinion was against 
the view of the four judges of the Sup. Ct. in the Habeas corpus case. But that 
consensus was brushed aside. Chandrachud J. found that the trouble with 
the High Court judges was that they lacked judicial detachment. He did not 
put it as bluntly as that; he administered his rebuke in sweet, soothing syrup: 
"But at the back of one's mind is the facile distrust of executive 
declarations which recite threat to the security of the country, particularly 
by internal disturbance. The mind then weaves cobwebs of suspicion and 
the Judge without the means to knowledge of full facts, covertly weighs the 
pros and cons of the political situation and substitutes his personal 
opinion for the assessment of the Executive ....A frank and unreseroed 
acceptance of the proclamation of emergency, even in the teeth of one's 
oxim pre-disposition, is conducive to a more realistic appraisal of the 
emergency provisions".^ 
In other words, judges in the nine High Courts did not show the 
judicial detachment required from judges. Their minds were enmeshed in 
cobwebs of suspicion and they substituted their personal opinions for the 
assessment of the executive. By reversing their judgements Chandrachud J. 
reminded them of their judicial duty in a judgement which enforced that duty 
by precept and example. 
Anyone who reads and re-reads the four judgements - for they occupy 
306 pages of the Sup. Ct. Reports - will be filled with amazement that the four 
judges should not have asked the central question raised by the Habeas Corpus 
Case and, even more, that they should have failed to realize the implications 
of the fu'st question which the Att. Gen. formulated, and the concession 
1976 Supp. SCR at p.380 (76) ASC at p. 1325 
which he made m answering that question. We will, therefore, consider the 
question raised by the Habeas Corpus Case independently of the discussion in 
the four judgements, and will refer to those judgements in the light of our 
independent discvission. 
Therefore it remains to add that the Habeas Corpus Case is the most 
glaring instance in which the Supreme Court of India has suffered most 
severely from a self-inflicted wound.-' 
The judgement in the Habeas Corpus case was totally illegal and 
arbitrary and it proves that our Supreme Covtrt failed to protect the innocent 
citizens of India. This judgement is anti-democratic and has been widely 
criticised by the jurists. 
7. H.M. Seervai, "Constitutional Law of India" Fourth Edition, Appendix part II. 
Chapter-Ill 
^ersonaCLiberty' and '^eventive (Detention 
Micks 21 4.22 
84 
Chapter-Ill 
PERSONAL LIBERTY' AND 'PREVENTIVE 
DETENTION' - ARTICLES 21 & 22 
Ultimately, as Granville Austin says, the story of 'due process' and 
'liberty' in the Constituent Assembly was the story of preventive detention. 
The provisions for preventive detention contained in Article 22 of the Indian 
Constitution have not only provoked endless litigation and filled the pages of 
the law reports, but have, at the same time, aroused tremendous controversy 
in this country and abroad by virtue of their nature, extent and practice by the 
executive authorit}^ of the coimtry. In justifying such a provision. Dr. 
Ambedkar said, on the floor of the Constituent Assembly that "in the present 
circumstances of the country, it may be necessary for the executive to detain a 
person who is tampering either with public order Or with the Defence 
Services of the counby. In such a case 1 do not think that the exigency of the 
liberty of the individual should be placed above the interests of the State."^ 
There were, of course, many critics of this provision in the Constituent 
Assembly who remarked that Article 15 prepared by the Drafting Committee 
was 'the crown of our failures because by virtue of Article 15 we have given 
the executive and the legislature power to do as they like with the people of 
this counti-y so far as procedure is concerned"^, that Article ISA was the most 
reactionary article that has been placed by the Drafting Committee before the 
House^, that these provisions reduced "the chapter of fundamental rights into a 
1. Constitiient Assembly Debates, Vol. IX, p. 1498 
2. Ibid., p. 1501, (Pt. Thakurdas Bhargava) 
3. Ibid., p. 1529, (Dr. Bakshi Tek Chand), 
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penal code worse than the D.L Rules of the old government"'^, and that "It is not 
only restriction, but it Is a case of contradiction, total contradiction of the 
rights"^. But, in spite of these critical sentiments, the provisions for preventive 
detention side by side with those for punitive detention found their place in 
the final Constitution that emerged. Although it was widely felt that the 
provision for preventive detention constituted a serious invasion of personal 
liberty, the Constitution, recognizing the need for the resurgent nation to 
protect itself adequately from anti-social, subversive elements, sought to give 
a legal status to preventive detention. In accordance with the authority so 
conferred, and subject to the safeguards incorporated, the Indian Parliament 
enacted the Preventive Detention Act in 1950. This Act enabled the Central 
Government or a State Government to place under detention any person, if it 
was satisfied that it was necessary to do so in order to prevent such, person 
from acting In any manner prejudicial to (i) the defence of India, the relations 
of India with foreign powers, or the security of Iiidia, or (ii) the security of the 
state or the maintenance of public order, or (iii) the maintenance of supplies 
and services essential to the community. Originally enacted as a temporary 
measure for a period of one year only, the Act continued to be on the statute 
book as a result of periodic extensions and renewals, until it lapsed on the 
31st December, 1969. Under the Act, the jurisdiction of the Courts had been 
confined solely to the examination of the question whether a detenue had 
been furnished with the grounds of his detention to an extent sufficient to 
enable him to make, his representations to the Advisory Board. With the lapse 
4. Ibid., p. 1548 (Sn Mahavir Tyagi) 
5. Ibid., p. 1549. 
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of the P.D. Act, 1950, several State Governments have enacted the Prevention 
of Violent Activities, Acts and the Maintenance of Internal Supplies Acts for 
similar purposes and. on the same lines as the former P.D. Act. 
It is apparent that the scope for Judicial Review in the field of 
preventive detention is extremely limited since the jurisdiction of the Courts 
has been purposely kept confined to a very narrow range, as Is evident from 
the provisions of the former P.D. Act, 1950, and the recently introduced 
P.V.A. Acts. It is famihar kiiowledge that the 'Gopalan' case was brought 
before the Supreme Court of India to decide the question whether the 
impugned Act, viz., the Preventive Detention Act (IV of 1950) was ultra vires, 
being in violation of Arts. 19, 21 and 22, of the Constitution. It may be recalled 
that the Judges, while admitting the odiousness of detention without hial, 
pleaded their utter helplessness in the matter, since the Constitution has 
specifically sanctioned preventive detention in Article 22. 
Significant cases decided by the Supreme Court: 
In Motilal Jain v. State of Bihar'', the Supreme Court held that 
individual liberty is a cherished right, one of the most valuable fundamental 
rights guaranteed by the Constitution. If that right is invaded except strictly in 
accordance with law, the aggrieved party is entitled to appeal to the judicial 
power of the State for relief. The interest of the societ}' is no less important 
than that of the Individual. The provisions of the Constitution for 
safeguarding the interests of the society harmonise the liberty of the 
individual with social interests. The authorities have to act solely on the basis 
6. AIR 1968 SC 1509. 
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of those provisions. They cannot deal with the liberty of the individual in a 
casual manner. Such an approach does not advance the true social interest. 
This judgment, in a sense, sets the correct perspective in which the role of the 
Court is to be judged in the matter of reconciling Article 21 with Article 22, 
for, as laid down in Krisltnan v. State of Madras^, Arts, 21 and 22 confer a 
fundamental right and constitute a fundamental guarantee, and it is the duty 
of the Court to see that the right is kept fundamental and that the fullest scope 
is given to the guarantee. Article 22 provides for protection against arrest and 
detention in certaiii circumstances, and provides for certain safeguards Clause 
(3) states, inter alia, that nothing in Cls. (1) aiid (2) shall apply to any person 
who is arrested or detained under any law providing for preventive 
detention. The word 'preventive' is used in contradistinction to the word 
'punitive'. As laid down by Mukherjea, J. in the 'Gopalan' case, preventive 
detention is not a punitive but a precautionary measure. Its object is not to 
punish a man for having done something but to intercept him before he does 
it and' to prevent him from doing it. In preventive detention no offence is 
proved, nor any charge formulated; and the justification for such detention is 
suspicion or reasonable probabilit)' and not criminal conviction which can 
only be, warranted by legal evidence. Although it is a most unwholesome 
encroachment on the liberties of the people, preventive detention has been 
made an integral part of the Indian Constitution, and the Court was of the 
opinion that although such a law was odious at all times, it was not for the 
Court to question the wisdom and polic}' of the Constitution which the people 
have given to themselves. Any legislation relating to preventive detention 
7. AIR 1951, SC 301: 1951 SCR 621. 
would only have to conform to the requirements of Cls. (4) to (7) of Article 22, 
and provided that is done, there is nothing in the language employed, nor in 
the context in which it appears, which affords any ground for suggesting that 
such law must be reasonable in its character and that it would be reviewable 
by the Court on that ground. 
LIFE AND PERSONAL LIBERTY 
Meaning and Significance: 
While Article 19 provides that a citizen shall have the various rights 
enumerated, and proceeds to lay down the extent to which these rights may 
be curtailed by the State by means of laws imposing 'reasonable restrictions', 
Articles 21 and 22 are couched in a negative form and purport to enact 
restrictions on the power of the State. Article 21 says, "no person shall be de-
prived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by laxu". 
Certainly, this is the most primary, the most cherished, as well as the most 
'fundamental' of all Fundamental Rights. The content or meaning of 'personal 
libert}'' is not found in the Constitution itself, but a peep into the history of the 
framing of this Article shows that liberty' was sought to be qualified by the 
word 'personal', because, otherwise, it might be construed very widely so as 
to include even the freedoms already dealt with in Article 13 (corresponding 
to the present Article 19) of the Draft C~onstitution. The Advisory Committee 
had recommended: 
"No person shall be deprived of his life or liberty without due process of 
taw, nor shall any person be denied the equal treatment of the lav^s within 
the territory of Union"^. 
8. Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. Ill, p. 428. 
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Apart from qualifying 'liberty' with 'personal', the Drafting Committee 
also substituted the expression 'except according to procedure established by 
law' for the words 'due process of law' on the ground that the former would 
be more 'specific' and would minimise the possibility of the intellectual 
yardstick of the judiciary being applied indiscriminately in interpreting svich 
.a vague and elastic phrase as 'due process of law'. As we all know now, there 
was 'fierce "controversy over this drafting. Supporters of 'due processes 
would have liked to preserve it for its procedural safeguards, primarily 
against executive action. But Sir B. N. Rau, who had met Justice Frankfurter of 
the United States Supreme Court, and convinced after his discussions that the 
power of Judicial Review implied iii the due process clause was both 
undemocratic and burdensome to the Judiciary, pointed to the 'substantive' 
meaning of 'due process' and the impact of such substantive interpretation on 
legislation for social purposes.^ Among the supporters of the due process 
clause Sri KM. Munshi delicate and the most critical issue of 'due process' 
versus preventive detention. While Dr. Ambedkar, in spite of presenting the 
two aides of the picture, Refrained from committing himself to any categorical 
decision'", it was AUadi Krishnaswami Ayyar, originally a strong advocate of 
the 'due process clause', who tilted the scale in favour of procedure estab-
lished by law.' Vv'hile Ambedkar very correctly observed that "the question of 
the relationship between the legislature and the judiciary."^^ Shri AUadi 
Krislinaswami Ayyar frankly admitted that this expression, as developed in 
9. Granville Austin, The Indian Constitution - Cornerstone of a Nation, O.U.P., 1966, pp. 
102-103. 
10. Constihient Assembly Debates, Vol. VII, 1948, pp. 1000-1001. 
11. Ibid., p. 1000 
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the U.S. Supreme Court, had acquired, in a long course of American judicial 
decisions, a different meaning and import from those understood in England, 
that these decisions were mostly conflicting and inconsistent, and that, if 
adopted in India, "this clause may serve as a great handicap for all social 
legislation".12 There is no doubt that in changing his erstwhile stand on this 
question, Shri Alladi was heavily influenced by the abnormal conditions 
prevailing in the country at that moment. In any event. Articles 21 and 22 that 
finally emerged from the Constituent Assembly left the legislature virtually 
supreme in respect of the individual's right to life and personal liberty. It is 
interesting to see how the Supreme Court of India, faced with the delicate task 
of reconciling the fundamental' right of life and liberty with the law of pre-
ventive detention, has lived up to the expectations of the Constitution-makers 
and the needs and demands of the moment. 
Civil Liberties in the Scheme of Indian Constitution: 
The bill of rights in the Indian Constitution has its genesis in the 
sh-uggle for India's liberation. Civil liberties also evolved along with the 
growth of constitutional government and Parliamentary institutions from the 
time of the British rule in India. The nationalist movement and the hidian 
National Congress were the direct results of the oppressive rule of the British 
in India and, as GianviUe Austin says, India's desire for civil rights was 
implicit in the formation of the Indian Natioiial Congress in 1885.^ 3 The 
nationalist leaders aimed at establishing an egalitarian society in which each 
man, while contributing his mite to the we'iiare of his fellow beings, could 
12, Ibid., p. 853 
13. Granville Austin, llie Indian ConstUiition: Cornerstone of n Nation (Bombay: Oxford 
University Pres, 195t)), p.52. 
develop his personality to the widest possible extent in an atmosphere of 
freedom. They insisted on human rights and civil hberties being placed 
beyond the reach of the legislature. These were the rights and liberties which 
were denied to them under the colonial regime and for which they were 
fighting. An explicit demand for these rights and liberties was made for the 
first time in a formal way in the Constitution of India Bill, 1895. This Swaraj 
Bill, believed to be inspired by Lokmanya Tilak, proposed to guarantee rights 
like freedom of speech, inviolabihty of one's home, right to property, 
imprisoiiment only by a competent authority, equahty before law, etc.^ '* when 
the British Government of India attempted to repress the national movement 
and libert)' of the press in the early years of the twentieth century, the charter 
of rights for citizens became an article of faith with the national leaders. 
A series of Congress Resolutions adopted between 1917 and 1919 
repeated the demand for civil rights and equality of status with the 
Englishman.^5 y\s years rolled by, the demand became more and more 
insistent and forceful. Following the Montague-Chelmsford Report in 1918, 
the Indian National Congress at its special session held in Bombay in August 
that year made a demand for writing into the Government of India Bill, then 
on the anvil, a "a declaration of the rights of the people of India as British 
citizens", including therein, among other things, guarantee of equality before 
14. The Constitution of India Bill, 1895, Se B. Shiva Rao, ed., Tlte Framing of India's 
Constitution: Selection Documents I (New Delhi: Indian Institute of Public Administration, 
1966), p. 7, The author of the Bill is unknown but, in a brief preface, he explained that it 
contained the outlines of the consdtution, which he wished India to get from the British 
Goxernment. While admittmg that at that time the people of India were "far from being 
able to exercise the rights proposed to be conferred," he said that they would "in future 
be able to enjoy and use them to the greatest advantage of their counti'y and the British 
Government", p. 5 
15. Gran\ille Austin, n. 60, p.53 
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law, protection of liberty, life and property, freedom of speech and press, and 
right to association.^^ In the same year, at its Delhi Session in December, the 
Congress passed another resolution claiming the recognition of India as a 
nation "to whom the principle of self-determination should be applied." As a 
first step, the resolution demanded the immediate repeal of laws. Regulations 
and ordinances which denied basic civil liberties to the people, restricted free 
discussion of Political questions, or empowered the executive to arrest, detain, 
intern, extern or imprison without the process of ordinary civil or criminal 
law.i7 
Inspired by the Irish Free State of 1921, which included a list of 
fundamental rights, the Commonwealth of India Bill, finalised by the 
National Convention in 1925, embodied a specific "declaration of rights", 
visualising for every person certain fundamental rights which were almost 
similar to the relevant provisions of the Irish Constitution.^^ The problem of 
minorities in India further sti'engthened the argument for incorporating a set 
of fundamental human rights in the Constitution. A resolution passed at the 
Madras Session of the Indian National Congress in 1927 reiterated that 
fundamental rights must constitute an integral part of any future Constitution 
for the countiy.^^ 
The demand for fundamental rights received an impetus when a 
committee was appointed by the Congress in May 1928 under the 
lo. Subhash C. Kash\ap, n. 27, p. 21 
17 Congress Resolution on Self-Determination, December 1918, passed by the tliirty-tliird 
session of the Indian National Congress held at Delhi on 26-31 December 1918, 
18. The Commonv/ealth of hidia Bill, 1925. 
14. Congress ResoluHon on Swaraj Constitution passed by the Madras Session of the Indian 
National Congress on 28 December 1927 
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Chairmanship of Motilal Nehru to frame a draft Constitution for India. The 
report of the Committee, known as the Nehru Report, insisted on the grant to 
hidians of all those fundamental rights which had so far been denied to them 
and it emphasised that "our first care should be to have our fundamental 
rights guaranteed in a manner which will not permit their withdrawal under 
any circumstances.2" The fundamental rights of which the Nehru Report 
spoke were a "precursor" of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Indian 
Constitution in a much as ten of the nineteen sub-clauses reappear, materially 
unchanged, and three of them are included in the directive principles. The 
first sub-clause of the section on rights, which said that all power and 
authority of government was derived from the people, was the raison d'etre of 
the Constituent Assembly as expressed in the objectives Resolution. 
The Simon Commission appointed by the British Government in 1927 
totally rejected the demand for fundamental rights on the plea that abstiact 
declarations were useless unless there existed the will and means to make 
them effective. The matter again came up for consideration at the Second 
Round Table Conference held in London in 1931 and the Indian leaders 
pressed for incorporation of a bill of rights in the proposed constitution, but 
the British Government finally rejected the demand on the ground of practical 
difficulties in enforcing such rights.^^ 
A new dimension was given to the demand for fundamental rights 
when the Congress at its Karachi Session in March 1931 adopted the 
20. Motilal Nehru, Chairman, All Parties Conference, 1928, Report of Committee appointed 
by the Conference to Determine the Principles of the Constitution for India (Allahabad: 
All India Congress Committee, 1928), pp. 89-90. 
21. V.N. Chavvla, Fundnmentnl Rights - A re-interpretation, 1^ ' ed. 9]ullundur: International 
Book Company, 1977), pp. 6-7. 
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Resolution on Fundamental Rights and Economic and Social Change. 
\n addition to the demand for the incorporation of negative rights imposing 
only negative obligations on the state, the resolution demanded the inclusion 
of socio-economic rights, which would, the effect, impose positive obhgations 
on it to provide its people with the necessary social and economic conditions 
for the realisation of their negative rights.^^ It showed that India wanted to 
bring about a socio-economic revolution, which would make the human 
rights and civil liberties meaningful. These provisions of the resolution, in 
fact, became the direct antecedents of the directive principles. 
Another important step toward the realisation of fundamental rights 
was the Sapru Report, which was published at the end of 1945 and spoke not 
only of the fundamental rights but also of special provisions for the protection 
of minorities. The Sapru Committee Report made a distinction between 
justiciable and non-justiciable rights in the context of the rights of minorities 
in the countiy, though no such distinction was made earlier. It suggested that 
the breach of some of the rights of minorities be subjected to judicial scrutiny 
and that the violation of other rights be remedied without the court's 
intervention. 
The members of the sub-committee on Fundamental Rights23 realised 
that it was not practicable to tieat the declarations of social and economic 
policies as justiciable rights. Therefore, it decided to separate the non-
22. K. M. Munshi, Indian Constitutional Documents, Pilgrimage to Freedom, 19G2-195Q, Vol. I, 
1^ ' Ed., Bombav: Bhartiya Vidya Bhavan, 1967, p. 28. 
23. As a first step towards the framing of the Constitution, the Constituent Assembly 
constituted an Advisory Committee on Fundamental Rights and Minorities. The 
Committee, in turn, formed five sub-committees, one of them being the sub-committee 
on Fundamental Rights, February - April 1947. 
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justiciable rights from the justiciable ones and remove them from the chapter 
on Fundamental Rights.^* These were later designated as Directive Principles 
of State Policy. When the Constituent Assembly met, there was no opposition 
to the idea of including a chapter on Fundamental Rights as an integral part of 
the Constitution. In this way, the Constitution of India recognised some of 
the basic civil liberties, which had been struggling so long for unqualified 
recognition. 
The inclusion of fundamental rights in the Constitution of India soon 
after the Universal declaration of Fiuman Rights reflected the anxiet}' of the 
founding fathers to honour the basic principles enunciated in the Universal 
Declaration. The balance, which the Constitution makers struck between the 
political and civil rights, on the one hand, and the social and economic rights, 
on the other, as they laboured from 1947 to 1947, was very similar to that 
sti-uck by the draftsmen of Universal Declaration and other international 
covenants. The civil and political rights are internationally enforceable 
through the machinery of the Human Rights Committee; of courser, without 
minimising the importance of other rights. The provision only indicates the 
essential differeiices as far as enforcement and protection of rights are 
concerned.25 Similarly, in the Indian Constitution,"(^vil and political rights are 
given statutory protection, and the economic rights are covered by the 
Directive Principles of State Policy. 
24. B. Shiva Rao, ed., The Framing of India's Constitution: Select Documents 11, New Delhi: II 
PA, 1967, pp. 67,115,125. 
25. A.G. Noorani, TJie Does Report, Human Rights: India vs. UN?, Indian Express, 13 Dec. 
198, p.6 
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The first and foremost tenet of humanism embodied in the Universal 
Declaration is that all men are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They 
are endowed with reason and conscience and should approach one another in 
a spirit of brotherhood.26 This basic principle has been embodied in the 
Preamble of the Indian Constitution.27 Article 2 to 21 of the Declaration of 
Human Rights deal, by and large, with civil and political rights, while Articles 
22 to 28 set forth, mostly in general terms, the economic, social and cultural 
rights. The Indian Constitution has adopted in its two parts - the 
Fundamental Rights (Part III) and the Directive Principles (Part IV) - most of 
the principles of Universal Declaration. The traditional civil and Political 
Rights are enshrined in it as Fundamental Rights, and the economic and social 
rights are set forth as Directive Principles. 
The Indian Constitution attempts to resolve the conflict between 
personal rights and social needs by achieving a delicate balance between 
them. It has incorporated the right to life and liberty which is of fundamental 
importance for the United Nations and finds expression in Articles 3 and 9 of 
the Declaration: Article 3 lays down that everyone has the right to life, liberty 
and security of person, whereas Article 9 refers to freedom from arrest, 
detention or exile. Article 10 enjoins that everyone is entitled in full equality 
26. Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 
27, The Preamble of the Indian Constitution reads: 
We, the People of India having solemnly resolved to constitute India into a 
SOVEREIGN SOCIALIST SECULAR DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC and to secure to 
all its citizens: 
justice, social, economic and political; liberty of thought, expression, faith, belief 
and worship; Equalit}' of stahrs and of opportunit}'; and to promote among them 
all Fraternity assuring the dignit}' of the individual and the unity and integrity of 
the Nation, 
The words "socialist", "secular" and "Integrity" have been incorporated in the 
Preamble by the ConstituHon (Forty-Second Amendment) Act, 1976 
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to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial ti-ibunal, while 
deciding his rights and obhgations or a criminal charge against him. These 
rights were subsequently codified in various Articles of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. For instance. Article 3 of the Covenant 
seeks to ensure the equal rights of men and women for the enjoyment of all 
civil and pohtical rights; and Article 9 guarantees the right to liberty and 
security of person. All these rights are secured by Articles 21 and 22 of the 
Indian Constitution.^^ 
The several freedoms which are preserved by Articles 13,17,19 and 20 
of the Declaration^^ are guaranteed to the citizens by Article 19 of the Indian 
Constitution;^^ and the individual's right to marriage, privacy, honour and 
reputation, preserved by Articles 12 and 16 of the Declaration, is included in 
the personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution as 
28. Article 21 of the Indian Constitution reads: "Protection of life and personal liberty - No 
person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure 
established by law. 
29. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 reads: 
Article 13: Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the 
borders of each state. 
(2) Every one has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to 
return to his country. 
(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property. 
Article 19: Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression, this 
right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, 
receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless 
of frontiers. 
Article 20: Every one has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association. 
(2) No one may be compelled to belong to an association. 
30. Article 19 of the Indian Constitution reads: 
1) All citizens shall have the right: 
a) to freedom of speech and expression; b) to assemble peaceably and without 
arms; c) to form associations or unions; d) to move freely throughout the territory 
of India; e) to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India; and g) to 
practice any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business, 
'and' inserted and sub-clause f) omitted by the Constitution (ForU'-Fourth 
Amendment) Act, 1978 
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interpreted by the Supreme Court in Kharak Singh's case.^'' In fact, the 
traditional civil and political rights enumerated in the Declaration are 
substantially protected by the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Indian 
Constitution, and the Constitution also provides an effective machinery for 
their enforcement (which is the subject matter of Article 8 of the Declaration)32 
by appropriate proceedings under Article 32, 226 and 227.^ 3 A unique feature 
of the Indian Constitution is that it not only provides for an effective 
machinery for the enforcement of fundamental rights, but the right to move 
the Supreme Court for their enforcement also is a fundamental right 
guaranteed by the Constitution. 
Article 21 sei-ves as a restraint on the executive and not as a 
constitutional limitation on the power of the legislature to protect the 
individual's life and personal libert\'. But the Constitvition is fully alive to the 
social needs and the need to curtain personal rights for social good. It is tiue 
that clauses (1) and (2) of Article 22 '^' confer certain constitutional rights on an 
arrested person, but subject to these limitations, the legislature is free to lay 
31. Kharak Singh v. State of UP, AIR, 1963, SC 1295 
32. Article 8 of the Declaration refers to the right of "an effective remedy b\ the 
competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by 
the constitution or by law". 
33. Article 32 - in the Chapter on Fundamental Rights - guarantees the right of every 
person to move the Supreme Court of India for the issue of writs, including the writ 
of habeas corpus, and provides that the Supreme Court would have power to issue 
such writs and other appropriate orders or directions. Under Article 226 of the 
Constitution, the High Court in each State is empo^vered to issue five prerogative 
writs, including the writ of habeas corpus. 
Article 227 refers to the power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court. 
34. Article 22 1) reads; "No person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without 
being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest nor shall he be 
denied the right to consult, and to be defended by, a legal practitioner of his choice". 
(2) "Every person who is arrested and detained in custody shall be produced before 
the nearest magistrate within a period of twenty-four hours of such arrest excluding 
the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the court of the 
magistiate and no such person shall be detained in custody beyond the said period 
without the authority of a magistrate". 
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down the procedure for deprivation of life and personal liberty of a person. 
Thus, the Constitution values personal liberties very highly but does not 
deem them absolute. 
Judicial interpretation of Article 21: 
The process started with the famous case of Gopalan v. State ofMadras^'^' 
which is by far the most notable and the most exhaustive case concerning the 
Fundamental Right to Freedom and Personal Liberty under the Constitution 
of India. As defined in this, case, personal Hberty was an antithesis of physical 
resti'aint or coercion. The majority judgment rejected the contention of the 
petitioners that Article 21 guaranteed procedural rights while Article 19(1) 
guaranteed substantive rights, Mukherjea, J. observed that "the right to the 
safety of one's life and limits and to enjoyment of personal liberty, in the sense of 
fi-eedom from physical restraint and coercion of any sort, are the inherent birth rigJits-
ofa man"^^ The inter-relation between Arts. 19 and 21 was very exhaustively 
dealt with by different judges in this case, and while Fazl AH, J., in his 
niinorit)' opinion, held that Article 19(1) (d) controlled Art, 21 since, 
juristically, the freedom of movement is an essential requisite of personal 
libertv' and, therefore, the reasonableness of law of preventive detention 
should be justiciable under Article 19(5), the majority of the judges, led by 
Kania, C.J., took the stand that Article 19 did not apply to the law of 
preventive detention and that the freedom of movement throughout the 
territory of India under Article 19(1) (d) was different from personal libert\' 
under Article 21. All the four majorit}' judges agreed that the concept of the 
35. AIR 1950 SC 27; 1950 SCR 88 
36. Supra note 13 
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right 'to move freely throughout the territory of India' in Article 19(1) (d) is 
entirely different from the right to 'personal liberty' referred to in Article 21. 
The object of Article 19(1) (d) is to guarantee to a citizen the right to move 
freely throughotit the territory of India without any discriminating barriers. 
Incidentally, the Court also laid down the distinction between 'restriction' and 
'deprivation'. While Kania, C.J, observed that the word 'restriction', 
as-distinguished from the word 'deprivation', indicated 'partial control'. Das J. 
expressed the same view in different words, by saying that the implication of 
'restriction' is that the right is not entirely destroyed, but that parts of the right 
remain. The Court decided that in respect of the fundamental right to life and 
personal liberty, no person in India had any remedy against legislative action. 
Provided the Legislature is competent to pass the law and no other 
constitutional provision stands in the way, it can enact any law authorising 
the deprivation of personal liberty. The judiciary shall have no power to 
review the reasonableness or otherwise of such law^ .^ The only object that 
Article 21 shall serve is to put a resh'aint upon the Executive so that it may not 
proceed against the life or personal hbert)' of an individual save under the 
authorit}' of some law and in conformit}' with the procedure laid down 
thereiji.^ *^ The Court was of the opinion that there were important differences 
between the U.S, and the Indian ConstilTitions, and that the American 
Supreme Court's unlimited power of review could not be a model for its 
Indian couiiterpart. On the basis of this presumption, the Court established 
that in using the words according to procedure established by law" in Article 
37. D.D. Basu, Cases on the ConsUhitwu of India, 1950-51, 1952, p. 71. 
38. Ibid. 
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21, Instead of the words "according to the due process of law", the Indian 
Constitution had dehberately abstained from adopting the 'due process 
clause" of the 5th and the 14th Amendments to the U.S. Constihition. 
As Mukherjea, J, so cogently pointed out, "it is quite clear that the framers of the 
Indian Constitution did not desire to introduce into our system the elements of 
uncertainty, vagueness and changeability that have grown round the 'due process' 
doctrine in America. They xvanted to make the provision clear, definite and precise 
and deliberately chose the xvords 'procedure established by law, as in their opinion no 
doubts would ordinarily arise about the meaning of this expression"?'^ Further, 
according to him, "in the Supreme Court of America, stress has been laid uniformly 
upon the word 'due' which occurs .before and qualifies the expression process of law'. 
'Due' means what is just and proper according to the circumstances of a particular 
case. It IS this word, which introduces the variable element in the application of the 
doctrine; for what is reasonable in one set of circumstances may not be- so in another 
and a different set. In the Indian Constitxdion the word 'due' has been deliberately 
omitted and this shows clearly that the Constitution-makers of India had no intention 
of introducing the American doctrine...." Regarding the meaning of 'law' as used 
in "procedure established by law", the majority decision iii this case was that 
'law' referred to State-made law and not law in the abstract or general sense 
embodying the principles of natural justice. 'Procedure established by law', 
therefore, means procedure established by law made by the State, that is to 
say, by the Union Parliament or the Legislatures of the States. The Court held 
that Arts. 21 and 22 constitute a distinct code, and therefore, if once a person 
39. 1950 SCR 88, at pp. 275 and 276 
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is deprived of his personal liberty in accordance with the procedure 
established by law, no further question would arise under Article 19. 
Evaluation of 'Gopalan' decisions: 
Foreign commentators and critics have lamented over the majority 
decision in the "Gopalan case as disquieting and as putting the judiciary into 
fetters. One commentator has criticised the decision as it eliminated from 
Indian law both the British concept of 'natural justice' and the American 
equivalent 'due process of law', so tliat the Court was rendered powerless to 
interfere with a laAv depriving citizens of personal liberty except on the 
ground of legislative competence.-*" It has also been contended that the 
narrower interpretation given to Article 21 has reduced the same to represent 
the same situation as obtaiiis under the underwritten Constitution of 
England.''^ It has further been considered unfortunate that the word 
'procedure' was used in Article 21 iii respect of life and personal liberty, since 
the exact comiotation of the word remains yet to be established, and the view 
has been advanced that the general expression 'law', as used in the Irish 
Constitution, would have avoided the controversy as it more easily covers 
both substantive rights as well as procedural rights.^^ However, it cannot be 
doubted that although the 'Gopalan' case ushered m the period of strict and 
hteral consti'uction, it set the proper perspective in which the judiciary in 
India would act and move, especially durmg the initial period of the working 
of the Constitution. Being the first case to have come up before the Supreme 
40. Bernard Schwartz, A Comparative View of Some Recent Supreme Court Decisions, in Indian 
Law Review, Vol. V. No. 1, pp. 1-12 
41. D. D. Basu, op.cit. 
42. P. B. Mukharji, Civil Liberties, 1968, p. 58 
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Court of India, it was looked upon with treniendous interest and expectancy, 
and the learned judges could ill-afford to follow the untrodden risky course 
of liberal interpretation. The reasoning adopted in this case was quite in line 
with the intention of the Constitution framers, and was consistent with the 
provisions of the Constitution. 
Subsequent judicial decisions: 
The interpretation given in the 'Gopalan' case was followed in soiTie 
subsequent cases, namely. State of Bombay v. Atmaram Sridhar Baidya,'^^ Ram 
Singh V. State ofDelhi'^'^, Krishnan v. State of Madras^^ and Makhan Singh v. State 
of Punjah.'^^ However, the literal and somewhat restrictive interpretatioii of 
Article 21, given by the Supreme Court in the 'Gopalan' case, and followed in 
the above-mentioned cases, gradually gave way to a more liberal and 
individualistic opinion in the later years. That a law, depriving a person of life 
and personal liberty, enacted by the legislature, would have to satisfy the tests 
of "reasonable restrictions' and 'public interest', and would, therefore, come 
under the purview of judicial scrutiiiy, came to be accepted in many cases.-^ ^ 
hi the first 'Kochuni case,-*^  in particular, Subba Rao, J. laid down some very 
liberal and far-reaching principles which were quite opposed to those laid 
down in the 'Gopalan' case. The Klinrak Singh case marked a big step forward 
43. AIR 1951 SC'157: 1951 SCR 167 
44. AIR 1951 SO 270:1951 SCR 451 
45. AIR 1951 SC 301:1951 SCR 621 
46. AIR 1952 SC 91:1951 SCJ 835 
47. Dr. N. B, Kliare v. State of Delhi, op. cit., n. 96 (eh. 8); Mart Khemu Gavvali v. D.C. of 
Police, op. at., 11. 94j (ch. '8); State of M.P. v. Baldeo Prasad, AIR 1961 SC 293: (1961)1 
SCR 970 
48. K. K. Kochuni v. State of Madras, AIR 1959 SC 725:1959 Supp, 2 SCR 316 
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in the emergiiig process of expansion of the contours of the right to life and 
personal liberty. Reference has already been made to this case in connection 
with Article 19 (1) (d). It was held that 'personal liberty' is used in Article 21 
as a compendious term to include within itself all the varieties of rights which 
go to make up the personal liberties of man other than those dealth with in 
the several clauses of Article 19 (1). While Article 19 (1) deals with particular 
species or attributes of that freedom, 'personal liberty' in Article 21 takes in 
and comprises the residue. While Ayyangar, J. representing the majority, 
pomted out that 'in dealing with a fundamental right such as the right of free 
movement and personal liberty, that only can constitute an infringement 
which is both direct as well as tangible and it could not be that the 
Constitution makers intended to protect or protected mere personal 
sensitiveness", Subba Rao and Shah, ].]. in their minority judgements, refused 
to fall in line with such restricted interpretation and declared that "the 
petitioner suspect under the shadow of surveillance is certainly deprived of 
this freedom". While the majority judgment considered CI. (b) of Reg. 236 of 
the UP Pohce Regulations which authorized 'domiciliary visits' as being 
violative of Article 21 of the Conshtution, as there was no law by which it 
could be justified, Subba Rao and Shah, JJ, asserted that the entire Reg. 236 
was unconstitutional on the ground that it infringed Article 19 (1) and Article 
21 of the Constitution. 
chapter- J ^ 




EMERGENCY EXCESSES - VIOLATION OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
The emergency was proclaimed by the country and was declared in 
gross violation of the provisions of the Constitution of India and thus, was 
legal arbitrary and malafide. The local papers in Delhi categorically told 
Indira Gandhi to step down, as she had no moral right to continue as the 
Prime Minister of India after the adverse verdict of the Allahabad High 
Courti. Even the Supreme Court, Justice Krishna Iyer ~ granted her only 
partial stay by suspending her functional membership of the Lok Sabha. 
An editorial of the Hindustan Times^ captioned "A Time to Go", ran as 
under; 
"Mrs. Indira Gandhi's politico-legal standing has clearly suffered 
significant erosion as a consequence of Justice Krishna Iyer's 
interim Judgement on Tuesday. The absolute stay granted by the 
Allahabad High Court has been attenuated by the Supreme Court 
The Vacation Judge has essentially passed no more than what is 
termed the usual order, which is conditional stay that merely 
allows the person concerned to sign the register. For the rest the 
member camiot participate, vote or draw the usual remuneration. 
In other words, while elective membership is technically kept alive, 
functional membership is virtually denied." 
"Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer has himself stated that legality is within 
the court's province to pronounce upon, but camions of political 
propriety and democratic dharma are polemical issues on which 
judicial silence is the golden rule." What is this but a reminder that 
more than the letter of the law is involved and the question of 
morality and propriety' are at issue. 
"She has even now one last opportunity to rise above the 
controversy and narrow legalities and redeem herself, her party 
1. Dr. Janak Raj ]ai as quoted in his book "Emergency Excess" 
2. Hindustan Times. June 27. 1975 
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and her government by resigning with grace and dignity. The 
country will not fall apart. 
"If the final verdict is in her favour, she could triumphantly lead 
her part}' to the ensuing polls - and if victorious, return to office as 
Prime Minister. The alternative would be to give another twist to 
the debasement of standards and moral decline and risk having to 
depend on methods of guided democracy and populist demagogy 
to survive. That can do Mrs. Indira Gandhi little good. It could be 
disastrous for the country." 
Not only the Hindustan Times^, the Indian Express and the Statesman 
also wrote similar editorials. 
The editorial of Indian Express-* captioned "The Only Course", 
preceded: 
"The Supreme Court has rejected Mrs. Gandhi's pleas for the 
extension of the unqualified stay of the operation of the Allahabad 
High Court Judgement which found her guilty on two counts of 
corrupt electoral practices. The result is that tliough Mrs. Gandhi 
can coiitinue to be the member of the Lok Sabha until the final 
disposal of her appeal against the Allahabad Judgement, she cannot 
m the interval function as a Member of the House. Justice Krishna 
Iyer has ruled that she may continue in her office as Prime Minister. 
This is an unusual ruling and whether it has any more force than 
the expression of an opinion by the Court will be open to dispute". 
The editorial of The Statesman^ was captioned "The only Way" and 
was worded as under: 
"The situation, as it now holds is materially different from what it 
was before the Supreme Court's order. The obligation to resign, 
earlier justified on grounds of convention and propriety, has been 
reinforced by a court order that impinges on Mrs. Gandhi's ability 
to act as Prime Minister. Her credibility in that role has been 
seriously diminished. Justice Iyer's observation that since 
Parliament is not in session, the veto on the right to vote is 
'currently academic' is unexceptionable. But he further notes that a 
review of this point and related issues would be appropriate if 
Parliament is convened or in the event of other developments. In 
effect the degree of Mrs. Garidhi's disability in her capacity as 
3. Hindustan Times, June 28, 1975 
4. Indian Express, June 29. 1975 
5. The Statesman, June, 30. 1975 
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Prime Minister is liable to be sharply increased as circumstances 
take shape in the immediate future. 
The case for Mrs. Gandhi's resignation on grounds of 
propriety is now too familiar to bear repetition, yet it is worth 
pointing out that a resignation will strengthen and not damage the 
institution of the Prime Minister and that it is an incredible 
distortion to insist that if the Prime Minister steps down the legal 
process will thereby be short-circuited. As earlier after the High 
Court Judgment so now Mrs. Gandhi is free to surrender office to 
uphold staiidards that are indefinable in law but are well 
understood in countiies where democratic liberties have survived. 
She can do so without damage to the law or anything resembling 
the public interest." 
On the evening of 25'*^  June, 1975 a dramatic announcement of about 7 
days Satyagrah to be launched in Delhi from June 29, 1975 was made at 
Ramlila Grounds. The Satyagrahis would daily march to Mrs. Indira Gandhi's 
residence in small batches and court arrest to demand her resignation from 
the office of the Prime Minister. On the other hand the newspaper offices 
were busy, after having attended the JP's future pubhc meeting the reporters 
of all the national newspapers had reached their office with every very hot 
news. 
But before the newspaper offices could press their button to bring the 
historic matter for people of the country, all of a sudden, the entire press area 
was plunged into darkness. It was under the instructions of the Prime 
Minister, Indira Gandhi, that the lights of the entire area at Bahadur Shah 
Zafar Marg went off and the newspapers could not be printed and the people 
of our counhy were deprived of the vital information of great public 
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importance. Power supply of the Statesman and the Hindustan Times in 
Cannaught Place area was also switched off in the same way. 
In spite of all these efforts, aimed at ensuring that no newspaper 
should be able to come out the next morning, luckily two of them could 
manage to print and bring out supplements on the proclamation of the 
Emergency and mass scale arrests of national leaders. The Motherland was 
able to print and circulate several thousand copies of its supplement in 
defiance of censorship all over the capital and the neighbouring cities. 
What helped the Motherland was the omission of Delhi's officials to 
switch off its power as they did in the case of many other papers. Blanket 
censorship was imposed on all newspapers. The press was gagged so that it 
would not raise its voice on behalf of the people against dictatorship and 
authoritarianism of Government. 
The Govermnent tried its best to mislead the public by saying that 
censorship had been imposed only to safeguard the defence of the country 
and the mamtenance of public order. But it did not take very long for the 
people to realise the real motives of the Government behind press censorship. 
It is a matter of great shame that the light of the news papers remained 
switched off for continuously three days under the directioii and instructions 
of the Prime Minister of India, Indira Gandhi. 
Happily many top journalists had the courage and boldness to oppose 
the imposition of censorship. Mr. B.G. Verghese of The Hindustan Times and 
Mr. Nanporia of the Statesman also tried to raise a voice of protest against the 
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efforts to enslave the Press but they were iiot heeded to for want of adequate 
support from others in their line. 
Thus an era of authoritarianism and dictatorship came into full swing 
and the fundamental rights (as enshrined in the Constitution of India) of the 
people of this great country were crushed; the subversion of democracy took 
birth and the law of jungle prevailed all over the country. The then Attorney 
General of India, Niren De is on record to say, in the Supreme Court of India 
before the illustrious judges, that "even if a constable shoots any citizen, he 
cannot be questioned in any court of law, even the Supreme Court." 
According to Inder Malhotra, a veteran journahst (Times of India 
28.6.1995 under the caption - "Emergency Remembered") Emergency was 
imposed at night and behind the back of Union Cabinet which meekly 
endorsed it the following morning. 
Large scale arrests had begun, however, even before the proclamation 
was signed by the pliant President Fakhruddin AH Ahmad. The exercise, 
conducted in complete secrecy was stunning. No less stunning was the 
country's reaction, or rather the other lack of it, to the outrage. 
For months India reverberated with the war cries of those vowing to 
fight Indira Gandhi to finish. It was against this back drop that the press, like 
the people had to respond to the Emergency. Newspapers and journals with 
very few exceptions fell in line with remarkable alacrity, and abandoning 
their earlier stridency and following the rigorous censorship rules. Even those 
lew pubhcations whicli did attempt some defiance had to make their own 
compromises. 
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The most surprising though persistent myth is that the Times of India 
supported the Emergency. In any event, let the facts speak for themselves. 
On the first morning of the Emergency, our main anxiety at the Times of 
India under the distinguished leadership of the then Editor, Mr. Sham Lai 
was somehow to get the news of the arrests of JP, Morarji Desai and others to 
the readers of The Evening News of India as quickly as possible. But this was 
thwarted by the Police who entered the building and switched off the rotary 
presses. 
While this was going on, the editor and his senior colleagues were in 
the board room where an emergency meeting of the members of the board of 
directors present in Bombay had been called. The meeting's mandate to the 
editor was that the Emergency having been imposed under the Constitution 
was the law of the land and must be obeyed. 
A crucial but ignored fact is that at that time the owners of the Times 
of India did not actually control it. Under a court order dated several years 
back, the conti'ol of the paper was vested in a board of directors, headed by a 
judge and several government nominees. The owners were in minority on the 
board. 
The gravity of the situation being faced by the political prisoners and 
the detenus could be judged from the fact that the Superintendent of Tihar 
Jail, ordered a merciless Lathi Charge on the innocent political prisoners 
detained in ward No. 15 A(known as poHtical ward) and got them beaten 
scvcrel}' b\- tlie hardened convicts and the warders of the Jail. This incident 
took place on 2"^  October, 1975 (birthday of Mahatma Gandhi - the apostle of 
non-violence). There was no provocation for this Lathi Charges except that 
the prisoners of this ward had been pressing for some genuine demands for 
proper clothing, supply of utensils, better arrangements for medical facilities, 
proper food, proper sanitation arrangements, proper supply of water and 
such like things. 
Choudhry Charan Singh, Prakash Singh Badal were in the next ward, 
i.e. ward No. 14 when this lathi charge took place. There was a wall which 
was common to ward No. 15 and ward N0.14. 
Baweja Comission^ 
After the release of the prisoners and the coming into power of the 
Janata Party, the Government appointed a Commission of enquiiy to go into 
the incident of the Lathi Charge on 2"'' October 1975. Mr. R. K. Baweja was 
appointed the Commission of Enquiries; incidentally I was one of the 
Advocates who appeared before this Commission. This Commission held 
that there was Lathi Chage and the innocent prisoners were beaten 
mercilessly. The Commission also recommended dome departmental action 
against some high officials of the jail, including the then Deputy Inspector 
General of Prisons, and the then Superintendent of Tihar Jail. 
Choudhry Charan Singh, who was at that time the Union Home 
Minister also submitted his statement and an affidavit before this 
Commission regarding the incident of Lathi Charge in Tihar Jail on 2"^ ' 
( \ tober, 1975. The statement submitted by Ch. Charan Singh, the then Home 
Minister reads as under: 
ih Supra Note 1 
Statement of Choudhry Charan Singh, son of Choudhry Mir Singh, 
Home Minister, Government of India, New Delhi. 
At about 21.30 on October 2,1975,1 heard a lot of commotion from 
the direction of adjoining ward NO. 15. I could hear people crying 
and shouting and it appeared to me that some were beaten. This 
went on for about 40 minutes. Next morning on October 3, some 
other iiimates of the jail told me that the jail warders had beaten up 
a number of people in ward No. 15 and some of them had received 
grievous injuries and had been taken to hospital. Later R. N. 
Sharma (Supdt. Jail) came and saw me. At that time I was sittiiTg 
along with Shri Prakash Singh Badal, Atma Singh. The Jail 
Superintendent stated that on the night of October 2, some political 
prisoners were refusing ton go inside the ward and therefore some 
force had to be used. He assured that nobody had received 
injuries. 
However, subsequently I heard from some other inmates of the jail 
that the version of the Jail Superuitendent was not true and that a 
number of inmates had really received grievous injuries. At this 
Shri Badal, Atma Singh and I wrote a joint letter to the Jail 
Superintendent demanding that unless proper enquiry was held 
into the incident we would be compelled to go on hunger strike. I 
am not very sure about the date. Either on 3.10.1975 or 4.10.1975 
the Jail Superintendent met us again and apologised for the 
incident. As far as I can remember he also conceded that 
considerable force had been used. 1 do not remember whether he 
gave an assurance that an enquiry will be held. Shri Sushil Kumar, 
the then Deput}' Commissioner of Delhi saw me two/three days 
later and gave me an impression that an enquiry would be held 
into the incident of 2'^ '' October, 1975. In fact no enquiry was held. 
28.12.77 sd/-
Ch. Charan Singh 
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Some respected an eminent citizens of this countiy issued a signed 
press release of their letter to the Prime Minister Smt. Indira Gandhi. The 
father of Justice Rajinder Sachhar former Chief Justice of Delhi High Court 
addressed the letter to Mrs. Gandhi High Court some of the important 
paragraphs from that letter which was as under: 
Letter from Shri Bhim Sain Sachhar and others (former Chief Minister 
of Punjab letter dated 23'-d July 1975). 
Must the nionster of fear devour us again, the monster for the 
annihilation of which our beloved Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru had sacrificed his 
all - his riches, his comforts, his parents and even the dearest deit}' of his 
heart. He held fear to be enemy No. 1 of India's destiny. It is well to seek 
fresh inspiration from his memorable words: 
"The greatest gift for an individual or a Nation, so xoe had been told in our 
ancient hooks, loas abhaya (fearlessness), not merely bodily courage but 
the absence of fear from the mind. Janaka and Yajnavalka had said, at the 
dawn of our history, that it was the fiinction of the leaders of a people to 
make them fearless. But the dominant impulse in India under British rule 
was that of fear pewasive, oppressing strangling fear; fear of the army, the 
police, the widespread secret service; fear of law meant to suppress. It xvas 
against this all-peivading fear that Gandhi's qidet and determined voice 
was raised: "Be not afraid". 
The present situation looks every citizen in the face enquiringly and 
the old surviving freedom fighters in particular. We must respond to the call. 
Accordingly we propose, with effect from 9^^ August, 1975 and regardless of 
consequences to ourselves, to advocate openly the right of public association 
and freedom of the Press, for discussmg the merits and demerits of the 
Government arming itself ^vith e.xtraordinary powers. The intention is not to 
embarrass authority or to cause any umiecessary stir. Our self-suffering will 
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just be an humble offering at the foot of the Mothedand, in the breaking of 
whose chains we had been privileged to play our small part inspired by the 
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addressed, all the signatories were 
arrested and detained under MISA. 
Letter of Mrs. Subhadra Joshi's the then M.P. from Chandni Chowk 
Parliamentary Constituency to Prime Minister hidira Gandhi on 24'^  April 
1976 is reproduced as under translated from Hindi to English. 
Dear Indira Ji, 
A long time ago I had sought time from you to talk to you and tell you 
about the Congress and our organisation. 
Much has happened since then. Perhaps you did not have the time, or 
perhaps you did not want to know what happened. I am surprised. 
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What has happened iii Turkman Gate and Jama Masjid is difficult to 
describe. Nothing in the past or the future can compare with it. And how 
needles, unnecessary it all was. 
You have handed over Delhi and Delhi's Moslems - whose, houses we 
had guarded in the dead of night and who we had comforted to a few officers 
and some racketeers whose intentions and sanity you would yourself doubt if 
you knew the facts. 
One Hindu officer has said "When our men came to know this was a 
Moslem block, they came down to such brutality that I personally had to run 
to rescue men, women and children from their hands. 
The officials, hospital workers and even pohcemen are suffering at the 
hands of these people. You can well imagine the plight of the common 
people. Many have fled to Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. They must be telling 
about the happenings in the capital. Their talk will be more dangerous 
especially because the newspapers are censored. What will the foreign press, 
especially of Islamic countries, say. 
1 hear tomorrow it is the turn of Serai Khalil, Panditji (Jawaharharlal 
Nehru) and you have been especially kind to this place. 
Jamil Tamb, the famous poet and Congress worker, has been thrown 
into goal. There are small industries in every house here. The scheme was to 
settle the people at the same place; 1 do not know what the new rulers of 
Delhi are plamiiiig to do. That area can be redeveloped in two phases if some 
official does not want to take a sadistic pleasure iii sackmg it. 
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You know the people of the area yourself. 
That you will do something, the hopes are diminishing, but still it is 
my duty to raise my voice. It is coming from my heart. Because it is man's 
nature to hope and to keep on hoping. I have written this letter so long. 
People at the top are a little hard of hearing. 
Yours 
Subhdra 
Misuse of Powers during Emergency: 
The Calicut Regional College student Mr. P. Rajan died in unlawful 
police custody at Kakayam police Camp on March 2, 1976, as a result of 
continuous PoHce torture with iron and wooden rollers. This was admitted in 
the returns filed in the form of affidavits by respondents, including the 
former Chief Minister, Mr. K. Karunakaran, before the Division Bench of the 
Kerala High Court.^ 
Counsel after counsel expressed the fear that during Emergency the 
executive may whip and strip and starve the detenu and if this be our 
judgement even shoot him down. Such misdeeds have not tarnished the 
records of free India and I have a diamond bright, diamond hard hope that 
such things will never come to pass.^ 
Furthermore, we imderstand that the care and concern bestowed by 
the State authorities upon the welfare of the detenus who are well-housed, 
well-fed and well-ti'eated, is almost maternal.^ 
7. The Times of India, May 24,1977 
8. Per Criandrachul ]., in A.D.K4. Jabalpur v. Shiva Kant Shukla, AIR 976, SC 1207 
9. Beg. j . Supra. 
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The powers of detention cannot be left to the assumed fair exercise of 
power by competent authorities. Even the judiciary fell into error when the 
Supreme Court in a habeas corpus case observed: 
"In viexv of the Presidential Order dated ]une 27, 1975, no person has 
locus standi to move any writ petition under Article 22.6 before a High 
Court for habeas corpus or any other writ, or order or direction to 
challenge the legality of an order of detention on the ground that the order 
is not under or in compliance ivith the Act, or is illegal or is vitiated by 
malafides factual or legal or is based on extraneous consideration."'^'^ 
Nani A Palkhiwala - Opposes Emergency: 
Nani A Palkhiwala was the Counsel of Mrs. Indira Gandhi and he 
argued her case Indira Gandhi v. Shri Raj Narain and obtained a conditional 
order from the Supreme Court against the judgement and order of Allahabad 
High Court. Later he returned the brief of Mrs. Indira Gandhi and did not 
argue her appeal before the Supreme Court. He had written an article on the 
Proclamation of Emergency in this country which is beiiig produced as 
under:! 1 
"The Allahabad High Court had, in the month of June 1975, decided that 
the election of Mrs. Indira Gandhi to Parliament should be set aside. This 
meant that she would cease to be a member ofLok Sabha. With a potential 
risk to her Prime Ministership, Mrs. Indira Gandhi filed an appeal in the 
Supreme Court. 
Her application for interim relief was argued by me on June 23, 1975. 
justice Krishna Iyer heard the application and passed the order of interim 
relief on the next day. The interim order was that pending the herring and 
final disposal of the appeal. Mrs. Gandhi could continue to sit in the 
Lok Sabha and participate in the proceedings in that House like any other 
member, and could also continue to be tlie Prime Minister of India. The 
10. AIR 1976, SC 1207 
11. Indian Express, 25 June 1995 
evening of that very day (June 24, 1975), I saw Mrs. Gandhi at her 
residence and told her that the interim order was very satisfactory and she 
should not worry about the case since the judgement of the trial court did 
not seem to he correct on the recorded evidence. 
On the plane which I boarded to return to Bombay, I had a strange 
encounter which can be explained on the basis of preordination or 
precognition. You may call it clairvoyance or by any other name. 1 have 
related this meeting in the introduction to my book "We, the Nation". 
To my great surprise, the Emergency was declared on the night of June 25, 
1975 (It continued till the late hours of March 20, 1977). I would like to 
to bring to the surface of my mind some of the recollections of those 21 
months of suffocation, formally called the "Emergency", which are 
indelibly etched in my memory. 
On the twentieth anniversary of the Emergency, let me, first of all, 
reiterate the nation's gratitude to the men xvho suffered in diverse ways 
and whose sacrifices made the restoration of freedom possible. 
The first name which springs to my mind is that of jayaprakash Narayan. 
Not since the time of Gandhifi, has moral force-personified by a frail 
individual - triumphed so spectacularly over the forces of evil. He 
changed decisively the course of history. One life transformed the destiny 
of hundreds of millions. 
It urns Jayaprakasli xvho talked of "total revolution". He wanted to shake 
the people out of their apathy and lethargy and make them realise that they 
are the inheritors of resplendent heritage which holds them together, 
despite their differences in caste and creed, region and language. I had the 
good fortune to have a long chat with him in Delhi before he admiinstercd 
the pledge at Rajghat on March 24, 1977 to the Members of Parliament 
"to uphold the inalienable rights to life and liberty of the citizens of our 
Republic." 
O)ifortunately, jayaprakash passed away in October, 1977 and India has 
remained without true leadership since then. 
19 
/ 
Only next to jayaprakasJi, 1 would place Raninath Goenka as the most 
feared opponent of the Emergency. 
Most newspapers, like most people, capitulated. The two national English 
papers which stood up were the Indian Express and the Statesman. 
Every neiospaper had a Censor installed in the office who masqueraded as 
the editor and decided what should or should not be published. I vividly 
recall the day, early in the Emergency, when Mr. V.K. Narasimhan, the 
Editor of the Indian Express, had written an editorial which the Censor 
did not allow to be published. Mr.Narasimhan, with the concurrence and 
support of Raninathji, published the paper with the space for the editorial 
left blank, so that the discerning reader might understand xohat was 
happening in the newspaper world. 
During the Emergency, I used to meet Raninathji off and on. And I can 
say quite truthfully that I have never met a proprietor of a newspaper who 
had the courage and the public spirit of Raninathji. He xoas a dedicated 
citizen xuho used his enormous power, as the proprietor of a national 
nexvspaper, for what he believed to he the good of the country. He acted on 
his conviction that the press should never be a poodle of the establishment, 
but should act as the watchdog of democracy. He believed that a 
courageous and idependent press is the noblest servant of society, along 
with a courageous and independent judiciary. 
Raninathji was against any form of tyranny by the state. He always 
adhered to the unshakable belief, xvhich he shared with Bernard Eevin, that 
barbed wires will rust, stone lualls will crumble, and the tyrant's club will 
shatter in his first. 
During the 21 months of the Emergency, when most papers and journals 
capitulated, Ramnathji asserted his independence at colossal personal cost. 
The Government launched innumerable criminal prosecutions against him 
and his companies in different courts of India; but he faced the onslaught 
with terror-like tenacity. 
To the best of my memory, about 166,000 persons were detained without a 
trial in different parts of India for an indefinite period. Even their close 
relatives were not told about the place where they were detained. The 
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people detained without a trial included prominent figures like 
jayaprakhas Naraya, Morarji Desai and Kuldip Nayyar - and the humble 
and nameless who will never be knoxim to gthe roll-call of honour. A 
hundred thousand petty tyrants mushroomed all over the country. 
I come to the next question. What has happened before - can it happen 
again? Tlie answer is - undoubtedly yes. 
No period in the history of our Republic is of more educative value than 
1975 to 1977. George Santayana said "Progress far from consisting in 
change, depends on retentiveness. Those who cannot remember the past 
are condemned to repeat it". If our basic freedoms are to survive, it is of 
vital importance that we remember the happenings during the Emergency 
when the freedoms were suspended 
Countries which were integral parts of India in the days gone by -
Pakistan, Bangladesh and Burma (Myanmar) - Iiazv gone through periods 
of authoritarian rule; and so have highly advanced countries like Germany 
which had a Constitution which guaranteed freedoms of the type we still 
enjoy today. (Hitler amended the German Constitution just as Mrs. 
Gandhi did in India and deprived the people of their fi-eedoms). 
Self-knoxuledge would dictate that we recognise three defects in our 
national character - lack of discipline and public spirit, lack of sense of 
justice and fairness, and lack of a sense of moderation and tolerance. It is 
these three defects in our character xohich made a cultured Prime Minister 
like Rjive Gandhi say publicly, more than once, that he would not hesitate 
to reimpose the Emergency if the circumstances demanded such a course of 
action, although it must be said to his credit that during the dark days of 
the Emergency, lie kept himself totally aloof from the tyranny which 
stalked the land. 
Tlie danger of a re-imposition of the Emergency is greater for a country 
like India where the society is feudal and caste ridden. I do not think 
casteism was ever more pronounced in the history of our Republic than 
during tiie recent past 
Today, India presents a picture of a great nation in a state of moral decay. 
The noble processes of our Constitution have been trivialised by the power-
holders, the power-brokers and the power-seekers. Elections have been 
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reduced to a horse race by contesting politicians- the difference being that 
the horse is highly trained. 
Wlien we look around India today, we can hardly recognised it to be the 
same country in which a dozen different civilizations of incredible nobility 
flourished over the last 50 centuries. This is the only country knoxon to 
history where men of knowledge and learning had precedence over kings. 
What a sad contrast between Sri Aurobindo's vision (Mother India is not 
a piece of earth, she is a Poiver, a Godhead) and the cesspool of degradation 
to which professional politicians have reduced this country. 
I should like to reaffirm my firm conviction that it is not the Constitution 
which has failed the people, but it is our chosen representatives who have 
failed the Constitution. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar poignantly remarked in the 
Constituent Assembly that, if the Constitution which was given by the 
people unto themselves in November 1949 did not xuork satisfactorily at 
any future time, we should have to say, not that the Constitution had 
failed, but that man was vile. 
On June 25, 1975, along with the already existing external Emergency, 
internal Emergency was declared and the provisions of MISA were used in a 
most ruthless manner agatrist the political opponents of Indira Gandhi. The 
total picture of what happened duriiig Emergency will not be and cannot be 
obtained. 
But even what has come out is revolting and awe-inspiring. It has been 
found out that at the instance of the Prime Minister and her son, hundreds 
and thousands of people were arrested without following even the norms laid 
down in MISA. If any magistrate demurred in issuing warrants of arrest, he 
himself was threatened with arrest under MISA. Anmest}' International, in its 
report of 1977, has this to sa}' about India at that point of time: 
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"The MISA and the Defence of India Rules m particular, had been used 
extensively to detain peaceful opponents of the Government after the 
declaration of National State of Emergency on June 26, 1975. On June 26, 
1976, the first anniversary of the declaration of the State of Emergency, 
Arrmest}' International made a public appeal to the Indian Government to 
mark the occasion by declaring a general amnesty for the at least 40,000 
political prisoners, who, the organisation estimated, were being held without 
trial. On February 20,1977, Defence Minister Bansi Lai stated that 'no pohtical 
persons were in jail', but in early March, the Janata Party claimed that as 
many as 30,000 political prisoners were still being held in various parts of the 
country. Official Government statistics published after the new Government 
took over showed that on March 19,1977,17,754 political detainees were still 
being held under the Preventive Detention provisions of the MISA alone. 
These figures exclude an unknown but large number of political prisoners 
then held under the Defence of India Rules. 
"More and more reports that pohtical prisoners were being ill-treated 
in detention or tortiu'ed after arrest, reached Amiiesty International from all 
over India during 1976. The organisation received a signed statement about 
ti-eatment after arrest from Jasbir Singh, one of three students from New 
Delhi, who was arrested on June 23m 1976, and said he had been beaten for 
five days after arrest in order to force him to confess to having engaged in 
subversive activities. He had been made to swing from a pole, to which his 
hands and feet were tied, as a result of which he started vomiting blood. 
Another well-documented case reported was that of Lawreiice Fernandes, 
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who was seriously beaten for several days, threatened with being killed and 
deprived of food for three days if he would not disclose the whereabouts of 
his brother George, who was in hiding. According to his mother's signed 
statement, she found him on May 26, looking dead, unable to move as a result 
of beatings by the police. His left side is without use as if crippled and both 
his left leg and hand are still swollen'. 
Kuldip Nayari2, y^ j^ o J-Q prison during Emergency, gave a description 
of tortures inflicted on political prisoners during Emergency. To quote from 
his book "The Judgment" -
"Tortures of various types were carried out - stamping on the bare body 
with heeled 'amnmnition' hoots; severe beating on the soles of feet; 
rolUng of heavy police lathis over shinbones, with a constable sitting on 
the latin; making the vktim crouch for hours in a fixed position; beating 
on the spine slapping both ears till the victim lost consciousness; beating 
with the butt of riffle; inserting live electric xvires in the crevices of the 
body; stripping and making satyagrahis lie on slabs of ice, burning the 
skin with cigarettes or wax candles; denying food, iimter and sleep, and 
making the victim drink his oxvn urine; suspending him in the air with 
his wrists tied at the back and putting him up s an 'aeroplane'. (The 
victim's hands were tied behind the back with a rope which was takm 
over a pulley attached to the ceiling and the victim ivas pulled up a few 
feel above ground. He thus dangled in midair, hanging from his hands, 
tried at the back). 
"Alt tins was done systematically - a team of ten to twelve constables 
would encircle a detenu and try one type of torture or the other. If it left 
visible marks on the body or affected the prisoner's physical condition, 
the police did not produce him before a magistrate for fear of reprimand. 
If a search warrant was issued, the police would shift the victim from 
12. Mainstream. Novembci' 1979 
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station to station. MISA came to the authorities rescue since no judicial 
relief was available to those arrested under it." 
Paradoxically, the highest Court of the land hearing a habeas corpus 
petition gave an astounding judgment on April 28, 1976, declaring that 
habeas corpus was not available to citizens of this country during that period. 
The judges did not stop at that. In spite of affidavit after sworn affidavit 
brought before them by responsible counsel indicating brutal torture of 
detainees, Y.V. Chandrachud, the then Chief Justice of India, wrote in his 
judgment Counsel after counsel expressed the fear that during emergency, 
the executive may whip and strip and starve the detenu, and if this be our 
judgment, even shoot him down. Such misdeeds have not tarnished the 
record of free India and I have a diamond bright, diamond-hard hope that 
such things will never come to pass. 
Cdaper-V 
^k of Supreme Court of India ^ fter M/ithdrawd 
of IntemdEmergency -1977 To (Date 
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Chapter-V 
ROLE OF SUPREME COURT OF INDIA AFTER 
WITHDRAWAL OF INTERNAL EMERGENCY - 1977 
TO DATE 
The Supreme Court realised the serious consequences of its 
proiiouncements, particularly those of its denial of the writ of habeas corpus 
in Shivakant Shukla's case. The court began to rebuild its prestige and power. 
It created a wide "due process" jurisdiction which had been decisively 
rejected by the framers of the Indian Constitution. Besides, it endeavoured to 
show that it was still the protector of the Western System of law and justice 
and that the emergency had not really done a lasting damage to its powers. It 
prepared itself to demonstrate that any exercise of power by the government 
could be reviewed by the courts on jurisdictional and other grouiids.^ It was 
in this context that the Supreme Court was motivated to give a liberal 
interpretation to Article 21 and, in several cases after the internal emergency, 
stood firmly on the side of civil liberties. "The withering Article 21 which had 
been mauled severally by Gopalan and almost totally by Shivakant Shukla, was 
thus rejuvenated" 2 in Maneka's case. 
The decision of the Court in Maneka Gandhi's case was one of immense 
constitutional significance, as it was the first major decision concerniiig; 
personal liberty since the Habeas Corpus case. "Maneka vibrates with 
humanism and single-minded judicial dedication to the cause of human rights 
in India, still recovering from the trauma of the suspension of civil liberties in 
1975-77".^  This case gave the court a good opportunity to show its 
partisansliip for Civil liberties and to declare that the "reahty of liberty is not 
to be drowned in the hysteria of the hour" and the "hubris of power". It 
coiifidently ruled: "Governments come and go, but the fundamental rights of 
Rajeev Dhavan, On the Future of Western Law and justice in India. Reflections on the 
Predicament of the Post-Emergency Supreme Court", journal of the Bar Council of India, 
Vol. 8, No. 1, January-March 1981, pp. 71-7.3. 
O. Cliinnappa Reddy, Judicial Process and Social Change, Journal of the Indian Law 
Institute, Vol. 25, No. 2, April-June 1983, p. 155. 
Upendra Bnxi, The Indian Supreme Court and Politics, Mehr Chand Mahajan Memorial 
Law Lectures (Lucknow: Eastern Book Company, 1980), p. 151. 
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the people caniiot be subject to the wishful value-sets of political regimes of 
the passing day".'' 
The seven-judge constitutional bench in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of 
India^ examined the concept of personal liberty in general and the right to 
travel abroad in particular. In the case, the petitioner's (Mrs. Maneka 
Gandhi's) passport was impounded under Section 10 (3) (c) of the Passport 
Act, 1967.6 Provision iii the Act was violative of Article 21 of the Constitution 
since it did not prescribe "procedure" within the meaning of that article and if 
it was held that procedure had been prescribed, it was arbitrary and 
unreasonable; and the impounding provision in the Act was also violative of 
Article 19 (1) (a) and (g),^  since it permitted restrictions to be imposed on the 
rights guaranteed by those provisions even though the restrictions were such 
as could not be imposed under Article 19 (2) and (6).^  
The Court examined these arguments and analysed the provisions in 
Part III of the Constitution, and discussed in detail earlier decisions on similar 
pleas. 
4. This was an evidence of the court's affirmation of civil liberties in xinambiguous terms. 
5. Ibid. The seven judges' constitutional bench consisted of Beg, C.J., Y.V. Chandrachud 
(as he then was), P.N. Bhagwati (as he then was), V.R. Krishna Iyer, N.L. Untawalia, S. 
Murtaza Fazal Ali and P.S. KaUsam, JJ. 
6. Section 10 (3) reds; 
"The passport authorit)' may impound or cause to be impounded or revoke a passport 
or travel document -
a) 
b) 
c) If the passport authority deems it necessary so to do in the interests of the 
sovereignt}' and integrity of India, the security of India, friendly relations of India 
with any other foreign country, or in the interests of general pubUc". 
7. Article 19 of the Constitution of India reads: "Protection of Certain rights regarding 
freedom of speech, etc. 
(1) All citizens shall have the right -
a) To freedom of speech and expression, 
b) To practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business. 
8. Article 19 (2) of the Constitution of India reads: "Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) 
shall affect the operation of any existing law, or prevent the state from making any law, 
in so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right 
conferred by the said sub-clause in the security of the state, friendly relations with 
foreign states, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, 
defamation or incitement to an offence. 
(6) Nothing in sub-clause (g) of the said clause shall affect tl\e operation of any existing law 
in so far as it imposes, or prevent the state from making any law imposing, in the 
interests of the general public, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right 
conferred by the said sub-clause...." 
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The following cases determine now, the change attitude of the 
Supreme Court of India in the matter of preventive detention. 
Object of Preventive Detention: 
Preventive detention is devised to afford protection to society. The 
object is not to punish a man for having done something but to intercept 
before he does it and to prevent him from so doiiig.^ 
Object of Preventive Detention - Not punitive but precautionary: 
A preventive detention "is not punitive but precautionary measure". 
The object is not to punish a man for having done something but to intercept 
him before he does it and to prevent him from doing it. No offence is proved, 
nor any charge is formulated; and the justification of such detention is 
suspicion or reasonable probability and there is no criminal conviction which 
can only be warranted by legal evidence. In this sense it is an anticipatory 
action. Preventive justice requires an action to be taken to prevent 
apprehended objectionable activities. In case of punitive detention to person 
concerned is detained by way of punishment after being found guilty of 
wrongdoitig where he has the fuUest opportunity to defend himself, while 
preventive detention is not by way of punishment at all, but it is intended to 
prevent a person from indulging in any conduct injurious to the society.^" 
Different from punitive detention: 
Though the element of detention is a common factor in cases of 
preventive detention as well as punitive detention, there is a vast difference in 
their objective. Punitive detention follows a sentence awarded to an offender 
for proven charges in a trial by way of punishment and has in it the elements 
of reh'ibution, deterrence, correctional factor and institutional ti'eatment in 
varying degrees. On the conti-ary preventive detention is an exti'aordinary 
measure resorted to by the State on account of compulsive factors pertaining 
9. Stnte of Punjab v. Sukhpal Singh, (1990) 1 SCC 35, 45:1990 SSC (Cri) 1: AIR 1990 SC 231: 
1990 CriLJ 584. 
10. Kubic Darusz vs. Union of India, (1990), 1 SCC 568, 582: 1990 SCC (Cri.) 227: AIR 1990 
SC605 
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to maintenance of public order, safety of public life and the welfare of the 
economy of the country.^^ 
Punitive and preventive detention- Distinction 
There is a vital distinction between these two kinds of detention. In 
case of 'punitive detention', the person concerned is detained by way of 
punishment after he is found guilty of wrongdoing as a result of a trial where 
he has the fullest opportunity to defend himself, while 'preventive detention' 
is not by way of punishment at all, but it is intended to pre-empt a person 
from indulging in any conduct injurious to the society. In case of preventive 
detention, he is detained merely on suspicion with a view to preventing him 
from doing harm in future and the opportunity that he has for contesting the 
action of the executive is very limited. Having regard to this distinctive 
character of preventive detention, the restrictions placed on a person 
preventively detained must, consistently with tlie effectiveness of detention, 
be miiiimal.^2 
It has been said that the history of liberty has largely been the history 
of observance of procedural safeguards. The procedural sinews shengthening 
the substance of the right to move the court against executive invasion of 
personal liberty and the due dispatch of judicial business touching violations 
of this great right is stiessed. 
Personal liberty is by every reckoning, the greatest of human freedoms 
and the law of preventive definition are stiictly constiued and a meticulous 
compliance with the procedural safeguards, however technical, is strictly 
insisted upon by the courts. The law on the matter did not start on a 
clean slate. The power of courts against the harsh incongruities and 
unpredictabilities of preventive detention is not merely 'a page of history' but 
a whole volume. The compulsions of the primordial need to maintain order in 
society, without which the enjoyment of all rights, including the right to 
personal liberty, would lose all their meaning are the tiue justifications for the 
laws of preventive detention. The pressures of the day in regard to the 
imperatives of the security of State and of public order might, it is tiue, 
require the sacrifice of the personal liberty of individuals. Laws that provide 
for prevention detentioii posit that an individual's conduct prejudicial to the 
maintenance of pubUc order or to the security of the State provides grounds 
for a satisfaction for a reasonable prognostication of a possible future 
manifestation of similar propensities on the part of the offender. This 
jurisdiction has been called a jurisdiction of suspicion; but the compulsions of 
the very preservatioii of the values of freedom, or democratic society and of 
social order might compel a curtailment of individual liberty. "To lose our 
countiy by a scrupulous adherence to the written law" said Thomas Jefferson 
"would be to lose the law itself, with life, liberty and all those who are 
11. Pushpa Devei M. Jatia vs. M.L. Wadhawan, (1987) 3 SCC 367, 395: 1987 SCC (Cri.) 526: 
AIR 1987 SC 1748,1987 Cri L] 1888: (1987): 12 ECC 356. 
12. Francis Cornlie Mullin v. Admimstraior, Union Territory of Delhi, (1981) 1 SCC 608: 1981 
SCC (Cri) 212: AIR 1981 SC 746: (1981) 2 SCR 516:1981 Cri LJ 306:1981 ML) (Cri) 331. 
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enjoying with us, thus absurdly sacrificing the end to the means." This is, no 
doubt, the theoretical justification for the law enabling prevention detention. 
But the actual manner of administration of the law of prevention 
detention is of utinost importance. The law has to be justified by the genius of 
its administiation so as to strike the right balance between individual liberties 
on the one hand and the needs of an orderly society on the other. But the 
realities of executive excesses in the actual enforcement of the law have put 
the courts on the alert, ever-ready to intervene and confine the power within 
strict limits of the law both substantive and procedural. The paradigms and 
value judgments of the maintenance of a right balance are not static but vary 
according as the "pressures of the day" and according as the intensity of the 
imperatives that justify both the need for and the extent of the curtailment of 
individual liberty. Adjustments and readjustments are constantly to be made 
and reviewed. No law is an end in itself. 
The "tiin that shelters for the night is not journey's end and the law, 
like the traveler, must be ready for the morrow". 
As to the approach to such laws which deprive personal liberty 
without trial, the libertarian judicial faith has made its choice between the 
pragmatic view and the idealistic or doctiinaire view. The approach to the 
curtailment of personal liberty which is an axiom of democratic faith and of 
all civilized life is an idealistic one, for, loss of personal Uberty deprives a man 
of all that is worth living for and builds up deep resentments. Liberty belongs 
to what correspond to man's inmost self. 
Under our Constitution also the mandate is clear and the envoy is left 
under no dilemma. The constitutional philosophy of personal hberty is an 
idealistic view, the curtailment of liberty for reasons of State's security, public 
order, disruption of national economic discipline etc. being envisaged as a 
necessary evil to be administered under stiict constitutional restiictions.^^ 
Detenus to e kept separate from convicts 
If any of the persons detained under NSA are at present housed in the 
same ward or cell where the convicts are housed, immediate steps must be 
taken to segregate them appropriately.^^ 
Interpretation of Prevention detention legislation 
Per Venkataramiah,}. 
The law of prevention detention is a hard law and therefore it should 
be strictly construed. Care should be taken that the liberty of a person is not 
jeopardized unless his case falls squarely within the four corners of the 
relevant law.^ ^ 
13. Ayyn v. Stnte of U.P., (1989) 1 SCC 374, 380 to 382:1989 SCC (Cri) 153: AIR 1989 SC 364: 
1989 Cri L] 991. 
14. A.K. Roy v. Union of India, (1982) 1 SCC 271: 1982 SCC (Cri) 152; AIR 1982 SC 710: 1982 
Cn L] 340:1982 MLJ (Cri) 524. 
15. Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar, (1984) 3 SCC 14, 35: 1984 SCC (Cri) 361: AIR 1984 SC 
1334:1984 Cri LJ 909. 
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Preventive detention law, how to be construed 
Prevention detention for the social protection of the community' is a 
hard law but, it is a necessary evil in the modern society and must be 
pragmatically construed, so that it words, does not endanger social defence or 
the defence of the conimunity and at the same time does not infringe the 
liberties of the citizens. A balance should always be struck,^^ 
Court's approach should be pragmatic and not highly technical- Strict 
adherence to procedure sacrificing greater social interests not justified- Practice and 
Procedure 
Prevention detention unUke punitive detention which is to punish for 
the wrong done, is to protect the society by preventing wrong being done. 
Though such powers must be very cautiously exercised so as not to 
undermine the fundamental freedoms guaranteed to our people, the 
procedural safeguards are to ensure that yet these must be looked at from a 
pragmatic and commonsense point of view. An understanding between those 
who exercise powers and the people over whom or in respect of whom such 
power is exercised is necessary. The purpose of exercise of all such powers by 
the Government must be to promote common well-being and must be to 
subserve the conunon good. It is necessary to protect therefore the individual 
rights insofar as practicable which are not inconsistent with the security and 
well-being of the society. Observance of written law about the procedural 
safeguards for the protection of the individual is normally the high duty of 
public official but in all circumstances not the highest. The law of self-
preservation and protection of the country and national security my claim in 
certain circumstances higher priority.^^ 
Precedent- High Court not justified in quashing order of detention merely on 
ground that detention order in similar cases had earlier been revoked- Each 
case to be decided on its own facts^* 
Place of detention- Administi'ative decision should normally prevail- Court's 
interference when called for- Detenu belonging to Punjah, detained in District jail, 
Bharatpur, Rajasthan- Detenu's prayer for detaining him at a place in or near his 
lionie State disallowed. 
The place of detention is a matter for the administiative choice of the 
detaining authority, and a court would be justified in interfering with that 
decision only if it was in violation of any specific provisioii of the law or was 
vitiated by arbitrary considerations and mala fides. While it is ordinarily 
desirable that a detenu should be detairied in an environment natural to him in 
poiiit of climate, language, food and other incidents of living, in the actual 
decision concerning the place of detention these considerations must yield to 
factors related to, and necessitated by, the need for placing him m preventive 
16. Raj Kuunir Smgh v. Stale of Bihar, (1986) 4 SCC 407, 413; 1986 SCC (Cri) 481: AIR 1986 SC 
2173:1986 CriLJ 2042. 
17. Prakash Chandra Mehla v. Commr. and Secy., Govt, of Kerala, 1985 Supp SCC 144,170, 172: 
1985 SCC (Cri) 332: AIR 1986 SC 687. 
18. Constitution of India, Art. 226, DM. v. Kiilbir CJiand, 1990 Supp SCC 141: 1990 SCC (Cri) 
538. 
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detention. Although the detention must be punitive, they must nevertheless 
be such as to secure the effectiveness of his incarceration. 
In the present case the affidavits filed by the respondents on the record 
indicate that the mind has been applied to the facts and circumstances of the 
case and that it was felt necessary to effect the detention at Bharatpur. The city 
of Bharatpur, although situated in the State of Rajasthan, is not very distant 
from the States of Punjab and Haryana. In the circumstances, the reUef sought 
on behalf of the detenu in respect of the place of detention cannot be granted.^^ 
Solitary Confinement- On facts held, Court's interference not called for- National 
Security (Rajasthan Conditions of Detention) Order, 1984, Condition No. 4 (ii) 
The detenu had been provided two adjacent cells and enjoyed a certain 
degree of freedom of movement from early morning to the evening. A convict 
officer served as his cook and he was entitled to contact two wardens, one of 
whom was available in the ward itself and the other was posted at the gate of 
the ward. Medical officers and male nurses also attended on the detenu. The 
respondents claimed that Condition No. 4(ii) of the National Security 
(Rajasthan Conditions of Detention) Order, 1984 empowered them to keep the 
detenu separate from ordinary prisoners. On behalf of the petitioner-deteni( it 
could not be satisfactorily shown that the nature of the detenu's detentioii calls 
for interference by the Court.^ o 
Torture of detenu while in detention- Proof regarding- Visitor's register 
maintained at jail produced to show that police ojficers had visited the detenu and 
interrogated him- Held, visitors' register xvould not he substantiate the charge of 
torture in absence of showing what actually ivent on during the visits- Register will 
only indicate identity of the visitors and may record duration of the visit.^^ 
Unreasonable restraints put on a detenu during detention can be subjected to 
judicial review 
Persons who are put under preventive detention must be segregated 
from the convicts and kept in a separate part of the place of detention. It is 
hardly fair that those who are suspected of being engaged in prejudicial 
conduct should be lodged in the same ward or cell where the convicts whose 
crimes are estabhshed are lodged. The evils of 'custodial perversity' are well 
known. Care has to be taken to ensure that the detenu is not subjected to any 
indignity. 22 
Constitutional Rights 
Constitutional safeguards, available to detenus, approach of detaining 
authorities and scope of court's interference with detention orders-
Constitution of India, Arts. 21 and 22 
19. Geetmder Knur v. State of Punjab, 1985 Supp SCC 388, 390; 1985 SCC (Cri) 474: AIR 1985 
SC1409; 1985 Cri LJ1640. 
20. Geetmder Kaiir v State nf Punjab, 1985 Supp SCC 388, 391; 1985 SCC (Cri) 474; AIR 1985 
SC 1409; 1985 Cri L] 1640. 
21. Geetinder Kaur v. State of Punjab, 1985 Supp SCC 388, 391: 1985 SCC (Cri) 474: AIR 1985 
SC 1409; 1985 Cri LJ 1640. 
22. A.K. Roy v. Union of India, (1982) 1 SCC 271; 1982 SCC (Cri) 152: AIR 1982 SC 710: 1982 
Cri LJ 340:1982 ML] (Cri) 524. 
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Detention of individuals without trial for any length of time, however 
short, is wholly inconsistent with the basic ideas of our government and the 
gravity of the evil to the community resulting from anti-social activities can 
never furnish an adequate reason for invading the personal liberty of the 
citizen except in accordance with the procedure established by law. The 
Supreme Court has therefore in a series of decisions forged certain procedural 
safeguards in the case of preventive detention of citizens. When the life and 
liberty of a citizen is involved, it is expected that the government will ensure 
that the constitutional safeguards embodied in Art. 22(5) are strictly observed. 
When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law of 
preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, 
communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made 
and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation 
against the order. These procedural safeguards are ingrained in our system of 
judicial interpretation. The power of preventive detention by the government 
under aiiy law for preventive detention is necessarily subject to the limitations 
enjoined on the exercise of such power by Art. 22(5) as construed by this 
Court.23 Thus, this court speaking through Bhagwati, ]. observedi^^ 
"The constitutional imperatives enacted in this article are twofold: (1) 
the detaining authoritj' must, as soon as may be, that is, as soon as practicable 
after the detention communicate to the detenu the grounds on which the order 
of detention has been made^ and (2) the detaining authority must afford the 
detenu the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order of 
detention. These are the barest minimum safeguards which must be observed 
before an executive authority can be permitted to preventively detain a 
person and thereby drown his right of personal liberty in the name of public 
good and social security."^5 
As observed by this Court, when the liberty of the subject is involved, 
whether it is under the Preventive Detention Act or the Maintenance of 
Internal Security Act or the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention 
of Smuggling Activities Act or any other law providing for preventive 
detention: [SCC p. 642: SCC (Cri) p. 562, para 17] 
" it is the bounden duty of the court to satisfy itself that all the 
safeguards provided by the law have been scrupulously observed 
and that the subject is not deprived of his personal liberty 
otherwise than in accordance with law." 
Nevertheless, the community has a vital interest in the proper 
enforcement of its laws particularly in an area such as conservation of foreign 
exchange and prevention of smuggling activities in dealing effectively with 
persons engaged in such smuggling and foreign exchange racketerring or 
with persons engaged in anti-national activities which threaten the very 
existence of the unity and integrity of the Union or with persons engaged in 
anti-social activities seeking to create public disorder in the worseiiiiig law 
and order situation, as unfortunateh' is the case in some of the States today, 
23. Khiidiram Das v. Stale ofV^est Bengal, (1975) 2 SCC 81: 1975 SCC (Cri) 435 
24. [SCC p. 87, para 5] 
25. Narendm Pursliotum Umrao v. B.B. Gujrat, (1979) 2 SCC 637:1979 SCC (Cri) 557. 
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by ordering their preventive detention and at the same time, in assuring that 
the law is not used arbitrarily to suppress the citizen of his right to life and 
liberty. The court must therefore be circumspect in striking down the 
impugned order of detention where it meets with the requirements of Art. 
22(5) of the Constitution.26 
Compliance with Art. 22(5) mandatory 
It is incumbent on the State to satisfy the court that the detention of the 
petitioner/detenu was legal and in conformity not only with the mandatory 
provisions of the Act but also strictly in accord with the constitutional 
safeguards embodied in Art. 22(5). 
When the life and liberty of a citizen is involved, it is expected that the 
government will ensure that the constitutional safeguards embodied in Art. 
22(5) are strictly observed. The gravity of the evil to the community resulting 
from anti-social activities can never furnish an adequate reason for invading 
the personal liberty of a citizen, except in accordance with the procedure 
estabUshed by the Constitution and the laws. The history of personal Hberty is 
largely the history of insistence on observance of the procedural safeguards.^'' 
Constitutionality of law relating to held, no longer open- Held, cannot he struck 
down on a general plea of interference with the liberties of the people if otherxoise 
constitutional- Constitution of India, Arts. 245, 246, Schedide VII, List I, Entry 9 
and List III Entry 3 - justiciability on a due process method rejected- National 
Security Act, 1980 (65 of 1980) as such therefore not unconstitutional - Constitution 
of India, Arts. 21 and 14,19 &21 - Interpretation of the Constitution 
So long as the preventive detention law is made within the legislative 
power arising out of a legislative entry and does not violate any of the 
conditions or restrictions on that power, such law cannot be struck down on 
the specious ground that it is calculated to interfere with the Uberties of the 
people. What is provided for by the Constitution itself cannot be judged 
unconstitutional by importing court's notions of what if right and wrong. One 
cannot therefore content that preventive detention is basically imperrrussible 
under the Indian Constitution. 
Though it is now well settled that rights in Part II of the Constitution 
are not mutually exclusive and that therefore, a law of prevention detention 
under Art. 22 must also satisfy Arts. 14, 19 and 21, it is equally settled that a 
law of preventive detention cannot be held unconstitutional for the reason 
that it violates Arts. 14,19, 21 and 22. The National Security Act, 1980 which is 
in pari material with MISA, 1971 is not unconstitutional on the ground that, 
by its very nature, it generally violates Arts. 14,19, 21 and 22.2^  
Procedural safeguards available to detenu under Art. 22(5) - Any deviation 
therefrom calls for court's interference - Constitution of India, Arts. 22(5) % 32, 
226 and 136. 
26. Raiendrahimar Nnivnrki Shnh o. State ofGiijnnil, (1988) 3 SCC 153, 160: 1988 SCC (Cri) 
575: AIR 1988 SC 1255. 
27. Mohinuddin v. D.M., (1987) 4 SCC 58, 63, 64:1987 SCC (Cri) 674: AIR 1987 SC 1977. 
28. A.K. Roy v. Union of India, (1982) 1 SCC 271: 1982 SCC (Cri) 152: AIR 1982 SC 710; 1982 
Cn L] 340:1982 MLJ (Cri) 524. 
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A citizen is entitled to protection within the meaning of Art. 22(5) of 
the Constitution of the procedural guarantees envisaged by law. The court 
frowns upon any deviation or infraction of the procedural requirements. That 
in fact is the only guarantee to the citizen against the State's action of 
prevention detention.29 
Procedural requirement of Art. 22 and the statute must be strictly complied 
with - It is no answer to say that such requirements have been complied with 
before the date of hearing - Constitution of India, Arts. 22 and 21. 
In a habeas corpus proceeding, it is not a sufficient answer to say that 
the procedural requirements of the Constitution and the statute have been 
complied with before the date of hearing and therefore, the detention should 
be upheld. The procedural requirements are the only safeguards available to a 
detenu since the court is not expected to go behind the subjective satisfaction 
of the detaining authority. The procedural requirements are, therefore, to be 
strictly complied with if any value is to be attached to the liberty of the subject 
and the constitutional rights guaranteed to him in that regard. If a reference to 
an Advisory Board is to be made within three weeks, it is no answer to say 
that the reference, though not made within three weeks, was made before the 
hearing of the case. If the report of the Advisory Board is to be obtained 
within three months, it is no answer to say that the report, though not 
obtained within three months, was obtained before the hearing of the case. If 
the representation made by the detenu is required to be disposed of within a 
stipulated period, it is no answer to say that the representation, though not 
disposed of withiii three months, was disposed of before the hearing of the 
case.^ o 
Any unreasonable restriction in regard to detenu's right to confer 
with legal adviser and meet family members and friends would violate 
Arts. 21 and 14 - CL. 3(b)(i) and (ii) of (Delhi) Condition of Detention Order, 
dated August 23,1975 - Validity3i 
Judicial review — Court's interference under Art. 32 or 136 or 226 not called 
for where requirements of Art. 22(5) satisfied — Constitution of India, Arts, 
22(5), 32,136 and 226 — Administrative Law 
The High Court mider Art, 226 and the Supreme Court under Art. 32 
or 136 do not sit on appeal on the orders of preventive detention. The courts 
have only to see whether the formalities enjoined by Art, 22(5) have been 
complied with the detaitimg authorit)' and if so, the courts cannot examine 
the materials before it and find that the detaining authority should not have 
been satisfied on the materials before it and detained the detenu under the 
preventive detention Act. In the present case the detaining authority neither 
violated the relevant provisions of the Constitution nor those of the 
29. Ahmedhussmn Cbaikkhussam v. Commr. of Police, Ahmedabad, (1989) 4 SCC 751, 756: 1990 
s e c (Cri) 86: AIR 1989 SC 2274:1989 Cn 1J 2312. 
30. Abdul Latif Abdul WnJmb Slieikh ;'. B.K. }h,i, (1987) 2 SCC 22:1987 SCC (Cri) 244: AIR 1987 
SC 725:1987 Cri LJ 700. 
31. COFEPOSA Act, 1974. S. 5. Francis Coralie MuUin v, AdmiiAistrator, Union Territory of 
Delhi, (1981) 1 SCC 608:1981 SCC (Cri) 212: AIR 1981 SC 746: (1981) 2 SCR 516: WSl'Cri 
LJ 306:1981 ML] (Cri) 331. 
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COFEPOSA Act under which the detenu had been detamed and therefore, it is 
not open to the Court under Art. 32 to interfere with the order of detention.^^ 
Order of detention — Scope of High Court's interference under Art. 226 — 
High Court has only to see if the order is based on materials on record and has no 
jurisdiction to enquire into adequacy of those materials - COFEPOSA Act, 1974 (52 
of 1974), S. 3 -Constitution of India, Arts, 226 and 22. 
The High Court in its writ jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the 
Constitution is to see whether the order of detention has been passed on any 
materials before it If it is found that the order has been based by the detaining 
authority on materials on record, then the Court cannot go further and 
examine whether the material was adequate or not, which is the function of 
an appellate authority or court. It can examine the material on record only for 
the purpose of seeing whether the order of detention has been based on no 
material The satisfaction mentioned in S. 3 of the Act is the satisfaction of the 
detaining authority and not of the court, 
In the present case the High Court was not justified in holding that there was 
no material on record to prove knowledge of the detenu with the contraband 
goods. By implication, the High Court erroneously imported the rule of 
criminal jurisprudence that the guilt of an accused must be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt to the law of detention.^^ 
Detention order challenged by petition under Art. 32 — State informing that 
the detenu has since been released — Petition becomes infructuous.^^ 
Habeas corpus — Filing of another such writ though not barred, the Court 
can refuse to admit the writ petition if the matters being raised are under 
decision of a Constitution Bench or are such as could be raised earlier-Review 
petition may be filed after decision on the constitutional questions.^^ 
Habeas corpus petition — Detention- order against petitioner revoked and 
petitioner already released - Petition becoming infructuoiis - But if a fresh 
detention order is passed subsequently and the petitioner is again detained in 
pursuance thereof, petitioner is entitled to maintain a fresh petition - Preventive 
Detention - Constitutional Rights - National Security Act, 1980 - Res judicata^^ 
Habeas corpus petition — Burden of proof on the State — Court not justified in 
dismissing such a petition merely on ground of imperfect pleadings of the petitioner 
It was an improper exercise of power on the part of the High Court in 
disallowing the writ petition on the ground of imperfect pleadings. Normally, 
writ petitions are decided on the basis of affidavits and the petitioner caimot 
be permitted to raise grounds not taken in the petition at the hearing. The 
32. Hemlata Kantilal Shah v. State of Maharashh-a, (1981) 4 SCC 6475 658: 1982 SCC (Cri) 
16: AIR 1981 SC 8 
33. State of Gujarat v. Adam Kasam Bhaya, (1981)4 SCC 216, 218: 1981 SCC (Cri) 823: AIR 
1981 SC 2005:1981 Cri LJ 1686: (1981) 22 GLR 1278, 
34. Bhim Singh v. State of) & K, 1984 Supp SCC 504:1985 SCC (Cri) 60. 
35. Kavita v. State of Maharashtra (II), (1981) 4 SCC 145:1981 SCC (Cri) 808: AIR 1981 SC 
2084: 1981 Cri L] 1703, 
36. Constitution of India, Art, 32, Ram Jethmalani v. Union of India, (1984) 3 SCC 571:1984 
SCC 
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same rule cannot be applied to a petition for grant of a writ of habeas corpus. 
It is enough for the detenu to say that he is under wrongful detention, and the 
burden lies on the detaining authority to satisfy the court that the detention of 
the petitioner detenu was legal and in conformity not only with the mandatory 
provisions of the Act but also strictly in accordance with the constitutional 
safeguards embodied in Art. 22(5).^ ^ 
Habeas corpus petition presented by an advocate on behalf of the detenu — 
Registrar and another officer of the Registry knowing language of the detenu directed 
to meet the detenu in camera, explain substance and nature of the petition as also 
nature of relief sought therein and ascertain if he desires to file tlte petition -
Constitution of India, Art 32.^^ 
BASIS OF DETENTION 
In order that an activity may be to affect adversely the maintenance of 
public order, there must be materials to show that there has been a feeling of 
insecurity among the general public. If any act of a person 
panic or fear in the minds of the members of the public upsetting the even 
tempo of life of the communit)', such act must be said to have a direct bearing 
on the question of maintenance of public order. The commission of an offence 
will not necessarily come within the purview of 'public order'.^^ 
Public order — Extorting money from shopkeepers of an area by threatening 
them and throwing bomb on police party — Held on facts, related to laiv and 
order problem - National Security Act, 1980, S. 3(2) 
An act whether amounts to a breach of law and order or a breach of 
public order solely depeiids on its extent and reach to the society. If the act is 
restricted to particular individuals or a group of individuals it breaches the 
law and order problem but if the effect and reach and potentiality of the act is 
so deep as to affect the community at large and/or the even tempo of the 
community then it becomes a breach of the public order. In this case the 
respondents can very well proceed with the criminal case under S, 307 of IPC, 
execute it agaiiist the appellant and can get him punished if the case is proved 
beyond doubt against the appellant.'*" 
Public order— Individual actions which do not disturb the even tempo of life in the 
society and community or do not cause apprehension in the minds of the residents of 
the locality in regard to maintenance of public order, held, cannot amount to inter-
ference with the maintenance of public order - National Security Act, 1980 (65 of 
1980), S. 3.« 
It cannot be said that the satisfaction of the detaining authority on the 
basis of his past terrorist and disruptive activities that if the detenu were to be 
37. Mohinuddin v. DM,, (1987) 4 SCC 58, 63:1987 SCC (Cri) 674: AIR 1987 SC 1977. 
38. Ram Jethmalani v. Union of India, (1985) 1 SCC 116:1985 SCC (Cri) 39. 
39. Pi}'ush Kantilal Mehta v. Commr. of Police, 1989 Supp (1) SCC 322, 329:1989 SCC (Cri) 
438: AIR 1989 SC 491:1989 Cri 1.] 956. 
40. Gulab Mehra v. State of U.P., (1987) 4 SCC 302, 311, 316: 1987 SCC (Cri) 721: AIR 1987 
SC 2332. 
41. Bimla Dewan v, Lt.-Governor, (1982) 2 SCC 469:1982 SCC (Cri) 484: AIR 1982 SC 1257: 
1982 Cri LJ1737. 
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left at large he would indulge in similar activities in future and thus act in a 
manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order etc. would not be based 
on adequate materials. Public safety ordinarily means security of the pubhc or 
their freedom from danger. Public order also implied public peace and 
tranquilhty. The terrorist and disruptive activities disrupt public peace and 
tranquilUty and affect the freedom of the pubHc from danger to life and 
property. Disruption means the act of bursting and tearing as under. Dis-
ruptive means producing or resulting from or attending disruption. Terrorism 
means the act of terrorising; unlawful acts of violence committed in an 
organized attempt to overthi'ow a government or like purposes. Terrorist 
means one who adopts or supports the policy of terrorism. The terrorist and 
disruptive activities are naturally disruptive of public peace, tianquilUty and 
development.'*^ 
Pubhc order or law and order — Test to determine 
The impact on "public order" and "law and order" depends upon the 
nature of the act, the place where it is committed and motive force behind it. 
If the act is confined to an individual without directly or indirectly affecting 
the tempo of the life of the communit}', it may be a matter of law and order 
only. But where the gravity of the act is otherwise and likely to endanger the 
public tranquillity, it may fall within the orbit of the pubhc order. What might 
be an otherwise simple "law and order" situation might assume the gravity 
and mischief of a "public order" problem by reason alone of the manner or 
circumstances in which or the place at which it is carried out. Necessarily, 
much depends upon the nature of the act, the place where it is committed and 
the sinister significance attached to it. 
As for example dare-devil repeated criminal acts, open shoot out, 
throwing bomb at pubhc places, committing serious offences it public 
transport, armed persons going on plundering public properties or terrorizing 
people may create a sense of iiisecurity in the pubUc mind and may have an 
impact on "pubhc order". Even certain murder committed by persons in 
lonely places with the definite object of promoting the cause of the party; 
which they belong may also affect the maintenance of 'public order'.^^ 
Public order or law and order - Substance and not form of language in 
detention order to be seen - Verbatim use of statutory language that detenu 
acted in the manner prejudicial to the maintenance of pubhc order not 
enough.'*'* 
'Public order' and 'law and order'- Distinction between - When can 
preventive detention measures be resorted to - Activities of theft, 
robbery and ornament snatching by use of knives or guns in particular 
residential area of a metropolitan city like Delhi consistently for several years 
42. State of Punjab \'. Sukiipal Singh, (1990) 1 SCC 35, 44: 1990 SCC (Cri) 1: AIR 1990 SC 
231:1990 Cn LJ 584. 
43. Angoori De. Union of India, (1989) 1 SCC 385, 389, 3 1989 SCC (Cri) 164: AIR 1989 SC 
371:!S*;CnLJ950, 
44. T. Devakiv. Govt, of T.N., (195 SCC 456, 469, 470:1990 SCC (Cri) 348: AIR 1990 SC 1086: 
1990 Cri LJ 1140. 
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by dangerous and desperate characters, held, disrupt pxiblic-order and hence 
detention of such persons justified. 
The FIR shows that the petitioner is a desperate and dangerous character. He 
along with his associates had been involved in series criminal activities like 
theft, robbery an: snatching of ornaments by the use of knives an: firearms 
during a span of four years only in particular residential areas of Delhi. While 
ht and his associates were facing trial or matters were still under 
investigation, the impugned order of detention under the National Security 
Act was served on him. 
Preventive detention is devised to after protection to society. Any preventive 
measures even if they involve some restraint or hardship upon individuals, 
do not partake in any way of the nature of punishment, but are taken by way 
of precaution to prevent mischief to the State. Justification for such detention 
is suspicion or reasonable probability and not criminal convictioii which can 
only be warranted by legal evidence. The Executive is empowered to take 
recourse to its power of preventive detention in those cases where the Court is 
genuinely satisfied that no prosecution could possibly succeed against the 
detenu because he is a dangerous person who has overawed witnesses or 
against whom no one is prepared to depose. 
The distinction between the concepts of 'pubHc order' and slaw and order hes 
in the degree and extent of the reach of the act upon society. Acts similar in 
nature but committed in different contexts and circumstances might cause 
different reactions. What essentially is a problem relating to law and order 
may due to sudden sporadic and intermittent acts of physical violence on 
innocent victims in the meti'opolitan city of Delhi result in serious public 
disorder? It is the length, magnitude and intensity of the terror wave 
unleashed by a particular act of violence creating disorder that distinguishes 
it as an act affecting public order from that concerning law and order. Some 
offences primarily injure specific individuals and only secondarily the public 
iriterest, while others directly injure the public interest and affect individuals 
only remotely. It is the potentiality of the act to distiub the even tempo of the 
life of the community which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of pubhc 
order. 
The prejudicial activities of the detenu, as revealed in the grounds of 
detention, consist of a consistent course of criminal record. The detenu appears 
to have taken to a life of crime and become a notorious character. The fact that 
the petitioner and his associates are facing trial or the matters are stiU under 
investigation, only shows that they are such dangerous characters that people 
are afraid of giving evidence against them. The armed hold-up by gangsters 
in exclusive residential areas of the cit}^  where persons are deprived of their 
belongings at the point of knife or revolver, reveal organised crime. The 
particular acts enumerated in the grounds of detention clearly show that the 
activities of the detenu cover a wide field and fall within the contours of the 
concept of public order. The grounds furnished were also neither vague or 
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irrelevant or lacking in particulars nor inadequate or insufficient for the 
subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority.'*^ 
"Public order" and "law and order" - Creating terror or disorder, based on 
ideological differences between two communities in a sensitive town where 
one of the communities predominates, which may lead to conununal violence, 
held, pertains to "public order" and not merely to "law and order" .^ ^ 
The petitioner was detained by an order dated February 29,1984 of the 
DM under S. 3 (2) of the National Security Act in order to prevent him from 
acting prejudicially to maintenance of public order. The grounds mentioned 
in the detention order were (1) that on April 10, 1981 he along with his 
companions had surrounded one 'K' and had committed an offence under S. 
307, IPC, (2) that on September 27, 1982, he collected goondas in his house 
and had fired at the police party when it reached to arrest the goondas, (3) 
that on September 27, 1982 he was arrested and a country-made tamancha 
and carti'idges without license were recovered from his possession, (4) that on 
January 15, 1983 he along with his brother had shot dead one 'N' and a case 
under S. 302, IPC was registered against him, (5) that on October 31,1983 he 
forced one 6S9 at the point of revolver to take a nude snap of immoral act 
being committed by two persons; and (6) that on February 26, 1984 he along 
with his associates attempted to murder one T by sprinkling kerosene and 
lighting it with a matchbox. The detenu's father filed a writ petition under Art. 
32 challenging validity of his son's detention. Allowing the petition and 
quashing the detention order the Supreme Court Held: 
The allegations mentioned in the grounds of detention do not pertain to 
'public order', being not of such nature as to lead to any apprehension that the 
even tempo of the community would be endangered. Therefore, the detention 
of the detenu under S. 3(2) of the N.S.A. was not justified. Apart from the first 
ground being old and stale, it is irrelevant inasmuch as the detenu had been 
acquitted of the charge before the detention order was passed. The conduct 
alleged of tiie detenu in other grounds also, though reprehensible, are not of 
such nature which could endanger 'public order'. 
The difference between law and order situation and maintenance of 
public order must be kept in mind. The act by itself is not determinant of its 
gravity. In its quahty it may not differ from another but its potentiality may 
be very different. Therefore, the question whether a man has only committed 
a breach of law and order or acted in a manner likely to the disturbance of 
public order is a question of degree of the reach of the act upon society. It is 
necessary in each case to examine the facts to deternune, not the sufficiency of 
the grounds or the ti'uth of the grounds but nature of the grounds alleged and 
see whether these are relevant or not for considering whether the detention of 
the detenu is necessary for maintenance of public order.*^ 
45. Ashok Kumar v. Delhi Admn., (1982) 2 SCC 403; 1982 SCC (Cri) 451; AIR 1982 SC 1143; 
]982Cril.J 1191. 
46. Wdsiuddm Ahmed v. DM, (1981) 4 SCC 521, 533, 554: 1982 SCC (Cri) 4; AIR 1981 SC 
2166: 1981 Cri LJ1825. 
47. Apy Dixit \, State of U.P., (1984) 4 SCC 400; 1984 SCC (Cri) 625: AIR 1985 SC 18. 
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Similarly and continuous repetition of the prejudicial act or omission 
whether essential - Bihar Control of Crimes Act, 1981 (7 of 1981), Ss. 2(d) (i), 
(ii) and (iv) and 12 - Scope and interpretation of - Three separate incidents 
set out in grounds of detention — First incident relating to clause (i) second 
relating to clause (iv), and third again relating to clause (i) of S. 2 (d) though 
committed after a lapse of 8 years — On facts held (per majority), detenu not 
'anti-social element" within meaning of S, 2 (d) and therefore, detention order 
under S. 12 invaUd. The petitioner along with others was committed to the 
Court of Session for being tried for offences under S. 302 read with Ss. 120-B, 
386 and 511, IPC. During pendency of the said trial the petitioner obtained 
from High Court an order for his enlargement on bail. Before the petitioner 
could furnish bail and secure his release from jail, the D.M. passed on August 
16,1983 the impugned order of his detention under S. 12 of the Bihar Control 
of Crimes Act read with Bihar Government Notification No. H(P) 6844, dated 
June 20, 1983. In the grounds of detention, the D.M. relied on the following 
three incidents to hold him an 'anti-social element' (i) that on 15, 1975 the 
petitioner along with his associates had gone to the shop of a cloth dealer and 
had forcibly demanded subscription at the point of a gun, (ii) that on June 
17/18, 1982, the petitioner was found teasing and misbehaving with females 
returning from a cinema hall, and (iii) that the criminal case referred to earher 
was pending against him. Held: 
Per Venkataramiah, J. 
The word 'habitually5 used separately in (i), (ii) and (iv) of S. 2(d) 
means 'repeatedly' or 'persistently'. It implies a thread of continuity stTinging 
together similar repetitive acts. Repeated, persistent and similar, but not 
isolated, individual and dissimilar acts are necessary to justify an inference of 
habit. It connotes frequent commission of acts or omissions of the same kind 
referred to in each of the said sub-clauses or an aggregate of similar acts or 
omissions. Absence of the word 'habitually' in clauses (iii) and (v) of S. 2(d) 
suggests that in order to tieat a person as 'anti-social element', under clauses 
(iii) and (v) a siiigle act or omission referred to therein may be enough, 
whereas in the case of clauses (i), (ii) and (iv) there should be a repetition of 
acts or omission of the same kind referred to therein. If the acts or omissions 
in question are not of the same kind or even if they are of the same kind when 
they are committed with a long interval of time between them they cannot be 
treated as habitual ones. Commission of an act or omission referred to in one 
of the clauses (i), (ii) and (iv) and of another act or omission referred to in any 
other of the clauses of S. 2 (d) would not be sufficient to tieat a person as an 
'anti-social element'. A single act or omission falling under clause (i) and a 
single act or omission falling under clause (iv) of S. 2(d) carmot, therefore, be 
characterised as a habitual act or omission referred to in either of them. 
In the present cases the detenu cannot be called an 'anti-social element' as 
defined by S. 2(d) and therefore, the impugned order of detention could not 
have been passed under S. 12. In the first tivo incidents referred to in the 
grounds oi detention, the detaining authority failed to mention how those 
criminal cases ended. If they had ended in favour of the detenu finding him 
clearly not guilty, they cannot certainly constitute acts or omissions habitually 
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committed by the detenu. Moreover, the said two incidents are of different 
kinds altogether. Whereas the first one may fall under clause (i), the second 
one falls under clause (iv) of S. 2(d). They are, even if true, not repetitions of 
acts or omissions of the same kind. Although the third ground which is based 
on the pending Sessions is of the nature of acts or omissions referred to in 
clause (0 but the interval between the first and the third grounds is nearly 
eight years and cannot therefore make the detenu a habitual offender of the 
type falling under-clause (i) of S.2(d). 
Per Chinnappa Reddy, J. (concurring) 
I entirely agree with my brother Venkataramiah, J, both on the question of 
inter-pretation of the provisions of the Bihar Control of Crimes Act, 1981 and 
on the question of the effect of the order of grant of bail in the criminal 
proceeding arising out of the incident constituting one of the grounds of 
detention. PerA.P, Sen, J. (concurring) 
The Bihar Act appears to be based on the English Prevention of Crime Act, 
1908. But the scheme under the English Act is entirely dif-
ferent where a person has to be charged at the trial of being a habitual 
criminal Therefore, the considerations which govern the matter in case of the 
English Act do not arise in case of preventive detention under S. 12(2) of the 
Act, 
The word 'habitually9 means by force of habit. It is the force of habit inherent 
or latent in an individual with a criminal instinct, with a criminal disposition 
of mind, that makes a person accustomed to lead a life of crime posing danger 
to the society in general. If a person with criminal tendencies consistently or 
persistently or repeatedly commits or attempts to commit or abets the 
commission of offences punishable under Chap. XVI or Chap. XVII of the 
Penal Code, he should be considered to be an 'antisocial element'. 
It is not required by clauses (i), (ii) and (iv) of S, 2(d) that the nature and 
character of the anti-social acts should be the same or similar. What have to be 
repetitive are the anti-social acts. It is not possible to accept the view that the 
commission of an act referred to in one of the clauses (i), (ii) or (iv) and any 
other act or omission referred to in any other of the clauses of S, 2(d) would 
not be sufficient to treat a person as an 'anti-social element'. 
Section 12(2) should not be confined in its operation against habitual 
criminals who have a certain number of prior convictions for offences of the 
'characters specified. The definition of 'anti-social element' in S. 2(d) nowhere 
requires so.''^  
Basis of detention - Public order or law and order - Even a single act or 
omission may disturb public order -
But where alleged single act of assault committed on account of business 
rivalry, held on facts, the act pertained to disturbance of law and order and 
not public order - National Security Act, 1980, S. 3(2) 
4cS. Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar, (1984) 3 SCC 14,18,19, 23; 1984 SCC (Cri) 361: AIR 
1984 SC 1334:1984 CriLJ 909. 
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The appellant was detained under S. 3(2) of the National Security Act. In the 
grounds of detention it was inter alia stated that the appellant used to secure 
government conti'acts by terrorising other tenderers, that when the offer of the 
complainant-tenderer was accepted the appellant along with his companions 
had attacked him by throwing hand-grenade and firing gunshots causing 
commotion, ti-affic obstruction and disturbance of public tranquillity (though 
the complainant escaped unhurt), that pursuant to FIR of the appellant a 
charge-sheet had been put up against him, and that in case of his release on 
bail from jail, there was possibility of his again acting in a maimer prejudicial 
to the maintenance of public order to prevent which it was necessary to detain 
him, The High Court held that the alleged act was intended to teach a lesson 
to the complainant and to act as a warning to prospective tenderers in future 
who may not dare to avail of the opporturiity to submit their tenders against 
that of the appellants and that the impact and reach of the act went beyond 
the individual and affected the community of contractors. Accordingly the 
High Court upheld the order of detention. Allowing the detenu's appeal the 
Supreme Court 
The alleged act of assault by firearms, which was confined to the complainant 
alone and not to others, infringed law and order. The reach and effect of the 
act was not so extensive as to affect a considerable number of members of the 
society. The act did not disturb public tranquillity nor did it create any terror 
or in the minds of the people of the locality nor did it affect in any manner the 
even tempo of the life of the community. The criminal act emanated from 
business rivalry between the detenus and the complainant. Therefore such an 
act cannot be the basis of subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority to 
pass an order of detention on the ground that the impugned act purports to 
affect public order. Moreover, no injury caused to the person of the 
complainant by the appellants nor any damage was caused to his car though 
hand-grenade was alleged to have been thrown on the car. 
A solitary act of omission or commission can be taken into 
consideration for being subjectively satisfied, by the detaining authority to 
pass an order of detention if the reach, effect and potentiality of the act is such 
that it disturbs public tianquiUity by creating terror and panic in the society 
or a considerable number of the people in a specified locality where the act is 
alleged to have been committed. Thus it is the degree and extent of the reach 
of the act the society which is vital for considering the question whether a 
man has committed only a breach of law and order or has acted in a manner 
likely to cause disturbance to public order.^^ 
Public order — Satisfaction regarding breach of 
Absence of allegation regarding disturbance of public order in FIR 
lodged in cormection with criminal case against detenu - Held, not material 
where detaining authority had additional material, such as supervision note 
of police, which satisfied him about apprehension of breach of public order, o^ 
49, Subhash Bhandari v. D.M., (1987) 4 SCC 685, 690:1988 SCC (Cri) 36; AIR 1988 SC 74. 
50. Alijan Mian v. Distt. Iviagistrate, (1983) 4 SCC 301, 308, 309: 1983 SCC (Cri) 840: AIR 
1983 SC 1130:1983 Cri LJ1649. 
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Public order — Whether detenu's actior\ prejudicial to maintenance of public 
order or law and order — 
Depends upon facts and circumstances of the particular case— National 
Security Act, 1980, S. 3(2) 
Conceptually there is difference between law and order and public 
order but what in a given situation may be a matter covered by law and order 
may really turn out to be one of public order. One has to turn to the facts of 
each case to ascertain whether the matter relates to the larger circle or the 
smaller cii-cle. An act which may not at all be objected to in certain situations 
is capable of totally disturbing the public tranquility. When communal 
tension is high, an indiscreet act of no significance is Hkely to disturb or 
dislocate the even tempo of the life of the community. An order of detention 
made in such a situation has to take note of the potentiality of the act objected 
to. No hard and fast rule can really be evolved to deal with problems of 
human society. Every possible situation cannot be brought under watertight 
classifications and a set of tests to deal with them cannot be laid down. As and 
when an order of detention is questioned, it is for the court to apply the well 
known tests to find out whether the impugned activities upon which the 
order of detention is grounded go under the classification of public order or 
belong to the category of law and order. 
The reference to Dr Allen's classification in Pushkar Mukherjee case, to 
the effect that some offences primarily injure specific persons and only 
secondarily the public interest while others directly injure the public interest 
and affect individuals only remotely, was intended to bring into bold relief 
the basic distinction. The guidelines indicated in that judgment falls in line 
with the general principles adopted by Supreme Court in several authorities. 
The criticism against Pushkar Mukherjee case, on ground that the test laid 
down by Dr Allen was not applicable to judge the validity of a detention 
order, is, therefore, unwarranted.^^ 
Any disorderly behaviour of a person in the public or commission of a 
criminal offence is bound to some extent affect the peace prevailing in the 
locality and it may also affect law and order but the same need not affect 
maintenance of public order. There is basic difference between Taw and 
order' and 'public order'. The question whether a man has only committed a 
breach of law and order or has acted in a manner likely to cause disturbance 
of the pubhc order, is a question of degree and the extent of the reach of the 
act upon the society. A solitary assault on one individual can hardly be said to 
disturb public peace or place public order in jeopardy so much as to bring the 
case within the purview of the Act providing for preventive detention. Such a 
solitary incident can only raise a law and order problem and no more. In the 
present case there is no material on record to show that the reach and 
potentiahty of the single incident of attempted murderous assault on the 
Minister was so great as to disturb the even tempo or normal life of the 
community in the locaiit}^ or disturb general peace and ti-anquillity or create a 
sense of alarm and insecurity in the locality. Though in the grounds of 
51. State of U.P. v. Hari Shankar Tewari, (1987) 2 SCC 490; 1987 SCC (Cri) 388: AIR 1987 SC 
998:1987 Cri LJ 840. 
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detention the detaining authority had stated that by committing this grave 
offence in pubHc, in broad daylight, the detenu created a sense of alarm, scare 
and a feeling of insecurity in the minds of the public of the area and thereby 
acted in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order which 
affected even tempo of life of the conmiunity, but mere repetition of these 
words in the grounds are not sufficient to inject the requisite degree of quality 
and potentiality in the incident in question. Thus the solitary incident as 
alleged in the ground of detention is not relevant for sustaining the order of 
detention for the pui-pose of the preventing the petitioner from acting in a 
manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.52 
Public order - Dangerous person under S. 2(c) of Gujarat PASAA 
Criminal cases against the detenu under Chapter XVI or XVIIIPC or 
Chapter V of Arms Act referred to in grounds of detention, in respect of 
which detenu has already been acquitted by court, caimot be taken into 
consideration for deciding that the detenu was a dangerous person — Cases 
under S, 135 of Bombay Police Act, referred to in the grounds, being not 
covered by S. 2(c). of Gujarat PASAA, not relevant - Remaining cases 
against, the detenu, referred to in the grounds, being still under investigation 
and not yet decided, not sufficient for the detaining authority's satisfaction 
that the detenu was a dangerous person — Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social 
Activities Act, 1985, S. 2(c).53 
Incidents referred to in the grounds relating to private individuals-
Grounds not referring to any dangerous, harmful or adverse act or alarm 
which gives rise to a feeling of insecurity for the general public amongst the 
persons of a locaHty — Held, on facts, the incidents pertained to disturbance 
of law and order — Non-application of mind — Gujarat Prevention of 
Anti-Social Activities Act, 1985, Ss. 3(1) and 2(c). 
The criminal cases against the detenu mentioned in the grounds of 
detention were confined to certain private individuals. There was nothing in 
this case to show that the petitioner was a member of a gang engaged in 
criminal activities systematically in a particular localit^ ^ which created a panic 
and a sense of insecurity amongst the residents of that particular area in 
consideration of which the impugned order was made. The alleged activities 
of the detenu did not affect adversely or tend to affect the even tempo of hfe of 
the community. They merely related to law and order problem. Their reach 
and effect was not so deep as to affect the public at large and they did not in 
any way pose a threat to the maintenance of public order. An act may create a 
law and order problem but such an act does not necessarily cause an 
obstruction to the maintenance of public order. So there has been complete 
non-application of mind by the detaining authority before reaching a 
subjective satisfaction to make the impugned order of detention.^^ 
52. T. Devaki v. Govt, of T.N., (1990) 2 SCC 456:1990 SCC (Cri) 348; AIR 1990 SC 1086:1990 
Cri LJ1140. 
53. Abdul Razak Nannekhan Pathan v. Police Commr., (1989) 4 SCC 43, 49, 50: 1989 SCC 
(Cri) 679. . 
54. Abdul Razak Nannekhan Pathan v. Police Commr., (1989) 4 SCC 43, 51, 52: 1989 SCC 
(Cri) 679. 
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Merely because the petitioner is a bootlegger within the meaning of S. 
2(b) of the Act, he cannot be preventively detained under the Act. Under sub-
section (4) of S. 3 of the Act a bootlegger or a dangerous person or a drug 
offender shall be deemed to be acting in a manner prejudicial to the 
maintenance of pubUc order; but such deeming provision will not be attracted 
unless the activities of the person concerned affect adversely or are likely to 
affect adversely the maintenance of pubHc order. This in the present case the 
detaining authority has failed to substantiate.^^ 
Assaulting the contractor with a view to kill him on his refusal to pay 
the fees — Threatening shopkeepers in market with revolver in hand to 
kill if they fail to pay the fees as a result of which shops closed down— A 
contractor and a shopkeeper lodging report with police— Held on facts, 
incidents maintenance of public order - National Security Act, 1980, S. 3(2) 
The demand of fees for goondagardi (chauth) from the contractor of a 
mango grove and the attack launched on him would show that it was not a 
case of singling out a particular conh'actor for payment of chauth but a 
demand expected to be complied with by all owners or contractors of mango 
groves in the locality. In such circumstances, the demand made and the attack 
launched would undoubtedly cause fear and panic in the minds of all the 
owners and contractors of mango groves in that area and this would have 
affected the even tempo of life of the community. 
Similarly as regards the incident of demanding Rs 10,000 from a 
shopkeeper and threatening him that unless the money was paid on the 
foUowmg day or the day after the shopkeeper would be killed, about which 
the shopkeeper had informed the police and a case was registered under S. 
506 IPC The demand had been made as part of a scheme to extort money from 
all the shopkeepers under a threat that their continuance of business and even 
their lives would be in danger if chauth was not paid. The demand would 
have certainly made all the shopkeepers in that locality feel apprehensive that 
they too would be forced to make payments to the (iefenw-petitioner and that 
otherwise they would not be allowed to run their shops. 
The third incident of threatening the shopkeepers in the market with 
revolver in haiid that if any one failed to pay "chauth" he would not be 
allowed to open his shop and he would have to face the consequences, on 
account of which the shopowners downed the shutters of their shops, cannot 
be considered as merely causing disturbance to the law and order situation 
but must be viewed as one affecting the even of life in the market. 
In Gulah Mehra case, no shopkeeper had come forward to complain 
about the detenu and only a picket employed at the police station had made a 
report. But in the present case specific reports had been given to the police by 
the contractor and a shopkeeper from whom Rs 10,000 had been demanded. 
55. Piyush Kantilal Mehta v. Commr. of Police, 1989 Supp (1) SCC 322, 328:1989 SCC (Cr 
438: AIR 1989 SC 491:1989 Cri LJ 956. 
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Therefore, the decision in Gulab Mehra cannot be of any avail to the detenu-
petitioner.^^ 
Such act being calculated to disturb public peace and tranquillity, held, 
pertains to public order and not merely law and order.^^ 
Neither maintenance of public security nor maintenance of law and order can 
justify detention under S. 3(2) of National Security Act, 1980 (65 of 1980).58 
On facts held, activities of the detenu pertained to disturbance of pubhc order 
The agitation on the issue of foreigners in Assam, which has been 
going on for years, has taken an ugly and serious turn and the statements of 
facts made in second and third paragraphs of the Grounds of Detention in the 
prevalent circumstances relate to the maintenance of public order and not 
merely law and order.59 
Public order — fermenting communal feelings 
Actions undermining public faith in poKce administration cause 
prejudice to maintenance of public order — Such attempts made at the time of 
communal tension affects maintenance of public order. 
An order of detention was passed under S. 3(2) of the National Security 
Act on April 15, 1988 against the petitioner, who is a bachelor and does not 
own any property. In the grounds of detention it was stated that a cow 
belonging to Muslims was diverted by some undesirable elements towards 
the place where religious celebrations in connection with the Muslim festival 
'Shabebarat' was going on in the night of April 2/3,1988. At this the petitioner 
came to the stage, got excited and spread the rumour that "the poUce had not 
made any arrangements". It was stated that the cow belonged to the Hindus 
and had been deliberately sent inside the festival and "other provoking" 
things. Due to the aforesaid, the people started running and communal 
feelings got aroused. Again on April 9,1988, it was stated, the petitioner had 
"provoked some persons" of the Muslim community by saying that "the 
administration even now has not allowed to get a loudspeaker fixed here and 
all of you are silent, get a loudspeaker on the mosque and we will see. 1 am 
with you" and also saying that on the occasion of *Shabebarat? Hindus had 
dehberately "sent their cow on the road" for their festive celebrations and the 
"people are silent". He had also said about teaching "them" a lesson. It was 
stated that due to the "aforesaid bad act" communal feelitigs got aroused in 
the city and fear and terror got spread, and in this way the petitioner had 
done an act which was "prejudicial to maintenance of public law and order" 
and as such there was possibiUty of the petitioner doing such an act, and 
therefore, in order to restrain the petitioner from doing so, it was necessary to 
detain him. Held: 
56. Sharad Kumar Tyagi v. State qfU.R, (1989) 1 SCC 736, 7415 742; 1989 SCC (Cri) 294; AIR 
1989 SC 764. 
57. Fitrat Raza Khan v. State of U.P., (1982) 2 SCC 449:1982 SCC (Cri) 472: AIR 1982 SC 146: 
1982 Cri L] 338. 
58. Aidal Singh v. State of 4 SCC 428:1981 SCC (Cri) 848. 
59. Dhananjoy Das v. D.M„ (1982) 2 SCC 521: 1982 SCC (Cri) 488; AIR 1982 SC 1315- 198^ 
Cri LJ1779. 
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The difference between public order and law and order is a matter of degree. 
If the morale of the poUce force or of the people is shaken or undermined by 
making them lose their faith in the law-enforcing machinery of the State then 
prejudice is occasioned to maintenance of public order. Such attempts or 
actions which undermine the public faith in the police adnunistration at a 
time when communal tensions are high, affects maintenance of public order 
and as such conduct is prejudicial. Therefore, the contention that the grounds 
of detention were not relevant to the order of detention under the Act carmot 
be accepted.^" 
Public order or law and order — Act of throwing bomb at election meeting 
pertains to pubUc order problem — Hence detention order valid.^^ 
Public order or law and order —Commission of any criminal offence such as 
selling liquor in contravention of Prohibition Act by itself would not affect 
public order 
There is a wide gap between law and order and public order. The criminal 
offence may relate to the field of law and order but such an offence would not 
necessarily give rise to a situation of public order. Depending upon peculiar 
situations an act which may otherwise have been overlooked as innocuous 
might con-stitute a problem of public order. Selling of liquor by the petitioner 
would certainly amount to an offence under the Prohibition Act but without 
something more would not give rise to a problem of pubic order. Similarly 
commission of any other criminal offence, even assault or threat of assault, 
would not bring the matter within the ambit of public order.^^ 
Public order or law and order — Detaining authority's apprehension 
regarding breach of public order by the detenu normally not open to judicial 
review. 
Throwing bomb on a person and assaulting another amongst the large 
gathering witnessing a cultural programme at dead of night on one occasion 
and opening of gun fire in a thickly populated residential area on another 
occasion causing t panic and alarm in the area, held, amounted to breach of 
pubUc order as the incidents disturbed the tranquillity and the even tempo of 
life of public."^ 3 
Public order or law and order — Detenu alleged to be a bootlegger engaged in 
unlawful storing and selling Hquor and causing injuries to irmocent 
persons of the locality by using lethal weapons — Six criminal cases 
registered against the detenu, of which two cases ended in acquittal? three 
cases pending trial and the remaining case pending inquiry - Held, sufficient 
and adequate material not available for holding that the alleged prejudicial 
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adversely maintenance of public order - Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social 
Activities Act, 1985, Ss. 3(1) and 4(3).6'' 
Public order or law and order- Grounds of detention alleging commission of 
offences by detenu of the nature ordinarily covered by Ss. 307, 504 and 506, 
IPC— Detenu a minor school-going boy at the time of his detention •- Held, 
activities of the detenu pertained to breach of law and order and not public 
order — Having regard to the nature of offences and age of the detenu, held, 
order of detention cannot be sustained - J & K Public Safety Act, 1978, S, 8 
The first ground of detention was that the detenu had attacked a bus 
conductor with a dagger with the intention to kill him and caused Injuries to 
his person and the second ground was that he had threatened a lemon vendor 
with a dagger saying 4<by demanding money you are inviting your death". In 
respect of each incident set out in the grounds FIRs had been lodged but the 
D.M. passed the impugned order of detention under S. 8 of the J & K Public 
Safety Act. Held: 
Preventive detention measures can be resorted to where a criminal conduct 
camiot be easily prevented, checked or thwarted, but every minor infraction 
of law camiot be upgraded to the height of an activity prejudicial to the 
maintenance of public order. In the present case there is no indication that 
witnesses were not forthcoming in respect of the alleged infraction of law and 
why the normal investigation was not pursued. Non-application of mind of 
the detaining authority becomes evident from the frivolity of grounds" on the 
detention order was founded. 
A greater infirmity which struck at the root of the detention order was that 
when the detenu was arrested and detained by the impugned order, he was a 
school-going boy of around 17 years. It passes comprehension to believe that 
he can be visited with drastic measure of preventive detention. Therefore, in 
the facts and circumstances of this case the detention order was wholly 
unwarranted and deserved to be quashed.^^ 
Public order or law and order — Incident of murder,of complainant*s brother 
by gunshot at night, held, affected law and order but incidents of firing on 
complainant and his companions in public street during daytime causing 
death of one of them and of firing on an undertrial prisoner in court 
compound, causing injuries, held, affected public order.^^ 
Pubhc order or law and order problem — What constitutes pubhc order 
— Isolated criminal case — Policemen arrested 
on charge of committing cognizable offence under S. 392/34 IPC with the 
assistance of a member of public - After their release on bail and during 
pendency of investigation, detention order under S. 3(2) of National Securit}' 
Act issued on ground that commission of the heinous crime by police 
64. Omprakash v, Commr. of Police, 1989 Supp (2) SCC 576:1990 SCC (Cri) 198- AIR 1990 
SC496. 
65. Jay a Mala v. Home Secy., Govt, of ] & K (1982) 2 SCC 538:1982 SCC (Cri) 502- AIR 198 '^ 
SC 1297: 1982 Cri LJ1777. 
66. State of U.P. v. Kamal Kishore Saini, (1988) 1 SCC 287, 295,296:1988 SCC (Cri) 107(2)-
AIR 1988 SC 208:1988 Cri L] 405. 
149 
personnel themselves ('created a sense of insecurity in the minds of public at 
large and is prejudicial to the maintenance of public order" - Held, the 
offence involved law and order problem and did not disturb public order -
Hence order of detention quashed 
The offence was committed by two misguided poHcemen under the cover of 
darkness with the assistance of a member of the public. It was certainly 
suicidal to those two police personnel. But it seems to have no connection 
whatsoever to disturb the 'public order' having regard to the circumstances of 
the case. It is an isolated criminal case with no sinister significance attached to 
it.67 
Disturbance of public order or law and order - Allegation thai detenu was 
caught with foreign liquor without any pass, permit or licence or that detenu 
was of high-handed and fierce in nature causing terror to public or allegation 
of minor incidents of beating by the detenu — Held, allegations do not 
estabUsh disturbance of public order - Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social 
Activities Act, 1985, S. 3(1) and (4). 
The alleged offence of the detenu being caught with bottles containing 
foreigii Hquor without any pass, permit or licence has no bearing on the 
question of maintenance of public order. 
The allegation of the deteyiu being of highhanded and fierce in nature 
may give rise to a question of law and order but, surely, they have nothing to 
do with the question of public order. A person may be very fierce by nature, 
but so long as the public generally are not affected by his activities or conduct, 
the question of maintenance of pubUc order wiU not arise. 
The alleged incidents of beating by the detenu do not have any bearing 
on the maintenance of 'public order'. The petitioner may be punished for the 
alleged offences com-mitted by him but, surely, the acts constituting the 
offences cannot be said to have affected the even tempo of the life of the 
community. ^ 8 
Public order or law and order problem — Commission of non-cognizable 
offence of breaking glass screens of bus and abusing its driver and conductor 
alleged in two separate incidents — But in both the incidents the offence was 
actually directed against the same person, who was the owner of the bus and 
on whose information or complaint the cases were registered against the 
detenu — Presence of passengers in the bus at the time of the incident not 
alleged - Held on facts, the acts alleged did not affect public order -
National Security Act, 1980, S. 3(2) 
The first two grounds which pertain to the commission of non-
cognizable offences have no rational nexus relatable to the maintenance of 
public order. The alleged attacks were directed against the same individual 
and, even according to the police; they constituted merely offences of a non-
cogi-iizable nature. In the facts of the case, it is difficult to impart to these acts, 
67. Angoori Devi v. Union of India, (1989) 1 SCC 385, 388, 391:1989 SCC (Cri) 164: AIR 
1989 SC 371:1989 CriLJ 950. 
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AIR 1989 SC491:1989 Cri L] 956. 
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which were liable to be dealt with under the ordinary laws of the land, a 
"public order" dimension within the meaning of and for purposes of the 
extraordinary law of preventive detention. It is true that the acts themselves, 
in relation to their effect on public order, which might otherwise be free from 
the vice of affecting public order, might assume a sinister colour and 
significance from the circumstances under and the manner in which they are 
done. What might be an otherwise simple "law and order" situation might 
assume the gravity and mischief of a "pubHc order" problem by reason alone 
of the manner or circumstances in which or the place at which it is carried 
OUt.69 
SUBJECTIVE SATISFACTION AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Factors influencing formation of — Inference can be drawn from past conduct 
and antecedent history of detenu — Government's confidential guide-lines 
regarding the authority's satisfaction have no binding force and failure of its 
strict compliance would not constitute mala fide action — Administrative 
Law. 
The detaining authority has of necessity to into account all the relevant 
materials placed before it and after due consideration thereof may justifiably 
come to the conclusion that the activities of a particular person were such that 
he had a tendency to repeat his illegal activities. For this purpose the past 
conduct or antecedent history of a person can appropriately be taken into 
account by the authority in a detention order. 
In the present case the detenu himself admitted in his confession that he 
has his home in Bombay and business in Muscat, His passport disclosed that 
he was frequently shuttling between Muscat and India, Admittedly he 
smuggled the Palladium in question in order to make profit by selling it to 
customers In India, The detaining authority would be within its jurisdiction to 
take into consideration all these facts and subjectively come to a satisfaction 
whether or not the offender may be repeating his activities.^" 
Tests of vaUdity 
There are well recognised objective and judicial tests of the subjective 
satisfaction for preventive detention. Amongst other things, the material 
considered by the detaining authority in reaching the satisfaction must be 
susceptible of the satisfaction both in law and in logic. The tests are the usual 
administrative law tests where power is couched in subjective language. 
There is, of course, the requisite emphasis in the context of personal liberty. 
Indeed the purpose of public lav/ and the public law courts is to discipline 
power and strike at the illegality and unfairness of government wherever it is 
found. The sufficiency of the evidentiary material or the degree of probative 
69. Ayya v. State of U.F., (1989) 1 SCC 374, 377, 378:1989 SCC (Cri) 153: AIR 1989 SC 364: 
1989 Cri L] 991. 
70. Hemlata Kantilal Shah v. State of Maharashtra, (1981) 4 SCC 647, 658:1982 SCC (Cri) 
16: AIR 198 ISC 8. 
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criteria for the satisfaction for detention is of course in the domain of the 
detaining authority/^ 
The petitioners were held under S. 3(2) of the National Security Act on 
the ground that they addressed members of a community in a language 
inciting them to beat the police and PAC men as a result of which the crowd 
commenced pelting stones and discharged firearms on the government 
officials and the police personnel assembled there causing injuries. It was 
contended that there was no material before the District Magistrate on the 
basis of which he could form the opinion that the detenus would act in future 
In a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Accepting the con-
tention and allowing the writ and appeals the Supreme Court 
Held: 
Preventive detention is not intended as a punitive measure, as a 
curtailment of liberty by way of punishment for an offence already com-
mitted. The power to detain under S. 3 of the National Security Act can be 
exercised only with a view to preventing a person from acting in a manner 
which may prejudice any of the considerations set forth in the section. While 
detaining under S. 3(2) there must be material to show that the detenus would 
act in the future to the prejudice of the maintenance of public order. Though 
the satisfaction of the Distiict Magistiate is subjective in nature, but even sub-
jective satisfaction must be based upon some pertinent material. The question 
is not of sufficiency of that material but of the very existence of relevant 
material. In the present case even if it is accepted that the detenus did address 
the assembly of persons and incited them to lawlessness there was no 
material to warrant the inference that they would repeat the rrusconduct or do 
anything else which would be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. 
Therefore, the detention orders must be quashed.'^ 
The sufficiency of the materials available to the detaining authority is 
not to be examined by the court. While considering the writ petition of or on 
behalf of the detenu the Supreme Court or the High Court does not sit in 
appeal over the detention order, and it Is not for the court to go into and 
assess the probative value of the evidence available to the detaining authority. 
Of course, a detention order not supported by any evidence may have to be 
quashed, but that is not the position here. There was clearly sufficient material 
before the District Magistiate to justify the forming of his opinion. It was not 
therefore possible to accept the contention that the ground mentioned for the 
detention was non-existent.^^ 
Scope of judicial review 
The executive authority is not the sole judge of.what is required for 
national security or public order. But the court caimot substitute its decision if 
71. Ayya v. State of U.P., (1989) 1 SCC 374,382:1989 SCC (Cri) 153: AJR 1989 SC 364:1989 
CriLJ991. 
72. Fazal Ghosi v. Slate of U.P., (1987) 3 SCC 502:1987 SCC (Cri) 596: AIR 1987 SC 1877: 
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73. K. Arima Kumari v. Govt of A.P., (1988) 1 SCC 296, 303, 304: 1988 SCC (Cri) 116: AIR 
1988 SC 227:1988 Cri LJ 411. 
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the executive authority or the appropriate authority acts on proper materials 
and reasonably and rationally comes to that conclusion even though the court 
might not be in agreement with the same. It is not for the court to put itself in 
the position of the detaining authority and to satisfy itself that untested facts 
reveal a path of crime provided these facts are relevant. '''* 
Scope of judicial review 
The subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority as regards the 
factual existence of the condition on which the order of detention can be made 
i.e. the grounds of detention constitutes the foundation for the exercise of the 
power of detention and the court cannot be invited to consider the propriety 
or sufficiency of the grounds on which the satisfaction of the detaining 
authority is based. Nor can the court, on a review of the grounds, substitute 
its own opinion for that of the authority. But this does not imply that the 
subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority is wholly immune from the 
power of judicial review. It inferentially follows that the subjective 
satisfaction being a condition precedent for the exercise of the power con-
ferred on the executive, the court can always examhie whether the requisite 
satisfaction was arrived at by the authority; if it is not, the condition precedent 
to the exercise of the power would not be fulfilled and the exercise of the 
power would be bad. The simplest case is where the authority has not applied 
its mind at all; in such a case, the authority could not possibly be satisfied as 
regards the fact in respect of which it is required to be satisfied.''^ 
Subjective satisfaction of detaining authority — Scope of judicial review of — 
Detention order, if made in derogation of the constitutional safeguards and 
provisions of relevant preventive detention law, liable to be quashed — Court 
should not be influenced by gmesomeness of the crime alleged against the 
detenu — Constitution of India, Arts. 21, 22, 32 — Bihar Prevention of Crimes 
Act, 1981, Ss. 2(d) and 12(2) 
Per Chinnappa Reddy, ]. (concurring) 
The Constitution of India does not give a carte blanche to any organ of 
the State to be the sole arbiter in matters of maintenance of security and public 
order. So it is too perilous a proposition to say that the authorities concerned 
with the preventive detention must be the sole judges of what the national 
security or public order requires. The preventive detention is within the 
judicial scrutiny where courts are required to examine, when demanded, 
whether the limits set by the Constitution and the Legislature have been 
h-ansgressed resulting in an excessive detention. Vv'hile adequacy or suf-
ficiency may not be a ground of challenge, relevancy or proximity are 
certaiiily grounds of challenge. It is now well settied that remoteness in point 
of time makes a ground of detention irrelevant. 
74. Raj Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, (1986) 4 SCC 407, 414: 1986 SCC (Cri) 481: AIR 1986 
SC 2173:1986 Cri LJ 2042. 
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Per A. P. Sen, J. (dissenting) 
If the persons engaged in anti-social activities seeking to create serious 
public disorder are being dealt with effectively by ordering their preventive 
detention and at the same time it is assured that the law would not be used 
arbitrarily to deprive the citizen of his right to life and liberty, there should 
not be any objection to the order of preventive detention. Those who are 
responsible for the national security or for -the maintenance of public order 
must be the sole judges of what the national security or public order requires. 
Sufficiency of grounds is not for the court but for the detaining authority for 
the formation of his subjective satisfaction. The power of preventive detention 
by the Distiict Magistiate under S. 12(2) is necessarily subject to the 
limitations enjoined on the exercise of such power by Art. 22(5). The Court 
must be circumspect in striking down the impugned order of detention where 
it meets with the requirements of Art. 22(5) and where it is not suggested that 
the detaining authority acted mala fide or that its order constituted an abuse 
of power. 
Per Venkataramiah, j , 
The Court should examine the case without being overwhelmed by the 
gruesomeness of the incident involved in the criminal trial.''^ 
The High Court under Art, 226 and Supreme Court under Art. 32 or 
136 do not sit in appeal from the order of preventive detention. But the court 
is only to see whether the formality as enjoined by Art. 22(5) had been 
complied with by the detaining authority, and if so done, the court carmot 
question the sufficiency of the grounds of detention for the subjective 
satisfaction of the authority. However, it is the duty of the Court to see that a 
law depriving the person of his liberty without' the safeguards available even 
to a person charged with crime is strictly complied with. But individual 
liberty is to be curtailed by an anticipatory action only in interest of what is 
enumerated in the statute.'''' 
If subjective satisfaction of detaining authority reached bona fide, court not 
competent to test adequacy of material on which such satisfaction is reached 
— It is for detaining authority to be satisfied that statement of detenu's 
accomplice provided link between the detenu and receipt of contraband 
articles and the facts relating thereto even though at a trial conviction may not 
be possible on the basis of such statement.^^ 
Judicial review of subjective satisfaction — Court cannot question sufficiency 
of grounds of detention for the subjective satisfaction of the authorit)^''^ 
76. Vijay Narain Singh y. State of Bihar, (1984) 3 SCC 14,19, 25. 26:1984 SCC (Cri) 361: AIR 
1984 SC 1334:1984 Cri LJ 909. 
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154 
Adequacy of subjective satisfaction, not open to be examined by High Court 
under Art 226, more so where Home Minister carefully considered the entire 
record before the detention order was passed — High Court can only see if 
the detention order is based on material on record, so 
The court has to ensure that the order of detention is based on 
materials before it. If it is found that the order passed by the detaining 
authority was on materials on record, the Court can examine the record only 
for the purpose of seeing whether the order of detention was based on no 
material or whether the materials have rational nexus with satisfaction that 
public order was prejudiced. Beyond this, the Court is not concerned. **i 
Validity — To be judged by an objective approach striking balance between 
need to protect the community and need to preserve libenty of a citizen 
having regard to all relevant circumstances and considerations.^^ 
DETENTION ORDER 
(a) Competent authority to pass order 
Svibordinate authority (Dy. Secretary) only authenticating the detention 
order passed by competent authority (Home Minister) after careful 
consideration of entire material on record — Detention order, having been 
taken in the name of Governor and validly authenticated, held, tantamounts 
to an order of State Government- COFEPOSA Act, 1974 (52 of 1974), S. 3(1).83 
Detaining authority — Competent authority — Administrator of Union Ter-
ritory, held, competent to pass detention order within his territory — 
Contention that order can be made only by the Chief Minister though in the 
name of the Administi-ator not acceptable - COFEPOSA Act, 1974.84 
Detention order made by an officer especially empowered by the Government 
to exercise powers under S, 3(1) of COFEPOSA Act but not one empowered to 
act on behalf of the Government under the Rules of Business — Held, 
amounts to an order made by the concerned Government itself— Detenu has 
no right to make representation to the officer passing the detention order 
before making representation to State Government and Central Government 
— Hence, failure to in the detention order that detenu had right to make 
representation to the officer passing the order apart from the State and 
Central Government not fatal to the detention — Detaining authority — 
Representation - COFEPOSA Act, 1974, Ss. 2(a), 3,8(b) & 11 
Article 22(5) does not provide that in addition to his right to make a 
representation to the State Government and the Central Government, he has a 
80. State of Gujarat v. Mohd. Ismail }umma, (1981) 4 SCC 609, 611; 1982 SCC (Cri) 1: AIR 
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1982 SC 683. 
84. Devji Vallabhbhai Tandel v. Administrator, (1982) 2 SCC 222: 1982 SCC (Cri) 403: AIR 
1982 SC 1029:1982 CriLj 799. 
155 
further right under Art. 22(5) to make a representation to the officer himself 
who made the order of detention. 
Under the COFEPOSA Act, an order of detention made by an officer is 
h"eated as an order of detention made by the Government itself, although 
through the instrumentaUty of an officer empowered under S. 3. Any 
government has to function only through human agencies, viz. its officers and 
functionaries. 
The resultant position emerging from various provisions of the 
COFEPOSA Act particularly Ss. 2(a), 3, 8(&) and 11 is that even if an order of 
detention is made by a specially empowered officer of the Central 
Government or the State Government, as the case may be, the said order will 
give rise to the obligations to be fulfilled by the Government to the same 
degree and extent to which it will stand obligated if the detention order had 
been made by the Government itself. So it is the concerned government that 
would constitiite the Detaining Authority under the Act and not the officer 
concerned who made the order of detention, and it is to that government the 
detenu should be afforded opportunity' to make representation against the 
detention order at the earliest opportunity, as envisaged under Art. 22(5) and 
not to the officer making the order of detention in order to provide the detenu 
an opportunity to make a further representation to the State Government and 
thereafter to the Central Goverrunent if the need arises for doing so. Though 
by reason of S. 3(1) a specially empowered officer is entitled to pass an order 
of detention, his constitutional obligation is only to communicate 
expeditiously to the detenu the grounds of detention and also afford him 
opportunity to make representation to the appropriate governments against 
his detention. The only further duty to be performed thereafter is to place the 
representation made by the detenu before the concerned officer or the Minister 
empowered under the Rules of Business of the government to deal with such 
representation if the detenu addresses his representation to the officer himself. 
Unlike in other Preventive Detention Acts, the COFEPOSA Act does 
not provide for the State Government or Cential Government passing an 
order approving a detention order made by one of its officers and therefore, 
the detention order will continue to be operative for the full period of 
detention unless the order is revoked by the State Government or the Central 
Government or is quashed by the court for any reason. This is an additional 
factor to show that an order of detention passed by an officer has the same 
force and status as an order of detention passed by the government itself. 
Even if a detention order is made by an officer who is empowered to 
act but not having additional empowerment under the Rules of Business of 
the Government, it will have the effect of making the Government and not the 
officer the Detaining Authority. This difference in the conferment of powers 
upon the officers falling under the two categories cannot have any impact on 
the nahire of the detention orders respectively passed by them because the 
common factor entitling the officers falling in the two classes is then-
empowerment under S. 3(1) of the Act. 
From the practical or pragmatic standpoint also if an order of detentioji 
is made b)' a specially empowered officer and if by the time the 
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representation of the detenu is received by him, the officer is not there to 
consider the representation either by reason of his proceeding on leave or 
falling sick or transfer or retirement or being placed under suspension or 
death, then the inevitable consequence would be that the detenu has to be 
invariably set at liberty solely on the ground that his representation had not 
been considered by the very same officer who had passed the order of 
detention. The Act and the Constitution do not envisage such situations. ^^  
Any goverruiTent, be it Central or State, has to function only through 
human agencies, viz. its officers and functionaries and it cannot function by 
itself as an abstract body. Such being the case, even though S. 3(1) provides 
for an order of detention being made either by the Central Government or one 
of its officers or the State Government or by one of its officers, an order of 
detention has necessarily to be made in either of the situations only by an 
officer of the concerned govemment.^^ 
Period of detention 
Period of detention is to be decided only at the time of confirming the order of 
detention under S. 8(f), COFEPOSA after receipt of report of Advisory 
Board — Neither at the stage of passing the order of detention [S, 3(1)] nor at 
the rime of making reference under S. 8(b) is the period of detention in 
question -Constitution of India, Art. 22(4) and (7) - COFEPOSA Act, 1974, S. 
8(b) and (f). 
The obligation to specify the period of detention is upon the 
appropriate Government and that has to be done at the final stage, after 
consideration of the report of the Advisory Board. There is no intermediate 
stage at which any tentative conclusion is to be arrived at by the Government 
regarding the period of detention though, at any and every stage, the 
Government has the full liberty to revoke the order of detention. The act of 
making a reference to the Advisory Board is a mechanical or nvLnisterial act 
involving no exercise of discretion. The prescription of five weeks in S. 8 (b) of 
the COFEPOSA for the making of a reference to the Advisory Board is with a 
view to enable fvilfilment of the constitutional requirement of Art. 22(4) and 
not with a view to imposing an obligation upon the Government to consider 
the question of the length of detention and arrive at a tentative conclusion 
even at that stage.^'' 
Section 3 of the Act does not oblige the detaining authority to specify 
the period of detention also while passing the order of detention. Under the 
scheme of the Act, the period of detention .must necessarily vary according to 
the exigencies of each case, namely, the nature of the prejudicial activity 
85. State of Maharashtra v, Sushila Mafatlal Shah, (1988) 4 SCC 490, 501, 507: 1989 SCC 
(Cri) 1: AIR 1988 SC 2090:18 EEC 322. 
8b. State of Maharashtra v. Sushila Mafatlal Shah, (1988) 4 SCC 490, 501. 1989 SCC (Cri) 1: 
AIR 1988 SC 2090:18 EEC 322. 
87. Kavita v. State of Maharashh-a (I), (1981) 3 SCC 558, 562, 563; 1981 SCC (Cri) 743: AIR 
1981 SC 1641, 
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complained of. It is not that the period of detention must in all circumstances 
extend to the maximum period of 12 months as laid down in S. 13 of the Act.*^ 
Maximum period of one or two years, as the case may be, mentioned in S. 10 
of COFEPOSA Act, 1974 will run from the date of actual detention and not 
from the date of the order of detention — If the detenu has served a part of the 
period of detention, he will have to serve out the balance .^ ^ 
Non-mention of period of detention in the order — Held, not fatal to the 
order — Detention is taken to be for the maximum prescribed period in such 
a situation — r.Af. Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug 
Offenders, Forest Offenders, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Slum Grabbers 
Act, 1982, Ss. 3(2), 8,10,11 and 13. 
The Act nowhere requires the detaining authority to specify the period 
for which the detenu is required to be detained. As the detention without trial 
is a serious encroachment on the fundamental right of a citizen, legislature 
has taken care to avoid a blanket delegation of power to subordinate, 
authorities for an indefinite period by providing in S. 3(2) that the delegation 
in the initial instance will not exceed a period of three months and it shall be 
specified in the order of delegation. But if the State Government on con-
sideration of the situation finds it necessary, it may again delegate the power 
of detention to the aforesaid authorities from time to time but at no time the 
delegation shall be for a period of more than three months. The period as 
mentioned in S. 3(2) of the Act thus refers to the period of delegation and it 
has no relevance at all to the period for which a person may be detained. 
Therefore, an order of detention is not rendered illegal merely because it does 
not specify the period of detention. The scheme as contained in other Acts 
providing for the detention of a person without trial, is similar. In the absence 
of any period being specified in the order the detenu is required to be under 
detention for the maximum period prescribed under the Act, but it is always 
open to the State Government to modify or revoke the order even before the 
completion of the maximum period of detention. Thus the impugned order of 
detention is not rendered illegal on account of the detaining authoritv''s failure 
to specify period of detention in the order.^ *^  
Subsequent detention under Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act 
— Detenu remaining in jail custody as well as in detention for about 3 years 
except released on parole for short periods when m prejudicial activities 
committed by him — Held, detenu's continued detention illegal— Gujarat 
Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 1985, Ss. 3(2) and 15(2).9i 
88. Ashok Kumar v. Delhi Admn., (1982) 2 SCC 403:1982 SCC (Cri) 451: AIR 1982 SC 1143: 
1982 CriLJ 1191. 
89. State of Gujarat v. Adam Kasam Bhaya, (1981) 4 SCC 216, 218: 1981 SCC (Cri) 823: AIR 
1981 SC 2005:1981 Cri LJ1686: (1981) 22 GLR 1278^  
90. T. Devaki v. Govt of T.N., (1990) 2 SCC 456: 1990 SCC (Cri) 348: AIR 1990 SC lOBo: 1990 
Cri LJ 1140. 
91. Abdul Razak Abdul Wahab Sheikh v. S.N. Sinha, (1989) 2 SCC 222: 1989 SCC (Cn) 326: 
AIR 1989 SC 2265. 
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Whether the period specified in detention order is a fixed period — Starting 
with the date specified in the detention order and ending with the expiry of 
that period or that period is automatically extended by any period of parole 
granted to the detenu — Position where detenu is released by High Court 
decision which is later reversed or if detenu absconds for some period 
and then apprehended — Question referred to a five-Judge Bench of the 
Court - COFEPOSA Act, 1974 - Parole.92 
Communication of the grounds presupposes the formulation of the 
grounds and formulation of the grounds requires and ensures the application 
of the mind of the detaining authority to the facts and materials before it, that 
is to say, to pertinent and proximate matters in regard to each individual case 
and excludes the elements of arbitiariness and automatism. ^ 3 
Application of mind — Subjective satisfaction of detaining authority — 
Supply of relevant documents to detaining authority — Bail granted to detenu 
with the condition requiring to attend Enforcement Department everyday 
varied on detenu's application requiring him to attend the Department (as and 
when required' — Detenu's application and order thereon for variation of bail 
condition, held, not vital and material document and hence failure to produce 
the same before detaining authority before arriving at his subjective satis-
faction had not vitiated the detention order.^ '* 
Application of mind — In detention order made by Maharashtra 
Government detenu stated to be absconding whereas detenu claiming to have 
obtained an anticipatory bail from Punjab and Haryana High Court — 
Affidavit on behalf of Maharashtia Government reiterating that detenu had 
absconded from Bombay and could not be traced — No satisfactory material 
available showing detaining authority's knowledge about the grant of 
anticipatory bail — Held, detention order not vitiated. ^^  
Application of mind — Allegation of non-consideration of material 
documents — Application for relaxation of conditions of bail submitted by 
detenu and order relaxing the conditions of bail passed by Magish'ate on the 
application were not material documents — Hence, non-consideration of the 
same by detaining authority would not impair the satisfaction arrived at by 
him and would not vitiate the order - COFEPOSA Act, 1974, S. 3(1). 6^ 
Certainty and precision - Extra verbiage — After recording subjective 
satisfaction of the necessity for the detention for the purposes of the Act, mere 
use of some exh-a verbiage in the detention order would not render the order 
92. Sunil Fulchand Shah v. Union of India, (1989) 3 SCC 236: 1989 SCC (Cri) 552: AIR 1989 
SC 1529:1989 Cri LJ1489: (1989)21ECC19L 
93. Prakash Chandra Mehta v. Commr. and Secy., Govt of Kerala, 1985 Supp SCC 144,166: 
1985 SCC (Cri) 332: AIR 1986 SC 687. 
94. Haridas Amarchand Shah v. K.L Verma, (1989) 1 SCC 250, 253:1989 SCC (Cri) 111; AIR 
1989 SC 497: 1989 Cn LJ 983: (1989) 19 ECC 196. 
95. lusher Govmdji Shah v. Union of India, (1985) 1 SCC 571: 1985 SCC (Cri) 135: AIR 
1985 SC 511: L] 793, 
96. M. Mohd. Sulthan v. Jt. Secy, to Govt, of India, (1991) 1 SCC 144: 1991 SCC (Cri) 104: 
AIR 1990 SC 2222:1990 Cri LJ 2473, 
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ultra vires and void on ground of lack of certainty and precision as to the 
purpose of the detention. 
The appellant/petitioner contended that the impugned order of 
detention was ultra vires the District Magistrate and void ab initio as there 
was clubbing of purposes which displayed lack of certainty and precision on 
the part of the detaining authority as to the purpose of detention. 
The purpose of the detention is with a view to preventing the appellant 
from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The 
prejudicial activities carried on by the appellant answer the description of a 
'bootlegger' as defined in S. 2(b) and therefore he comes within the purview of 
sub-section (1) of S. 3 of the Act, by reason of sub-section (4) thereof. The 
District Magistiate in passing the impugned order has recorded his subjective 
satisfaction with respect to the appellant that with a view to preventing him 
from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it 
was necessary to make an order that he be detained. In the accompanying 
grounds for detention this is the basis for the formation of his subjective 
satisfaction. The extra words added by way of superscription were wholly 
umiecessary. In future it would be better for the detaining authorities acting 
under Ss. 3(1) and 3(2) of the Act, to avoid such unnecessary verbiage.^'' 
Detention order challenged on grounds of non-application of mind and 
failure to consider representation under S. 8(b) of COFEPOSA Act and 
violation of Art 22(5) — Held, grounds not sustainable — COFEPOSA 
Act, 1974, S. 8(b). 98 
Held, prevention of smuggling of hashish for which detenu detained under S. 
3(1) of COFEPOSA Act, 1974 has nexus with the object sought to be achieved 
by the Act. 9^ 
Held, detention order passed mechanically without proper application of 
mind — Detenus directed to be released. 
Detaining authority being aware of the earUer arrest of the detenu, newspaper 
report about the date of such arrest not relevant for the purposes of 
subsequent order of preventive detention — Hence mention of incorrect 
inconsequential and detention order not vitiated on ground of failure to place 
the newspaper report before the detaining authority-
It was submitted that the detenu's arrest in connection with the Bank 
dacoit)' case is shown as August 21,1988 when he was actually arrested much 
earlier in comiection with the Bank dacoity as appeared in some local new-
spapers but those newspaper reports are not shown to have been placed 
before the detaining authority. On this basis, it was argued that the 
satisfaction reached by the detaining authority had been vitiated. 
97. Rajendrakumar Nat-varlal Shah v. State of Gujarat, (1988) 3 SCC 153: 1988 SCC (Cri) 
575; AIR 1988SCI255. 
98. Pushpa Devi M. Jatia v. M.L. Wadhawan, 1986 Supp SCC 535: 1987 SCC (Cri) 56: AIR 
1987 SC 1156:1987 Cri Lj 1054. 
99. lusher Govindji Shah v. Union of India, (1985) 1 SCC 571:1985 SCC (Cri) 135: AIR 
1985 SC 511:1985 Cri LJ 793. 
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Held: 
The newspaper reports indicating that the detenu was already in 
custody could at best be relevant only to show the fact that he was already in 
detention prior to the making of the detention order. Those reports were not 
relevant for the satisfaction needed to justify making of the detention order. 
The detaining authority's satisfaction was to be formed on the basis of 
material relevant to show the detenu's activities requiring his preventive 
detention with a view to prevent him from acting in a prejudicial to the 
maintenance of the public order, i"" 
Contention that persons apprehended on charge of carrying 
contiaband narcotic drugs viz. heroin in cars driven by them did not 
implicate the detenu in tiansporting and smuggling of drugs —But facts 
showing that persons were well known to the detenu and detenu knowing fully 
well that the cars would be used for transporting heroin handed over 
the keys of the cars to those persons for that purpose — Held, detention order 
not vitiated on ground of non-application of mind — Prevention of Illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotiopic Substances Act, 1988, S. 3(1). i°^  
From the facts it was quote apparent that the so-called factual 
misstatements are not mis-statements at all. The High Court rightly held that 
the alleged mistakes or infirmities were not so material or serious in nature as 
to vitiate the impugned order of detention. It was not possible to say on a 
perusal of the grounds that there was no material on which the detaining 
authority could have acted. The detention order was not challenged on 
ground of inadequacy or insufficiency of the grounds of detention, ^ o^  
Consequently detention order vitiated by non-application of mind — Gujarat 
Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 1985, Ss. 3(2) and 6. 
The requisite subjective satisfaction, the formation of which is a 
condition precedent to passing of a detention order, will get vitiated if 
material or vital facts which would have bearing on the issue and weighed the 
satisfaction of the detaining authority one way or the other and influenced his 
mind are either withheld or suppressed by the sponsoring authority or 
ignored and not considered by the detaining authority before issuing the 
detention order. 
Though as per S. 6 of the Gujarat PASAA the grounds of detention are 
severable and the order of detention shall not be deemed to be invalid or 
inoperative if one ground or some of the grounds are invalid, the question is 
whether the detaining authority was really aware of the acquittal of the detenu 
in the two criminal cases mentioned in the grounds of detention, on the date 
of passing of the detention order. In the present case at the time of passing the 
100. Meera Rani v. Govt, of T.N., (1989) 4 SCC 418, 428: 1989 SCC (Cri) 732: AIR 1989 SC 
2027:1989 Cri LI 2190: (1989) 3 Crimes 173. 
101. Sved Farooq Mohamniad v. Union, of India, (1990) 3 St C 537, 542: 1990 SCC (Cri) 500: 
AIR 1990 SC 1597:1990 Cri L] 1622. 
102. Pushpa Devi M. Jatia v. M.L Wadhawan, (1987) 3 SCC 357; 382, 383:1987 SCC (Cri) 526: 
AIR 1987 SC 1748:1987 Cri L] 1888: (1987) 12 ECC 356. 
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detention order, the vital fact regarding acquittal of the detenu in two criminal 
cases had not been brought to the notice of the detaining authority and on the 
other hand they were withheld and the detaining authority was given to 
understand that the trial of those cases were pending. The non-placing of the 
material facts resulted in non-apphcation of mind of the detaining authority 
to the said fact which vitiated the requisite subjective satisfaction, rendering 
the impugned detention order invalid. "^^  
Held on facts, order under S. 9(2) passed after considering relevant facts and 
circumstances — Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 1985, S. 
9(2).i04 
Non-application of mind — Retraction of confessional statements made by 
detenu not referred to in grovmds of detention — Held, detention order not 
vitiated on ground of non-application of mind if subjective satisfachon 
arrived at on the basis of other iiidependent and objective/actors enumerated 
in the grounds - COFEPOSA Act, 1974, S. 5-A. 
If even ignoring the facts stated in the confession by the detenu the 
inference can still be drawn from other independent and objective facts 
mentioned in the grounds, then the order of detention caimot be challenged 
merely by the rejection of the inference drawn from confession. In the present 
case the authorities came to the conclusion that the detenus were engaged in 
smuggling relying on several factors viz., the search and seizure in detenu's 
room and recovery of gold biscuits, the detenue's failure to explain the 
importation of those gold biscuits, the secretive manner in which the gold 
biscuits were kept, the connection with various dealers and the statements of 
the employees of the dealers that the detenus used to come with gold bars etc. 
These materials were in addition to the statements and confessions made by 
the detenus under S. 108 of the Customs Act. So even if those statements which 
were retiacted as such could not be taken into consideration, there are other 
facts independent of the confessional statement as mentioned hereinbefore 
which can reasonably lead to the satisfaction that the authorities have come 
to. In view of S. 5-A of the COFEPOSA Act there was sufficient material to 
sustain other grounds of detention even if the reb-action of confession was not 
considered by the authorities. ^ "^  
There would be vitiation of the detention on grounds of iion-
application of mind if a piece of evidence, which was relevant though not 
binding, had not been considered at all. If a piece of evidence which might 
reasonably have affected the decision whether or not to pass an order of 
detention is excluded from consideration, there would be a failure of 
application of mind which, in turn, vitiates the detention. The detaining 
authority might very well have come to the same conclusion after considering 
103. Dharamdas Shamlal Agarwal v. Police Commr., (1989) 2 SCC 370, 375 to 378:1989 SCC 
(Cri) 378: AIR 1989 SC 1282:1989 Cri IJ 1130. 
104. Abdul Razak Nannekhan .Pathan v. Police Commr., (1989) 4 SCC 435 545 55: 1989 SCC 
(Cri) 679. 
105. Prakash Chandra Mehta v. Com.mr. and Secy., Govt, of Kerala, 1985 Supp SCC 144,167-
169:1985 SCC (Cri) 332: AIR 1986 SC 687, 
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this material; but in the facts of the case the omission to consider the material 
assumes materiality. ^^ ^ 
Bail applications in pending criminal case and applications to Collector of 
Customs made by detenu and his associate in which they had retracted their 
earlier confessional statements and recovery of gold and foreign currency not 
placed before detaining authority — Held, in absence of relevant material 
before the detaining authority, order of detention vitiated by non-apphcation 
of mind- COFEPOSA Act, 1974, S. 3(1), "^^  
Sita Ram Sonami v. State ofRajasthan, 1985 Raj LR 883, reversed 
Non-apphcation of mind - Counter-affidavit stating that when detenu 
appeared before authorities for recording his statement under S, 108 of 
Customs Act, he was detained only after recording his statement, that suffi-
cient grounds for detention existed, that detaining authority formed his 
subjective satisfaction after carefully scrutinising all relevant documents and 
facts of the case - Accordingly held, detention order not illegal or bad and 
nor vitiated by non-application of mind or non-consideration of relevant 
materials.^08 
Non-application of mind — Detention order verbatim reproduction of dossier 
submitted by SSP to the detaining authority (D.M.) requesting detention of 
the petitioner-detenu - Record not showing detaining authority's awareness 
of the fact that detenu was already in custody in connection with a criminal 
case at the time of passing detention order— Held, detention order vitiated 
on ground of non-application of mind to the question whether the order was 
necessary despite the detenu being already in custody.i''^ 
Non-application of mind — Detenu an undertrial prisoner arrested in 
connection with the incidents referred to in grounds of detention and was 
granted bail when detention order was passed — But detention order having 
no mention about these facts — Held, detention order vitiated by non-
application of mind on the part of the detaining authority while passing 
detention order - National Security Act, 1980, S, 3{2).^ o^ 
Non-apphcation of muid — Separate detention orders made against three 
detenus — All grounds of detention similar excepting reference to cases 
registered against each of the detenus showing them as 'dangerous persons' 
within the meaning ofS. 2(c) of Gujarat PASAA - Copies of the sheet 
showing the papers of the secret inquiry against the three detenus 
enclosed along with the grounds furnished to each of the detenus - Thus all 
106. Ayya v. State ofU.R, (1989) 1 SCC 374, 385: 1989 SGC (Cri) 153; AIR 1989 SC 364: 1989 
Cri LJ 991. 
107. Sita Ram Somani v. State of Rajasthan, (1986) 2 SCC 86: 1986 SCC (Cri) 104: AIR 1986 
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the cases noted in the enclosed sheet taken into consideration against each of 
the detenus while each detenu concerned only with a few of the cases and the 
remaining cases pertaining to the other detenus — Held, orders of detention 
vitiated by non-application of mind and extraneous considerations viz. 
incidents other than those shown in the grounds of detention and with which 
the detenus had no direct or indirect connection or participation. — As a result 
of such extraneous considerations detenus also deprived of making effective 
and purposeful representations — Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities 
Act, 1985, S, 3(1) - Constihition of India, An. 22(5).i" 
Non-application of mind - Supreme-Court's interim order in pending appeal 
against High Court's quashing of a previous order of detention, against the 
same detenu not considered by detaining authority while making the 
impugned subsequent order against him — By the interim order Supreme 
Court had permitted the detenu to be at large on condition of his reporting to 
the police station daily - Held, non-consideration of the interim order which 
constituted a relevant and important material, fatal to the subsequent 
detention order on ground of non-application of mind — Plea that the 
detaining authority is not supposed to collect court proceedings from 
concerned Government departments before making the detention order 
strongly deprecated and disallowed — Hence notice under S. 6 and 
proceedings under S. 7 of SAFEMA against the detenu fs brother liable to be 
quashed — Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of 
Property) Act, 1976, Ss. 2(2) (c), Explanation 2(ii), 6 and 7 - COFEPOSA Act, 
1974, S. 3(1) 
Absence of consideration of the interim order of the Supreme Court, 
which is an important document, amounted to application of mind on the 
part of the detaining authorit)^ rendering the detention order invalid. The 
order of the Court clearly indicated that the Court felt that there was no need 
to detain the present respondent's brother pending the appeal If the detaining 
authority had considered this order, one cannot state with definiteness which 
way his subjective satisfaction would have reacted. This order could have 
persuaded the detaining authority to desist from passing the order of 
detention since the Court had allowed freedom of movement; or the detaining 
authority could still feel that an order of detention is necessary with reference 
to other materials which outweigh the effect of the Court's order. In all these 
cases, non-application of mind on a vital and relevant material need not 
necessarily lead to the conclusion that application of mind on such materials 
would always be in favour of the detenu. Application of mind in such cases is 
insisted upon to enable the detaining authority to consider one way or the 
other, as to what effect a relevant material could have, on the authority that 
decides the detention. 
The contention that the detaining authority is not required to collect all 
material about any court proceedings etc. from different Ministries or 
Departments for the purpose of issuance of a detention order, made on behalf 
n i . Mehboob Khan Nawab Khan Pathan v. PoHce Commr, (1989) 3 SCC 568- 1989 SCC 
(Cri) 655: AIR 1989SCI803. 
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of the Government of India to meet a case that there existed an order of 
Supreme Court which was a relevant and vital material, betrays an attitude 
that lacks grace. If the sponsoring authority and the detaining authority are to 
adopt svich cavaUer attitude towards orders of courts and of the Supreme 
Court in particular, will have to be quashed. 
Thus the order of detention against the respondent's brother was bad. 
Since the provisions of SAFEMA cannot be invoked in cases where there is no 
valid order of detention, the High Court was justified in quashing the notice 
issued under S. 6 and the proceeding initiated under S. 7 of the SAFEMA 
against the respondent.^i^ 
Non-application of mind - When before making detention order detaining 
authorit}' had a copy of detenu's application for bail, statement made in 
grounds of detention that it was likely that the detenu may be released on 
bail in criminal cases against him, would not indicate that detaining authority 
proceeding on the assumption that in all cases the detenu had made bail 
applications though only in one case such application was made — 
Contention regarding non-application of mind on that basis not sustainable.^^^ 
Non-application of mind — When incident, which was the basis of the 
detention, took place in presence of detaining authority (DM) himself, 
the detaining authorit)' must form his satisfaction on the basis of his 
own knowledge — Where instead, detaining authority formed his 
opinion and passed detention order on mere perusal of the materials, 
facts and documents placed before him the police, held, the order was 
by non-application of mind. 
In a case where the detaining authority may not be present at the place 
of the incident or the occurrence, he has to form the requisite opinion on the 
basis of materials placed before him by the sponsoring authority but if the 
detaining authority was himself present and was an eye-witness to the 
occurrence on the basis of which detention order was made, it was imperative 
for the detaining authority to have honestly and bona fide formed the 
requisite opinion in making the order of detention on the basis of his own 
knowledge and perception instead of relying more on the version of the 
incident as placed before him by the sponsoring authority. In the instant case 
the detaining authority though present at the scene of occurrence did not 
support the incident as presented to him by the sponsoring authority. In the 
cn-cumstances, there was non-application of mind by the detaining authority 
in making the impugned order of detention, ii* 
Non-application of mind - Where detaining authority relied upon and 
referred to confessional statement of detenu (as recorded by Collector of 
Customs under S. 108 of Customs Act in this case) in the grounds of 
112. Union of India v. Manoharlal Naiang, (1987) 2 SCC 241, 247 252- 1987 SCC (Cri^  311' 
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detention, it is desirable that any retraction made should also be placed before 
detaining authority at the time of passing detention order — But detention 
order would not become invaHd merely on failure to place such retraction 
before detainiiig authority - Even assuming that the ground relating to the 
confessional statement was inadmissible, order of detention shall be deemed 
to have been made separately on each of such ground and inadmissibility of 
one ground will not vitiate the entire order of detention — COFEPOSA Act, 
1974, S. 5-A."5 
Non-application of mind - 'Withholding of vital fact that detenu had been 
acquitted in the criminal case referred to in grounds of detention, held, 
resulted in non-application of mind of the detaining authority to that fact 
vitiating the order of detention. ^^ ^ 
Dharamdas Shamlal Aganval v. Police Commissioner, (1989) 2 SCC 370:1989 SCC 
(Cn) 370, followed. 
No chances of detenu's involvement in prejudicial activities in future — 
Detention under COFEPOSA for involvement in smuggling activities -
Goods imported ui name of fictitious firms under exemption scheme and sold 
in local market in violation of condition of import licence to manufacture 
products with them and export within 6 months thus evading export duty 
and making profits — Even though term of the licence since expired, 
detention order cannot be quashed on ground of no more chances of detenu's 
involvement in smuggling activities."'' 
Allegation made in grounds of detention different from the statement 
made in counter-affidavit by detaining authority — Held, amounted to non-
application of mind which rendered the detention Ulegal.^ ^^ 
Detention order passed with due application of mind in regard to grant of 
bail to the detenu, activities alleged against the detenu grave and prejudicial 
to security of the State, grounds not vague but specific and allegation that the 
detenu was arrested on the date of passing the detention order but was 
lodged in jail after a month unfounded— Held on facts, detention order 
valid."9 
Whether a single solitary act attiibuted to the detenu warrants an 
inference that he will repeat his activity in future also and that his 
detention was necessary to prevent him from doing so in future - Held, an 
inference in each case will depend on the nature of the act and the 
attendant circumstances - Where detenu tiied to export huge amount of 
115. Madan Lai Anand v. Union of India, (1990) 1 SCC 81: 1990 SCC (Cri) 51: AIR 1990 SC 
176: (1990) 25 ECC 277:1990 Cri LJ 659: (1990) 45 ELT 204. 
116. Ramesh v. State of Gujarat, (1989) 4 SCC 124,128:1989 SCC (Cri) 716: AIR 1989 SC 1881-
1989 Cri LJ 2094. 
117. Madan Lai Anand v. Union of India, (1990) 1 SCC 81, 94, 95: 1990 SCC (Cri) 51- AIR 
1990 SC 176: (1990) 25 KCC 277:1990 Cri LJ 659: (1990) 45 ELT 204. 
118. Yumnam Mangibabu Singh v. State of Manipur, (1982) 3 SCC 18' 1982 SCC (Cri) 627-
AIR 1983 SC 300. ' 
119. Swaran Singh v. State of J&K, 1989 Supp (1) SCC 88, 90: 1989 SCC (Cri) 191' AIR 1989 
SC 188:1989 Cri LJ 792. 
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Indian currency to a foreign country in a planned and premeditated manner, 
held, such an inference was justified.i^o 
Grounds of detention of detenu-petitioner and his brother identical -
Approving authority having before it grounds of detention of petitioner's 
brother only - Grounds being identical the authority can be to have apphed 
its mind also to the grounds of detention on the basis of which the petitioner 
was detained.121 
Having regard to the fact that the name mentioned in the order was same as-
that signed by detenu when the order was served on him and the averments 
made by the detaining authority in his counter-affidavit, held, name 
mentioned in the order not wrong. ^^ 
Several cyclostyled orders passed - Held, would prima facie show non-
application of mind - But this is not a universal rule and would depend on 
the facts and circumstances of each case.^ ^s 
Whether detention based on no material - Statements recorded under S. 
40(1) of FERA by an officer of Enforcement appointed on ad hoc basis, though 
not a 'gazetted officer' within the meaning of S. 40(1), acceptable in evidence 
— Such statements can also be treated as statements relatable to S, 39(b) — 
Therefore, such statements can form basis of the subjective satisfaction of the 
detaining authority. 
It was contended on behalf of the detenu that the impugned order of 
detention was based on no material on which the detaining authority could 
have based the subjective satisfaction under sub-sec. (1) of S. 3 of the 
COFEPOSA Act inasmuch as the person who issued summons and recorded 
the statements was not a gazetted officer of Enforcement within the meaning 
of S. 40 of the FERA as at that time he was continuing as an ad hoc appointee 
to that post. It was further contended that even assuming that the statement 
recorded by such a person could be treated to be statem.ents falling under S. 
39(b) of the Act, it was not possible to say whether the detaining authority 
would have based his satisfaction upon such material. 
Held: 
The detaiiiing authority was entitled to rely upon the statements 
recorded by the said officer under S. 40(1) of the FERA. Even if the officer was 
not competent to record such statements under S. 40(1) of the FERA, the 
statements were clearly relatable to S. 39(&) of the Act. It cannot, therefore, be 
120. Sarasvvathi Seshagiri v. State of Kerala, (1982) 2 SCC 310: 1982 SCC (Cri) 423- AIR 1982 
SC 1165:1982 CriLJ 125.1. 
121. Ram Baoclian Dubey v, State of Maharashtra, (1982) 3 SCC 383:1983 SCC (Cri) 59(2). 
122. Pix'ush Kantilal Mehta v. Commr. of Police, 1989 Supp (1) SCC 32'' 326' 1989'SCC (Cri) 
438: AIR 1989 SC 491:1989 Cri LJ 956. 
123. Shivaji Atmaji Sawant v. State of Maharashtra, (1986) 2 SCC 112- 1986 SCC (L&S) 209' 
AIR 1986 SC 617:1986 Lab IC 585: (1986) 1 LLN 700: (1986) 1 SLR 495. 
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said that there was no material on which the detaining authority could have 
based his subjective satisfaction under sub-sec. (1) of S. 3 of the Act.^ ^^  
But detention order would not become invalid merely on failure to place such 
retraction before detaining authority — Even assuming that the ground 
relating to the confessional statement was inadmissible, order of detention 
shall be deemed to have been made separately on each of such ground and 
inadmissibility of one ground will not vitiate the entire order of detention — 
COFEPOSA Act 1974, S. 5-A - Customs Act, 1962, S. 108. i25 
Rehaction - Consideration of- Detenu's letter retracting his confessional 
statement — Not received by detaining authority at the time of passing 
detention order — Hence non-consideration of detenu's retraction by the 
detaining authority caimot be a ground for vitiating the detention order.^^s 
Detenu claiming to have communicated the letter of retraction under a 
certificate of posting — But only a photostat copy of certificate of posting and 
not that of the letter of retraction sent by the detenu along with his 
representation to the detaining authority - No letter of reti-action also 
received in the files of customs authorities — Held, the presumption that the 
letter was posted and in due course reached the addressee, arising from the 
certificate of posting is only permissible — On facts held, no letter of 
retraction was posted and question of its non-consideration does not arise — 
Evidence Act, 1872, Ss. 16 and 114. 
The certificate of posting miglU lead to a presumption that a letter 
addressed to the concerned authority was posted and in due course reached 
the addressee. But, that is only a permissible and not an inevitable 
presumption. Neither S. 16 nor S. 114 of the Evidence Act compels the court to 
draw a presumption. The presumption may or may not be drawn. On the 
facts and circumstances of a case, the court mav refuse to draw the 
presumption. On the other hand, the presumption may be drawn initially but 
on a consideration of the evidence the court may hold the presumption 
rebutted and may arrive at the conclusion that no letter was received by the 
addressee or that no letter was ever despatched as claimed. In the circum-
stances of the present case, it is clear that no such letter of retiaction was 
posted as claimed by the detenu.^ 27 
When sufficient to snap nexus between the incident and passing of order -
No tixed period - Delay of five months satisfactorily explained - Mala tides 
cannot be inferred - Held on facts, detention order not vitiated on ground of 
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Where an unreasonably long period has elapsed between the date of 
the incident and the date of the order of detention, an inference may 
legitimately be drawn that there is no nexus between the incident and the 
order of detention may be liable to be struck down as invahd. But there can be 
no hard and fast rule as to what is the length of time which should be 
regarded sufficient to snap the nexus between the incident and the order of 
detention. 
In the present case the lapse of time between the date of the incident 
and the date of the order of detention has been sufficiently explained by the 
detaining authority and hence it is not possible to draw the inference of mala 
fides merely because the order of detention happened to be made about, five 
months after the petitioner was found carrying foreign marked gold, ^ s^ 
If there is potentiahty or likelihood of repetition of prejudicial activities and 
the delay is not unreasonable, court should not strike down the detention -
Long lapse of time between date of search (September 17, 1987) and date of 
passing order of detention (September 21, 1988) - Absence of nexus 
between the incident and the detention order alleged - On facts held, delay 
in passing the order reasonably explained - Hence detention not vitiated 
on ground of such delay - COFEPOSA Act, 1974, S. 3 
It carmot be contended that merely because of the delay in passing the 
detention order the necessary nexus got severed and that the grounds had 
become stale and illusory. In appreciating such a contention, the court also 
has to bear in mind the nature of the prejudicial activities indulged by the 
detenu and the likelihood of his repeating the same. It is this potentiahty in 
him that has to be taken into consideration and if the detaining authority is 
satisfied on the available material then on mere delay as long as it is not 
highly unreasonable and undue the court should not normally strike down 
the detention on that ground.^29 
It is not right to assume that an order of detention has to be 
mechanically stiuck down if passed after some delay. It is necessary to con-
sider the circumstances in each individual case to find out whether the delay 
has been satisfactorily explained or not. In the present case the ground which 
led the Distiict Magistiate to pass the detention order became available in July 
and the order was passed only in December, The petitioner was in custody 
and there could not be any apprehension of his indulging in illegal activities 
requiring his detention until the grant of bail by the criminal court became 
imminent. Besides, inquiry was also pending. This aspect has been explained 
in the detention order itself as also by the Distiict Magistiate in his affidavit 
and it is clear that there has been no undue delay on his part in taking action. 
Besides, the distinction between such delay and the delay in complying with 
the procedural safeguards of Art. 22(5) is also relevant here especially because 
of the background of the petitioner's antecedents taken into account by the 
128. Shiv Ratan Makim v. Union of India, (1986) 1 SCC 404,408:1986 SCC (Cri) 74- AIR 1986 
SC 610:1986 Cri LJ 813. 
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detaining authority showiiig his propensity for acts which were likely to 
disturb public order, i^ o 
There had been delay in passing the detention order and the delay had 
not been satisfactorily explained. The ground mentioned in the detention 
order could not be a proximate cause for a sudden decision to take action 
under the National Security Act and this also vitiates the order.^^i 
The appellant-detenu was intercepted at Trivandrum Airport and was 
arrested and produced before Chief Judicial Magistrate on January 31,1988 on 
charge of smuggliiig of gold. The Magistrate remanded him to judicial 
custody till February 12, 1988 when he was granted bail on condition, inter 
alia, that he would report before the Superintendent (InteUigence) Air 
Customs, Trivandrum on every Wednesday until further orders, and that he 
would not change his residence without prior permission of court to 
"February 25,1988", The Collector of Customs sent the proposal for detention 
on May 27, 1988 along with the draft grounds. In the Screening Committee 
meeting held on June 21, 1988 the detenu's case was considered to be fit for 
detention under the COFEPOSA Act The impugned order of detention was 
thereupon passed on June 25,1988 under S. 3(1) (i) of COFEPOSA Act by the 
Home Secretary, Government of Kerala with a view to prevent the appellant 
from smuggling gold. It was contended that after the event there was 
inordinate delay in passing the detention order which showed that there was 
no genuine need for detention of the appellant. 
Held: 
Where the seemingly long time taken for passing the detention order 
after the prejudicial act is the result of full and detailed investigation and 
consideration of the facts of the case, the ground cannot be held to be remote 
and the detention cannot be held to be bad on that ground. In the present case 
it was submitted for the State that as a thorough investigation of the case was 
required on the part of the customs authorities both for the proceedings under 
the Customs Act and for prosecution in the criminal court, the proposal could 
not have been hurried through. These facts have not been shown to be unti'ue. 
Considering the given explanation of the period in between the interception 
on January 30,1988 and the order of detention on June 25,1988 the nexus was 
not snapped and the ground was not rendered stale and the order of 
detention was not rendered invalid thereby.^ 32 
Delay in passing detention order - Inordinate and unexplained delay, held 
on facts, vitiated the detention order.^ 33 
On facts held, the delay satisfactorily explained - Hence detention order not 
vitiated on ground of delay iti its passing. i^ J 
130. Yogendra Murari y. State of U.R, (1988) 4 SCC 559, 563: 1988 SCC (Cri) 992- AIR 1988 
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Detention under COFEPOSA Act preceded by arrest under Foreign Exchange 
Regulation Act some eight months earlier - Delay in passing of detention 
order not occasioned by any laxity but result of full and detailed 
consideration of facts and circumstances of the case by various deparhnents 
involved - Detention order passed after full application of mind - Held, 
detention valid.^ ^5 
Delay in passmg detention order and arresting the detenu - When 
vitiates detention - Depends upon facts and circumstances - Absence of 
convincing explanation - Throws doubt on subjective satisfaction of 
detaining authority. 
Some gold biscuits and gold ingots were seized from the residence of 
the detenu on November 30, 1986 and December 9, 1986. An order of 
detention was passed under S. 3(l)(iii) and (iv) of the COFEPOSA Act against 
the detenu on October 7,1987 but the detenu was arrested only on January 1, 
1988. Counter was filed on behalf of the State before the Court stating that the 
investigating officer had to question a number of persons and to conduct 
extensive search of various premises in different places in connection with the 
information gathered during interrogation and the Superiatendent of Central 
Excise issued summons to brothers of the detenu for appearance on March 3 
and 10,1987 but one of the brothers was absconding and that on February 10, 
1987 the statement of another person referred to in the statement of the 
detenu was recorded and that on May 18, 1987 show-cause notices were 
issued to persons connected with the case and immediately after completion 
of the investigation the customs authorities sponsored the proposal for 
detention of the detenu by their letter dated August 26, 1987 and that the 
proposal was screened by the Screening Committee on September 11, 1987 
and thereafter the detention order was passed on October 7,1987. As regards 
the delay in securing the detenu by arrest it was explained that the detention 
order was forwarded to the concerned S.P. for its execution by letter dated 
October 9,1987 but that the police executed the order on January 18,1988. No 
supporting affidavit had been filed by the S.P. explaining the delay in 
securing the arrest of the detenu. 
Held: 
Leaving apart the question of delay in passing the order of detention 
from the date of the seizure of the gold, the fact remains that the detaining 
authority has failed to explain the long delay in securing the arrest of the 
detenu after three months from the date of the passing of the detention order 
and this non-explanation throws a considerable doubt on the genuineness of 
the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority- vitiating the validity of 
the order of detention. 
The question whether the prejudicial activities of a person necessitating 
to pass an order of detention is proximate to the time when the order is made 
or the live-link between the prejudicial activities and the purpose of detention 
IS snapped depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. No hard and 
135. 
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fast rule can be precisely formulated that would be applicable under all 
circumstances and no exhaustive guidelines can be laid down in that behalf. It 
follows that the test of proximity is not a rigid or mechanical test by merely 
'counting number of months between the offending acts and the order of 
detention. However, when there is undue and long delay between the 
prejudicial activities and the passing of detention order, the court has to 
scrutinise whether the detaining authority has satisfactorily examined such a 
delay and afforded a tenable and reasonable explanation as to why such a 
delay has occasioned, when called upon to answer and further the court has 
to investigate whether the casual connection has been broken in the 
circumstances of each case. 
Similarly, when there is unsatisfactory and unexplained delay between 
the date of order of detention and the date of securing the arrest of the detenu, 
such a delay would throw considerable doubt on the genuineness of the sub-
jective satisfaction of the detaining authority leading to a legitimate inference 
that the detaining authority was not really and genuinely satisfied as regards 
the necessity for detaining the detenu with a view to preventing him from 
acting in a prejudicial marmer. T.A. Abdul Rahman v. State of Kerala, (1989) 4 
s e c 741, 748, 749:1990 SCC (Cri) 76: AIR 1990 SC 225. 
Delay in passing, after arrest — Held, would not vitiate the detention if 
adequately explained by the detaining authority to the Court — But detenu 
cannot demand such an explanation from the authority — Constitution of 
India, Art. 22(5). 
Delay ipso facto in passing an order of detention after an incident is not 
fatal to the detention of a person, for, in certain cases delay may be 
unavoidable and reasonable. What is required by law is that the delay must 
be satisfactorily examined by the detaining authority, who is under an 
obligation to satisfy the court as to the causes of the delay to show that there 
was no infraction of Art. 22(5) of the Constitution. The authority is, however, 
in no legal liabiUty to tell or satisfy the detenu as to the causes of the delay. 
In the present case the delay has been satisfactorily explained by the 
authority in its aftidavit and it has not vitiated the detention. 3^6 
Having regard to the time taken in tianslating the documents into Hindi 
and Gurumukhi, held, there were valid and sufficient reasons for the delay -
COFEPOSA Act, 1974, S. 3(3). "7 
Huge quantit)' of heroiii recovered on July 19 - Persons apprehended 
examined and their statements recorded on July 20 - Thereafter 
samples of the conti-aband drugs taken from each packet sent for chemical 
examination - Test reports received by customs deparbnent on September 
29, October 13 and November 15 and then screened by customs officials -
After considering all the materials, detention order passed on December 20 -
136. 
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In the circumstances held, the delay of five months in making the order of 
detention did not render the detention illegal and bad - Detention order had 
been made with promptitude considering the relevant and vital facts 
proximate to the passing of the order- Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic 
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988, S. 3(1).^ ^^ 
The appellant was carrying on the illicit business of importing Indian-
made foreign hquor into Godhra in the State of Gujarat where there is total 
prohibition. A Godhra-bound truck carrying such Uquor was intercepted on 
December 29/30, 1986 and the driver and cleaner of the ti'uck made 
statements on January 4, 1986 impUcating the appellant as the main person. 
The appellant thereupon absconded and moved for anticipatory bail on 
January 21, 1987 but no orders were passed as the police made a statement 
that there was no proposal at that stage to arrest him. On February 2,1987 the 
appellant was arrested but later on released on bail. He was prosecuted for 
various offences under the Bombay Prohibition Act. After a lapse of five 
months i.e. on May 28,1987 the D.M., Godhra passed the impugned order of 
detention and the grounds therefor were served on the appellant on May 30 
when he was taken into custody. The immediate and proximate cause for the 
detention was the aforesaid transportation of foreign liquor on December 
29/30, 1986. Incidentally the grounds furnished particulars of two other 
crimiiial cases viz. one relating to 142 bottles of foreign liquor recovered from 
his residence on July 21, 1982 which had ended in his acquittal, the 
prosecution witnesses having turned hostile and the other relating to recovery 
and seizure of 24 bottles of foreign liquor from his house on May 30, 1986 
which case was still pending. There was also a recital of the fact that he was 
continuing his business surreptitiously and he could not be caught easily and 
therefore, unless the order of detention was made he would not stop his illicit 
business; hence the necessity to detain him under S. 3(2) of the Act. Besides it 
was further stated: "In order to safeguard the health of the people of Gujarat, 
for public peace and in the iiiterest of the nation, with a view to stop such 
anti-national activities ... for the purpose of public order and public peace and 
in the interest of the State...". The appellant made a representation against his 
detention to the State Government and the Advisory Board on June 8, 1987 
which was rejected on June 12,1987. 
The appellant/petitioner contended that the inordinate unexplamed 
delay of five months in making the impugned order of detention by itself was 
sufficient to vitiate the order. 
Dismissing the appeal and the writ petition of the detenu: 
Held: 
A distinction must be drawn between the delay in making of an order 
of detention under a law relating to preventive detention like the COFEPOSA 
Act and the delay in complying with the procedural safeguards of Art. 22(5). 
The rule as to unexplained delay in taking action is not inflexible. In cases of 
Syed Farooq Mohammad v, Union of India, fl990) 3 SCC 537, 543-1990 SCC (Cri) SDO-
AIR 1990 SC1597:1990 CriLJ 1622. ' ^ ^ l^npuu. 
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mere delay in making of an order of detention under a law like the 
GOFEPOSA Act enacted for the purpose of dealing effectively with persons 
engaged in smuggling and foreign exchange racketeering who, owing to their 
large resources and influence, have been posing a serious threat to the 
economy and thereby to the security of the nation, the courts should not 
merely on account of delay in making of an order of detention assume that 
such delay, if not satisfactorily explained, must necessarily give rise to an 
iiiference that there was no sufficient material for the subjective satisfaction of 
the detaining authority or that such subjective satisfaction was not genuinely 
reached. Taking of such a view would not be warranted unless the court finds 
that the grounds are 'stale' or illusory or that there is no real nexus between 
the grounds and the impugned order of detention. 
In the present case even though there was no explanation for the delay 
between February 2 and May 28, 1987 it could not give rise to a legitimate 
inference that the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the District Magistrate 
was not genuine or that the grounds were stale or illusory or that there was 
no rational correction 'between the grounds and the impugned order of 
detention.13^ 
Delay of 11 months in passing — Explanation that investigation took five 
months to complete and thereafter time taken in processing the records for 
issuing show-cause notice as Customs Act mandatorily required issuance of 
such notice within 6 months from the date of detection of the case — Held, 
explanation not satisfactory — Delay vitiated the order —CQFEPOSA Act, 
1974, S. 3 
It was not incumbent on the authorities to wait till the issue of the 
show-cause notice. The need to issue a show-cause notice within 6 months has 
nothing to do with the processing of the detention papers. Therefore; the 
explanation is far from satisfactory, ^ o^ 
What amounts to unreasonable delay depends on facts and circumstances of 
each case — Where reason for the delay is stated to be abscondence of detenu, 
mere failure on the part of the authorities to take action under S. 7 of National 
Security Act by itself not sufficient to vitiate the order— But that the police 
force remained extiemely busy in tackling the serious law and order problem 
then prevailing in the city is not a proper explanation for delay in arresting 
the detenu — Failure to properly explain the inordinate delay, held on facts, 
rendered the order bad - National Security Act, 1980, Ss. 3(2) and 7. 
An order of detention was passed under S. 3(2) of the National Security 
Act on April 15,1988 against the petitioner. However, the petitioner could be 
arrested only on October 2,1988. By an affidavit tiled on behalf of the Dishict 
Magistrate, being the detaining authorit)', it was explained that pursuant to 
passing of the detention order, the authorities had raided the house of the 
petitioner to serve the order several times viz. one raid on May 12, 1988 
139. Rajendrakumar Natvarlal Shah v. State of Gujarat, (1988) 3 SCC 153: 1988 SCC (Cri) 
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followed by eight other raids up to the end of May 1988 and again on 
September 23, 25 and 29, 1988, but the petitioner was not available and the 
order could not be served before October 2,1988, It was stated that during the 
period from May to September, 1988 great communal tension was prevailing 
in the city, a large number of people were arrested on account thereof, the 
entire police force of the city was extremely busy in maintairung law and 
order, but the petitioner was all along absconding in order to avoid the 
service of the order. In the writ petition under Art. 32, the detention order was 
challenged inter aha on ground of inordinate delay in arresting the detenu 
pursuant to the detention order vitiated the detention. Accepting the first 
contention and consequently allowing the writ petition and quashing the 
order of detention. 
Held: 
Preventive detention is a serious inroad into the freedom of 
individuals, Reasoiis, purposes and the maimer of such detention must, 
therefore, be subject to closest scrutiny and examination by the courts. There 
must be conduct relevant to the formation of the satis-faction having 
reasonable nexus with the action of the petitioner which are prejudicial to the 
maintenance of pubUc order and existence of relevant material in this regard 
is subject to judicial review. Actions based' on subjective satisfaction are 
objective indication of the existence of the subjective satisfaction. Such action 
should be with speed commensurate with the situation, though it is not the 
law that whenever there is some delay in arresting the subjective satisfaction 
of the detaining authority must be held to be not genuine or colourable. 
Whether there has been unreasonable delay, depends upon the facts and the 
circumstances of a particular situation. 
If in a situation the person concerned is not available or cannot be 
served then the mere fact that the action under S. 7 of the Act had not been 
taken, would not be a ground to say that the detention order was bad. Failure 
to take action even if there was no scope for action under S. 7 of the Act, 
would not be decisive or determinative of the question whether there was 
undue delay in serving the order of detention. In this case even though no 
warrant under S. 7 had been issued in respect of the property or person of the. 
petitioner, it camnot be said that the respondent was riot justified in raising the 
plea that the petitioner was absconding. The petitioner has no properly and so 
no order under S. 7 could be made. 
In this case, however, there was no explanation as.to why no attempts 
had been made to contact or arrest the petitioner during the periods between 
April 15 to May 12,1988 and again between September 29 to October 2,1988. 
That the 'entire police force' was extremely busy in controlling the situation is 
not a proper explanation. If the law and order was threatened and prejudiced, 
it was not the conduct of the petitioner but because of "inadequacyS or 
'inability' of the police force of the cit}' to control the situation. To shift the 
blame for public order situation and raise the bogey of the conduct of the 
petitioner would not be proof of genuine or real belief about the conduct of 
the petitioner but only raising a red herring. Thus, by the conduct of the 
respondent authorities, there was undue delav not commensurate with the 
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facts situation in this case. There was no reasonable or acceptable explanation 
for the delay. In a situation of communal tension prompt action is imperative. 
It is, I therefore, not possible for the Court to be I satisfied that the District 
Magistrate had applied his mind and arrived at the subjective satisfaction that 
there was real and genuine apprehension that the petitioner was Hkely to act 
in any manner prejudicial to public order and that it was necessary to detain 
the petitioner to "prevent" him from wrongdoing. The condition precedent 
not being present, the detention order must be quashed and set aside on this 
ground, i^ i 
Detenu himself absconding and trying to evade the arrest — In the circum-
stances held, the delay explained and the link between the grounds of 
detention and the avowed purpose of detention not snapped.^^^ 
When detenu was absconding and could be arrested only when he 
surrendered after initiating proceedings under Ss, 82 and 83, CrPC, 1973, 
held, challenge to the detention order on ground of delay in arrest not 
sustainable - National Security Act, 1980, S, 7(2).i43 
On the mere delay in arresting the detenu pursuant to the order of 
detention the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority cannot be held 
to be not genuine. Each case depends on its own facts and circumstances. The 
court has to see whether the delay is explained reasonably. In the instant case, 
the delay, if at all, is only about 21/2 months and the explanation offered for 
the delay is reasonable. Abdu Salam v. Union of India, (1990) 3 SCC 15, 22, 23: 
1990 SCC (Cri) 451: AIR 1990 SC 1446: 1990 Cri LJ 1502: (1990) 48 ELT 162: 
(1990) 3 Crimes 82. 
Delay in execution of detention order — When caused due to abscondance of 
the detenu, held, order not vitiated. 
The order of detention was passed on June 259 1988 under S. 3(l)(i) of 
COFEPOSA Act, Grounds of detention were also served on the appellant. On 
June 27, 1988 the Home Secretar)' wrote to the Superintendent of Police 
requesting him to arrange for the immediate execution of the detention order 
and on July 19,1988 a teleprinter reminder was sent to the Superintendent, of 
Police. But on July 27,1988 the Superintendent of Police, wrote back that the 
detenu was absconding and his 'present' whereabouts were not known and it 
was only on 25 1988 that the Superintendent of Police by a wireless message 
intimated the Home Secretary that the detention order had been served on the 
detenu on that date. It was contended that there was inordinate and 
unexplained delay of 38 days in execution of the detention order. 
Held: 
Where after passing of the detention order the passage of time is 
caused by the detenu himself by absconding, the satisfaction of the detaining 
141. Shqfiq Ahmad v. D.M. (1989) 4 SCC 556: 1989 SCC (Cri) 774: AIR 1990 SC 200. 
142 Sved Farooq Mohammad v. Union of India, (1990) 3 SCC 537, 546, 547:199D SCC (Cri) 
500: AIR 1990 SC 1597:1990 Cri LJ 1622. 
Sharad Kumar Tyagi v. State of U.P., (1989) 1 SCC 736, 747: 1989 SCC (Cri) 294: AIR 
1989 SC 764: (1989)1 SCR 257. 
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authority cannot be doubted and the detention cannot be held to be bad on 
ground of delay in execution of the Order. In the facts and circumstances of 
the present case there was no inordinate arid unexplained delay of 38 days 
between the detention order and its execution so as to snap the nexus between 
the two or to render the grounds stale or to indicate that the detaining 
authority was not satisfied as to the genuine need for detention of the detenu. 
However, the circumstances in the present case seem to indicate a certain 
degree of lack of coordination between the detaining authorities and those 
entrusted with the execution of the detention order. The State should ensure 
that such delays do not occur as, apart from giving the detenu a ground for 
attacking the detention order, such delay really tends to frustrate and defeat 
the very purpose of preventive detention.^** 
The role of the petitioner and that of the co-accused persons were 
identical and the reasonable apprehension as to their future conduct must 
depend on the relevant facts and circumstances which differ from individual 
to individual It would have been wrong on the part of the detaining authority 
to take a uniform decision in this regard only on the ground that the persons 
concenied are all joined together as accused in a criminal case.^ '*^ 
Where the detention orders of co-detenus already quashed by High 
Court — Held, not sustainable when detention of the detenu based on 
entirely distinct and separate materials including his own confessional 
statements.^ **^ 
The law of preventive detention is the same for the police personnel as 
well as for the public. A different standard cannot be applied in respect of acts 
individually committed by any police officer. The subjective satisfaction of the 
detaining authority with respect to the persons sought to be detained should 
be based only on the nature of the activities disclosed by the grounds of 
detention. The grounds of detention must have nexus with the purpose for 
which the detention is made. 4^7 
(h) Pendency of and liability to criminal prosecution 
Pendency of criminal proceedings against detenu — Not a bar to passing 
detention order on the basis of proper subjective satisfaction of detaining 
authority. 
Preventive detention is an anticipatory measure and does not relate to 
an offence while the criminal proceedings are to punish a person for an 
offence committed by him. They are not parallel proceedings. In the 
circumstances the pendency of a criminal prosecution is no bar to an order of 
preventive detenhon, nor is an order of preventive detention a bar to 
prosecution. It is for the detaining authority to have the subjective satisfaction 
144 M Ahamedkutty v. Union of India, (1990) 2 SCC1,9 to 12; 1990 SCC (Cri) 258. 
145. Yogendra Murari v. State of U.P., (1988) 4 SCC 559, 564; 1988 SCC (Cri) 992; AIR 1988 
SCC 1835; 1988 BLJR 592. 
146. Azra Fatima (Smt) v. Union of India, (1991) 1 SCC 76; 1991 SCC (Cri) 641- MR 1990 
SC 1763:1990 CriLJ 1731. 
147. Angoori Devi v. Union of India, (1989) 1 SCC 385, 389; 1989 SCC (Cri) 164- AIR 1989 
SC 371; 1989 Cri L| 950. 
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whether m such a case there are sufficient materials to place the person under 
preventive detention in order to prevent him from acting in a manner 
prejudicial to public order or the like in future, i^ s 
The jurisdiction to make orders for preventive detention is different 
from that of judicial tiial in course for offences and of judicial orders for 
prevention of offences. Even unsuccessful judicial trial or proceeding would 
not operate as a bar to a detention order or render it mala fide. A fortiori 
therefore the mere fact that a criminal prosecution can be instituted cannot 
operate as a bar against the making of an order of detention. If an order of 
detention is made only in order to bypass a criminal prosecution which may 
be irksome because of the inconvenience of proving guilt in a court of law, it 
would certainly be an abuse of the power of preventive detention and the 
order of detention would be bad. But if the object of making the order of 
detention is to prevent the commission in future of activities injurious to the 
community, it would be a perfectly legitimate exercise of power to make the 
order of detention. The court would have to consider all the facts and 
circumstances of the case in order to.determine on which side of the line the 
order of detention falls. 
In the present case, the petitioner detenu was caught in the act of 
smuggling gold and the circumstances in which the gold was being smuggled 
as also the facts set out in the written statement of the petitioner clearly 
indicate that the petitioner was engaged in the activity of smuggling gold. 
Therefore, the order of detention cannot be said to have been passed with a 
view to subvert, supplement or substitute the criminal law of the land. The 
order of detention was passed with a view to preventing the petitioner from 
continuing the activity of smuggling and it was therefore a valid order of 
detention, Shiv Ratan Makim v. Union of India, (1986) 1 SCC 404, 408, 409: 
1986 SCC (Cri) 74: AIR 1986 SC 610:1986 Cri LJ 813. 
Liability to criminal prosecution — Possibility of criminal prosecution or 
absence of it — Though relevant factor but mere non-consideration thereof 
would not vitiate the detention order — Detention may instead be based on 
past conduct and antecedent history of the detenu — Detaining authority's 
satisfaction about reasonable probability or suspicion of commission of the 
prejudicial acts by the detenu sufficient justification for the detention — 
Moreover, a grievous crime against commuruty itself justifies preventive 
detention - National Security Act, 1980, S.3(2). 
Possibility of launching a criminal prosecution or absence of it is not an 
absolute bar to an order of preventive detention. Failure of the detaining 
authority to consider the possibility of criminal prosecution being launched 
before ordering preventive detention may in the circumstances of a case lead 
to the conclusion that the detaining authority had not appUed its mind to the 
important question as to whether it was necessary to make an order of 
preventive detention but it cannot invariably render the order of detention 
148. Alijan Mian v. Distt. Magistrate, (1983) 4 SCC 301, 305; 1983 SCC (Cri) 840- AIR 1983 
~ SC 1130:1983 Cri LJ 1649. 
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bad on ground of non-application of mind. In this regard the relevant facts 
and circumstances of the case including the time and place concerned have to 
be borne in mind. 
The anticipated behaviour of a person based on his past conduct in the 
light of surrounding circumstances may provide sufficient ground for 
detention. But such conduct should be reasonably proximate and should have 
a rational connection with the conclusion that the detention of person is 
necessary. The question of relation of the activities to the detention order 
must be carefully considered. The grounds supplied operate as an objective 
test for determining the question whether a reasonably exists between 
grounds of detention and the detention order or whether some infirmities had 
crept in. A conjoiiied reading of the detention order and the grounds of 
detention is, therefore, necessary. 
Executive can take recourse to its powers of preventive detention in 
those cases where the executive is genuinely satisfied that no prosecution can 
possibly succeed against the detenu because he has influence over witnesses 
and against him no one is prepared to depose. However, pusillanimity on the 
part of the executive has to be deprecated and pusillanimous orders avoided. 
In the present case prosecution might not be possible to bring home the 
offender to book as witnesses might not come forward to depose against the 
detenu out of fear or it might not be possible to collect all necessary evidence 
without unreasonable delay and expenditure to prove the guilt of the 
offender beyond reasonable doubt. Further from the nature and contents of 
the detenu's speeches stated in the grounds of detention there was sufficient 
justification for the inference that he would repeat such speeches if not 
preventively detained. 
Moreover, when grievous crime against the community was 
committed it would surely be subject to the penal law and stiingent sentences, 
but at the same time it could be considered unsafe to allow him the 
opportunities to repeat prejudicial acts during the period the penal process 
was likely to take. 
Considering the relevant facts and circumstances including the time 
and place, the contents of the detention order and the allegations in the 
grounds of detention in this case, it is clear that non-registiation of any 
criminal case could not be said to have shown non-application of mind or 
absence of subjective satisfaction on the part of the detaining authority. ^ ^^  
It is necessary for the detaining authority to resist the temptation to 
prefer and substitute, as a matter of course, the easy expedience of a 
preventive detention to the more cumbersome one of punitive detention, i^ o 
A prosecution or the absence of it is not an absolute bar to an order of 
preventive detention. What is required is that the detaining authority is to 
149. State t.f Punjab v. Sukhpal Smgh, (1990) 1 5CC 35, 44 to 46:1990 SCC (Cri) V AIR 1990 
SC231:1990CnLJ584 
150. Ay}'a v. State of U.P., (1989) 1 SCC 374, 383: 1989 SCC (Cri) 153: AIR 1989 SC 364-
1989 Cri 1,1 991. 
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satisfy the Court that it had in mind the question whether prosecution of the 
offender was possible and sufficient in the circumstances of the case. The 
normal law is that when an isolated offence or isolated offences is or are com-
mitted, the offender is to be prosecuted. Buts if there be a law of preventive 
detention empowering the authority to detain a particular offender in order to 
disable him to repeat his offences, it can do so, but it will be obligatory on the 
part of the detaining authority to formally comply with the provisions of Art. 
22(5). In case of professional criminal or international smuggling, preventive 
detention instead of criminal prosecution would be justified.i^i 
Possibility of detention under criminal law - Held, not an absolute bar to an 
order of preventive detention. ^ 52 
A clear distinction has to be drawn between preventive detention in 
which anticipatory and precautionary action is taken to prevent the 
recurrence of apprehended events, and punitive detention under which the 
action is taken after the event has already happened. It is true that the 
ordinary criminal process of trial is not to be circumvented and short-
circuited by apparently handy and easier resort to preventive detention. But 
the possibility of launching a criminal prosecution cannot be said to be an 
absolute bar to an order of preventive detention.^^^ 
Absence of express views in that regard in counter-affidavit filed by the 
detaining authority immaterial where the satisfaction of the authority in this 
regard is clearly inferable from the counter-affidavit read as a whole.i '^* 
(i) Detenu already in jail 
When an incident was such that it created communal tension and the 
authorities were apprehensive of the breaking of a communal riot, such 
incident in itself may be sufficient and may afford justification for the 
satisfaction of the detaining authority for the detention of the detenu in order 
to prevent him from indulging in such activity prejudicial to public order 
even though, there are no antecedent acts of similar nature or past history of 
commission of crime by the detenu.^ ^^ 
Detaining authority being aware about these facts, concluding that under the 
normal law detenu may be granted bail and in view of his antecedents 
regarding drug trafficking, he may be in a position to continue to pursue his 
nefarious activities — In the circumstances, order of detention cannot be held 
to be illegal merely because it was passed while detenu was already in jail -
151. Hemlata Kantilal Shah v. State of Maharashtra, (1981) 4 SCC 647, 656-658: 1982-SCC 
(Cri) 16: AIR 198 ISC 8. 
152. Saraswathi Seshagiri v. State of Kerala, (1982) 2 SCC 310: 1982 SCC (Cri) 423: AIR 
1982 SC 1165:1982 Cri L] 1251. 
153. State of Punjab v, Sukhpal Singh, (1990) 1 SCC 35, 42, 43: 1990 SCC (Cri) 1- AIR 1990 
SC 231:1990 Cri LJ 584. 
154. L.M.S, Ummu Saleema v. B.B. Gujaral, (1981) 3 SCC 317:1981 SCC (Cri) 720- AIR 1981 
SC 1191: (1981) 3 SCR 647:1981 Cri LJ 889. 
155. Simla Rani v. Union of India, 4 SCC 509, 513:1989 SCC (Cri) 756: (1989) 3 Crimes 578. 
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Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 
Act, 1988, S. 3 (1). 156 
The appellants were arrested on charge of commission of offences 
under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 and were 
produced before the Chief Judicial Magistrate next day who remanded them 
to police custody and thereafter to judicial custody till October 13, 1988, 
Meanwhile the appellants submitted bail appUcations but the same were 
rejected. On October 11, 1988 the Joint Secretary to the Government of India, 
Ministry of Finance passed orders under S. 3(1) of the Prevention of Illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 against the 
appellants stating that with a view to preventing them from engaging in the 
transportation and abetting m the export inter-State of psychotropic 
substances it was necessary to detain and keep them in custody. The order of 
detention was served on the appellants on October 13,1988 while they were 
in custody. The appellants were also served with the grounds of detention 
inter alia mentioning the fact about the appellants remand to judicial custody 
till October 13, 1988. The writ petitions under Art. 226 challenging the 
detention were dismissed by the High Court. It was urged before the 
Supreme Court that since the appellants were in custody on the date of 
passing of the detention order, there was no apprehension that the appellants 
would be engaging in any prejudicial activity and the order for detention of 
the appellants under S. 3(1) of the Act could not be validly passed. Allowing 
the appeals 
Held: 
An order for detention can be validly passed against a person in 
custody and for that purpose it is necessary that the grounds of detention 
must show that (i) the detaining authority was aware of the fact that the 
detenu was already in detention; and (ii) there were compelling reasons 
justifying such detention despite the fact that the detenu was already in 
detention. The expression "compelling reasons" in the context of making an 
order for detention of a person already in custody implies that there must be 
cogent material before the detaining authority on the basis of which it may be 
satisfied that (a) the detenu is likely to be released from custody in the near 
future and (b) taking into account the nature of the antecedent activities of the 
detenu, it is likely that after his release from custody he would indulge in 
prejudicial activities and it is necessary to detain him in order to prevent him 
from engaging m such activities. 
In the present case there was no material in the grounds of detention 
showing that the detaining authority apprehended that the further remand 
would not be granted by the Magistrate on October 13, 1988, and the 
appellants would be released from custody on that day. On the other hand the 
bail applications moved by the appellants had been rejected by the Sessions 
Judge a few days prior to the passing of the order of detention. The grounds 
156. Azra Fatima (Smt) v. Union of India, (1991) 1 SCC 76: 1991 SCC (Cri) 641: AIR 1990 SC 
1763:1990 CriLJ 1731. 
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of detention disclose that the appellants were engaged in activities which are 
offences punishable with imprisonment under the Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. It caimot, therefore, be said that there was 
a reasonable prospect of the appellants not being further remanded to 
custody on October 13,1988 and their being released from custody at the time 
when the order for preventive detention was passed on October 11, 1988. In 
the circumstances, the order for detention of the appellants cannot be 
sustained and must be set aside and the appellants should be released 
forthwith, is^ 
It is imperative that if the detenu was akeady in jail the grounds of 
detention are to show the awareness of that fact on the part of the detaining 
authority, otherwise there would be non-application of mind and detention 
order vitiated thereby.^^^ 
If the only ground or justification for the detention is the apprehension 
that the detenu was likely to be enlarged on bail, the detention might be 
rendered infirm on the ground that the detention was solely for the purpose 
of rendering nugatory the order of bail, the grant of which the detaining 
authority had then considered quite imminent. 
But, where, as here, there are otlier grounds, the reference by the 
detaining authority to the prospects of grant of bail could be no more than an 
emphasis on the imminence of the recurrence of the offensive activities of the 
detenu. Even a single instance of activity tending to harm "public order" 
might, in the circumstances of its commission, reasonably supply justification 
for the satisfaction as to a legitimate apprehension of a further repetition of 
similar activity to the detriment of "public order". ^^ ^ 
On the basis of facts that remand to judicial custody was for a limited period 
and that co-detenus had moved bail applications, detaining authority stating 
in the grounds that there was likelihood of filing of bail application by the 
detenu also and of his consequent release — In view of the facts and 
circumstances and statements recorded and disclosed showing abetting and 
smuggling of goods by detenu, detaining authority also statmg in the grounds 
that unless preveiited, detenu would continue to do so in future on being 
released on bail — Held, detaining authority was aware that detenu was 
already in jail and on his release on bail he would again indulge in prejudicial 
activities - Hence detention valid - COFEPOSA Act, 1974, S. 3(1). 
Having regard to the material relied upon by the detaining authorit}' it 
cannot be said that there was no awareness in the mind of the detaining 
authority about the detenu being in custody and that if he is released on bail 
he is likely to indulge in the pre-judicial activities. Therefore, the detention 
was not ordered on the mere ground that he is likely to be released on bail but 
on the ground that the detaining authority was satisfied that the detenu was 
157. Dharmendra Suganchand Chelawat v. Union of India, (1990) 1 SCC 746, 754, 755; 1990 
s e c (Cri) 249: AIR 1990 SC 1196:1990 Cri L] 1232: (1990) 28 ECC12, 
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likely to indulge in the same activities if released on bail. The contention that 
the bail application could be opposed if moved or if enlarged the same could 
be questioned in a higher court and on that ground the detention order 
should be held to be invahd cannot be sustained in this case. It is not the law 
that no order of detention can vaHdly be passed against a person in custody 
under any circumstances. Therefore, the facts and circumstances of each case 
have to be taken into consideration in the context of considering the order of 
detention passed iii the case of a detenu who is already in jail.^ ^o 
An order of detention was passed under S. 8 of the National Security 
Act against the detenu on May 3,1989. The facts referred to in the grounds of 
detention were that on the basis of a complaint of theft of electric wires 
lodged on February 15,1989 an FIR was registered against three persons,']', 
'S' and'M'. From the house of']' some of the stolen material was recovered 
and on his information about the purchaser of such material, the factory of the 
detenu was raided. There 'M', stated to be servant of tlie detenu, was found to 
be in possession of 20 kg of melted electric wire and that was seized under a 
recovery memo. 'M' made a confession statement which was recorded in the 
recovery memo itself It was recorded in the recovery memo that 'M' had 
stated that he had purchased the aluminium electric wires from 'T' and 'S', 
that he had melted and sold the to the detenu and that the said wires could 
not be identified after being melted and were used for making utensils 
thereafter. The detenu was on May 2, 1989. On the same date the bail 
application was moved on his behalf. The detention order stated that the 
detenu was likely to be bailed out and was every likelihood that after coming 
out of jail he will again indulge in his criminal activities. On this basis the 
order stated that the detaining authority was satisfied that the detenu had 
been engaged in criminal activities injurious to the maintenance of essential 
services and supplies required for public life and that with a view to prevent 
him from indulging in such unlawful activities it had become necessary to 
keep him under detention. 
Held: 
The detaining authority though can take into account the possibility of 
the detenu being released on bail in the criminal proceedings, has to be 
satisfied, having regard to his past activities or by reason of the credible 
information or cogent reasons, that if he is enlarged on bail, he would indulge 
in such criminal activities. In the present case except the bald statement that 
the detenu would repeat his criminal activities after coming out of jail, there is 
no credible information or material or cogent reasons apparent on the record 
to warrant an inference that the detenu if enlarged on bail would indulge in 
such criminal activities which are prejudicial to the maintenance of essential 
services. There must be something more than what is found in the record here 
to come to the conclusion that this is not a case of solitary incident but a 
of the detenu indulgiiig in business of receiving stolen electric wires. On the 
160. Sanjay Kumar Aggarwal v. Union of India, (1990) 3 SCC 309: 1990 SCC (Cri) 473: AIR 
1990 SC 1202:1990 Cri LJ1238. 
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other hand it appears that the detention order had been made in order to 
supplant the criminal prosecution which is not permitted .^ i^ 
Detaining authority's satisfaction regarding- Must be based on his past 
activities, credible information or material or cogent reasons - Mere bald 
statement of detaining authority not enough - Court can look into the 
material on record — - National Security Act, 1980, S, 8.1^ 2 
Section 3 of the National Security Act does not preclude the authority 
from making an order of detention against a person while he is in custody or 
in jail, but the relevant facts in connection with the making of the order would 
make all the difference in every case. The vahdity of the order of detention 
has to be judged in every individual case on its own facts. There must be 
material apparently disclosed to the detaining authority in each case that the 
person against whom an order of preventive detention is being made is 
already under custody and yet for compelling reasons, his preventive 
detention is necessary. 
Every citizeii in this country has the right to have recourse to law. He 
has the right to move the court for bail when he is arrested under the ordinary 
law of the land. If the State thinks that he does not deserve bail the State could 
oppose the grant of bail. He caraiot, however, be interdicted from moving the 
court for bail by clamping an order of detention. The possibility of the court 
granting bail may not be sufficient. Nor a bald statement that the person 
would repeat his criminal activities would be enough. There must also be 
credible information or cogent reasons apparent on the record that the detenu, 
if enlarged on bail, would act prejudicially to the interest of public order. 
In the instant case, there was no material made apparent on record that 
the detenu, if released on bail likely to commit activities prejudicial to the 
maintenance of public order. The detention order appears to have been made 
merely on the ground that the detenu is trying to come out on bail and there 
is enough possibility of his being bailed out. The order of detention could not 
be justified only on that basis.^ ^^ 
The fact that the person sought to be detained is in fact under 
detention is a relevant and material factor but is not per se determinative of 
the validity of the detention order, nor the fact that a man was not found 
guilty in a criminal trial is determinative of the allegations made against him. 
The allegations or the incidents leading to his detention have also to be borne 
in mind and correlated to the object of a particular Act under which 
preventive detention is contemplated. All the relevant factors must be 
objectively considered and if there are causal cormections between the facts 
alleged and the purpose of detention and if bona fide belief was formed then 
there was nothing to prevent the authority from serving an order of 
preventive detention even against a person who was in jail custody if there is 
161. Anand Prakash v. State of U.P„ 1 SCC 291, 298:1990 SCC (Cri) 96: AIR 1990 SC 516. 
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imminent possibility of his being released and set at liberty if the detaining 
authority was duly satisfied. If the person is in detention or is under trial and 
his conviction is unlikely but his conduct comes within the mischief of the Act 
then the authority is entitled to take a rational view of the matter. The 
grounds must be there. The decision must be bona fide. Where a person is 
accused of certain offences whereunder he is undergoing trial or has been 
acquitted, the appeal is pending and in respect of which he may be granted 
bail, the authority may not in all circumstances be entitled to direct preventive 
detention and the principle enunciated in Ramesh Yadav must apply; but 
where the offences in respect of which the detenu is accused are so interlinked 
and continuous in character and are of such nature that these affect 
continuous maintenance of essential suppUes and thereby jeopardize the 
security of the State, then subject to other conditions being fulfilled, a man 
being in detention would not detract from the order being passed for 
preventive detention. 
In the present case there was no ir\fraction of any procedural 
safeguards engrafted in the Act, There was rational subjective satisfaction 
arrived at bona fide on the basis of the materials available to the detaining 
authority and the materials had rational nexus with the purpose and object of 
the detention as contemplated by the Act. The detention order was, therefore, 
valid.164 
Detaining authority unaware that bail application had been rejected and 
thereafter no further application for bail moved by detenu — No fresh and 
relevant grounds mentioned justifying the satisfaction that if released detenu 
would mdulge in prejudicial activities — Detaining authority merely denying 
the specific averment of detenu that no prejudicial activities committed by 
him — Criminal case against detenu referred to in grounds but FIR pertaining 
to the case not containing detenu's name — Held, subjective satisfaction of 
detaining authority not reached on relevant materials — Hence detention 
order liable to be set aside. 
There must be awareness in the mind of the detaining authority that 
the detenu is in custody at the time of service of the order of detention on him 
and cogent relevant materials and fresh facts have been disclosed which 
necessitate the making of an order of detention. Considering all the facts and 
circumstances of the case it must be held that there has been no subjective 
satisfaction by the detaining authorit}' on a consideration of the relevant 
materials on the basis of which the impugned order of detention has been 
clamped on the detenu.i''^ 
Non-application of mind alleged - Detenu already in jail - Grounds of 
detention stating that though High Court had granted a conditional 
bail to detenu but instead of availing it, a subsequent application for 
moditication of the condition was moved by the detenu but the same was 
164. Siiraj Pal Sahu v. State of Maharashtra, (1986) 4 SCC 378: 1986 SCC (Cri) 452- AIR 1986 
SC 2177:1986 CriL] 2047. 
165. Abdul Razak Abdul Wahab Sheikh v. S.N. Sinha, (1989) 2 SCC 222-1989 SCC (Cri) 326-
AIR 1989 SC 2265. 
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rejected — Hence challenge to the detention on ground of absence of material 
before the detaining authority about likelihood of detenu's release on bail, 
had no substance - COFEPOSA Act, 1974, S. ?,{iy^ 
Detenu already in jail for an alleged criminal offence when detention order 
passed - Order must have clear mention of this fact and indicate that such 
detention was not sufficient to prevent the detenu from the prejudicial 
activities covered by the preventive detention law — That neither the 
detention order nor the counter-affidavit of the State referred to it, held, 
proved non-application of mind rendering the detention illegal. 
An order for preventive detention against a person already in jail for 
some offence must show awareness of that fact else an inference of 
non-application of mind cannot be refuted. ^ ^^  
Detention on mere apprehension of grant of his bail and on the basis of some 
stale grounds and a ground in respect of which detenu had already been 
acquitted, held, not sustainable— National Security Act, 1980, S. 3. 
Merely on the ground that an accused in detention as an under-trial 
prisoner was likely to get bail, an order of detention under the National 
Security Act should not ordinarily be passed. If the apprehension of the 
detaining authority was true, the bail appUcation had to be opposed and in 
case bail was granted, challenge against that order in the higher forum had to 
be raised.16^ 
If the detaining authority is satisfied, considering the past conduct 
antecedent history or the prior events showing the tendencies or inclinations 
of a man, that unless the activity is interdicted by a preventive detention 
order, the activity which is being indulged into is like to be repeated, then the 
authority can put an end to the activity by making a preventive detention 
order under sub-section (2) read witli subsection (3) of S. 3 of the National 
Security Act. 
Where a preventive order may have to be made against a person 
already confined to jail are detained the detaining authority must show 
awareness that the person sought to be detained is already in jail or under 
detention and yet a preventive detention order is a compelling necessity. This 
awareness would show that such a person is not a free person to indulge into 
a prejudicial activity which is required to be prevented by detention order, 
And this awareness must find its place either in the detention order or in the 
affidavit justifying the detention order when challenged. If the subjective 
satisfaction is reached without the awareness of this very relevant fact the 
detention order is likely to be vitiated. But it will depend on the facts and 
circumstances of each case. 
In the present case the detention orders merely referred to the name of 
the detenus and the places of their residence, without indicatmg the fact that 
166. Alocious Fernandez v. Union of India, (1990) 2 SCC 668:1990 SCC (Cri) 36^ ). 
167. Vijay Kumar v. State of J & K, (1982) 2 SCC 43:1982 SCC (Cri) 348: AIR 1982 SC 1023-
1982 Cri LJ 988:1982 ML] (Cri) 471. 
168. Ramesh Yadav v, DM, (1985) 4 SCC 232:1985 SCC (Cri) 514: AIR 1986 SC 315. 
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they were already in jail, one being for a period of roughly two months and 
the other for above one month. Therefore, the subjective satisfaction arrived at 
clearly discloses a non-apphcation of mind to the relevant facts and the order 
is vitiated.169 
Detenu already in jail at the time of passing detention order— No reference 
made in this regard in detention order or affidavit justifying the order — 
Held, detaining authority's awareness about detenu's preexisting 
confinement not shown — Hence, detention order vitiated on ground of 
non-application of mind. ^^ ^ 
Does not vitiate the detention if detaining authority is aware of this fact but 
even then is satisfied about necessity of the preventive detention. 
The detenu had been called by the Customs Authorities for 
investigation. A statement had been made by him under S. 108 of the Customs 
Act and thereafter he was taken into custody and produced before the 
Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate who remanded him to custody and 
directed him to be produced on the following day in the court. By the time the 
order of detention came to be made the petitioner was in jail for at the most 
one day. Charge-sheet had not been submitted agaiiist him in the criminal 
case and he had been remanded to the judicial custody with the direction to 
be produced before the Metropolitan Magistrate next day. It was contended 
that since the detenu was already in custody, the order of detention was liable 
to be quashed. Rejecting the contention, the Supreme Court. 
Held: 
The fact that the detenu is already in detention does not take away the 
jurisdiction of the detaining authority in making an order of preventive 
detention. What is necessary in such a is to satisfy the court when detention is 
challenged on that ground that the detaining authority was aware of the fact 
that the detenu was already in custody and yet he was subjectively satisfied 
that his order of detention became necessary. In the facts of the present case, 
there was sufficient material to show the same. '^'^  
Detaining authority's awareness of this fact as also his satisfaction about 
likelihood of recurrence of the prejudicial activities in case of detenu's release 
on bail not shown — Held, detention order invalid — National Security Act, 
1980, S. 3(2) 
There was nothing to show that there was awareness in the mind of the 
District Magistiate, the detaining authority, of the fact that the appellant was 
in jail at the 'time of clamping of the order of detention, and that the detainiiig 
authority was satisfied in considering his antecedents and previous criminal 
acts, that there was likelihood of his indulging in criminal activities 
169. Merugu Satyanarayana v. State of A.P, (1982) 3 SCC 301: 1983 SCC (Cri) 18: AIR 1982 
SC 1543:1982 Cri L] 2357. 
170. Devi Lai Mahto v. State of Bihar, (1982) 3 SCC 328:1983 SCC (Cri) 37: AIR 1982 SC 1548: 
1982 Cri LJ 2363. 
171. Poonam Lata v. M.L. Wadhawan (1987) 4 SCC-48, 59: 1987 SCC (Cri) 685: AIR 1987 SC 
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jeopardizing public order if he is enlarged on bail and that there is every 
likelihood that the appellant will be released on bail within a short time. On 
this ground alone, the order of detention is invalid. 
The respondents could very well proceed with the criminal case 
pending against the detenu-appellant, oppose the bail application, execute it 
against the appellant and could get him punished if the case is proved. If at all 
the appellant is released on bail the respondents are not without any remedy. 
They can also file application in revision for cancellation of the bail 
application. In such circumstances, the passing of the order of detention of the 
appellant who is already in custody is bad and invalid in law. ^^ ^ 
Detenu's release or prospect of his imminent release not considered — Held, 
continued detention illegal on ground of non-application of mind to relevant 
factors even if detention otherwise found to be justified - National Security 
Act, 1980, S. 3(2). 173 
Per Dutt, ]. 
When a detenu is already in jail for an offence at the time of his 
preventive detention, two facts must appear from the grounds of detention, 
namely, (1) awareness of the detaining authority of the fact that the detenu is 
already in detention and (2) compelling reasons justifying such detention, 
despite the fact that the detenu is already under detention. The question 
whether or not a particular offence, for which a detenu has been detained, is a 
bailable or non-bailable offence, does not have any bearing on the question of 
passing an order of detention. Even though an offence is a non-bailable one, 
an accused may be enlarged on bail. Again, an offence for which a detenu has 
been put under detention, may be a bailable offence. Whether an order of 
detention can be against a person who is already in detention or in jail, will 
always have to be determined in the facts and circumstances of each case. In 
the present case the detaining authority was aware of the fact that the 
appellant was arrested and produced before the Additional Metiopolitan 
Magistrate, New Delhi. The grounds of detention also disclosed compelling 
reasons that the appellant should be preventively detained under the Act in 
spite of his detention on a charge under S. 135 of the Customs Act. 
Per Shetty, j . (concurring) 
The detaining authority must have awareness of the fact that the 
detenu is already in custody and yet for compelling reason his preventive 
detention is found necessary. The compelling reasons justifying the 
preventive detention have to be found out from the grounds of detention and 
not apart from the grounds. The satisfaction of the detaining authority camiot 
be reached on extraneous matters. The need to put the person under 
prevexitive detention depends only upon the grounds of detention. The 
activities of the detenu may not be isolated or casual. They may be continuous 
172. Gulab Mehra v. State of U.P., (1987)4 SCC 302, 316, 317: 1987 SCC (Cri) 721: AIR 1987 
SC 2332. 
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or part of a transaction or racket prejudicial to the conservation or 
augmentation of foreign exchange. Then there may be need to put the person 
under preventive detention, notwithstanding the fact that he is under custody 
in cormection with a case. There cannot, however, be any uniform principle to 
be applied in this regard. Each case has to be judged on its own facts and on 
its own grounds of detention. If the grounds are germane it would bq 
perfectly legitimate exercise of power to make an order of detention. In the 
instant case there is hardly any justification to find fault with the order of 
detention. ^^ * 
Where a preventive order is to be made against a person already 
confined to jail or detained, the subjective satisfaction of the detaining 
authority must comprehend his awareness of the very fact that the person 
sought to be detained is already under confinement in respect of the same 
offence and yet a preventive detention is a compelling necessity. If the 
subjective satisfaction is reached without the awareness of this very relevant 
fact the detention order is likely to be vitiated. But it will depend on the facts 
and circumstances of each case. 
Moreover, the detention order must show on the face of it that the 
detaining authority was aware of the situation. Otherwise the detention order 
would suffer from vice of non-application of mind. 
In the present case there was not even a whimper of the detenu being 
in jail for nearly three weeks prior to the date on which the detention order 
was made. Therefore, the subjective satisfaction arrived at clearly disclosed a 
non-application of mind to the relevant facts and the order is vitiated.^^^ 
Mere apprehension of detenu's release on bail and his resort to anti social 
activities again, not enough.^ ^^ 
Detenu already in jail — Absence of detaining authority's satisfaction 
about Hkelihood of detenu's release on bail, held on facts and 
circumstances, rendered the detention order invalid — Principles laid 
down in Rameshwar Shaw case and followed in subsequent decisions 
reiterated - National Security Act, 1980, S. 3(1) 
An order of detention was passed against the appellant's husband on 
September 7,1988. The detention order and its accompanying annexure show 
that the detaining authority was aware and conscious of the fact that the 
detenu was already in custody in connection with a criminal case (bank 
dacoity) at the time of making the detention order. The detenu's application 
for grant of bail in the dacoity;' case had been rejected on August 22,1988 and 
he was remanded to custody for the offence of bank dacoity. In the detention 
order the detaining authority recorded its satisfaction that the detenu's 
174. Vijay Kumar v. Union of India, (1988) 2 SCC 57, 70: 1988 SCC (Cri) 293: AIR 1988 SC 
934: (1988) 17 ECC 82. 
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preventive detention was necessary to prevent him from indulging in 
activities prejudicial to maintenance of public order in which he would 
indulge if he was allowed to remain at large. 
Held: 
The detention order read along with its annexure nowhere indicated 
that the detaining authority apprehended the likelihood of the detenu being 
released on bail in the dacoity case and, therefore, considered the detention 
order necessary. On the contrary the detention order and its annexures show 
the satisfaction of the detaining authority that there was ample material to 
prove the detenu's complicity in the Bank dacoity including sharing of the 
booty in spite of absence of his name in the FIR as one of the dacoits. On these 
facts, the order of detention and the order of its confirmation by the State 
Government were clearly invahd since the same were when the detenu was 
already in jail custody for the offence of bank dacoity with no prospect of his 
release. The test indicated by the Constitution Bench in Rameshwar Shaw case 
was not sahsfied. 
[The Court however clarified that the detenu would coiitinue to be 
held in coimection with the case under S. 397, IPC and if and when he is 
released this judgment would not prevent the authorities from considering 
his preventive detention according to law.] 
Subsisting custody of the detenu by itself does not invalidate an order 
of his preventive detention and the decision must depend on the facts of the 
particular case; preventive detention being necessary to prevent the detenu 
from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or to the 
maintenance of pubHc order etc. ordinarily it is not needed when the detenu 
is already in custody; the detaining authority must show its awareness to the 
fact of subsisting custody of the detenu and take that factor into account while 
making the order; but, even so, ii the detaining authority is reasonably 
satisfied on cogent material that there is likelihood of his release and in view 
of his antecedent activities which are proximate in point of time he must be 
detained iii order to prevent him from indulging in such prejudicial activities, 
the detention order can be validly made even in anticipation to on his release. 
The above is the summary and reiteration of the principle settled by 
the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Rameshwar Shaw case. All 
the subsequent decisions of the Court on this aspect have to be read in the 
light of this decision. The conclusion about validity of the detention order iii 
each case was reached on the facts of the particular case and the observations 
made in each of them have to be read in the context in which they were made. 
None of the observations made in any subsequent case can be construed at 
variance with the principle indicated in Rameshwar Shaw case for the 
obvious reason that all subsequent decisions were by benches comprised of 
lesser number of judges. ^'^'^ 
177. N, Meera Rani v. Cicnt, of T.N., (1989) 4 SCC 418, 428, 429:1989 SCC (Cri) 732: AIR 1989 
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It was contended on behalf of the petitioner that the detention 
order was passed with a view to frustrate the bail allowed to the detenu-
petitioner in the criminal case. 
Held: 
In case of passing of an order of detention against an accused 
immediately after he is allowed bail or at a point of time when he is likely to 
be enlarged on bail, great caution should be exercised in scrutinising the 
validity of the order, which is based on the very same charge which is to be 
hied by a criminal court. 
In the present case the District Magistrate being detaining authority 
did not act for defeating the bail order. He was of the view that having regard 
to the entire circumstances appearing from the records placed before him, the 
petitioner when let out on bail, was likely to create public order problem. The 
Distiict Magistiate came to this conclusion on the considerationiof relevant 
materials. Copies of the documents were served on the petitioner along with 
the grounds, considering the entire circumstances of the case was no fault in 
the detention order. ^ ''^  
Deteiition order passed, detaining authority being apprehensive of 
likelihood of detenu's release on bail and being satisfied about necessity of 
preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to public order in case of 
his release — Held, detention order would not become invalid merely 
because detenu was in jail at the time of passing the order.i''^ 
Even assuming that the original office file containing a note 
mentioning that the detenu was already in custody and was likely to be 
released soon, carmot be relied on to establish that the detaining authority 
was aware of these facts and that the awareness of the detaining authority 
ought to have appeared from the grounds of detention themselves, a perusal 
of the grounds in the present case which ran into many pages clearly 
indicated that the detaining authority was conscious of the fact that the 
detenu was in judicial custody and was apprehensive that he would be 
released on baiL^^ o 
The detention order cannot be made for the purpose of circumventing 
the expected bail order. The object of detention has to be prevention of a 
detenu from indulging in activities prejudicial to the conservation of foreign 
exchange resources, and not to facilitate his trial in a criminal case nor as a 
punitive measure. However, the gi'ounds of detention in this case indicated 
that the offences in respect of which the detenu was accused were "so inter-
linked and continuous in character and are of such nature" that they fully 
justify the detention order. In the circumstances, the satisfaction of the 
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detainiiig authority as specifically recorded in the grounds cannot be 
doubted.^^1 
Detenu already in jail and likely to be released on bail — Governments failure 
to oppose the bail application, does not invariably lead to the inference 
that the detention was not called for - COFEPOSA Act, 1974, S. 3(1). 
Merely because the prayer for bail made on behalf of the detenu was 
not opposed on behalf of the respondents before the Magistrate, it cannot be 
held that his detention was not called for. Having regard to the circumstances 
arising in this case no such inference is permissible to be drawn in favour of 
the petitioner. Besides, according to the respondents, the bail application was 
as a matter of fact opposed. In any view, this factor is not of much con-
sequence in the facts of the present case.^ ^a 
Detaining authority's satisfaction that detenu's bail application likely to be 
granted by criminal court — Does not mean that the bail application was not 
opposed by the State— National Security Act, 1980, S. 3. 
The apprehension of the District Magistrate that the prayer in regard to 
grant of bail was likely to be granted does not mean that the application was 
unopposed. The District Magistrate was expecting an adverse order on 
account of the fact that the witnesses of the incident appeared to be reluctant 
to support their earlier statements.^ ^^^ 
Detenu already in jail — Mere possibility of his release on bail not enough for 
preventive detention — Material justifying apprehension that detenu would 
indulge in prejudicial activities in case of his release on bail essential — 
National Security Act, 1980, S. 3. 
Every citizen has right to move the court for bail when he is arrested 
under the ordinary law of the land, and he cannot be interdicted from moving 
the court for bail or clamping an order of detention. The possibility of the 
court granting bail may not be sufficient. Nor a bald statement that the person 
would repeat his criminal activities would be enough. There must also be 
credible information or cogent reasons apparent on the record that the detenu, 
if enlarged on bail, would act prejudicially to the interest of public order. In 
the instant case, there was no material made apparent on record that the 
detenu, if released on bail, is likely to commit activities prejudicial to the 
maintenance of public order. The detention order had been made merely on 
the ground that the detenu was tiying to come out on bail and there was 
enough possibility of his being bailed out. 
(j) Detention after grant of bail application 
181. Bal Chand Bonsai v. Union of India, (1988) 2 SCC 527, 531:1988 SCC (Cri) 356: AIR 1988 
SC1175: (1988) 16 ECC 227. 
182. Bal Chand Bansal v. Union of India, (1988) 2 SCC 527, 532:1988 SCC (Cri) 356: AIR 1988 
SC 1175: (1988) 16 ECC 227. 
!83. Yogendra Murari v. State of U.P., (1988) 4 SCC 559, 563, 564: 1988 SCC (Cri) 992: AIR 
1988 SC1835:1988 BLJR 592. 
192 
Detenu already in jail released on bail— Detaining authority aware of this fact 
— Detention order valid. ^^ '^  
Detenu already in jail in connection with a criminal case — Bail application 
granted by court — But prior to his release on bail, preventive detention order 
passed against him on grounds including the charges made in the pending 
criminal case — Vahdity of the detention order must be examined very 
carefully in such circumstances 
Per Venkataramiah, ]. 
The law of preventive detention should not be used merely to clip the 
wings of an accused who is involved in a criminal prosecution. It is not 
intended for the purpose of keeping a man under detention when under 
ordinary criminal law it may not be possible to resist the issue of orders of 
bail, unless the material available is such as would satisfy the requirements of 
the legal provisions authorising such detention. When a person is enlarged on 
bail by a competent criminal court, great caution should be exercised in 
scrutinising the validity of an order of preventive detention which is based on 
the very same charge which is to be tried by the criminal court. 
Per A. P. Sen, J. 
Merely because there was pending prosecution and the detenu was 
already in jail, there is no impediment for his detention if the detaining 
authority is satisfied that his being enlarged on bail would be prejudicial to 
the maintenance of public order.^^s 
Detenu released on bail or acquitted — Facts and circumstances involved in 
the criminal proceedings can be taken into account in forming subjective 
satisfaction for passing detention order 
Even if a prosecution against a person fails or bail is granted an order 
of detention could be passed drawing the satisfaction therefor from the facts 
and circumstances involved in the criminal proceedings. An offender might 
secure an acquittal by intimidating witnesses. It all depends upon the 
circumstances of each case. But it is necessary for the detaining authority to 
resist the temptation to prefer and substitute, as a matter of course, the easy 
expedience of a preventive detention to the more cumbersome one of punitive 
detention. Ayya v. State of U.P., (1989) 1 SCC 374, 383: 1989 SCC (Cri) 153: 
AIR 1989 SC 364:1989 CriYj 991. 
Non-application of nund — Detaining authority aware about detenu's 
anticipatory bail application — Grounds showing likelihood of recurrence of 
anti-social activities by the detenu and compelling necessity of his detention 
— Held on facts, non-application of mind by detaining authority not 
established - Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 1985, S. 3(2). 
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The appellant/petitioner contended that there was non-application of 
mind on the part of the detaining authority inasmuch as there was nothing to 
show his awareness of the fact that the appellant had apphed for grant of 
anticipatory bail and his satisfaction about the compelling necessity to make 
an order for detention which, it is said, was punitive in character. Dismissing 
the appeal and the writ petition of the detenu. 
Held: 
Earlier two incidents stated in the grounds were not really the grounds 
for detention but they, along with the transaction in question of importation 
of foreign liquor in bulk, show that his activities in this transaction afforded 
sufficient ground for the prognosis that he would indulge in such anti-social 
activities again, if not detained. Having regard to the recital in the grounds of 
detention as also the counter-affidavit of the detaining authority stating that 
he was aware of the fact that the detenu had on January 21,1987 applied for 
anticipatory bail but no orders were passed, there is no force in the contention 
about non-application of mind.^ *^ 
Detention order challenged on ground that continued detention caused 
detenu's mental disorder — Psychiatiist reporting to the contrary — 
Detention order not open to challenge on this ground. ^^ ^ 
The contention that the detention would be illegal in view of dismissal 
of detenus from service is really without merit. The subsequent order of 
dismissal is not germane to examine the validity of the detention. ^ ^^  
COMMUNICATION OF GROUNDS OF DETENTION 
Article 22(5) requires that the grounds of detention must be 
'commimicatedS to the detenu. "Communicate" is a strong word which means 
that sufficient knowledge of the basic facts constituting the 'grounds' should 
be imparted effectively and fully to the detenu in writing in a language which 
he understands. The whole purpose of communicating the 'grounds' to the 
detenu is to enable him to make a purposeful and effective representation. If 
the 'grounc^s' are only verbally explained to the detenu and nothing in writing 
is left with him, in a language which he understands, then that purpose is not 
served, and the constitutional mandate in Art. 22(5) are infringed.!*^ 
Communication of grounds — Government letter to the detenu claiming 
privilege in respect of certain information — Letter signed by Assistant 
Secretary using first person (word T) — Contention that it was Government 
and not the Assistant Secretary that could claim the privilege, held, untenable 
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as the use of the first person by the Assistant Secretary was a mere clerical 
mistake which Government rectified later.^ ^o 
There is an inexorable connection between the obligation on the part of 
the detaining authority to furnish the 'grounds' and the right given to the 
detenu to have an 'earliest opportunity' to make the representation. Since 
preventive detention is a serious inroad on individual liberty and its 
justification is the prevention of inherent danger of activity prejudicial to the 
community, the detaining authority must be satisfied as to the sufficiency of 
the grounds which justify the taking of the drastic measure of preventive 
detention. The requirements of Art. 22(5) are satisfied once 'basic facts and 
materials' which weighed with the detaining authority in reaching his sub-
jective satisfaction are communicated to the detenu. The test to be applied in 
respect of the contents of the grounds for the two purposes are quite different. 
For the first, the test is whether it is sufficient to satisfy the authority, for the 
second, the test is whether it is sufficient to enable the detenu to make his 
representation at the earliest opportunity which must, of course, be a real and 
effective opportunity. The court may examine the 'grounds' specified in the 
order of detention to see whether they are relevant to the circumstances under 
which preventive detention could be supported e.g. security of India or of a 
State, conservation and augmentation of foreign exchange and prevention of 
smuggling activities, maintenance of public order, etc. and set the detenu at 
liberty if there is no rational connection between the alleged activity of the 
detenu and the grounds relied upon, say public order. ^^^ 
Meaning of effective representation and need to furnish copies of documents 
and other materials relied upon in grounds of detention, restated — 
Constitiition of India, Art, 22(5). "2 
Non-furrvishing of relevant material and vital facts to detenu would 
vitiate the detention. 
If "material and vital facts" which would influence the mind of the 
detaining authority one way or the other on the question whether or not to 
make the detention order, are not placed, it would vitiate the subjective 
satisfaction rendering the detention order illegal That was not so in the 
present case. There was ample material before'the Distiict Magistrate for him 
to base his subjective satisfaction as to the necessity for passing the impugned 
order, as stated by him in his affidavit, i^ ^ 
Habeas corpus petition under Art. 226 on ground that documents referred to 
in grounds of detention not supplied to detenu— Held, High Court cannot 
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decide their relevancy by itself examiruiig them — Ccmstitution of India, Arts, 
226 & 22(5). 
It is not open to the High Court to wade through the confidential file of 
the government in order to fish out a point against the detenu. Further, the 
question of relevance is not to be decided by the court by the detaining 
authority which alone has to consider the representation of the detenu on 
merits and then come to the conclusion whether it should be accepted or 
rejected, i^ * 
(b) Language of communication 
Grounds are always required to be furnished in. a language which is 
understood by the detenu and this requirement is not limited to or^ Iy where 
the grounds are complicated or lengthy — Detenus being not conversant with 
EngUsh Language, held, supply of the grounds in that language vitiated their 
detention - Constitution of India, Art. 22(5).i95 
Communication of grounds of detention — Language of communication 
— Whether known to the detenu — Should be ascertained by court in the 
facts and circumstances of the case by applying commonsense — On facts 
held, detenu feigning ignorance of the language in which grounds were 
communicated to him - COFEPOSA Act, 1974, S. 3(3) - Constitution of 
India, Art. 22(5) 
Whether grounds were communicated or not depends upon the facts 
and circumstances of each case. Court should apply commonsense while 
considering constitutional provisions for safeguards against misuse of powers 
by authorities though these constitutional provisions should be strictly 
construed. 
In the present case in the background of the facts that the grounds of 
detention were given to the detenu following search and seizure of gold 
biscuits from his room in his presence, that a mercy petition was made by him 
to the Government which was written in English though signed by him in 
Gujarati, and that he was in constant touch with his daughter and sons who 
knew English and Hindi, it cannot be said that the grounds were not 
communicated in the sense the grounds of detention were not conveyed to the 
detenu. The detenu was merely feigning ignorance of English in which the 
grounds were furnished to him. The mere fact that Llindi translation of the 
grounds was served beyond the period of 5 days stipulated in S. 3(3), 
COFEPOSA Act is inconsequential even in absence of any exceptional 
circumstances because his daughter and sons knew both English and Hindi. 
Prakash Chandra Mehta v. Commr, and Secy, Govt, of Kerala, 1985 Supp SCC 
144:1985 SCC (Cri) 332: AIR 1986 SC 
Grounds of detention — Communication of— Language — Grounds of 
detention as well as the entire documents and materials relied upon therein 
194. Kirit Kumar Chaman Lai Kundaliya v. Union of India, (1981) 2 SCC 436, 441:1981 SCC 
(Cri) 471; AIR 1981 SC 1621; (1981) 2 SCR 718; 1981 Cri L) 1267; (1981) 22 GLR1067. 
195. Surjeet Smgh v. Union of India, (1981) 2 SCC 359:1981 SCC (Cri) 535: AIR 1981 SC 1153: 
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must be supplied to the. detenu in the language known to him — Such 
supplies must be made within 5 days and in exceptional circumstances within 
15 days from the date of detention — Written reasons indicating the 
exceptional circumstances in justification of delay up to 15 days must be 
communicated to the detenu along with the grounds, documents and 
materials — Non-compliance with any of these mandates would vitiate the 
detention order - COFEPOSA Act, 1974 (52 of 1974), S. 3(3) - Constitution 
of India, Art. 22(5) 
On a combined reading of Art, 22(5) of the Constitution and S. 3(3) of 
the COFEPOSA Act and having regard to the case-law evolved through the 
decisions of the Supreme Court, the following propositions emerge in the 
context: 
(a) All documents, statements and other materials incorporated in the 
grounds by reference and which have influenced the mind of the detaining 
authority in arriving at the requisite subjective satisfaction must be furnished 
to the detenu in a script or language which he understands. 
(b) All these materials must be furnished to the detenu along with grounds or 
in any event iiot later than five days ordinarily and in the exceptional 
circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing not later than 15 days 
from the date of his detention. 
(c) The detenu must be informed about the existence of exceptional 
circumstances and what they were for delay in supplying grounds of 
detention and/or documents and statements incorporated therein in the 
language which he understands. This flows from the right which is conferred 
upon the detenu to make representation against his detention inasmuch as 
the detenu is entitled to satisfy either the superior authority or the 
Advisory Board that 
the delay that has occurred in the supply of requisite material to him was not 
justified either because exceptional circumstances did not exist or those put 
forward were unreal or invalid. Obviously, the detenu will not be in a 
position to do so if the alleged exceptional circumstances are not 
communicated to him. In other words, what he has done before the Court 
now, he could have done before the superior authorities or the Advisory 
Board. 
Failure to comply with any of the above requirements would amount 
to breach of the mandate contained in Art. 22(5) read with S. 3(3), COFEPOSA 
Act. In preventive detention jurisprudence whatever httle safeguards the 
Constitution and the enactment authorising such detention provide assume 
utmost importance and must be strictly adhered to. 
In the present case supply of bulk of documents and statements 
incorporated in the grounds in the script or language understood by the 
detenu was delayed beyond the normal period of five days. The respondents 
filed an affidavit and also produced the office notings before the Court which 
explained the reason for the delay, by stating that there were a large number 
of documents requiring translation and on account of the holy month of 
Ramzan Urdu translators were not available and those handful of translators 
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who were available and were put on the job were prepared to work only from 
12 noon to 4 p.m. Such an explanation camiot be regarded as constituting 
exceptional circumstances justifying the delay. Since the petitioner was 
already in judicial custody and no bail had been granted, there was no fear of 
his abscondence and no urgency and therefore, the detaining authority could 
have kept all the material ready in Urdu and supplied the same to him 
immediately after detaining him second time. Moreover, the office noting 
neither gave particulars of how many Urdu translators were put on the job 
except vaguely stating 'handful of tianslators' were available, nor indicated 
whether and if so what efforts were made to avail the services of the 
additional Urdu translators who had nothing to do with the observance of 
Ramzan fasts. 
Further, the alleged exceptional circumstances contemplated by S. 3(3), 
COFEPOSA Act were not communicated to the detenu at the time of the 
delayed supply of the concerned documents and statements in Urdu 
language. 
Lastly, Urdu translations of quite a few documents and statements 
referred to in the grounds of detention and relied upon by the detaining 
authority were not supplied to the detenu at all. The petitioner is a Pakistani 
national and Urdu seems to be his mother tongue and a little knowledge of 
English figures, ability to read English words written in capital letters and a 
smattering knowledge of Hindi or Gujarati would not justify the denial of 
Urdu translations to him of the material documents and statements referred 
to as incriminating documents in the grounds and relied upon by the 
detaining authority in arriving at its subjective satisfaction. 
The aforesaid failures on the part of the authorities constituted breach 
of Art. 22(5) of the Constitiition read with S. 3(3) of the COFEPOSA Act and 
vitiated the continued detention of the petitioner.^^^ 
Grounds of detention must be explained in the language and script 
understandable to the detenu — Detenu specifically stating to be knowing 
Arabic language only — Hence, explaining the grounds in Hindi 
inconsequential — Averment in the counter-affidavit that the detenu made 
his submission iri Hindi before Advisory Board, wholly Inadmissible in 
absence of testimony of any reliable witness — In absence of any proof of 
explaining the grounds in Arabic, held, continued detention of the detenu 
illegal 
Orders of detention which touch the valuable rights of citizens and 
their liberty are matters of moment and cannot be dealt with in a casual or 
routine manner. The iiecessaiy safeguards laid down by the Supreme Court 
and enshrined in Art. 22(5) of the Constitution have to be compUed with 
however onerous and difficult the task may be. Moreover, with huge 
resources at the command of the State, it is not at all difficult for the detaining 
196. Ibrahim Ahmad Batti v. State of Gujarat, (1982) 3 SCC 440:1983 SCC (Cri) 66; AIR 1982 
SC1500. 
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authority to see that these Uttle things are comphed with so that the detenu 
does not complain that the authorities try to play with his liberty. 
There is no cogent proof in this case that the detenu who admittedly is 
an Arab knew Hindi at all or that the grounds were actually explained and 
translated to him. If the detenu did not know Hindi, explaining the grounds 
in Hindi to him is absolutely of no consequence. On this ground alone, the 
detenu is entitled to be released as his continued detention becomes legally 
invaHd.197 
Language — Grounds must be in the language which detenu understands — 
Strict compliance with this requirement essential — Test of prejudice caused 
to the detenu as a result of language used in the grounds not material for 
determining effective communication of the grounds — While detenu 
claiming to know Ladhaki language only grounds suppUed in a different 
language — Held, requirements of law not complied with — Fact that the 
detenu's wife understands the language in which grounds were supplied not 
sufficient — Constitution of India, Art. 22(5).^ ^^  
Language - Detenu held under S, 3(1) (i) of COFEPOSA Act alleging that 
English version of the grounds stated that detention intended to prevent him 
from indulging in smuggling activities which is covered by S. 3(1) (i) but 
Tamil version disclosed that it intended to prevent him from transporting 
contraband goods which is covered by S. 3(1) (iii) — Held, on facts, the two 
versions not so different as to cause any prejudice to the detenu — 
COFEPOSA Act, S. 3(l)(i). 1^9 
"Commuiiicate' is a strong word. It requires that sufficient knowledge 
of the basic facts constituting the grounds should be imparted effectively and 
fully to the detenu in writing in a language which he understands, so as to 
enable him to make a purposeful and effective representation. Where the 
grounds are couched in a language which is not known to the detenu, unless 
contents of the grounds are fully explained and translated to the detenu, it 
would tantamount to not sei^ ving the grounds to the detenu and would thus 
vitiate the detention ex facie. If the grounds are only verbally explained to the 
detenu and nothing in writing is left with him in a language which he 
understands, then that purpose is not served and Art. 22(5) is ir^fringed. Thus 
what is considered necessary is a working knowledge of the language 
enabling the detenu to understand the grounds or full explanation or 
translation thereof in the language understood by the detenu. 
It would be open for the court to consider the facts and the 
circumstances of a case to reasonably ascertain whether the detenu is feigning 
ignorance of the language or he has such working knowledge as to 
understand the grounds of detention and the contents of the documents 
furnished. It would involve a subjective determination. It would, of course, 
197. Nafisa Khalifa Ghanem v. Union of India, (1982) 1 SCC 422:1982 SCC (Cri) 236. 
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always be a safer course in such cases to furnish translations in the detenu's 
own language. 
In the present case when the detention order and the grounds of 
detention were served the detenu received them and acknowledged the 
receipt thereof, as it appears from the records, putting his signature in 
English. He did not complain that the grounds of detention were not 
understood by him. On the other hand in the very grounds of detention it was 
stated that in course of interrogation he answered the questions in English 
including the questions as to how he happened to learn English. The gist of 
his answers in this regard was also given in the grounds of detention. The 
statements contained number of informations peculiar to the detenu himself 
which could not have been communicated by him to the interrogators unless 
he knew the English language. In several places he corrected the statements 
putting appropriate English words and signing the corrections; No objection 
regarding non-communication of the grounds in a language understood by 
the detenu was made within the statiitory period for furnishing the grounds. 
The representation was beyond the statutory period, almost a month after the 
grounds were served, along with the detenu's statements as to how he learnt 
English. In the meantime bail petitions were moved on his behalf before the 
Chief Judicial Magistiate and the High Court. There is nothing to show that 
he did not give instructions to his counsel. In the circumstances of the case it 
must be held that the detenu understood the English language, had working 
knowledge of it and was feigning ignorance of it, and there was no violation 
of Art. 22(5) of the Constitution on the ground of non-communication of the 
grounds of detention in a language understood by him.^ oo 
Communication of detention order — Order reciting S. 3(1) of the COFEPOSA 
Act served in English but grounds of detention together with basic materials 
served, along with the order, in the language known to the detenu — Held, on 
facts, neither Art. 22(5) violated nor was detenu handicapped in submitting 
his representation.201 
It is imperative that the detaining authority has to serve the grounds of 
detention which include also all the relevant documents which had been 
considered in forming the subjective satisfaction by the detaining authority 
before making the order of detention and referred to in the list of documents 
accompanying the grounds of detention in order to enable the detenu to make 
an effective representation to the Advisory Board as well as to the detaining 
authority. Hence the refusal on the part of the detaining authority to supply 
legible copies of the said relevant document to the detenu for making an 
effective representation infringed the detenu's right under Art. 22(5) of the 
Constitution. The order of detention is, therefore, set aside and the detenu is 
200. Kubic Darusz v. Union of India, (1990) 1 SCC 568, 573-578:1990 SCC (Cri) 227: AIR 1990 
SC 605. 
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directed to be released forthwith. Dharmista Bhagat v. State of Karnataka, 
1989 Supp (2) s e c 155; 1990 SCC (Cri) 39. 202 
Supply of illegible copies of documents— Detention order confirmed before 
supply of legible copies made — Held, right of making representation denied 
— Constitution of India, Art 22.^ 03 
Supply of illegible copies of documents- Held, procedural safeguards 
provided by Constitution violated - Detention quashed - On facts of the 
case Supreme Court did not go into question whether those documents were 
relevant or material — Constitution of India, Art. 22(5). o^* 
Delay in supplying documents and materials in support of the grounds of 
detention, held, would vitiate the detention - The detention also stands 
vitiated by the delay of more than a month in disposing of the representation 
- Constitiation of India, Art 22(5). 205 
Delay in serving beyond mandatory period under S. 8(1) of National Security 
Act- Rigours of limitation prescribed under S. 8(1) to be literally interpreted 
and stiictly followed — No relaxation permissible merely because detenu 
had been released on bail or parole and hence was not in detention — Where 
detention order sewed on September 29, detenu released on bail on October 2, 
police officer sent to Bombay for serving the grounds going back to Delhi 
having failed to trace the detenu though his address was well known and 
grounds ultimately served on October 14, held, inaction after October 6 till 
October 14 sufficient for violation of S. 8(1) in absence of satisfactory and 
acceptable explanation — Detention order quashed — National Security Act, 
1980, S. 8(1)- Constitiition of India, Art. 22 
In this case there is no acceptable or satisfactory explanation as to what 
the officer or the officers did after October 6,1986, this inaction after October 
6,1986 till October 14,1986, by itself is sufficient for us to hold that S. 8(1) has 
been violated by the officer concerned and on that ground alone the order of 
detention has to be quashed. 
An attempt was made to contend that the delay in communicating the 
grounds of detention caused in this case has to be condoned and the rigour of 
the section relaxed since the detenu had been released on October 2,1986, and 
hence was not in detention. This according to us is specious plea which 
cannot stand legal scrutiny. If this contention is to be extended to its logical 
conclusion it would be clothing the authorities with powers to delay 
communication of the grounds of detention indefinitely, whenever a detenu 
secures from a court of law either bail or parole. To accept this contention 
would be to destroy the effect of the mandate of the section. As indicated 
earlier, the mandate enacted in the section is a safety^  valve for a citizen who is 
202. Devji Vallabhbhai Tandel v. Administrator, (1982) 2 SCC 222: 1982 SCC (Cri) 4.03: AIR 
J982SC 1029:1982 Cri L] 799. 
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robbed of his liberty and to disable the authorities from manipulating the 
grounds of detention. The section has to be Interpreted literally. No relaxation 
is permissible. If the original time of 5 days has to be extended, such extension 
must be supported by an order recording reasons. If reasons are not so 
recorded the order of detention will automatically fail Even if reasons are 
recorded they have to inspire confidence in the court and are subject to legal 
scrutiny. If the reasons are unsatisfactory courts would still quash the order of 
detention, ^ o^  
Documents and materials mentioned in grounds of detention to be supplied 
to the detenu immediately on demand — Explanation for delay of about 28 
days in supplying the same not convincing — Hence, continued detention of 
the detenu illegal - Constitution of India, Art. 22(5) 
A demand for documents should not be taken lightly but the detaining 
authority must be prepared to supply at least those materials or documents 
which are clearly mentioned in the grounds of detention and he must have 
those material ready with him so as to be given to the detenu as and when 
asked for, with utmost despatch. The dilatory procedure adopted by the 
detaining authority in referring the question of supplying of documents to 
various authorities and inviting their comments is condensable. The detenu 
cannot make any effective representation unless he gets copies of the docu-
ments which are expressly mentioned in the grounds of detention. In the 
present case the explanation given by the detaining authority for delay of 
about 28 days in sending the documents to the detenu does not appear to be 
satis-factory or convincing. The continued detention of the detenu therefore, 
becomes illegal on this ground also. 0^7 
Grounds of detention must be furnished as soon as practicable and need not 
be furnished simultaneously along with the detention order — Grounds 
furnished within two days of the detention — Held, delay reasonable and 
therefore the detention order not vitiated on ground of such delay alone — 
Constitiition of India. Art 22(5) - National Security Act} 1980 (65 of 1980), 
S.8. 
There is no constitutional imperative that no person shall be detained 
under preventive detention law without being informed of the grounds for 
such detei"ition. The law is that the detaiiiing authority must, as soon as may 
be, i.e. as soon as practicable, communicate to the detenu the grounds on 
which the order of detention has been made. That period has been specified 
by S. 8 of the Act to mean a period ranging from five to 10 days depending 
upon the facts and circumstances of each case. 
In the present case the detenu was served with the grounds of 
detention within a period of two days, that is, within the period allowed by S. 
8 of the Act and that was "as soon as practicable". In absence of any 
allegations as to mala tides on the part of the detaining authority or that the 
206. Hem Lai! Bhandari v. State of Sikkim, (1987) 2 SCC 9,14: 1987 SCC (Cri) 262: AIR 1987 
BC762:]987CriL]718. 
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detention was for non-existent grounds, the order of detention is not rendered 
invalid merely because the grounds of detention were furnished two days 
later. 208 
Documents and materials relied upon in grounds of detention - Copies of, 
supplied to the detenu more than one month after furnishing of grounds of 
detention - Held, detenu thereby deprived of his constitutional right to make 
effective and expeditious representation - Hence, continued detention of 
detenu rendered void - COFEPOSA Act, 1974 (52 of 1974), S, 3.209 
Documents reUed upon in the grounds not supplied to detenu within 15 days 
from the date of order of detention - On "detenu's request by his 
representation dated April 6, the documents suppUed to him on April 24 and 
the representation disposed of by Advisory Board on April 29 — Held, failure 
on the part of the detaining authority to supply the material documents 
prevented the detenu from making an effective representation against the 
grounds of detention and as such mandatory requirements of Art. 22(5) of the 
Constitution r/w S. 3(3) of COFEPOSA Act not complied with - Order of 
detention, therefore, illegal and bad and liable to be quashed— COFEPOSA 
Act, 1974, S. 3(3) and (1) - Constihition of India, Art. 22(5). 210 
Icchu Devi Clioraria v. Union of India, (1980) 4 SCC 531:1981 SCC (Cri) 25 and 
Kamla Kanyalal Khushalam v. State of Maharashtra, (1981) 1 SCC 748: 1981 SCC 
(Cn) 287, relied on 
Prevention of Elicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 
Act, 1988, Ss. 3(3) and 10(1) — Period of Umitation prescribed under S. 
3(3) is for communicating the grounds to detenu and not applicable to 
declaration under S. 10(1)— Detention order passed on December 19 and 
grounds furnished and declaration made on December 20 and declaration 
served on February 2 — Period taken in serving the declaration adequately 
explairied — Held on facts, grounds furnished to the detenu within the period 
prescribed by S, 3(3) and detenu had also not been denied any opportunity of 
making effective representation against the declaration under S. 10(1).2" 
The order of detention was passed on March 5, 1986 and served on 
March 6,1986 when the appellant was already in jail in connection with other 
cases. Even so the grounds of detention were served on May 11, 1986, i.e. 
more than two months after the service of the order of detention. 
There is clear contravention of S. 17 of the Bihar Act. The order of 
detention is therefore quashed. 212 
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Supply of relevant material to detenu- Whether delayed — Information as 
towhether exporters were interrogated to find out circumstances under which 
gold came to be exported - Statements of the exporters, having not been 
recorded at the time of making detention order, not forming part of the 
materials placed before detaining authority - Reply to the desired 
information therefore sent after obtaining comments of customs authorities — 
In the circumstances and having regard to the promptness with which the 
matter moved in the office, held, supply of the information to the detenu not 
delayed — Constitution of India, Art. 22(5).2i3 
Copies of documents and materials relied upon in grounds of detention and 
forming basis of the detention order must be furrushed to the detenu along 
with the grounds of detention - Supply of such copies seven days after 
furnishing of the grounds rendered detention illegal and void — Constitution 
of India, Arts. 22(5) and 21 - COFEPOSA Act, 1974 (52 of 1974), S. 3(3). 
The documents and materials in support of the grounds on the basis of 
which the detention order has been made, the same being ex hypothesi in 
existence at the time of the issuance of the detention order and framing of the 
grounds, should be supplied to the detenu along with the grounds. Non-
supply of such material and documents along with the grounds would clearly 
amount to a violation of the safeguard guaranteed under Art. 22(5) of the 
Constitution. Since in the instant case that safeguard afforded to the detenu 
has been violated, further detention of the detenu would be illegal and 
void.214 
Detenu has right to have copies of vital documents irrespective of whether he 
knows about their contents or not. The detenu has the right to be furnished 
with the grounds of detention along with the documents relied on. If there is 
failure or even delay in furrushing those documents it would amount to 
denial of the right to make an effective representation guaranteed under Art. 
22(5). It is immaterial whether the detenu already knew about their contents 
or not. The question of demanding the documents is also wholly irrelevant 
and the infirmity in that regard is violative of Art. 22(5). i^s 
Documents and materials to be supplied - Confessional statements of detenu 
on which grounds of detention based not supplied to the detenu along with 
grounds of detention - Held, detention illegal in view of failure to furnish 
necessary documents to the to make a proper representation - National 
Security Act, 1980, Ss. 3(2) and 8.216 
Documents forming vital part of the grounds not supplied to detenu - Held, 
detenu entitled to be released. 217 
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Documents to be supplied- Allegation that summons issued under S. 108(1) 
of Customs Act not supplied to the detenu despite demand — S. 61, Criminal 
Procedure Code, 1973 requiring the summons to be in writing - In view of 
positive case of the State that no summons had been issued and the detenu 
had only been orally directed to attend the office of the authorities concerned, 
held, no summons was in existence and therefore, detenu suffered no 
prejudice - COFEPOSA Act, 1974, S. 3(l).2i8 
Documents to be supplied - Bail application and bail order - Constituted 
vital materials - Non-consideration of, by detaining authority or non-supply 
of copies thereof to detenu would be violative of Art 22(5) and continued 
detention would be illegal - Constitution of India, Art. 22(5) 
The appellant-detenu was intercepted at Trivandrum Airport and was 
arrested and produced before Chief Judicial Magistrate on January 31,1988 on 
charge of smuggling of gold. The Magistrate remanded him to judicial 
custody till February 12, 1988 when he was granted bail on condition, inter 
aha, that he would report before the Superintendent (Intelligence) Air 
Customs, Trivandrum on every Wednesday until further orders, and that he 
would not change his residence without prior permission of court to 
"February 25,1988". Tlie Collector of Customs sent the proposal for detention 
on May 275 1988 along with the draft grounds. In the Screening Committee 
meeting held on June 21, 1988 the detenu's case was considered to be fit for 
detention under the COFEPOSA Act. The impugned order of detention was 
thereupon passed on June 25S 1988 under S. 3(l)(i) of COFEPOSA Act by the 
Home Secretary, Government of Kerala with a view to prevent the appellant 
from smuggling gold. It was contended that non-furnishing of the bail 
application and the bail order vitiated the detention order. 
Held: 
It is imperative that if the detenu was already in jail the grounds of 
detention are to show the awareness of that fact on the part of the detaining 
authority, otherwise there would be non-application of mind and detention 
order vitiated thereby. In the present case it appears from the records that the 
bail application and the bail order were furnished to the detaining authority 
on his enquiry and therefore it cannot be said that the detaining authorit}' did 
not consider or rely on them. It was stated in the grounds of detention that the 
detenu was remanded to judicial custody and he was subsequently released 
on bail. The bail application contained the grounds for bail including that he 
had been falsely implicated as an accused in the case at the instance of 
persons who were inimi-cally disposed towards him, and the bail order 
contained the conditions subject to which the bail was granted. Considering 
the facts the bail application and the bail order were vital materials for 
consideration. If those were not considered the satisfaction of the detaining 
authority itself would have been impaired, and if those had been considered, 
they would-be documents relied on by the detaining authority though not 
specifically mentioned in the armexure to the order of detention and those 
218. Poonam Lata v. M.L Wadhawan, (1987) 4 SCC 48,53:1987 SCC (Cri) 685: AIR 1987 SC 
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ought to have formed part of the documents suppUed to the deteriu with the 
grounds of detention and without them the grounds themselves could not be 
said to have been complete. It must therefore, be held that it amounted to 
denial of the detenu's right to make an effective representation and that it 
resulted in violation of Art. 22(5) rendering the continued detention of the 
detenu illegal and entitling the detenu to be set at liberty in this case. 2^ 9 
Documents to be supplied - Only copies of documents on which order 
of detention primarily based should be supplied to detenu and not any and 
every document. 220 
Material document relied upon by detaining authority in forming its 
subjective satisfaction - Copy of, not supplied to the detenu - Held, order 
of detention rendered void - COFEPOSA Act, 1974 (52 of 1974), S. 3.221 
Material document relied upon by detaining authority in forming its 
subjective satisfaction - Copy of, not supplied, to the detenu - Held, order 
of detention rendered void - COFEPOSA Act, 1974 (52 of 1974), S. 3.222 
Non-supply of relevant documents to detenu - Copies of statements 
recorded under S. 161, CrPC furnished long after passing of order of 
detention and communication of the grounds - Held, order of detention 
illegal and bad. 223 
Basic facts and materials which influenced the mind of detaiiaing authority 
in making detention order must be supplied to the detenu within the time 
stipulated in S, 3(3), COFEPOSA Act, 1974 (52 of 1974) - All the documents 
and materials relied upon by the detaining authority in passing the order of 
detention must be supplied to the detenu, as soon as practicable, to enable 
him to make an effective representation. 
In the instant case, the materials and documents which were not 
supplied to the detenu were evidently a part of those materials which had 
influenced the mind of the detaining authority in passing the order of 
detention. In other words, they were a part of the basic facts and materials, 
and therefore, should have been supplied to the detenu ordinarily within five 
days of the order of detention, and, for exceptional reasons to be recorded, 
within fifteen days of the commencement of detention as contemplated in S. 
3(3) of the COFEPOSA Act.224 
Copies of material documents referred to in the grounds of detention cannot 
be denied to the detenu on the mere ground that the detenu was already 
219. M Ahamedkutty v. Union of India, (1990) 2 SCC1,13,16:1990 SCC (Cri) 258. 
220. Madan LalAnandv, Union of India, (1990) 1 SCC 81: 1990 SCC (Cri) 51: AIR 1990 SC 
176: (1990) 25 ECC 277:1990 Cri L] 659: (1990) 45 ELT 204. 
221. Thakor Mulchandani v, Asstt Secy., Govt of Maharashtra, (1982) 3 SCC 321: 1983 SCC 
(Cri) 30: AIR 1982 SC 1221:1982 Cri L] 1730. 
222. Yumnam Mangibabu Singh v. State of Manipur, (1982) 3 SCC 18: 1982 SCC (Cri) 
627: AIR 1983 SC 300. 
223. State of U.P. v. Kamal Kishore SainL (1988) 1 SCC 287, 292, 296:1988 SCC (Cri) 107(2): 
AIR 1988 SC 208:1988 Cri L] 405. 
224. Lallubfiai jogibhai Patel v. Union of India, (1981) 2 SCC 427, 435:1981 SCC (Cri) 463; AIR 
1981 SC 728: (1981) 2 SCR 352:1981 Cri IJ 288:1981 ML] (Cri) 350. 
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aware of the contents of those documents - Held, failure to furnish to the 
on demand vitiated the detention - Constitution of India, Art 22(5).^ 25 
Documents and materials forming part of grounds of detention - Whether 
supplied to detenu or not? is a question of fact - Findings of High Court in 
this regard not open to interference under Art 136 - Constitution of India, 
Art 136.226 
Documents and materials which form the basis of detention order must be 
supplied to the detenu along with grounds of detention — Where grounds 
of detention not accompanied by these documents and materials and disposal 
of detenu's representation delayed for 25 days, held, continued detention of 
the detenu void - Both Arts. 21 and 22(5) must be fully and strictly compUed 
with - Goverrmient officials responsible for the lapse resulting in release of 
the detenu must be held personally responsible or at least must owe an 
explanation— Constitution of India, Arts. 21 and 22(5) 
It is of the utmost importance that all the necessary safeguards laid 
down by the Constitution under Art. 21 or Art. 22(5) should be compHed with 
fully and shictly and any departure from any of the safeguards would void 
the order of detention. The law of preventive detention has now to satisfy a 
twofold test; (1) that the protection and the guarantee afforded under Art, 
22(5) is comphed with, and (2) that the procedure is just and reasonable. If a 
procedure under Art. 21 has to be reasonable, fair and just, then the words 
'effective representation' appearing in Art. 22(5) must be construed so as to 
provide a real and meaningful opportunity to the detenu to explain his case to 
the detaining authority in his representation. In this view of the matter, unless 
the materials and documents relied on in the order of detention are supplied 
to the. detenu along with the grounds, the supply of grounds simpliciter 
would give him not a real but merely an illusory opportunity to make a 
representation to the detaining authority. 
For the above reasons the continued detention of the detenu is void, 
whenever a detention is struck down by the High Court or the Supreme 
Court, the detaining authority or the officers concerned who are associated 
with the preparation of the grounds of detention, must beheld personally 
responsible and action should be taken against them for not complying with 
the constitutional requirements and safeguards (viz. delay in disposing of the 
representation, not supplying the documents and materials reUed upon in the 
order of detention pari passu the order of detention, etc. etc.) or, at any rate, 
an explanation from the authorities concerned must be called for by the 
Central Government so that in future persons against whom serious acts of 
smugghng are alleged, do not go scot-free. In the instant case, not only were 
the documents and materials not supplied along with the order of detention, 
but there has been a delay of about 25 days in disposing of the representation 
225. Mehmnissa v. State of Maharashtra, (1981) 2 SCC 709:1981 SCC"(Cri) 592: AIR 1981 SC 
1861:1981 Cri LI 1283, 
226. State of Gujarat v. jat Harun Dadn, (1981) 4 SCC 659; 1982 SCC (Cri) 27: AIR 1981 SC 
2238: 1981 Cri LJ1872. 
207 
of the detenu and no explanation for the same has been given. These are 
matters which must be closely examined by the government. 227 
Documents forming basis of the grounds of detention not supplied to the 
detenus —Detention, held, improper.228 
Documents which are only referred to in the grounds of detention must also 
be supplied along with the grounds - Constitution of India, Art 22(5). 
Once the documents are referred to in the grounds of detention it 
becomes the bounden duty of the detaining authority to supply the same to the 
detenu as part of the grounds or pari passu the grounds of detention. There is 
no particular charm in the expressions 'relied on', 'referred to' or 'based on' 
because ultimately all these expressions signify one thing, namely, that the 
subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority has been arrived at on the 
documents mentioned in the grounds of detention. The question whether the 
grounds have been referred to, relied on or based on is merely a matter of 
describing the nature of the grounds. This having not been done in the present 
case the continued detention of the petitioner must be held to be void .229 
Failure to supply the documents and materials forming basis of detention 
order to the detenu along with the of detention and unexplained delay of 
a month in disposing of the detenu's representation would render continued 
detention of the detenu void - Constitution of India, Art 22(5).230 
Supply of copies of documents on which detention order is based— Held, 
mandatory under National Security Act also, like that under COFEPOSA 
Act.231 
Detenu, held, deprived of his right of representation by delayed supply of 
some of the documents relied upon in the order of detention — Detention 
rendered void — Constitution of India, Art, 22(5).232 
Non-production of relevant and vital materials before detaining authority 
— Application of the co-accused as well as statement made in the bail 
application filed on behalf of the detenus alleging that the detenus had been 
falsely implicated and pohce report thereon not produced before detaining 
authority before passing the detention order - Held, order of detention 
invaUd and illegal - National Security Act, 1980, S. 10. 233 
227. Kamla Kanyalal Khusalini v. State of Maharashtra, (1981) 1 SCC 748, 751-753:1981 SCC 
(Cri) 287; AIR 1981 SC 814: (1981) 2 SCR 459:1981 Cri LJ 353, 
228. Ana Carelina D'Souza v. Union of India, 1981 Supp SCC 53(1): 1982 SCC (Cri) 131: AIR 
1981 SC 1620:1981 Cri L] 1277, 
229. Kirit Kumar Chaman Lai Kundaliya v. Union of India, (1981) 2 SCC 436:1981 SCC (Cri) 
471: AIR 1981 SC 1621: (1981) 2 SCR 718:1981 Cri LJ 1267: (1981) 22 GLR 1067. 
230. Virendra Singh v. State of Maharashtra, (1981) 4 SCC 562:1981 SCC (Cri) 874: AIR 1981 
SC 1909:1981 Cri LJ 1283. 
231. Aziz V. Delhi Minn,, (1981) 3 SCC 557:1981 SCC (Cri) 742: AIR 1981 SC 1389:1981 Cri L] 
1011. 
232. Tararnati Chandulal Sejpa! v. State of Maharashta'a. (1981) 2 SCC 17:1981 SCC (Cri) 314: 
AIR 198 ISC 871:1981 Cri L] 445. 
State of U.P. V. Kamal Kishore Saini, (1988) 1 SCC 287, 2925 296:1988 SCC (Cri) 107(2): 
AIR 1988 SC 208:1988 Cri LJ 405. 
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Non-supply of copies of documents relied upon by detaining authority in the 
detention order, along with grounds of detention, would render continued 
detention of the detenu void.234 
(iii) Documents and materials which need not be supplied 
Particulars to be supplied - If ground supported is precise containing all 
relevant details, held, absence of those details, in extracts of CID report 
enclosed with the would not vitiate the detention on ground of denial of 
opportunity to make effective representation and non-application of mind — 
Extracts to be read together with the ground - National Security Act, 1980, 
S. 3(2), (3). 
The ground of detention mentioned each and every one of the material 
particulars which the respondent was entitled to know in order to be able to 
make a full and effective representation against the order of detention. This is 
not a case in which the ground of detention contains a bare or bald statement 
of the conclusion to which the detaining authority had come, namely, that it 
was necessaiy to the order of detention in order to prevent the detenu from 
acting in a manner prejudicial to the interest of public order. The CID report 
was furnished to the detenu as forming the source of information leading to 
the conclusion that he had made a speech which necessitated his detention in 
the interests of public order. In the circumstances, the grounds and the 
material fur-to the detenu have to be read together as if the material in the 
form of the CID report was a continuation of the ground of detention. 
Although the extiacts of the CID report did not refer to the details which were 
mentioned in the ground, that did not cause any prejudice to the respondent, 
nor did that intioduce any obscurity in the facts stated in that ground or 
detract from the substance of the allegations mentioned in that ground. The 
detaining authority had before it the whole of the CID report on the basis of 
which it passed the order of detention. What was omitted from the extract 
furnished to the respondent was incorporated in the ground. It is therefore, 
not possible to accept the argument that the of detention was bad because the 
detaining authority did not apply its to the question as to whether there was 
material on the basis of which the respondent could be detained. 
The detenu is not entitled to be informed of the source of information 
received against him or the evidence which may have collected against him 
as? for example, the evidence corroborating that the report of the CID is tiue 
and correct. His right is to receive every material particular without which a. 
full and effective representation cannot be made. If the order of detention 
refers to or relies upon any document, statement or other material, copies 
thereof have, of course, to be supplied to the detenu. But the furnishing of the 
CID report, of which a tiuncated extract was furnished to the respondent, was 
a superfluous exercise in the light of the facts of the instant case. 
However, the detaining authority lessly applied his scissors excising 
the which mentioned the date, the place, the tim.e and the occasion of the 
meeting. While passing orders of detention, great care be to bear on their task 
234. Ram Baochan Dubey v. State of Maharashtra, (1982) 3 SCC 383:1983 SCC (Cri) 
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by the Preventive detention is a necessary evil but essentially an evil 
Therefore, deprivation of personal liberty, if at all, has to be on the strict terms 
of the Constitution.235 
Documents and materials reHed upon in grounds of detention - Respondent 
claiming privilege in respect of document not suppHed - But proper affidavit 
not filed - Hence privilege claim fails and detention is vitiated -
Affidavit.236 
Documents materials to be supplied - confidential source of information 
reUed on in making the detention order - need not be supplied to the detenu. 
The detenu is not entitled to a disclosure of the confidential source of 
information used in the grounds or utilised for the making of the order. What 
is necessary for the making of an effective representation is the disclosure of 
the and not the source thereof. By indicating that the facts have been gathered 
from confidential reports, a suggestive disclosure of the source has also been 
made. In the present case there had been no infraction of the law in not 
supplying the respondent copies of the reports or disclosing the source 
thereof. The respondent had actually been given in the grounds all material 
details necessary for making an effective representation.237 
Documents to be supplied to detenu - Copies of documents (bail application 
filed by detenu himself) not relied upon but only incidentally referred to in 
the grounds — Refusal to supply, if not handicapped the detenu in making 
effective representation, would not violate Art, 22(5) and vitiate the 
detention— Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 1985, S. 3(1) — 
of India, Art 22(5).238 
Non-supply of copies of documents which are not material documents will 
not vitiate the detention - COFEPOSA Act, 1974, S.3(l). 
The application for relaxation of the conditions of bail submitted by the 
petitioner and the order relaxing the conditions of bail passed by the 
Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate on the said application were not 
material documents and were not required to be considered by the detaining 
authority. Therefore, the non-supply of the copies of the same to the petitioner 
would not result in denial of the right of the petitioner to make a 
representation under Art. 22(5). 239 
Non-supply of relevant document viz, bail application and order 
thereon - Bail application having been rejected after passing of detention 
order, neither considered by detaining authority in coming to his subjective 
235. State of Punjab v. Jagdev Singh Talwandi, (1984) 1 SCC 596, 603, 606: 1984 SCC (Cri) 
135: AIR 1984 SC 444:1984 CriLJ 177, 
236. Dina Nath Anand v. Administrator, (1983) 2 SCC 252:1983 SCC (Cri) 388. 
237. State of v. Shamsher Singh, 1985 Supp SCC 4165 430: 1935 SCC (Cri) 421: AIR lOS'i SC: 
1082:1985 CriLJ 1348. 
238. Abdul Sattar Abdul Kadar Shaikh v. Union of India, (1990) 1 SCC 480: 1990 SCC: (Cri) 
242. 
239. M. Mohd. Sultlian v. Jt. Secy, to Govt of India, (1991) 1 SCC 144: 1991 SCC (Cri) 104: 
AIR 1990 SC 2222:1990 Cri LJ 2473. 
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satisfaction, nor referred to in grounds - In the circumstances held, non-
supply of the documents to the detenu did not prejudice him in making 
effective representation - Interim order of Supreme Court in SLP against 
rejection of bail that the detenu shall not be arrested in the meantime, not 
relevant as that SLP was not against the detention order. Syed Farooq 
Mohammad v. Union of India, (1990) 3 SCC 537, 544, 545:1990 SCC (Cri) 500: 
AIR 1990 SC 1597:1990 Cri LJ1622, 
Binod Singh v. Distiict Migistiate, Dhanbad, (1986) 4 SCC 416:1986 SCC (Cri) 
490: (1986) 3 SCR 905; Suraj Pal Sahu v. State of Maharashtra, (1986) 4 SCC 
378:1986 SCC (Cri) 452: AIR 1986 SC 2177, distinguished 
Supply of relevant documents to detenu - It is not necessary to furnish to 
the detenu copies of all the documents under S. 37 of the FERA from him 
which are not material and relevant for reaching subjective satisfaction of 
detaining authority merely because they were mentioned in pan-chnama -
Moreover in absence of any application from the detenu requesting 
detaining authority to furnish copies of such documents, held, detention 
order not vitiated on ground that failure to supply those documents infringed 
fundamental right to make effective representation - Constitution of India, 
Art 22(5) - Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, S. 37 - National Security 
Act, 1980, S. 3, Haridas Amarchand Shah v. K.L Verma, (1989) 1 SCC 250, 
254 255:1989 SCC (Cri) 111: AIR 1989 SC 497: 1989 Cri LJ 983: (1989) 19 ECC 
196. 
Ashadevi v. K. Shiveraj, (1979) 1 SCC 222: 1979 SCC (Cri) 262 and Ashok 
Kumar v. Union of India, (1988) 1 SCC 541:1988 SCC (Cri) 193, distinguished 
Detaining authority not bound to disclose and supply to the detenu 
intelligence report or history-sheet, relied upon in passing detention 
order - Constitiition of India, Art. 22(6). Wasiuddm Ahmed v. D.M., (1981) 4 
SCC 521, 532:1982 SCC (Cri) 4: AIR 1981 SC 1981 Cri LJ 1825. 
Documents and materials forming basis of detention — Once supplied to 
the detenu, held, further information regarding particular grounds which 
influenced subjective satisfaction of detaining authority not required to be 
furnished - Authorities also not bound to furnish legal information such as 
the particular provisions of law prohibiting the smuggling activity alleged in 
the grounds - Constitution of India, Art. 22(5) 
When an order of detention together with the grounds of detention is 
served on a detenu, the detenu may ask for particulars on which a ground is 
based if they are not already there. When a document containing what are 
called "grounds" which often consist of the background of a case, narration of 
facts and instances of tiie detenu's activities, is supphed to the detenu, the 
detenu is not entitled to know which part or parts of the *'grounds" was or 
were taken into consideration and which not. The Court may not take mto 
consideration any reply given by the detaining authority to such an enquiry, 
for, the reply may be an afterthought. It will be for the Court to judge whether 
the facts narrated constitijte a ground of detention or which facts might 
possibly enter and influence the detaining authority in cornmg to its sub-
jective satisfaction. In the present case the request of the detenu for 
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"information" whether his detention was inter aha based on seizures of certain 
articles mentioned in the list of grounds of detention and the reply of the 
authority to the request were irrelevant. 
Further, the Government is not under any Uability to furnish the 
detenu with legal information available from legal literature. The Uability of 
the detaining authority is only to comply with the requirement of Art, 22(5) of 
the Constitution. In the present case, therefore, the "information" sought by 
the detenu regarding the provision under which the import of the article in 
question (Palladium) is prohibited is untenable, for it is an information on a 
question of law and can be obtained from statutes, rules or notifications. 
Moreover, the plea that the Goverimient's failure to furnish, him with that 
"information" prevented him filing a proper representation is not permissible 
on the ground of public policy, for, any detenu may plead that he does not 
know whether the entry of the item smuggled by him is restricted.^^o 
Copy of State Government's order under s. 3 (3) of NJSL Act, 1980, 
authorizing District Magistrate or Commissioner of Police to make order of 
detention not required to fee supplied to detenu. 
The Act does not provide for supplying a copy of an order under S. 
3(3) of the Act. The said order has not been relied upon by the Commissioner 
of Police in passing the impugned of detention in the present case. Though by 
virtue of the order passed under S. 3(3), the Commissioner of Police could 
exercise the powers of the detaining authority under that section, but that has 
nothing to do as to the subjective satisfaction of the Commissioner of Police in 
making the impugned order of detention. 4^1 
Documents to be suppUed — Copies of FIRs — Where under S. 173(5), CrPC 
all the documents or relevant extiacts thereof on which the prosecution relied 
on in criminal cases against the detenu "were supplied to him, held, failure to 
furnish copies of FIRs filed against him would not deprive him of his right to 
make effective representation. 4^2 
Failure to furnish copy of a mere forwarding letter which does not form the 
basis of grounds of detention would not vitiate the detention order. 243 
Failure to supply the documents materials which are only casually or pass-
ingly referred to in the course of narration of the facts in the grounds of 
detention and are not relied upon by the detainiaig authority in making 
detention order, held5 would not render the detention illegal.244 
240. Hemlata Kaniilal Shah v. State of Maharashtra, (1981) 4 SCC 6475 654- 1982 SCC (Cri) 
16: AIR 198 ISC 8. 
241. Jitender Tyagi v. Delhi Admn., (1989) 4 SCC 6539 661:1989 SCC (Cri) 787- AIR 1990 SC 
487. ' 
242. Wasiuddin Ahmed v. D.M, (1981) 4 SCC 521, 531, 532: 1982 SCC (Cri) 4- AIR 1981 SC 
2166:1981 Cri IJ 1825. 
243. S. Gayathri v. Commr. of Police, (1981) 4 SCC 171: 1981 SCC (Cri) S i r AIR 1981 SC 
1672. 
244. LM.S. Ummu Saleerna v. B.B. Gujaral, (1981) 3 SCC 317, 320: 1981 SCC (Cri) 720- AIR 
1981 SC 1191: (1981) 3 SCR 647:1981 Cri L] 889. 
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Particulars to be supplied to the - Evidence gathered by detaining authority 
against detenu and details of sources of information need not be furnished to 
the detenu.245 
Documents and material relied upon in grounds - Intelligence report - No 
privilege against disclosure of, claimed - But failure to furnish copy of 
intelligence report, on facts held, caused on prejudice to the detenu as ade-
quate material had been supplied to him.^ ^^ 
The documents are such that even in their absence subjective satisfaction 
would not be affected, then failure to place the documents before the 
detaining authority would be immaterial - Documents having bearing on the 
subjective satisfaction of detaining authority but not relied upon by him must 
be placed before the detaining authority at the time of passing of detention 
order.-"^ ^ 
The grounds of detention served along with the order are nothing but a 
narration of facts.2^ ** 
The 'grounds' under Art, 22(5) of the Constihition do not mean mere 
factual inferences but mean factual inferences plus factual material which led 
to such factual inferences. -''^  
Scope of the word 'grounds' - Basic facts and subsidiary facts 
While the expression 'grounds' includes not only conclusions of fact 
but also all the "basic facts" on which those conclusions were founded, they 
are different from subsidiary facts or further particulars or the basic facts.^ so 
Constituents of — 'Basic facts' and 'subsidiary facts' — Distinction between 
- Non-compliance of S. 3(3), COFEPOSA Act and Art, 22(5) in 
communicating basic facts to the detenu would be fatal to the detention order, 
but a marginal delay in furnishing supplementary or additional materials 
may in the particular circumstances not vitiate the detention — Where 
grounds elaborately stated contained basic facts, delay of 17 days in fur-
nishing copies of documents and particulars relied upon in the grounds of 
detention, being only additional in nahjre, held in the totality of facts and 
circumstances of the case, not so unreasonable as to deny detenu's right to 
make effective representation - COFEPOSA Act, 1974, 5. 3(3) - Constitution 
of India, Arts. 19, 21 and 22. 
245. State of Punjab v, Jagdev Singh Tal-wandi, (1984) 1 SCC 596, 608: 1984 SCC (Cri) 135-
AIR 1984 SC 444:1984 Cn Lj 177. 
246. . Asha Keshavrao Bhosale v, Union of India, (1985) 4 SCC 361, 367- 1985 SCC (Cri) 561-
AIR 1986 SC-283. 
247 Madan Lai Anand v. Union of India, (1990) 1 SCC 81, 88 to 90- 1990 SCC (Cri) 51- AIR 
1990 SC 176: (1990) 25 ECC 277:1990 Cri L] 659: (1990) 45 ELT 204. 
248. K. Aruna Kumari v. Govt, of A.P., (1988) I SCC 296, 305, 306: 1988 SCC (Cri) 116- AIR 
1988 SC 227:1988 Cri LJ 411. 
249. Prakash Chandra Mehia v. Commr. and Secv., Govt of Kerala, 1985 Supp SCC 144 166-
1985 SCC (Cri) 332: AIR 1986 SC 687. 
250. Prakash Chandra Mehtd v. Commr, and Sec\., Govt, of Kerala, 1985 Supp SCC 144-167-
1985 SCC (Cn) 332: AIR 1986 SC 687. 
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The expression 'grounds' in Art. 22(5), and for that matter, in S. 3(3) of 
the COFEPOSA Act, includes not only conclusions of fact but all the 'basic 
facts' on which conclusions are founded. The basic facts are different from 
subsidiary facts or further particulars of the basic facts. If in a case the so-
called 'grounds of detention' communicated to the detenu lack the basic or 
primary facts and this deficiency is not made good and communicated to the 
detenu within the period specified in S. 3(3), the omission will be fatal to the 
vaUdity of the detention. If, however, the grounds communicated are 
elaborate and contain all the 'basic facts' but are not comprehensive enough to 
cover all the details or of the 'basic facts', such particulars, must be suppUed to 
the detenu, if asked for by him with reasonable expedition, within a 
reasonable time. What is reasonable time conforming with reasonable 
expedition, required for the supply of such details or further particulars, is a 
question of fact depending upon the facts and circumstances of the particular 
case. In the circumstances of a given case, if the time taken for supply of such 
additional particulars, exceeds marginally, the maximum fixed by the statute 
for communication of the grounds, it may still be regarded 'reasonable', while 
in the facts of another case, even a delay which does not exceed 15 days, may 
be unjustified, and amount to an ii\fraction of the constitutional imperative of 
affording the earUest opportunity for making the representation. 
In the instant case, the grounds supplied to the detenu were elaborate 
and full and contained all the 'basic facts', although they did not set out all the 
details or particulars of those 'basic facts' relied upon or referred to therein. 
There was thus no breach of the first constitutional imperative embodied in 
Art. 22(5). 
However, there had been a delay of about 17 days (excluding the time 
taken for communications in hansit) in the supply of the further particulars of 
the basic facts to the detenu. But in the facts and circumstances of the case the 
period of 17 days was not an unreasonably long one which could amount to a 
denial of the detenu's right to make an effective representation. Several causes 
had contributed to this 'delay'. [The Supreme Court after con-the 
circumstances found them relevant for condoning the delay and that the 
delay of 17 days could not be said to be so unreasonable as to amount to an 
infractionof Art. 22(5)].251 
Interference of Court with grounds - Court carmot examine the propriety or 
sufficiency of the grounds - Prevention of Black-marketing and Maintenance 
of Supphes of Essential Commodities Act, 1980, S. 3. 
The subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority as regards the 
factiial existence of the condition on which the order of detention can be 
made, namely, the grounds of detention constitute the foundation for the 
exercise of the power of detention and the court carmot be invited to consider 
the propriety or sufficiency of the grounds on which the satisfaction of the 
detaining authority' is based. Nor can the court, on a review of the grounds. 
Hansmukh v. State of Gujarat, (1981) 2 SCC 175: 1981 SCC (Cri) 387: AIR 1981 SC 28-
(1981) 1 SCR 353:1981 ML] (Cri) 172. 
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substitute its own opinion for that of the authority. In the instant case the 
ground of detention was only one, viz, the detenu was acting prejudicial to 
the maintenance of supplies of commodity, that is, levy cement, essential to 
the community by diverting it.to the open market. The question whether the 
deteni was acting in a maimer prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies 
essential to the life of the community is a matter of inference to be drawn 
from facts. It appears from the grounds, i.e., the facts set out that the detenu 
had made a statement admitting that he had diverted 600 bags of levy cement 
issued to him for use in the masonry ballast wall along the railway track and 
therefore the District Magistrate was justified in coming to the con-elusion 
that he (the detenu) was acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of 
supplies of the commodity essential to the community.252 
Reliance inter alia on certain grounds found to be bad and unsustainable 
would be fatal to the entire order of detention — National Security Act, 1980 
(65 of 1980), Ss. 3 and 8.253 
(b) What should be stated in grounds 
Criminal cases in which detenu found to be not guilty was acquitted — Held, 
cannot form part of the grounds and hence cannot be taken into consideration 
- National Security' Act, 1980 (65 of 1980), Ss, 3(2) and 8.254 
It is not necessary to mention in the grounds the reaction of the detaining 
authority in relation to every piece of evidence separately — Detaining 
authorit}^'s view that not much credence could be attached to a particular 
document need not be mentioned in the grounds especially when it was 
stated in the grounds that the detaining authority formed his opinion after 
consideration of that document - COFEPOSA Act, 1974, S, 3.255 
Mere allegations against the detenu in an FIR, without showing that the 
authorities had any vahd reasons to believe those allegations to be true — 
Held, cannot constitute a ground even while the case registered on that 
complaint pending trial.256 
Particular of prejudicial activities need not be specified in the detention order 
if subsequently furnished in ground of detention— National Security Act, 
1980, S. 3. 
A notification dated February 8, 1982 was published in the Gazette 
specifying 16 items of supplies and services and which were essential to the 
community. An order of detention was passed thereafter under S. 3(2) read 
with S. 3(3) of the National Security Act against the respondent without 
252. K, Aruna Kumari v. Govt, of A,P., (1988) 1 SCC 296, 305? 306: 1988 SCC (Cri) 116: AIR 
1988 SC 227:1988 Cri LJ 411. 
253. Simla Dewan v. Lt.-Governor, (1982) 2 SCC 469:1982 SCC (Cri) 484: AIR 1982 SC 1257: 
1982 Cri LJ 1737. 
254. Simla Dewan v. Lt.-Governor, (1982) 2 SCC 469: 1982 SCC (Cri) 484: AIR 1982 SC 1257: 
1982 Cri L] 1737. 
255. State of Gujarat \, Sunil Fulchand Shah, (1988) 1 SCC 600, 604: 1988 SCC (Cri) 201: AIR 
1988 SC 723: (1988) 16ECC 16: (1988) 1 Crimes 854. 
256. Bunla Dewan \. Lt.-Governor, (1982) 2 SCC 469:1982 SCC (Cri) 484: AIR 1982 SC 1257: 
1982 Cri L] 1737. 
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specifying the particulars of the activities of the detenu which were 
prejudicial to the essential supplies and services. But the grounds of 
subsequently served on the detenu contained full particulars in that regard. 
Before the High Court the detenu inter alia contended that in absence of 
specification in the detention order as to which particular supply and/or 
service the detaining authority had in mind while making the order, the order 
was bad. Accepting the contention the High Court set aside the order. 
Held: 
It is manifest from the statutory scheme that the detenu's right to 
represent is after the grounds are served on the detenu. A full disclosure 
made in the grounds in no way-prejudices the right guaranteed to the detenu 
to make an effective representation challenging his detention. Therefore non-
specification of the required particulars in the order of detention would not 
vitiate the order as long as the particulars are provided in the grounds in 
support of the order of detention which in quick succession of the detention 
order are served on the detenu. 5^7 
(c) Reading of the grounds 
Detention order must be read with the grounds 
In actual practice the grounds supplied operate as an objective test for 
determining the question whether a nexus reasonably exists between grounds 
of detention and the detention order or whether some infirmities had crept in. 
A conjoined reading of the detention order and the grounds of detention is 
therefore necessary.258 
Mode of interpreting 'grounds' 
The concept of 'grounds' has to receive an interpretation which will 
keep it meaningfully in tune with the contemporary notions of the realities of 
the society and the purpose of the Act in question in the light of concepts of 
liberty and fundamental freedoms guaranteed by Arts. 19(1), 21 and 22 of the 
Constitution. Reviewing several decisions in the case of Hasmukh Bhagwanji 
v. State of Gujarat, (1981) 2 SCC 175:1981 SCC (Cri) 387, Supreme Court held 
that a democratic Constitution is not to be interpreted merely from a 
lexicographer's angle but with a realisation that it is an embodiment of the 
living thoughts and aspirations of a free people. The concept of 'grounds' 
used in the context of detention in Art. 22(5) of the Constitution and in sub-
section (3) of S. 3 of COFEPOSA, therefore, has to receive an interpretation 
which will keep it meaningfully in tune with contemporary notions. 5^9 
Preamble or infa-oductory para — Whether part of the grounds is to be seen on 
the facts and circumstances of each case - On facts held, the first para of the 
grounds was only a preamble - Hence its vagueness not fatal. 
257. DM. V. Sarat Mudoi, (1984) 1 SCC 25, 27, 28:1984 SCC (Cri) 21: AIR 1984 SC 43. 
State of Punjab v. Sukhpal Singh, (1990) 1 SCC 35, 43:1990 SCC (Cri) 1: AIR 1990 SC 
231:1990 Cri LJ 584. 
Prakash Chandra Mehra v. Commr. and Secy., Govt of Kerala, 1985 Supp SCC 144S 




The grounds of detention may contain a preamble or introductory 
paragraph. The preamble betokens that which follows. It is a preliminary 
statement, a preface, a prelude. 
Whether a particular paragraph in the grounds amounts only to a 
preamble or introduction is to be determined on the facts and circumstances 
of each case and it is open to the court to come to its own conclusion whether 
that paragraph is only an introductory para or contains the grounds on the 
basis of which the detaining authority had the subjective satisfaction for 
passing the order of detention. 
In the present case the first paragraph of the grounds of detention, in 
substance, only indicates the modus operandi adopted by the various 
organizations to the current agitation on foreigners issue in Assam. The 
second and third paragraphs of the grounds alleged a specific part played by 
the detenu in the agitation. Reading the grounds of detention as a whole it is 
clear that the first paragraph of the grounds was only a preamble, prelude or 
introductory para. In view of this position the vagueness cannot be made a 
ground of attack on the impugned order of detention. 
[The observations made in Mohd. Yqusuf Rather case (1979) 4 SCC 370, 
do not indicate that there can be no preamble or intioductory para in the 
grounds of detention. The observations only mean all allegations of facts 
which have led to the passing of the order of detention will form part of the 
grounds of detention.j^^o 
(d) Relevancy of grounds 
(i) Generally 
Relevancy — Ground of inciting and fomenting communal hatred and 
violence and creating an atmosphere of fear and tension in the town— Grave 
communal disturbances then prevailing in the town— Criminal cases 
pending against detenu and detention order served in view of 
possibility of detenu's release on bail — In the circumstances held, grounds 
not irrelevant. 26i 
Relevancy of grounds — Relevancy of single ground sufficient under S, 
3(1) of COFEPOSA Act, 1974. 
The Court is only concerned whether there are relevant materials on 
which a reasonable belief or conviction could have been entertained by the 
detaining authority on the grounds mentioned in S. 3(1) of the Act. Whether 
other grounds should have been taken into consideration or not is not 
relevant at the of the passing of the detention order. 262 
Grounds — Relevancy of material — 
260. Dhananjoy Das v. DM, (1982) 2 SCC 521: 1982 SCC (Cri) 488: AIR 1982 SC 1315: 1982 
Cri L] 1779. 
261. National Security Act, 1980, S, 3, v. State of U.P., (1983) 4 SCC 537, 539:1984 SCC (Cri) 
16: AIR 1984 SC 46:1983 Cri LJ1785, 
262. Prakash Chandra Mehta v. Commr. and Secy., Govt, of Kerala, 1985 Supp SCC 144,167: 
1985 SCC (Cri) 332: AIR 1986 SC 687. 
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Reading grounds together held, allegations made in the grounds were 
factual inferences justifiably drawn from the circumstances — Hence grounds 
cannot be held to be based on without material.^^s 
Three incidents mentioned in the grounds — First and third incidents relating 
to public order problem — Detention order passed pursuant to the third 
incident — Held, mention of the first two incidents also in the grounds, not 
fatal to the detention specially when the-first incident to the order problem — 
Basis of detention — Public Order. 6^4 
Irrelevant ground— Ground of causing communal riot — Offences causing 
outbreak of riot alleged to have been committed by detenu after 9 a.m. on 
May 19 but communal riot breaking out in the night intervening between 
18/19 May - Held, it was inaccurate to state that riot broke out due to the 
incidents attributed to the detenu on May 19.265 
(ii) Past records or antecedents of detenu 
History sheet not linking to the proximity of two alleged incidents of 
extorting money by threatening the shopkeepers and throwing bomb on 
police party another day — Held on facts, 'detention order invahd. 6^6 
Past prejudicial conduct or antecedent of detenu when can be considered by 
detaining authority. 
The past conduct or antecedent history of a person can appropriately 
be taken into account in making a detention order. It is indeed usually from 
prior events showing tendencies or inclination of a man that an inference is 
drawn whether he is likely in the future to act in a manner prejudicial to the 
maintenance of pubUc order. Of course, such prejudicial conduct or 
antecedent history should ordinarily be proximate in point of time and should 
have a rational connection with the conclusion that the detention of the 
person is necessary.267 
Past antecedents of detenu — ReliabiUty of 
It is usually from prior events showing or inclinations of a man that an 
inference can be drawn whether he is likely, in the future, to act in a manner 
prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. It is not correct to say that 
merely because there was an acquittal of an 'anti-social element', the detaining 
authority carmot take the act complained of leading to his trial into 
consideration. 6^8 
263. Sonain Yongda v. State of Sikkim, (1986)3 SCC 594: 1986 SCC (Cri) 341: AIR 1986 SC 
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Past conduct or antecedent history can be taken into consideration — 
The past conduct or antecedent history of a person can appropriately be taken 
into account in making a detention order — It is usually from prior events 
showing tendencies or inclinations of a man that an inference can be drawn 
whether he is likely, in the future, to act in a manner prejudicial to the 
maintenance of public order.^ ^^ 
Antecedents of detenu — Future conduct of detenu can be assessed on the 
basis of his past conduct 
The basis for an order of preventive detention is the reasonable 
prognosis of the future behaviour of the person based upon his past conduct. 
It is open to the detaining authority to take note of the past conduct of a 
detenu and apprehending repetition of such conduct in future an order of 
detention can be made with a view to preventing such action. If past conduct 
confined to any or all of the notified items of supplies and services which 
were essential to the community could be satisfied, the detaining authority 
could also on the basis of reasonable apprehension of repetition of such 
conduct in future make an order of detention for its prevention. 270 
Relevancy of grounds — Anticipated behaviour based on past conduct 
may provide sufficient ground 
The power of preventive detention is precautionary power exercised 
reasonably in anticipation and may or may not relate to an offence. It cannot 
be considered to be a parallel proceeding. The anticipated behaviour of a 
person based on his past conduct in the Ught of surrounding circumstances 
may provide sufficient ground for detention. It cannot be said that the 
satisfaction of the detaining authority on the basis of his past activites that if 
the detenu were to be left at large he would indulge in similar activities in 
future and thus act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order 
etc. shall not be based on adequate materials.^^i 
Relevancy of grounds — Past criminal record — Theft case against detenu 
relied on the grounds — Recovery memo. — In absence of any past criminal 
history on the part of detenu, held, statement found in recovery memo not 
form basis of satisfaction for detention.272 
(iii) ConsequepiCe of irrelevancy 
Irrelevancy or non-existence of one of the grounds would not vitiate the 
detention order in view of S. 5-A of COFEPOSA Act. 
There is, no authority to hold that even if one of the grounds or reasons 
which led to the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority is non-
269. Fitrat Raza Khan v. State of U.P., (1982) 2 SCC 449: 1982 SCC (Cri) 472: AIR 1982 SC 
146:1982 Cri L] 338. 
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231:1990 Cri LJ 584. 





existent or misconceived or irrelevant, the order of detention would be invalid 
despite inti-oduction of S. 5-A of the COFEPOSA Act. 2^ 3 
(e) Extraneous considerations 
Detention based on single ground - Some extianeous materials also taken 
into consideration by detaining authority in passing the detention order 
— Held, detention order vitiated thereby and cannot be saved under S. 5-A of 
National Security Act on the plea that the order could be sustained on the 
basis of the ground itself — National Security Act, 1980, S. 5-A. 
The contention based on S. 5-A of the National Security Act that the 
extraneous materials have no bearing on the validity of this impugned order 
which can be sustained on the material set out in the grounds of detention 
itself carmot be sustained. Section 5-A can be invoked where there are two or 
more grounds covering various activities of the detenu. In the present case the 
order had been passed on the sole ground relatable to a single incident. The 
conclusion is only on the basis that the extianeous materials, placed before the 
detaining authority, might have influenced the mind of the detairung 
authority. It is not on the ground that one of the grounds of the detention 
order has become invaUd or inoperative for the mentioned in S. 5-A(a). ^^ 4 
Detention on a ground which was not before the detaining authority at the 
time of making detention order - refuting detenu's allegations in this 
regard, without filing any affidavit - State's stand not acceptable 
High Court's decision allowing habeas corpus petition, upheld — Practice — 
Aftidavit.275 
Extraneous consideration — Police report making averments reflecting 
on character of detenu, though furnished with the sole ground, but not 
mentioned in the ground itself— These averments, being extraneous in 
nature, might have influenced the mind of the detaining authority — Hence 
detention order vitiated by consideration of extraneous material — National 
Security Act, 1980, S. 3(3). 
An order of detention was passed against the detenu under S. 3(3) of 
the National Act. The only ground of detention furnished to the detenu was 
that he (along with the associates) had at the time of auction of liquor held in 
the campus of CoUectorate threatened the bidders that they along with their 
family members would be shot down if they dared to bid the shop falling 
within his area and that when police officials advanced towards the detenu, 
he fired gun-shots at the police party, exploded bombs and fled away creating 
panic among the people and completely disturbing the public order. Along 
VN^ith the ground of detention four documents viz. a report of SSP, a report of 
SHO, a copy of the chik of the case registered against the detenu in connection 
273. Pushpa Devi M. Jatia v. ML. Wadhawan. (1987) 3 SCC 367, 380:1987 SCC (Cri) 526: AIR 
1987 SC 1748:1987 Cri LJ1888: (1987) 12ECC356, 
274. Vashisht Narain Karwaria v. State of U.P., (1990) 2 SCC 629, 633, 634; 1990 SCC (Cri) 
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275. State of Maharashtra v. Ramesh Kumar Shobhraj Jain, (1988) 1 SCC 597: 1988 SCC 
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with the incident stated in the ground and a copy of general diary relating to 
the offence were furnished. The averments made in the police reports 
unequivocally and clearly spell out that the detenu was a hardened criminal, 
having a his control often committing heinous crimes, that many cases against 
the detenu were registered in various police stations and that he was in the 
habit of committing offences. Question was whether the sponsoring authority 
had placed extraneous materials which had influenced the mind of the 
detaining while passing the detention order and as such the detention order 
was Hable to be quashed. Quashing the detention order. 
Held: 
The above averments which are extraneous touching the character of 
the detenu, though not referred to in the grounds of detention, might have 
influenced the mind of the detaining authority to some extent one way or 
other in reaching the subjective satisfaction to the decision of directing the 
detention of the detenu. Had these extraneous materials not been placed 
before the detaining authority, he might or might not have passed this order. 
The detention order was suffering from the vice of the consideration of 
extraneous materials vitiating the validity of the order. "^^^ 
Vashisht Narain Karwana v. State of U.P., 1990 Cri LJ NOC 36 (AH), reversed 
Extraneous considerations — Affidavit in opposition showing that in arriving 
at the subjective satisfaction, detenu's association with a pohtical party 
operating in the country — Whether consideration extianeous or irrelevant 
which would vitiate the detention order, not considered. 277 
(f) Vagueness of grounds 
Vague grounds — Particulars about victims and places of offence alleged 
against detenu not mentioned in grounds — Held, grounds vague — 
Detenu could not make effective representation against his detention — 
Hence detention order illegal and bad — Constitution of India, Art. 22(5).^ 78 
Vague grounds violative of Art, 22(5) — Detenu alleged to be a dangerous 
person within the meaning of S. 2(c) of Gujarat PASAA — In absence of 
particulars regarding the victims and places of the alleged offences, held on 
facts, grounds vague — Statement that the alleged activities of the detenu was 
coming in the way of maintenance of public order also vague — In the 
circumstances detenu not able to make proper and effective representation — 
Hence, Art, 22(5) violated - Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 
1985, Ss. 2(c) and 3(1) - Constitiition of India, Art 22(5). 
Article 22(5) requires that the grounds must not be vague but must be 
specific, relevant in order to enable the detenu to make an appropriate and 
effective representation against the same before the Advisory Board as well as 
276. Vashisht Narain Karwaria v. State of U.P., (1990) 2 SCC 629, 633: 1990 SCC (Cri) 372: 
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before other authorities ir\cluding detaining authority. The grounds and the 
averments made in the grounds which were served on the detenu are vague 
and as such they are violative of Art. 22(5). 7^9 
Pushkar Mukherjee v. State ofW.B., (1969) 1 SCC 10; Piyush Kantilal Mehta v. 
Commr, of Police, Ahemdahad, 1989 Supp (1) SCC 322, relied on 
Vagueness — Allegations should not be vague and general in nahire and 
should be supported by particular incidents — On facts held, grounds 
vague.2^0 
Vagueness — Grounds to be construed in the context of facts.^ ^^ 
Vagueness — Absence of particulars or details regarding pendency of 
many cases/offences as well as other allegations against detenu made in the 
documents furnished along with the sole ground — Held, allegations vague 
which prevented the detenu from making effective representation — Con-
stitution of India, Art. 22(5). 
No particulars or details had been given in the police report enclosed 
with the grounds of detention in regard to the alleged 'many cases/offences9 
said to have been registered in various police stations against the detenu and 
in regard to the allegations that he was a hardened criminal and had a gang 
often committing heinous crimes and that it had become the habit of the 
detenu to commit offences. There is therefore force in the submission that the 
had been deprived of making an effective and purposeful representation as 
envisaged under Art. 22(5). 8^2 
Vagueness — Facts on which conclusion regarding detention drawn by 
detaining authority constitute the grounds — Document containing the 
grounds must be read as a whole for ascertaining subjective satisfaction of the 
authority — Vagueness of any ground will violate Art, 22(5) and render the 
detention order void — But absence of minute details in the grounds will 
not denote vagueness — Vagueness to be determined on facts and cir-
cumstances of each case— On facts held, grounds not vague — National 
Security Act, 1980 (65 of 1980), S. 3(3) - Constitiition of India, Art. 22(5) 
The grounds of detention must be in existence on the date when the 
order was passed and the authority concerned has to be satisfied about the 
grounds of detentioii on the date of the order and the satisfaction of the 
detaining authority must be clear on the face of it from the grounds of 
detention itself. The material facts on the basis of which subjective satisfaction 
was derived for passing the order of detention become a part and parcel of 
the grounds and must be supphed to the detenu. It is the document itself 
which will be taken to be the proof of what weighed with the detaining 
279. Abdul Razak Nannekhan Pathan v. Police Commr., (1989) 4 SCC 435 50:1989 SCC (Cri) 
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authority while passing the order of detention and for this no extraneous 
evidence is admissible. 
The Inclusion of an or non-existent ground, among other relevant grounds is 
an infringement of the right to be informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds 
which led to the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority and the 
inclusion of an obscure or vague ground among clear and definite grounds is 
an infringement of the right to be furnished with sufficient particulars to 
enable the detenu to make a representation provided under Art. 22(5). 
The question whether a particular ground is vague will depend on the facts 
and circumstances of each case because vagueness is a relative term; If the 
basic facts have been given in a particular case constituting the grounds of 
detention which enable the detenu to make an effective representation, 
merely because meticulous details of facts are not given will not vitiate the 
order of detention. 8^3 
Vagiteness — Material disclosed vague with reference to the persons affected 
or victimised by detenu as also time and place of such victimisation — 
Consequently detenu unable to make an effective representation — Held, 
detention order vitiated and violative of An. 22 (5). 8^4 
A.K. Roy V. Union of India, (1982) 1 SCC 271:1982 SCC (Cri) 152, relied on 
Vagueness — Separate incidents of extorting money from shopkeepers 
by threatening them and of throwing bomb on police party causing panic 
alleged in the grounds — Particular of names of persons who had been 
threatened for money and names of witnesses in whose presence threat was 
given or alleged bomb was thrown not furnished — Held, grounds vague — 
Constitiition of India, Art. 22(5) - National Security Act, 1980, S. 3(2) 
The grounds were vague and it was not possible for the detenu to give 
an effective representation against the grounds which is one of the 
requirements enjoined in Art, 22(5). The police personnel who witnessed the 
incidents and those who recorded the FIR could have come forward to give 
evidence. In such circumstances, the open statement made in the affidavit of 
the Sub-Inspector of Police that the witnesses were afraid of disclosing then-
names and coming forward to give evidence is wholly incredulous and it 
cannot be accepted. The prosecution of the appellant for the • substantive 
offences can be properly proceeded with in this case. 8^5 
Ahdid Gaffer v. State ofW.B., (1975) 4 SCC 59:1975 SCC (Cri) 309, followed 
Vagueness — Statement of witnesses who had deposed against detenu 
supplied to detenu without disclosing their names — Detaining authority-
stating that disclosure of the names might have led to infliction of bodily 
injuries or even death of the witnesses - Though " there may be certam 
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situations where disclosure of names has to be withheld but question whether 
on facts such withholding would by itself vitiate the detention order need not 
be decided.286 
Where each activity of the detenu is a separate ground by itself, then the order 
of detention will not be vitiated merely because one of the grounds of 
detention is vague or irrelevant — Conservation of Foreign Exchange and 
Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (52 of S. 5-A -Object and scope) 
What S. 5-A provides is that where there are a number of grounds of 
detention covering various activities of the detenu spreading over a period or 
periods, each activity is a separate ground by itself and if one of the grounds 
is irrelevant, vague or unspecific but the grounds are clear and specific, then 
that by itself would not vitiate the order of detention of Gujarat v. 
SonL (1981) 2 SCC 24:1981 SCC (Cri) 311: AIR 1981 SC1480: (1981) 2 SCR 500: 
1981 Cri LJ 1042: (1981) 51 Com Cas 631. 
Expressions like 'defence of India', 'relations of India with foreign powers'. 
Security of India', 'security^ of the State' and acting in any manner prejudicial 
to the maintenance of and services essential to the community so vague, 
general broad as to be on ground of and uncertainty. Held, the first four 
expressions are constitutional but:must be narrowly construed— The power 
under the last expression is made subject to the prior enumeration and 
publicity of the suppUes and services to be regarded as essential — National 
Security Act, 1980, S. 3(1 )(a) & (2) Constitiition of India, Arts. 14,19 & 22(5). 
It was contended on behalf of the petitioners that the various 
regarding of detention in S. 3(l)(a) and (2) were so vague, and elastic that 
besides not so grave conduct even lawful conduct can be included depending 
on the whim and caprice of the detaining authority to the deti-iment of the 
libert)' of the subject. Rule of law requires that citizens must know when 
lawful conduct ends and unlawful conduct begins. 
Held: 
It is true that the vagueness and the consequent uncertainty of a law of 
preventive detention bears upon the unreasonableness of that law. A person 
cannot be deprived of his hberty by a law which is nebulous and uncertain in 
its definition and application. 
But expressions may not be capable of precise definition. Formulation 
of definitions cannot be a panacea to the evil of vagueness and uncertainty. 
Even so the impossibility of framing a definition with mathematical precision 
camiot either justify the use of vague expressions or the total failure to frame 
any definition at all which can furnish, by its inclusiveness at least, a safe 
guideline for understanding the meaning of the expressions by the legislature. 
But the point to note is that there are expressions which inlierently 
comprehend such an infinite variety of situations that definitions, instead of 
lending to them a definite meaning, can only succeed either in robbing them 
of their intended amplitude or in making it necessary to frame further 
286. Ahmedhussain Shaikhhussain v. Commr of Police, Ahmedabad, (1989) 4 SCC 751, 758: 
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definitions of the terms defined. Acts prejudicial to the 'defence of India', 
'security of India', "security of the State', and 'relations of India with foreign 
powers' are concepts of that nature which are difficult to encase within the 
straitjacket of a definition. The use of language carries with it the 
inconvenience of the imperfections of language. 
What is expected is that the language of the law must contain an 
adequate warning of the which may fall within the prescribed area when 
measured by common understanding, In criminal law, the legislature vague 
expressions. 
If it is permissible to the legislature to enact laws of preventive 
detention, a certain amount of minimum latitude has to be conceded to it m 
order to make those laws effective. In other words, though an expression may 
appear in cold print to be vague and uncertain, it may not be difficult to apply 
it to life's practical realities. This process undoubtedly involves the possibility 
of error but then, there is hardly any area of adjudicative process which does 
not involve that possibility. 
The impugned expressions in the very nature of things are difficult to 
define. They cannot therefore, be struck down on ground of their vagueness 
or uncertainty. In practice, courts must strive to give to those concepts a 
narrower construction than what the literal words suggest. While construing 
laws of preventive detention like the National Security Act, care must be 
taken to restrict their application to as few situations as possible. 
The same cannot, however, be said regarding the expression "acting in 
any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential 
to the community", which supplies and services are essential to the com-
munity can easily be defined by the legislature. Reading it along with the 
Explanation, this power is therefore capable of wanton abuse in that, the 
detaining authority can place under detention any person for possession of 
any commodity on the basis that the authority is of the opinion that the 
maintenance of supply of that commodity is essential to the community. This 
provision therefore violates Art. 21 on ground of vagueness and uncertainty. 
The other part of the expression, namely "services essential to the 
coiTtmunity" also requires a prior enumeration of the services as are 
considered essential to the community'. People have to be forewarned if new 
categories are to be added to the Hst of services which are commoi-ily accepted 
as being essential to the communit}'. 
Since the object of the above provision is justified, the power is not 
being stiuck down and it is held, that no person can be detained with a view 
to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance 
of supplies and services essential to the munity unless, by a law or notification 
or pubhshed fairly in advance, the supplies and services, the maintenance of 
which is regarded as essential to the community and in respect of which the 
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order of detention is proposed to be passed, are made known appropriately, 
to the public. 8^7 
(g) State grounds 
State or irrelevant or vague grounds sufficient to render detention order 
invalid Grounds of detention must be pertinent and not irrelevant, proximate 
and not state, precise and not vague. Irrelevance, stateness and vagueness are 
vices, any single one of which is sufficient to vitiate a ground of detention. 
And, a single vicious ground is sufficient to vitiate an order of detention. 
In the present case the order and the grounds of detention were served 
on the detenu-petitioner in November 1980 while the incidents enumerated in 
one of the grounds were of the years 19745 1975,1977 and 1978. That ground 
thus suffered from the vice of stateness because of the passage of time since 
the happeriing of some of the incidents. Moreover, that ground was to the 
effect that the detenu and his associates had terrorised the common man in 
the area by various criminal acts which disturbance to public peace and 
public safety. Several incidents were narrated to substantiate this ground. 
Thus the incidents are related to'law and order' and not to the maintenance of 
'public order5. That ground, therefore, also suffered from the vice of 
irrelevance. Hence the detenu is entitled to be released, Shiv Prasad 
Bhatnagar v. State of M.P. (1981) 2 SCC 456:1981 SCC (Cri) 489: AIR 1981 SC 
870: (1981) 3 SCR 81:1981 Cri LJ 594, 
State grounds - Proximity of time between events referred to in grounds and 
passing of detention order — Determination of —Two old incidents of more 
than 5 and 2 years prior to the date of order of detention mentioned in the 
grounds — All the incidents proximate to each other showing history of 
prejudicial activity of the detenu — Order of detention, if vitiated — National 
Security Act, 1980, S. 3(2). 
An order of detention was passed against the petitioner under S. 3(2) of 
the National Security Act. The grounds of detention mentioned seven 
incidents in which the petitioner was involved. Those incidents occurred on 
March 20,1978, August 9,1980, July 13,1982, July 26,1982, September 8,1982, 
Januaiy 1, 1983 and March 25, 1983 respectively. The petitioner contended in 
the present writ petition that the first two grounds were state and not 
proximate to the time when the detention order was made and therefore, they 
were irrelevant and vitiated the detention order. 
Held: 
Per Chinnappa Reddy and Vamdarajan, //. 
It is not open to the detaining authority either to pick up an old and 
state incident and hold it as the basis of an order of detention under S. 3(2) of 
the Act, or to contend that it has mentioned only to show that the detenu has 
a tendency to create problems resulting Ln distiirbance to public order, for as a 
matter of fact it has been mentioned as a ground of detention. 
287. A.K. Roy v. Union of India, (1982) 1 SCC 271:1982 SCC (Cri) 152; AIR 1982 SC 710:1982 
Cri L] 340:1982 ML] (Cri) 524. 
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In the present case the two were too remote and not proximate to the 
order of detention. In absence of any provision in the National Security Act 
similar to S. 5-A of the CQFEPOSA Act it cannot be postulated what view 
would have been taken by the detaining authority about the need to detain 
the petitioner under S. 3(2) of the Act if he had not taken into account the 
and not proximate grounds into consideration in arriving at the subjective 
satisfaction. Therefore, the petitioner's detention is unsustainable in law and 
accordingly the detention order must be quashed. 
Per Desni, ]. (dissenting) 
The detaining authority may examine the history of the criminal 
activity of the detenu and take into account a continuous course of conduct 
showing repeated indulgence into prejudicial activity which may permit an 
inference that unless preventive detention is resorted to it would not be 
possible to wean away such person from such prejudicial activity, for 
ordinarily a single stray incident may not, unless contiary is shown, be 
sufficient to invoke the drastic power of preventive detention, However, if 
there is a big time lag between the last of the events leading to the detention 
order being made and the remote earUer event, the same cannot be tieated as 
showing a continuity of criminal activity. But if events in close proximity with 
each other are taken into account for drawing a permissible inference that 
these are not or spasmodic events but disclose a continuous prejudicial 
activit}^ the reference to earlier events camiot be styled as state or remote 
which would vitiate the order of detention. The test of proximity is not a rigid 
or mechanical test to be blindly appUed by merely counting the number of 
months between the offending acts the order of detention. The question is 
whether the past activities of the detenu are such that the detaining authority 
can reasonably come to the conclusion that the detenu is likely to continue in 
his unlawful activities. 
In the present case if each event is examined in close proximity with 
each other, the events of 1978 and 1980 referred to in the first two grounds 
cannot be rejected as stiay or not proximate to the making of the detention 
order. They provide the genesis of the continuity of the prejudicial activity of 
the detenu and they appear to have been relied upon for that limited purpose. 
Therefore, the detention order cannot be quashed on the short ground that 
incidents set out in the first two grounds were state and irrelevant, s^s 
State ground— Two incidents regarding instigating members of a particular 
community to communal violence referred to — Second incident taking place 
after a lapse of a year — But both the incidents having rational nexus with the 
subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority — Held, first ground not 
state.289 
State grounds' — Remoteness of — Alleged speeches of detenu referred to in 
ground made in February or earlier and detention order passed in January 
288. Kamlakar Prasad Chaturvedi v. Stati- of MP., (1983) 4 SCC 443, 445, 452:1983 SCC (Cri) 
848: AIR 1984 SC 211. 
289. Pitrat Raza Klian v. State of U.P., (1982) 2 SCC 449:1982 SCC (Cri) 472: AIR 1982 SC 146: 
1982 Cri LJ 338. 
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next year — But speeches mentioned in the ground as a part of the continuous 
course of conduct brought out by the remaining grounds — Held, allegation 
regarding speeches in the ground not too remote to make it irrelevant.^^o 
Punitive and state order of detention— Commission of alleged criminal 
offences by the detenu about one and a half years back forming basis of 
detention order — No explanation given for failure to take action under 
preventive detention \a^A^ at the earliest after commission of the offence — 
Detenu appearing before magistrate on all dates of hearing in criminal case 
pending against him for the alleged offences even after passing the detention 
order but no reason given for failure to take him under custody during that 
period — Held, the charge too to have any real nexus with the detention and 
in the circumstances the detention is punitive rather than preventive in nature 
and therefore, vitiated - COFEPOSA Act, 1974 (52 of 1974), S. 3(1). 29i 
Alleged incidents about one year old — But proximity between the incidents 
existing indicating detenu's criminal propensity — In the circumstances, 
held, conclusion of the detaining authority that detenu was habitually 
committing or abetting commission of offences, not open to interference by 
Court - Bihar Control of Crimes Act, 1981, Ss. 2(d) & 12(2). 
Upon the materials the DM in his order of detention under S. 12(2) of 
the Bihar Control of Crimes Act, 1981 stated that he was satisfied that the 
detenu was an anti-social element and was habitual in committing offences 
punishable under Chs. XVI and XVII, IPC and as such his movements and 
acts adversely affected the public order. The incidents referred to in the 
grounds of detention showing criminal propensity of the detenu had taken 
place one year prior to the date of passing of the detention order. 
Held: 
While adequacy or sufficiency is no ground for a challenge, relevancy 
or proximity is relevant in order to determine whether an order of detention 
was arrived at irrationally or unreasonably. 
In the background of the present case and having regard to the 
definition of anti-social element in S. 2(d) of the Bihar Control of Crimes Act, 
if an appropriate authority charged with the implementation of the Act comes 
to the satisfaction that the detenu is one who is habitually committing or 
abetting the commission of offences, such a conclusion is neither irrational nor 
unreasonable. Anti-social elements creating havoc have to be taken care of by 
law. The power of preventive detention cannot be said to have been used to 
clip the 'wings of the accused' who was involved in a criminal prosecution. 
The fact that the detenu was in jail had been taken into consideration. All the 
relevant documents were in fact supplied and no other document was asked 
for. In the facts of this case and having regard to the nature of the offences, the 
impugned order cannot be said to be invalid and improper one. There was. 
290. Sonam Yongda v. State of Sikkim, (1986) 3 SCC 594: 1986 SCC (Cri) 341: AIR 1986 SC 
1736:1986 Cri LJ1606. 
291. Harnek Singh v. State of Punjab, (1982) 1 SCC 116:1982 SCC (Cri) 121: AIR 1982 SC 682: 
1982 CriLJ 420. 
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therefore, no ground- for the Court's interference with the order of 
detention.292 
Remoteness in time with the activity — Smuggled electronic goods seized on 
February 4 — Detention order under COFEPOSA passed on September 19, 
held, could not be said to be very remote from the fact of seizure of smuggled 
goods. 293 
Grounds of detention — Proximity of time between incidents mentioned in 
the ground — Long lapse of time between two prejudicial acts or omissions of 
the detenu—Whether detenu can be said to be habitual offender of public 
order - Bihar Control of Crimes Act, 1981 (7 of 1981), S. 17. 
Per Venkataramiah, J. 
The third ground which is based on the pending Sessions case is no 
doubt of the nature of acts or omissions referred to in sub-clause (i) of S. 2(d) 
but the interval between the first ground which falls under this sub-clause 
and this one is nearly eight years and carmot, therefore, make the petitioner a 
habitual offender of the type falling under sub-clause (i) of S. 2{d). 
PerA.P. Sen,}. 
On merits the impugned order carmot be to be vitiated because of some 
of the grounds of detention being non-existent or irrelevant or too remote in 
point of time to furnish a rational nexus for the subjective satisfaction of the 
detaining authority. 9^4 
(h) Solitary ground 
Detention order based on solitary incident when proper — COFEPOSA Act, 
1974, S. 3(1). 
It was contended that there was no necessity to pass an order for the 
detention of the petitioner because except the solitary incident mentioned in 
the grounds of detention involving the recovery of seven gold bars from the 
person of the petitioner there is no reference in the grounds of detention to 
any antecedent activity involving smuggling of goods by the petitioner. It is 
urged that a single incident could not afford the basis for arriving at the satis-
faction that the petitioner might repeat such acts in the future and it was 
necessary to detain him in order to prevent him from doing so. 
Held: 
An order for preventive detention is founded on a reasonable 
prognosis of the future behaviour of a person based on his past conduct 
judged in the light of the surrounding circumstances. Such past conduct may 
consist of one single act or of a series of acts. It must be of such a nature that 
an inference can reasonably be drawn froin it that the person concerned 
292. Raj Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, (1986) 4 SCC 407, 412 to 415:1986 SCC (Cri) 481: AIR 
1986 SC 2173:1986 CriLJ 2042. 
293. Rajendra Prasad v. State of U.P., (1981) 4 SCC 558:1981 SCC (Cri) 870: AIR 1982 SC 
1256. 
294. Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar, (1984) 3 SCC 14, 26, 35: 1984 SCC (Cri) 361: AIR 
1984 SC 1334:1984 Cri LJ 909. 
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would be likely to repeat such acts as to warrant his detention. The question 
which, therefore, needs to be considered is whether from the past conduct of 
the petitioner as set out in the grounds of detention it could reasonably be 
inferred that the petitioner would be likely to repeat such acts in the future. 
In the present case the evidence would show that the petitioner was 
indulging in. the activity of smuggling of gold as a carrier for monetary 
consideration. This was a deliberate act on the part of the petitioner and he 
had prepared himself for it by obtaining a passport in a false name and 
acquiring requisite skill to conceal such a large quantity of gold in his body. 
Taking into consideration the circumstances an inference could reasonably be 
drawn that unless detained the petitioner would be likely to indulge in 
smuggling of goods in future and, therefore, there was a reasonable basis for 
the detaining authority to arrive at the requisite satisfaction. ^ 95 
Solitary ground — When not sufficient to sustain detention — Further 
grounds cannot be supplemented by filing affidavit — National Security Act, 
1980, S. 3(3). 
Even one ground may be regarded as sufficient if the activity alleged is 
of such a nature that the detaining authority could reasonably infer that the 
detenu must be habitually engaged in such activity or there may be other 
circumstances set out in the grounds of detention from which the detaining 
authority could reasonably be satisfied even on the basis of one ground that 
unless the detenu is detained, he might indulge in such activity in future. But 
in the instant case the only ground alleged against the petitioner was that he, 
along with others, jointly committed murder in broad daylight. No other cir-
cumstances were mentioned. It was difficult to infer from the solitary ground 
that the act alleged to have been committed by the petitioner would have 
disturbed public order as distinct from law and order or that one single act 
committed by the petitioner was of such a character that it could reasonably 
be inferred by the detaining authority that if not detained, he would be likely 
to indulge in such activity in future. Therefore, the ground of detention given 
in support of the order of detention was irrelevant. 
The detaining authority cannot by an affidavit filed in court 
supplement what is stated in the grounds of detention or add to it. 9^6 
Solitary incident of smuggling — Facts and circumstances giving rise to 
the inference that detenu was member of a smuggling syndicate — Merely 
because only one incident coming to light does not mean that it was his 
maiden act of smuggling — Held, detaining authority justified in reaching 
satisfaction that detenu was engaged in smuggling — COFEPOSA Act, 1974, 
S. 4. 297 
295. M. Mohd. Sulthan v. Jt. Secy., to Govt, of India, (1991) 1 SCC 144: 1991 SCC (Cri) 104: 
AIR 1990 SC 2222:1990 Cri LJ 2473. 
296. Ramveer Jatav v. State of U.P. (1986) 4 SCC 762; 1987 SCC (Cri) 10: AIR 1987 SC 63. 
297. Shiv Ratan Makim v. Union of India, (1986) 1 SCC 404:1986 SCC (Cri) 74: AIR 1986 SC 
610:1986 Cri LJ 813. 
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Sufficiency of, for passing detention order — Quality and nature of the 
incidents and not their quantity material — Even one incident may be 
sufficient to satisfy the detaining authority — On facts held, subjective 
satisfaction arrived at by detaining authority on the basis of two incidents 
referred to in the grounds proper. 298 
(i) Identical grounds to different detenus 
Same ground, different detenu — Identical ground, on which another person 
involved in the same transaction, found by Advisory Board as insufficient for 
sustaining that person's detention — Held, is a highly relevant circumstance, 
though not binding, in the context of detention of the petitioner-detenu — 
Failure to place that circumstance before the detaining authority when it 
passed order of detention against the petitioner, held, amounted to non-
application of mind — Hence, detention order against the petitioner must be 
set aside.299 
REPRESENTATION BEFORE APPROPRIATE AUTHORITY/GOVT. 
Expeditious consideration of detenu's representation — Detenu's right to 
and detaining authority's corresponding obligation in regard to, held, is a 
constitutional imperative under Art. 22(5) and is not dependant on any 
particular preventive detention legislations which must conform to Art 22(5) 
— An unreasonable delay in considering the representation cannot be 
justified on the ground that unlike COFEPOSA Act, National Security Act 
makes the delay inevitable — Administrative red tapism cannot afford a valid 
explanation for such delay — On facts, held, unreasonable and unexplained 
delay rendered continued detention of the detenus illegal — Constitution of 
India, Art 22(5) - National Security Act, 1980 (65 of 1980), Conservation of 
Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (52 of 
1974), S. 3(3).30o 
The detenu has an independent constitutional right to make his 
representation under Art. 22(5) of the Constitution of India. Correspondingly, 
there is a constitutional mandate commanding the concerned authority to 
whom the detenu forwards his representation questioning the correctness of 
the detention order clamped upon him arid requesting for his release, to 
consider the said representation within reasonable dispatch and to dispose 
the same as expeditiously as possible. This constitutional requirement must 
be satisfied with respect but if this constitutional imperative is observed in 
breach, it would amount to negation of the constitutional obligation rendering 
the continued detention constitutionally impermissible and illegal, since such 
a breach would defeat the very concept of liberty — the highly cherished right 
— which is enshrined in Art 21. 
298. AUjan Mian v. Distt. Magistrate, (1983) 4 SCC 301, 308:1983 SCC (Cri) 840: AIR 1983 SC 
1130:1983 Cri LJ1649. 
299. Mohd. Shakeel Wahid Ahmed v. State of Maharashtra, (1983) 2 SCC 392: AIR 1983 
SC541. 
300. Khatoon Begum v. Union of India, (1981). 2 SCC 480:1981 SCC (Cri) 493: AIR 1981 SC 
1077: (1981) 3 SCR 137:1981 Cri LJ 606:1981MLJ (Cri) 466. 
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True, there is no prescribed period either the provisions of the 
Constitution or under the concerned detention law within which the 
representation should be dealt with. The use of the word "as soon as may be" 
occurring in Art. 22(5) reflects that the representation should be expeditiously 
considered and is disposed of with due promptitude and diligence and with a 
sense of urgency and without avoidable delay. What is reasonable dispatch 
depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and no hard and fast rule 
can be laid down in that regard. However, in case the gap between the receipt 
of the representation and its consideration by the authority is so unreasonably 
long and the explanation offered by the authority is so unsatisfactory, such 
delay could vitiate the order of detention. Q^^  
It is not possible to treat representations from whatever source 
addressed to whomsoever officer of one or other department of the Gov-
ernment as a representation to the Government requiring the appropriate 
authority under the COFEPOSA to consider the matter. Neither the countless 
petitions, memorials and representations presented to the Prime Minister and 
other Ministers are statutory appeals or petitions, nor the diplomatic 
communications between one country and another are representations to the 
statutory authorities functioning under the Act which are to be considered 
and disposed of in the manner provided in the Act. The Bout de Papier and 
the reminder being diplomatic communications between the Governments of 
the two countries cannot be treated as representations to the Central 
Government under S. 11, COFEPOSA Act and will be attended to and 
answered through appropriate diplomatic channels in proper time and with 
necessary expedition. 0^2 
Representation made to President amounts to representation to Central Gov-
ernment by virtue of S. 3(8) of General Clauses Act — National Security Act, 
1980, S. 14. 303 
Detenu falsely claiming to have sent his written representation to the 
President of India through another person — Government preferring 
application under S, 340 Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 for prosecution of the 
persons responsible for forging the documents and making interpolations in 
dak register of President's Secretariat — CBI enquiring into the matter — 
Hence passing of final orders on the application under S. 340 deferred till 
completion of investigation by CBI — Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, S. 
340.304 
Comments of detaining authority on the representation ~ Effect of — When 
representation is made to government, comments called for from detaining 
301. R?ma Dhondu Borade v. V.K. Sarqf, (1989) 3 SCC 173, 179, 180: 1989 SCC (CM) 520: 
AIR 1989 SC1861: (1989) 2 Cri LJ 653. 
302. Phillippa Anne Duke v. State of T.N., (1982) 2 SCC 389:1982 SCC (Cri) 444: AIR 1982 SC 
1178:1982 Cri LJ 1389. 
303. Raghavendra Singh v. Supdt., Distt. Jail, (1986) 1 SCC 650:1986 SCC (Cri) 60: AIR 1986 
SC 356:1986 Cri LJ 493:1986 All LJ 397. 
304. Pushpa Devi M, Jatia v. M.L Wadhawan, (1987) 3 SCC 367, 395 to 399:1987 SCC (Cri) 
526: AIR 1987 SC 1748:1987 Cri LJ 1888: (1987) 12 ECC 356. 
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authority would not vitiate government order rejecting the representation 
on ground that such comments would influence mind of the government. 
Unless the comments of the relevant authorities are placed before the 
Minister^ it will be difficult for him-to properly consider the representation. 
There is no substance in the contention that any comment from the detaining 
authority would influence the mind of the government. Such assumption is 
without any foundation, o^s 
Non-application of mind in rejecting representation alleged on ground that all 
relevant material not taken into cor\sideration by detaining authority — Held 
on facts, allegation not made out. 0^6 
Right to make effective representation— Denial of — Discrepancy between 
statements in detention order and grounds of detention as also between the 
English version and the regional language in which the order and the 
grounds had been served — In the regional language necessity of detention 
stated in the detention order to be to prevent the detenu from smuggling and 
abetting the smuggling under S, 3(1 )(i) & (ii) of COFEPOSA Act whereas the 
necessity stated in the grounds to be to prevent from concealing, transporting 
smuggled goods falling under S. 3(l)(ii) and (iv) of that Act — English version 
of detention order stating that the order passed only for abetting the 
smuggling of goods — Held, discrepancy caused confusion, as a result of 
which detenu was unable to make effective representation and 
thereby his right under Art. 22(5) denied - COFEPOSA Act, 1974, S. 3(1)-
Constitution of India, Art. 22(5). 307 
Only written and not oral representation permissible which may be 
sent through Jail Authorities or any other suitable mode — Constitution of 
India, Art. 22(5). 308 
All representations sent by detenu considered by Central Government and 
rejected —Plea of non-consideration of representation therefore not 
maintainable. Kamla Rajkumar Rajani v. Union of India, 1990 Supp SCC 135: 
1990 s e c (Cri) 539. 
Consideration of second representation by Central Government — State 
Government taking decision on detenu's representation and then forwarding 
the same to Central Government — Central Government once taking a 
decision on the representation, held, not obliged to consider another 
representation addressed to the Prime Minister for revocation of detention 
order — Nature of Central Government's power to revoke detention order 
stated - National Security Act, 1980, S. 14 - MISA, 1971, S. 14 -
COFEPOSA Act, 1974, S, 11(1 )(b). 
305. Vijay Kumar v. Union of India, (1988) 2 SCC 57, 68: 1988 SCC (Cri) 293: AIR 1988 SC 
934; 17 ECC 82: (1988) 3 Crimes 50. 
306. Sanjay Kumar Aggarwal v. Union of India, (1990) 3 SCC 309, 317:1990 SCC (Cri) 473: 
AIR 1990 SC 1202:1990 Cri LJ 1238. 
307. Vijay Kumar Dharna v. Union of India. (1990) 1 SCC 606:1990 SCC (Cri) 247: AIR 1990 
SC 1184: (1990) 48 ELT159. 
308. Devji Vallabhbhai Tandel v. Administrator, (1982) 2 SCC 222:1982 SCC (Cri) 403: AIR 
1982 SC 1029:1982 Cri LJ 799. 
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The power of revocation conferred on the Central Government under 
S. 14 of the National Security Act is a statutory power which may be exercised 
on information received by the Central Government from its own sources 
including that supplied by the State Government under S. 3(5) or from the 
detenu in the form of a petition for representation. It is for the Central 
Government to decide whether or not it should revoke the order of detention 
in a particular case. 
At one time it was thought that S. 14 of the Maintenance of Internal 
Security Act, 1971 which was in pan materia with S. 14 of the National 
Security Act, did not confer any right or privilege on the detenu but there is a 
definite shift in the judicial attitude, for which there appears to be no 
discernible basis. 
In the present case, the detenu was not deprived of the right of making 
a representation to the detaining authority under Art, 22(5) of the 
Constitution read with S. 8(1) of the Act. Although the detenu had no right to 
simultaneously make a representation against the order of detention to the 
Central Government under Art. 22(5) and there was no duty cast on the State 
Government to forward the same to the Central Government, nevertheless the 
State Government forwarded the same forthwith. The Central Government 
duly considered that representation which in effect was a representation for 
revocation of the order of detention under S. 14, Therefore, it was not 
obligatory on the part of the Central Government to consider a second 
representation for revocation under S. 14. 0^9 
Shyam Ambalal Siroya v. Union of India, (1980) 2 SCC 346: 1980 SCC (Cri) 
447; Sabir Ahmed v. Union of India, (1980) 3 SCC 295:1980 SCC (Cri) 675 and 
Rattan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1981) 4 SCC 481:1981 SCC (Cri) 853, doubted 
Denial of opportunity to make effective representation alleged by detenu 
— Burden to establish that proper opportunity afforded to the detenu rests 
strictly on the State — Constitution of India, Arts, 226,136 and 32. 
The obligation rests on the detaining authority to establish that 
sufficient particulars of the grounds of detention were furnished to the 
respondent so as to enable him to exercise effectively his constitutional right 
of making a representation against the order of detention. The rigour of the 
obligation cannot be relaxed under any circumstances. In the present case the 
State has discharged its obligation, ^^ o 
(b) Consideration of representation independent of reference to Advisory 
Board 
Appropriate Government obliged to consider detenu's representation 
independent of consideration by Advisory Board — Representation must be 
considered at the earliest—Held on facts, representation considered by State 
309. State of U.P. v. Zavad Zama Khan, (1984) 3 SCC 505, 5095 511:1984 SCC (Cri) 425: AIR 
1984 SC1095. 
310. State of Punjab v. Jagdev Singh Talwandi, (1984) 1 SCC 596, 605: 1984 SCC (Cri) 135: 
AIR 1984 SC 444:1984 Cri LJ177. 
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Government, the detaining authority, without any delay — Constitution of 
India, Art. 22(5). 
Article 22(5) itself does not say to whom the representation is made or 
who will consider the representation. By virtue of provisions of the statute 
under which he has been detained, the appropriate government is legally 
obliged to comply with these requirements. It is obligatory on the appropriate 
government to consider the detenu's representation separate^from other con-
sideration of the detenu's case by the Advisory Board, The Central 
Government which has the power to revoke the detention order passed by the 
State authority, is also under legal obligation to dispose of the representation 
without delay, ^ n 
Khudiram Das v. State ofVM.B., (1975) 2 SCC 81:1975 SCC (Cri) 435, relied on 
The failure on the part of the State Government to consider the 
representation made by the appellant addressed to the Chief Minister without 
waiting for the opinion of the Advisory Board also rendered the continued 
detention of the appellant invalid and constitutionally impermissible. The 
constitution of an Advisory Board under S. 8 of the Act does not relieve the 
State Government from the legal obligation to consider the representation of 
the detenu as soon as it is received by it. 3i2 
Narendra Purshotam Umrao v. B.B, Gujral, (1979) 2 SCC 637:1979 SCC (Cri) 557, 
followed 
In case of preventive detention of a citizen, the obligation of the 
appropriate government is two-fold: (0 to afford the detenu the opportunity' 
to make a representation and to consider the representation which may result 
in the release of the detenu, and (ii) to constitute a Board and to communicate 
the representation of the detenu along with other materials to the Board to 
enable it to form its opinion and to obtain such opinion. The former is distinct 
from the latter. Corresponding to this obligation there is a twofold right in 
favour of the detenu to have his representation considered by the appropriate 
government and to have the representation once again considered by the 
Government in the light of the circumstances of the case considered by the 
Board for the purpose of giving its opinion. 
In the present case the State Government failed to discharge the first of 
the two-fold obligation and waited till the receipt of the Advisory Board's 
opinion which resulted in non-consideration of the representation for an 
unexplained period of twenty-four days. This shows there was no 
independent consideration of the representation by the State Government 
which is a clear non-compliance of Art. 22(5). The order of detention is, 
therefore, liable to be quashed. 1^3 
311. Abdu Salam v. Union of India, (1990) 3 SCC 15, 18: 1990 SCC (Cri) 451: AIR 1990 SC 
1446:1990 Cri LJ 1502: (1990) 48 ELT162: (1990) 3 Crimes 82. 
312. Mohinuddin v. D.M., (1987) 4 SCC 58,66, 67:1987 SCC (Cri) 674: AIR 1987 SC 1977. 
313. Rahamatullah v. State of Bihar, (1981) 4 SCC 559:1981 SCC (Cri) 871: AIR 1981 SC 2069: 
1981 Cri LJ 1698. v^  
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Detaining authority not justified in deferring its decision on the 
representation till receipt of Advisory Board's report — Constitution of India, 
Art 22(5). 
The detenu has an independent constitutional right to have the 
representation considered by the detaining authority irrespective of whatever 
the Advisory Board may do in the present case although the representation 
was received by the detaining authority on February 25,1980, it was rejected 
on March 13,1980, a day after the Advisory Board had given its opinion. The 
Collector's remarks which were sent for were available to the detaining 
authority as far back as on March 6; 1980 and there could be no reason for the 
detaining authority to have deferred its decision on the representation till the 
receipt of the opinion of the Advisory Board. 3^ '* 
Representation made after confirmation of detention by Advisory Board 
— Non-consideration by detaining authority on the ground that the detenu 
had requested that his representation be forwarded to the Advisory Board 
also - Held, improper - Art 22(5) contravened - COFEPOSA, S. 11.3i5 
(c) Competent authority to consider representation 
Competent authority to consider — Chief Minister — Held, competent to 
dispose of the representation where statute requires the representation to be 
made to appropriate Government — National Security Act, 1980 (65 of 1980), 
S.8. 
It follows from the specific provision in S, 8 of the National Security 
Act for affording earopportunity to make representation not to the detaining 
authority but to the appropriate Government that the appropriate 
Government must consider the representation. Where the Chief Minister 
considered the representation and rejected it after calling for parawise 
remarks of the detaining authority, the failure of the detaining authority to 
consider the representation would not invalidate the detention order. 3i6 
Competent authority to consider—-Home Secretary or Home Minister — 
Held, competent under Maharashtra Rules of Business — Maharashtra 
Government Standing Order No. SI. 3(A) PSA 1181 dated October 13,1981 -
COFEPOSA Act, 1974 (52 of 1974), S. 3(1). 3^ ^ 
Competent authority to consider — Held, need not be the detaining authority 
itself — Any other authorised person, such as State Home Minister, is 
competent to dispose of the representation, for and on behalf of the State 
Government — Rules of Business of Government of Maharashtra, Rr. 6 and 
15. 
314. Nafisa Khalifa Ghanem v. Union of India, (1982) 1 SCC 422:1982 SCC (Cri) 236. 
315. Tara Chand v. State of Rajasthan, (1981) 1 SCC 416: 1981 SCC (Cri) 165: AIR 1980 SC 
2133. 
316. Raj Kishore Prasad v. State of Bihar, (1982) 3 SCC 10:1982 SCC (Cri) 530: AIR 1983 SC 
320. 
317. Raverdy Marc Germain Jules v. State of Maharashtra, (1982) 3 SCC 135:1982 SCC (Cri) 
638: AIR 1983 SC31L 
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Whether the detaining authority or the State Home Minister disposed 
of the representation, would be immaterial since both had authority to act for 
the State Government and whatever be the instrumentahty, it would be the 
State Government which would be considering and dealing with the 
representation. There is no requirement express or implied in any provision of 
the COFEPOSA Act that the same person who acts for the State Goverraiient 
in making the order of detention must also consider the representation of the 
detenu. The only requirement of Art. 22(5) is that the representation of the 
detenu must be considered by the detaining authority which in the present 
case is the State Government and this requirement was clearly satisfied, i^s 
Competent authority to consider — May be other than the detaining authority 
— State Home Minister competent to deal with the representation where 
authorised to do so by relevant rules and orders of the Government — 
Maharashtra Government Rules of Business, R. 6. 
The Minister of State for Home Affairs, Government of Maharashtra 
was entitled to deal with the representation of the detenu, by virtue of the 
Standing Order made by the Chief Minister and the State Home Minister read 
with R. 6 of the Maharashtra Government Rules of Business made undff Art. 
166(2) and (3) of the Constitution. There is no substance in the suggestion that 
it would have been more appropriate if the representation had been con-
sidered by the very individual who had exercised his mind at the initial stage 
of making the order of detention, namely the Secretary to the Government.^i^ 
[Ed: See also Mamma v. Slate of Maharashtra, (1981) 3 SCC 566 where the 
Court has affirmed the above view] 
Detaining authority itself must take a decision on the detenu's representation 
so as to afford remedy to the detenu to approach the higher authorities in case 
of rejection of his representation — Constitution of India, Art 22(5) — 
COFEPOSA Act, 1974 (52 of 1974), Ss. 3 and 11. 
Under Art. 22(5) as also under S. 11 COFEPOSA Act a representation should 
be considered by the detaining authority, who on a consideration thereof can 
revoke the detention order and if the representation is rejected by detaining 
authority it is open to the detenu to approach the State Government for 
revocation of the order and failing that it is open to him to approach the 
Central Government to get the detention order revoked. 
In the present case the Chief Secretary, Delhi Administration, who was 
the detaining authority, considered the detenu's representation on receipt of 
comments of Secretary, Law and Justice, but instead of himself rejecting it, he 
submitted, the same to the Administrator with an endorsement to the effect 
"the representation may be rejected". The Administrator made ^ an 
endorsement below that of the Chief Secretary to the effect that he had 
considered the representation as well as the comments of the Customs 
318. Mamma v. State of Maharashtra, (1981) 3 SCC 566, 568-570:1981 SCC (Cri) 750: AIR 
1981 SC1753; 1981 Cri U1256. 
319. Kavita v. State of Maharashtra (I), (1981) 3 SCC 558, 563, 564:1981 SCC (Cri) 743: AIR 
1981 SC 1641. 
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Department and after examination thereof he agreed that the representation 
had no merit and must be rejected. It is thus clear that the representation had 
only been considered by the detaining authority at the highest but he did not 
take the decision to reject the same himself and as such the constitutional 
safeguard under Art. 22(5) had not been strictly observed or complied with. 
The continued detention of the detenu was therefore illegal Santosh Anand v. 
Union of India, (1981) 2 SCC 420:1981 SCC (Cri) 456. 
Representation — Must be considered and rejected by the detaining authority 
— Where detaining authority is Home Minister, but detenu's representation 
rejected by Secretary, held, the Secretary had no jurisdiction to consider or 
pass any orders on the representation and hence the continued detention of 
the detenu becomes void.320 
(d) Delay in transmitting representation 
Representation to Central Government — Failure of jail authorities to 
forward detenu's representation to Central Government either directly or 
through State Government — Representation lying unattended for several 
months - Held, detention illegal - COFEPOSA Act, 1974 (52 of 1974), S. 11. 
Section 11(1) of the COFEPOSA Act confers upon the Central 
Government the power to revoke an order of detention even if it is made by 
the State Government or its officer. That power, in order to be real and 
effective, must imply the right in a detenu to make a representation to the 
Central Government against the order of detention. 
The failure of the Jail Superintendent to either forward the 
representations to the Government concerned or to have forwarded them to 
the State Government with a request for their onward transmission to the 
Central Government has deprived the detenu of his valuable right to have his 
detention revoked by that Government. The continued detention of the 
detenu must therefore be held illegal and the detenu be set free. 2^1 
Delay of one month, five days in communicating representation of detenu 
from jaii to detaining authority — Held, right to representation under Art. 
22(5) contravened — Detention held illegal.322 
Representation to Central Government— Detenu has right to make 
representation under S. 14(1), N.S. A. — Unexplained delay on the part of State 
Government in forwarding detenu's representation to Central Government 
resulting in delay of more than two months in considering the representation 
by Central Government — Held, the delay rendered continued detention of 
the detenu illegal — National Security Act, 1980, S, 14(1) — Constitution of 
India, Art. 22(5). 
Section 14(1) of the Act confers upon the Central Government the 
power to revoke an order of detention even if it is made by the State 
320. Kirit Kumar Chaman Lai Kundaliya v. Union of India, (1981) 2 SCC 436:1981 SCC (Cri) 
471: AIR 1981 SC 1621: (1981) 2 SCR 718:1981 Cri LJ1267: (1981) 22 GLR1067. 
321. Rattan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1981) 4 SCC 481:1981 SCC (Cri) 853: AIR 1982 SC 1. 
322. Tara Chand v. State of Rajasthan, (1981) 1 SCC 416: 1981 SCC (Cri) 165: AIR 1980 SC 
2133. 
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Government or its officer. That power, in order to be real and effective, must 
imply a right in a detenu to make a representation to the Central Government 
against the order of detention. Thus, the failure of the State Government to 
comply with the request of the detenu for the onward transmission of the 
representation to the Central Government has deprived the detenu of his 
valuable right to have his detention revoked by that Government. That being 
so, the continued detention of the detenu must be held to be illegal and 
constitutionally impermissible. 323 
Representation for, made by detenu to President and Prime Minister received 
in Ministry of Home Affairs after about two months and one week and 
disposed of within a week by the Home Ministry — Delay in Secretariats of 
President and Prime Minister not explained — Held, part of the delay may be 
due to detenu's failure to send the representation direct to the concerned 
ministry viz, the Home Ministry but that cannot justify the enormous delay — 
In view of unexplained and unduly long delay in disposal of the 
representations, further detention of the detenu, held, illegal NSA, 1980, 
Ss. 14 & 3. 324 
(e) Delay in disposal of representation 
Inordinate delay in disposal of, in absence of proper explanation, violates Art 
22(5) - Constitution of India, Art, 22(5). 
The detenu submitted representation against his detention originally 
on January 1,1988 which he got back and resubmitted it on February 2,1988. 
It was stated on behalf of the State that the representation dated February 2, 
1988 was received in the COFEPOSA section of Ministry of Finance on 
February 16,1988 witli a letter dated February 5, 1988 from the Government 
of Kerala; that as certain information was not available with the Central 
Government, the Collector of Customs, was asked to get a copy of the 
representation from the State Government and to send his comments; that 
Collector of Customs, informed the Central Government by a telex message 
dated March 1,1988 which was received in the COFEPOSA section on March 
8, 1988 informing that the representation was not available with the Home 
Department; that thereafter a copy of the representation was forwarded to the 
Collector of Customs by post on March 8, 1988; that the comments of the 
Collector were received back on March 28, 1988; that then the representation 
along with the comments were placed before the Joint Secretary, COFEPOSA 
section on March 30,1988, who forwarded the same to the Minister of State 
for Revenue on the same day and on April 4, 1988 the Minister of State 
forwarded his comments to the Finance Minister who considered and rejected 
the representation on April 8,1988. 
Held: 
The representation of the detenu had not been given prompt and 
expeditious consideration, and was allowed to lie without being properly 
323. Haji Mohd. Akhlaq v. Distt. Magistrate, 1988 Supp SCC 538:1988 SCC (Cri) 886. 
324. Raghavendra Singh v. Supdt, Distt, Jail, (1986) 1 SCC 650, 652, 653: 1986 SCC (Cri) 60: 
AIR 1986 SC 356:1986 Cri LJ 493:1986 All LJ 397. 
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attended to. The explanation that the delay has occurred in seeking the 
comments of the Collector of Customs etc. is not a convincing and acceptable 
explanation. The delay of 72 days in the absence of satisfactory explanation is 
too long a period for ignoring the indolence on the part of the concerned 
authority. Hence, the unexplained delay in disposal of the representation of 
the detenu is violative of Art, 22(5) rendering the order of detention invalid.325 
Non-disposal of — Request describing as representation made for furnishing 
translated copies of the grounds of detention in the language known to the 
detenu — Addressed to Chairman, Central Advisory Board sent through Jail 
Superintendent — Held, amounted to a representation to the appropriate 
government, which was obliged to consider and dispose it of independently 
irrespective of reference to the Board — Failure to do so violated Art, 22(5) 
and vitiated the detention - Constitution of India, Art 22(5) - COFEPOSA 
Act, 1974. 
Under Art. 22(5) no proforma for representation has been prescribed. 
Opportunity to make a representation comprehends a request for supply of 
translated copies. Therefore, the detenu's 'representation' asking for copies of 
documents must be held to have amounted to a representation. 
Article 22(5) does not say which is the authority to whom 
representation shall be made or which authority shall consider it. But it is 
indisputable that the representation may be made by the detenu to the 
appropriate government and it was mandatory on the part of the appropriate 
government to consider and act upon it at the earliest opportunity and failure 
to do so would be fatal to the detention order. In the present case though the 
representation was addressed to the Chairman, Central Advisory Board the 
same was forwarded by the Jail authorities and it must be taken to have been 
a representation to the appropriate government which was to consider it 
before placing it before the Advisory Board. But there was no consideration 
before and even after the Advisory Board considered the case of the detenu. It 
is settled law that delay in disposing the representation when inordinate and 
unexplained the detention would be bad and the detenu must be ordered to 
be released forthwith. Therefore, Art. 22(5) was violated.^ 26 
Non-consideration of representation alleged — Absence of counter-affidavit 
by State — Allegation remaining uncontraverted — Continued detention of 
detenu, held, illegal and constitutionally impermissible— Detention quashed 
- National Security Act, 1980, S. 3(2) - Constitution of India, Art, 22(5). 327 
Representation to appropriate authority — Should be disposed of 
expeditiously — Delay in disposal should he satisfactorily explained by all the 
concerned authorities individually where detaining authority is unable 
to personally explain delay at various stages — Inordinate and unexplained 
325. T.A. Abdul Rahman v. State of Kerala, (1989) 4 SCC 741, 751: 1990 SCC (Cri) 76: AIR 
1990 SC 225. 
326. Kubic Darusz v. Union of India, (1990) 1 SCC 568, 578-580: 1990 SCC (Cri) 227: AIR 
1990 SC 605. 
327. Ranbir Singh v. T. George Joseph, DM, Meerut, 1990 Supp SCC 54:1990 SCC (Cri) 613. 
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delay fatal to the detention irrespective of enormity and gravity of 
allegations made against the detenu - COFEPOSA Act, 1974, S. 3(1) 
In the counter-affidavit filed by the Joint Secretary, Department of 
Revenue, Ministry of Finance it was stated that the petitioner had made his 
representation on August 21,1989 and not on August 18,1989 as alleged by 
the detenu-appellant and that it was received in the office of his department 
on August 23,1989 and the same was forwarded to the concerned sponsoring 
authority on August 25? 1989. The sponsoring authority sent his comments 
only on September 11, 1989. Thereafter, the representation along with the 
comments was processed and put up before the Minister of State for Revenue, 
who considered and rejected the same on September 15, 1989 subject to the 
approval of the Finance Minister. On September 18,1989 the file was received 
back from the Finance Minister's office and the memorandum was issued on 
September 19S 1989 rejecting the representation. It was contended on behalf 
of the detenu that there was an inordinate delay in considering and disposing 
of the representation and as such continued detention of the detenu was 
violative of Art. 22(5). Allowing the appeal and directing that the detenu be 
set at liberty forthwith. 
Held: 
Except merely mentioning that the representation was forwarded to 
the concerned sponsoring authority on August 25, 1989 and the comments 
from the sponsoring authority was received by the department on September 
11, 1989, there is absolutely no explanation as to why such a delay had 
occurred. This undue and unexplained delay is in violation of Art. 22(5) 
rendering the detention order invalid. 
A representation of a detenu whose liberty is in peril should be 
considered and disposed of as expeditiously as possible; otherwise the con-
tinued detention will render itself impermissible and invalid as being 
violative of Art. 22(5). If any delay occurs in the disposal of a representation, 
such delay should be explained by the appropriate authority to the 
satisfaction of the court. In case the appropriate authority is to explain 
personally the delay at various then it will be desirable — indeed appropriate 
— for the concerned authority or authorities at whose hands the delay has 
occurred to individually explain such delay. In absence of any explanation, 
court cannot wink at or skip over or ignore such an infringement of the 
constitutional mandate and uphold an order of detention merely on the 
ground that the enormity of allegations made in the grounds of detention is of 
a very serious nature as in the present case. 328 
Rama Dhondu Borade v. V.K. Saraf, Commissioner of Police, (1989) 3 SCC 173:1989 
sec (Cri) 520, followed 
Requirement of prompt disposal of representation restated — On facts held, 
delay in disposal vitiated the detention - National Security Act, 1980, S. 8(1) 
— Constitution of India, Art. 22(5). 
328. Mahesh Kumar Chauhan v. Union oi India, (1990) 3 SCC 148:1990 SCC (Cri) 434: AIR 
1990 SC1455:1990 Cri LJ1507. 
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On September 1, 1988 the detenu filed representation against his 
detention addressed to the President of India through the Home Secretary, 
Government of Punjab and the Superintendent of District Jail, Agartala 
(Tripura). The State Government was not aware of pendency of any such 
representation with it. On September 13,1988 the Central Goveriunent issued 
a teleprinter message which was duly received on September 14, 1988 in 
which the Central Government wanted to know the date on which the 
grounds of detention were supplied to the detenu and also sought parawise 
comments on the representation of the detenu. However, the Central 
Government did not send any copy of the representation to the State Gov-
ernment. Even so, it directed the police, vide letter dated September 14,1988, 
to supply the required information to the Central Government. It was 
intimated to the Central Government that parawise comments on the 
representation could not be offered as copy of the representation was not 
available with the State of Punjab. The Central Government vide teleprinter 
message dated October 6, 1988 which was received on October 10, 1988 
intimated that the photostat copy of the representation had been sent along 
with the post copy of the teleprinter message. The representation was duly 
received on October 19, 1988 by the State of Punjab and it was examined at 
various levels on October 19,1988, (October 20,1988 was a holiday), October 
21, 1988 (October 22,1988 and October 23, 1988 were holidays), October 24, 
1988 (October 24, 1988 was again a holiday), October 26, 1988, October 27, 
1988 and October 28, 1988. The representation was duly put up before the 
competent authority who rejected it after deliberation and consideration on 
October 28, 1988, It was contended on behalf of the appellant State that the 
delay was caused by the representation having been addressed to the 
President of India, even though the detention order itself stated that if the 
detenu wished to make such representation, he should address it to the State 
Government through the Superintendent of Jail as soon as possible. 
Held: 
The clear instructions in the grounds of detention that the detenu 
should address the representation to the State Government through the 
Superintendent of the Jail where he was detained should have been followed. 
May be this was due to the fact that Punjab was under President's rule at the 
relevant time but Rashtrapati Bhawan, New Delhi was not the proper 
destination of the representation to the State Government. However, from the 
facts of the case it is clear that after receipt of the xerox copy from the Central 
Government, the State Government took only 13 days including 4 holidays in 
disposing of the representation. Considering the situation prevailing and the 
consultation needed in the matter, the State Government could not have been 
unmindful of urgency in the matter. But, it took more than two months from 
the date of submission of the representation to the date of informing the 
detenu of the result of his representation. Eight days were taken after disposal 
of the representation by the State Government. The result is that the detenu's 
constitutional right to prompt disposal of his representation was denied and 
the legal consequences must follow. It is a settled law that in cases of 
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preventive detention expeditious action is required on the part of the 
authorities in disposing of the detenu's representation. 2^9 
Delay in considering — Determination of, would depend upon facts and 
circumstances of each case — Unavoidable delay would not render continued 
detention invalid. 
The question whether the representation submitted by a detenu has 
been dealt with all reasonable promptness and diligence is to be decided not 
by the application of any rigid or inflexible rule or set formula nor by a mere 
arithmetical counting of dates, but by a careful scrutiny of the facts and 
circumstances of each case; if on such examination, it is found that there was 
any remissness, indifference or avoidable delay on the part of the detaining 
authority/State Government in dealing with the representation, the court will 
undoubtedly treat it as a factor vitiating the continued detention of the 
detenu; on the other hand, if the court is satisfied that the delay was 
occasioned due to unavoidable circumstances or reasons entirely beyond his 
control such delay will not be treated as furnishing a ground for the grant of 
relief to the detenu against his continued detention. In the present case there 
was no avoidable delay on the part of the District Magistrate in forwarding 
the petitioner's representation. 330 
Delay in considering representation — 'Earliest opportimity' — Meaning of 
— Delay (of 14 days) in transit and (of 19 days) in disposal of the 
representation by the Government, held, rendered the detention illegal — 
Duty to take expeditious action at all levels stressed — Jammu and Kashmir 
Public Safety Act, 1978, S. 13 - Constitution of India, Art. 22(5). 
The word 'earliest' in S. 13 of the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety 
Act, which qualifies "opportunity" must equally qualify the corresponding 
obligation of the State to deal with the representation, if and when made, as 
expeditiously as possible. The 'opportunity' contemplated by the section is the 
opportunity to make a representation against the detention order to the 
Government. 
If the Government enacts a law like the present Act empowering 
certain authorities to make the detention order and also simultaneously 
makes a statutory provision of affording the earliest opportunity to the 
detenu to make his representation against his detention, to the Government 
and not the detaining authority, of necessity the State Government must gear 
up its own machinery to see that in these cases the representation reaches the 
Government as quickly as possible and it is considered by the authorities with 
equal promptitude. The intermediary authorities who are communicaling 
authorities have also to move with an equal amount of promptitude. The cor-
responding obligation of the State to consider the representation cannot be 
whittled down by merely saying that much time was lost in the transit, Any 
slackness in this behalf not properly explained would be denial of the 
329. State of Punjab v. Sukhpal Singh, (1990) 1 SCC 35,489 49,54:1990 SCC (Cri) 1: AIR 1990 
SC 231:1990 Cri LJ584. 
330. Raisuddin v. State of U.P., (1983) 4 SCC 537, 540: 1984 SCC (Cri) 16: AIR 1984 SC 46: 
1983 Cri LJ1785. 
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protection conferred by the statute and would result in invalidation of the 
order. 
In the present case the representation handed over by the detenu in jail 
to the Jail Superintendent at J.ammu was received by the Government in 
Srinagar after 14 days. While forwarding the representation the Jail Super-
intendent had also sent a wireless message on the same day informing the 
Government that the representation had been sent by post. But in spite of 
being aware that a representation had been made, when it reached the 
concerned office in Srinagar, the Government took 19 days in its disposal 
Thus there are two vital time-lags and the delay, apart from being inordinate, 
is not explained on any convincing grounds. Thus the representation was not 
dealt with as early as possible or as expeditiously as possible, and, therefore, 
there would be contravention of S. 13 of the Act which would result in the 
invalidation of the order.^ ^i 
Under the COFEPOSA Act, a detenu has the right to simultaneously 
make a representation to the detaining authority which has to be considered 
by the Advisory Board, as also the right to apply to the Central Government 
for revocation of the detention order under S. 11. It is wrong to contend that 
the power of revocation by the Central Government under S. 11 is not 
attracted till the State Government has considered the representation of the 
detenu and rejected it and till the Advisory Board has submitted its Report to 
the State Government. 
When a simultaneous representation under S. ll(l)(b) is endorsed to 
the Central Government, the State Government has the corresponding duty 
not to withhold but to forward it to the Central Government forthwith for 
necessary action. A lapse on the part of the State Government in forwarding 
the representation simultaneously made by the detenu to the Central 
Government for revocation of the order of detention under S. 1.1 would result 
in striking down the detention order. 
In the present case the representation made by the detenu was 
forwarded to the Central Government after a lapse of 2 months and 15 days. 
But the Central Government acted with great promptitude in dealing with the 
representation and found no ground to interfere with the order of detention. 
Thus there is nothing but the unexplained delay on the part of State 
Government and that by itself is not sufficient to invalidate the order of 
detention. The detenu was not deprived of the right of making a 
representation to the State Government, i.e. the detaining authority, as well as 
of the right of making a representation to the Central Government for 
revocation of the order of detention under S. 11 of the Act. The Court must 
look at the substance of the matter and not act on mere technicality. 3^2 
The supine indifference, slackness and callous attitude on the part of 
the Jail Superintendent who had unreasonably delayed in transmitting the 
331. Vijay Kumar v. State of J & K, (1982) 2 SCC 43:1982 SCC (Cri) 348: AIR 1982 SC 1023: 
1982 Cri LJ 988:1982 MLJ (Cri) 471. 
332. Sat Pal v. State of Punjab, (1982) 1 SCC 12:1982 SCC (Cri) 46: AIR 1981 SC 2230. 
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representation as an intermediary, had ultimately caused undue delay in the 
disposal of the appellant's representation by the government which received 
the representation 11 days after it was handed over to the Jail Superintendent 
by the detenu. This avoidable and unexplained delay has resulted in 
rendering the continued detention of the appellant illegal and coristitutionally 
impermissible. 
When it is emphasised and re^emphasised by a series of decisions of 
the Supreme Court that a representation should be considered with 
reasonable expedition, it is imperative on the part of every authority, whether 
in merely transmitting or dealing with it, to discharge that obligation with all 
reasonable promptness and diligence without giving room for any complaint 
of remissness, indifference or avoidable delay because the delay, caused by 
slackness on the part of any authority, will ultimately result in the delay of the 
disposal of the representation which in turn may invalidate the order of 
detention as having infringed the mandate of Art. 22(5). It is neither possible 
nor advisable to lay down any rigid period of time uniformly applicable to all 
cases within which period the representation of detenu has to be disposed of 
with reasonable expedition but it must necessarily depend on the facts and 
circumstances of each case.^ ^^ 
Representation before Central Government — Should be disposed of with 
reasonable expedition — No rigid rule laid down — Delay of one month and 
five days in disposal of the representation, in absence of negligence, callous 
inaction and avoidable red-tapism, held, not fatal to the detention — 
COFEPOSA Act, 1974, Ss. 11 & 3. 
Though strictly speaking the Central Government is not the detaining 
authority within the meaning of Art. 22(5) yet they are under legal obligation 
to dispose of the representation as early as possible. But such delay by the 
Central Government should not be subjected to such a rigorous scrutiny as is 
done in the case of a delay caused by the appropriate government namely the 
detaining authority. The Central Government should consider the 
representation with reasonable expedition. What is reasonable expedition 
depends upon the circumstances of the particular case. No hard and fast rule 
as to the measure of reasonable time can be laid down. But it certainly does 
not cover the delay due to negligence, callous inaction, avoidable red-tapism 
and unduly protracted procrastination. From the explanation given in the 
present case for the delay of one month and five days on the part of the 
Central Government in disposal of the representation, it is clear that the 
representation was considered most expeditiously and there was no 
"negligence or callous inaction or avoidable red-tapism". Therefore, the 
detention was not vitiated due to the delay. 334 
Delay in disposal of — Explanation for — Representation alleged to have 
been made on behalf of the detenu by his advocate who had no authority to 
333. Aslam Ahmed Zahire Ahmed Shaik v. Union of India, (1989) 3 SCC 277,280 to 282: 
1989 SCC (Cri) 554: AIR 1989 SC1403:1989 Cri LJ1447: (1989) 22 ECC 308 
334. Abdu Salam v. Union of India, (1990) 3 SCC 15,19,20:1990 SCC (Cri) 451: AIR 1990 SC 
1446:1990 Cri LJ 1502: (1990) 48 ELT162: (1990) 3 Crimes 82. 
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make he same or whose authority had not been checked — Such allegation 
not made in counter-affidavit — No enquiry made about authority of the 
advocate — Held, making of the representation by an advocate failed to 
explain the delay in its disposal. 
The contention regarding the authority of the advocate to file 
representation on behalf of the detenu had not been taken up in the counter-
affidavit and cannot be urged merely at the hearing of the petition. There is 
nothing in law which prevents a representation being made by an advocate 
on behalf of the detenu, If there was any difficulty on that ground, enquiries 
should have been made with the advocate as to what was his authority to 
represent the detenu, but no such enquiry had been made in the present case. 
Thus, in the present ease, the fact that the representation was made by the 
advocate does not explain the delay in dealing with that representation.^^^ 
Delay in disposal of — Explanation for — That delay caused no prejudice to 
the detenu as he had filed a writ petition before High Court against his 
detention which had been dismissed — When cannot furnish a good 
explanation — Constitution of India, Arts. 32 and 226. 
Although the detenu-petitioner had preferred a writ petition before the 
High Court, but a special leave petition filed against that decision is pending 
in the Supreme Court. Moreover, at the time when the writ petition was 
dismissed, the detenu-petitioner had not made any representation to the State 
Government at all and hence the dismissal of his writ petition by the High 
Court cannot be regarded as any substitute for consideration of his 
representation by the State Government which, urilike the court, might be 
entitled to go into the factual merits of the grounds forming the basis of 
detention order. 3^6 
Delay in disposal of — Held on facts, there vsas no laches or negligence on 
the part of the detaining authority or the other authorities concerned in 
dealing with the less representation of the detenu — Detaining 
authority explained the delay and hence detention order not vitiated on 
ground of delay. 3^7 
Inordinate and unexplained delay in disposal of detenu's representation to 
Chief Minister, held rendered continued detention of the detenu illegal and 
unconstitutional — Explanation that Chief Minister remained on tour and 
busy with important matters of the State not acceptable — Mandate of Art 
22(5) explained — Constitution of India, Art. 22(5). 
The District Magistrate passed an order of detention against the 
appellant under S. 3(2) of the NSA on September 7, 1986. The appellant was 
taken into custody or September 8 and grounds of detention were served on 
335. Piara Singh v. State of Punjab, (1987) 4 SCC 550, 556:1987 SCC (Cri) 783: AIR 1987 SC 
2377. 
336. Piara Singh v. State of Punjab, (1987) 4 SCC 550, 556:1987 SCC (Cri) 783; AIR 1987 SC 
2377. 
337. Madan Lai Anand v. Union of India, (1990) 1 SCC 81, 94:1990 SCC (Cri) 51: AIR 1990 
SC 176: (1990) 25 ECC 277:1990 Cri LJ 659: (1990) 45 ELT 204. 
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him on September 14. On September 22, he made a representation to the Chief 
Minister through the Jail Superintendent. The Jail Superintendent forwarded 
it to the Home Department on September 24. The Home Department received 
it on September 26 and forwarded it to the District Magistrate on the same 
day for his comments. The District Magistrate returned the representation 
along with his comments on October 3 which was received by the Gov-
ernment on October 6. The State Government, in the mean while, under S. 3(4) 
of the Act accorded its approval to the impugned order of detention on 
September 18, 1986. On October 6, 1986 the appellant made another 
representation to the Advisory Board which met and considered the same on 
October 8,1986. On October 13,1986 the advisory Board after considering the 
representation made by the appellant together with the materials placed 
before it forwarded its report to the Government recommending confirmation 
of the impugned order of detention. It is said that thereafter the 
representation was processed together with the report of the Advisory Board 
and was forwarded to the Chief Minister's Secretariat where the same was 
received on October 23,1986. Acting upon the report of the Advisory Board, 
the State Government by its order dated November 19, 1986 confirmed the 
order of detention. The appellant filed a habeas corpus petition before the 
High Court contending that there was unexplained, unreasonable delay in 
disposal of the representation which was sufficient to render his continued 
detention illegal. The High Court dismissed the petition mainly on ground of 
imperfect pleadings regarding delay in the disposal of the representation. In 
the appeal before the Supreme Court the detaining authority i.e. the District 
Magistrate and the Desk Officer, Home Department (Special) filed counter-
affidavits. The District Magistrate generally denied that there was any such 
delay in disposal of the representation. But the Desk Officer explained the 
delay by saying that the Chief Minister remained preoccupied with very 
important matters of the State which involved tours as well as two Cabinet 
meetings on October 28 and 29 and November 11 and 12,1986. 
Held: 
The continued detention of the appellant was illegal and he must be set 
at liberty forthwith. The representation made by the appellant addressed to 
the Chief Minister could not lie unattended to in the Secretariat while the 
Chief Minister was attending to other political affairs. Nor could the 
Government keep the representation in the Secretariat till the Advisory Board 
submitted its report. 
In view of the wholly unexplained and unduly long delay in the 
disposal of the representation by the State Government the further detention 
of the appellant must be held illegal. There was utter callousness on the part 
of the State Government to deal with the representation to the Chief Minister. 
There was no reason why the representation submitted by the appellant could 
not be dealt with by the Chief Minister with all reasonable promptitude and 
diligence. The explanation that he remained away from Bombay is certainly 
not a reasonable explanation.338 
338. Mohinuddin v. D.M., (1987) 4 SCC 58,65 to 68:1987 SCC (Cri) 674: AIR 1987 SC 1977 
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Representation before Central Government — Delay in disposal of — Material 
evidencing that after receipt of the representation of the petitioner, 
it v^ ras sent to the detaining authority for his comments and immediately after 
receipt of the comments of the detaining authority the same were processed 
and put up before the Minister concerned who rejected the representation 
after corisidering the comments of the detaining authority and the State 
Government — Held, delay of one month properly explained. 339 
Representation before Central Government — Delay of 6 days in disposal, 
held, not unduly long. 
The time actually taken by the Central Government in considering the 
representation was six days. The said period of six days cannot, be regarded 
as unduly long. It is therefore, not possible to hold that there was inordinate 
delay in consideration of the representation of the petitioner by the Central 
Government and the detention of the petitioner cannot be held to be invalid 
on that basis, ^^ o 
Representation made to detaining authority — After rejection of the 
representation by the detaining authority for-warding the file to Minister for 
his consideration — Held, that would be inconsequential and would not 
vitiate the detention.^^i 
Second representation — Delay in disposal of — Detenu has no right to get 
his successive representations based on the same grounds rejected earlier 
to be formally disposed of again — No period of detention having been fixed 
under the Act, rejection of the second representation on the same ground 
three months after its filing not open to challenge — Prevention of 
Blackmarketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 
1980, S. 14.342 
Representation sent on January 31 by jointly addressing to State Government, 
Central Government and Advisory Board — Representation rejected by State 
Government on February 21 and by Central Government on March 3 — On 
facts held, the adequate and detailed reasons given by High Court in holding 
that the delay had been explained acceptable. 343 
Declaration by Central Government under S. 9(1) of COFEPOSA Act for 
detention beyond three months without Advisory Board's opinion — 
Detenu's representation rejected and declaration under S. 9(1) made on 
the same day but in different files — Mere non-reference to the representation 
in the declaration would not show failure of detaining authority to consider 
339. Syed Farooq Mohammad v. Union of India, (1990) 3 SCC 537, 547:1990 SCC (Cri) 500: 
AIR 1990 SC1597:1990 Cri LJ1622. 
340. M. Mohd. Sulthan v. }t. Secy, to Govt, of India, (1991) 1 SCC 144: 1991 SCC (Cri) 104: 
AIR 1990 SC 2222:1990 Cri LJ 2473. 
341. Vijay Kumar v. Union of India, (1988) 2 SCC 57, 68, 69:1988 SCC (Cri) 293: AIR 1988 SC 
934: (1988) 17 ECC 82: (1988) 3 Crimes 50. 
342. K. Aruna Kumari v. Govt, of A.P., (1988) 1 SCC 296, 304:1988 SCC (Cri) 116: AIR 1988 
SC 227:1988 CriLJ 411. 
343. Azra Fatima (Smt) v. Union of India, (1991) 1 SCC 76:1991 SCC (Cri) 641: AIR 1990 SC 
1763:1990 Cri LJ 1731. 
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the representation before making the declaration — Held on facts, there was 
ample evidence to show consideration of the representation before the 
declaration- COFEPOSA Act, 1974, S. 9(1). ^ 
Delay in considering representation caused in soliciting comments from other 
departments and allowing the representation to lie unattended — Held, the 
delay would render the detention unconstitutional— Representation must be 
taken up for consideration by detaining authority as soon as received and 
unless it is absolutely necessary to wait for some assistance, it must be dealt 
with continuously until final decision is taken and communicated to the 
detenu - Constihition of India, Arts. 22(5) and 226. 4^5 
Delay in disposal of — Detailed representation challenging detention made 
by an association on behalf of detenu disposed of expeditiously — Another 
representation made by petitioner on behalf of the detenu, found by High 
Court to be second one, mainly concentrating on necessity of keeping the 
detenu in a Bombay jail instead of sending him elsewhere and only casually 
impugning the detention — On facts, held, delay in disposal of petitioner's 
representation did not prejudice detenu's case.^ ^^ 
Delay of one and a half months in considering — In absence of satisfactory 
explanation fatal to continuance of detention. 4^7 
Rejection of representation about two months after the date of detention 
without any reasonable explanation, held, is sufficient to vitiate detention 
order — Representation must be considered by government within a 
reasonable time without waiting for opinion of Advisory Board — 
Constitution of India, Art 22(5) and (7). 348 
Representation — Delay in considering — There is no absolute time factor in 
considering representation — Detaining authority returning to India from a 
foreign trip three days after receipt of the representation and disposing of the 
representation three days thereafter — Held, delay not unreasonable. 
The time imperative can never be absolute or obsessive. The occasional 
observations made by the Supreme Court that each day's delay in dealing 
with the representation must be adequately explained are meant to emphasise 
the expedition with which the representation must be considered and not that 
it is a magical formula, the slightest breach of which must result in the release 
of the detenu. 349 
344. Madhu Kharma v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi, (1986) 4 SCC 240, 243: 
1986 SCC (Cri) 426: AIR 1987 SC 48:1987 Cri LJ 318. 
345. Harish Pahwa v. State of U.P., (1981) 2 SCC 710:1981 SCC (Cri) 589: AIR 1981 SC 1126: 
(1981) 3 SCR 276:1981 CriLJ 750. 
346. Asha Keshavrao Bhosale v. Union of India, (1985) 4 SCC 361, 365:1985 SCC (Cri) 561: 
AIR 1986 SC 283. 
347. Vinay Kumar Verma v. Union of India, 1986 Supp SCC 528:1987 SCC (Cri) 169. 
348. Ashok Kumar v. State of J & K, (1981) 2 SCC 73:1981 SCC (Cri) 329: AIR 1981 SC 851: 
1981 CriLJ 439. 
349. LM.S. Ummu Saleema v. B.B. Gujarat, (1981) 3 SCC 317:1981 SCC (Cri) 720: AIR 1981 SC 
1191: (1981) 3 SCR 647:1981 Cri LJ 889. 
249 
Representation to Central Government - Must be considered and 
disposed of with utmost expedition - COFEPOSA Act, 1974 (52 of 1974), S. 11. 
In matters touching the personal liberty of a person preventively 
detained, the constitutional imperative embodied in Art. 22(5) is that any 
representation made by him should be dealt v^ith utmost expedition. In the 
present case this constitutional mandate has been honoured in breach 
regarding the representation sent by the detenu to the Central Government.^so 
Delay of one day on the part of Senior Technical Officer to put up the matter 
before detaining authority after receiving comments from DRI as he had to be 
present before Advisory Board on the due date with relevant records in 
connection with hearing of detenu's case - Held, delay justified, ^^ i 
Disposed of within 4 days - Held, disposal not delayed. 
The appellant/petitioner contended that there was delay in the 
disposal of the representation made by the appellant to the State Government 
which rendered his continued detention invalid and constitutionally 
impermissible. 
Held: 
There was no delay, much less inordinate delay, in consideration of the 
representation, Rajendrakumar Natvarlal Shah v. State of Gujarat, (1988) 3 
s e c 153,167:1988 SCC (Cri) 575: AIR 1988 SC1255. 
A week's time taken by Central Government in considering and disposing of 
the representation— Held, delay reasonable.352 
Unexplained delay of about 20 days on the part of jail authorities in 
forwarding the representation to DM. and of three days on the part of D.M. in 
forwarding it to the Government - As a result of the delay, the 
representation could not be forwarded to Advisory Board, which after 
giving a personal hearing to the detenu, submitting its report — Government 
considering the representation thereafter and rejecting it - Held, the delay 
rendered continued detention of the detenu illegal - Constitution of India, 
Art. 22(5).353 
Twenty-one days taken by State Government in examining the representation 
under S. 8 of the National Security Act, 1980 - Disposal of the representation, 
held, inordinately delayed in view of the period fixed under S, 3(4) for the 
same - In absence of any explanation delay would vitiate the detention 
order. 5^4 
350. Lallubhai Jogibhai Patel v. Union of India, (1981) 2 SCC 427: 1981 SCC (Cri) 463- AIR 
1981 SC 728: (1981) 2 SCR 352:1981 Cri LJ 288:1981 MLJ (Cri) 350. 
351. Vijay Kumar v. Union of India, (1988) 2 SCC 57, 675 68:1988 SCC (Cri) 293- AIR 1988 
SC 934: (1988) 17 ECC 82: (1988) 3 Crimes 50. 
352. Suresh Bhojraj Chelani v. State of Maharashtra, (1983) 1 SCC 382: 1983 SCC (Cri) 202-
AIR 1983 SC 181:1983 Cri LJ 342. 
353. Youssuf Abbas v. Union of India. (1982) 2 SCC 380: 1982 SCC (Cri) 440- AIR 1982 SC 
1170:1982 Cri LJ 1396. 
354. Devi Lai Mahto v. State of Bihar, (1982) 3 SCC 328:1983 SCC (Cri) 37- AIR 1982 SC 1548-
1982 Cri LJ 2363. 
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Unexplained delay of more than three weeks in supplying copies of 
documents and statements referred to or relied upon in grounds of detention 
and of 37 days in considering the representation of the detenu, held, 
unreasonable and vitiates the detention order — COFEPOSA Act, 1974, S. 
3(3). 
Under Art. 22(5) of the Constitution, the detenu has got a two-fold 
right: First, the detenu has a right to be served with the grounds of detention 
as soon as practicable. [Under subsection (3) of S. 3 of COFEPOSA, such 
grounds must be communicated to the detenu within five days, and in 
exceptional cases, for reasons to be recorded, within 15 days of his detention. 
Secondly, he should be furnished with all the basic facts and materials, 
with reasonable expedition, which has been relied upon in the grounds of 
detention. The unreasonable delay of more than three weeks in supplying the 
detenu with copies of those basic documents had infringed this constitutional 
imperative, and had stultified and impeded his constitutional right to make a 
speedy and effective representation, ^ ss 
Unexplained delay of 22 days in disposing of the detenu 9s representation, 
held, rendered continued detention void. 5^6 
Representation before detaining authority — Delay of 27 days in disposal of 
— Explanation given in counter-affidavit filed by a Dy. Superintendent of 
Police instead of detaining authority or any other responsible officer 
personally connected with the case, not acceptable — In absence of any other 
explanation, held, delay vitiated the detention — Constitution of India, Art 
22(5) — Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances Act, 1988, S. 3(1). 3^7 
Delay in disposal of — Delay of over one month and ten days without any 
proper explanation, held, vitiated order of detention. 3^8 
Delay in considering — Period of 4 or 5 days taken by customs authorities in 
furnishing their parawise comments on the representation — Consequent 
delay, held, not unreasonable. 359 
Unexplained failure on the part of State Government to dispose of detenu's 
representation, held, rendered his further detention illegal- Disposal of a 
representation by detaining authority would not be substantial compliance of 
Art 22(5) as detenu has right to make representation to State Government 
355. Suryakant v. State of Maharashtra, (1981) 2 SCC 202:1981 SCC (Cri) 408: AIR 1980 SC 
2130. 
356. Sardar Kashmir Singh v. Union of India, 1981 SCC 55:1982 SCC (Cri) 133. 
357. Gazi Khan v. State ofRajasthan, (1990) 3 SCC 459: AIR 1990 SC 1361: 1990 Cri LJ1420: 
(1990)29ECC5. 
358. Piara Singh v. State of Punjab, (1987) 4 SCC 550, 555:1987 SCC (Cri) 783: AIR 1987 SC 
2377. 
359. Masuma v. State of Maharashtra, (1981) 3 SCC 566, 573:1981 SCC (Cri) 750: AIR 1981 
SC 1753:1981 Cri LJ 1256. 
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also - Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 1985, S. 3(2) -
Constitution of India, Art. 22(5).36o 
Mohinuddin v. District Magistrate, Seed, (1987) 4 SCC 58:1987 SCC (Cri) 674, 
relied on 
Writ petition against detention filed almost simultaneously v^ith the receipt of 
the representation by the government - Government hardly having time to 
consider the representation, held, petition on ground of delay not 
maintainable - Constitution of India, Arts. 32, 22(5). 36i 
A fortnight's time taken by State Government in considering the 
representation at all levels, held on facts, does not amount to undue delay .362 
Total delay of 28 days in disposal of representation - Nine days taken by 
detaining authority in examining the representation and forwarding its 
comments - Remaining period taken in rotating files at governmental levels 
- Held, delay inordinate and vitiated the detention order. 363 
Delay in disposal of - Inordinate and unexplained delay in disposal may 
vitiate the detention order - Representation disposed of by Central 
Government after 28 days and order of rejection of the representation 
communicated to detenu after 32 days of receipt of the representation on the 
sole explanation that further information required from State Government 
received by it after 14 days and the representation disposed of 10 days 
thereafter within which period there were certain holidays — Held, delay 
inordinate and unreasonable and explanation unsatisfactory and 
unacceptable — Hence detention order set aside on ground of breach of Art. 
22(5) - Constitution of India, Art. 22(5) - National Security Act, 1980, S. 8 -
National Security (Conditions of Detention) (Maharashtra) Order, 1980.^ 64 
Delay in considering— Government examining and rejecting the 
representation and referring it to Advisory Board two days after it was made 
- Advisory Board fixing a date for production of the detenue in accordance 
with the detenue's request and tendering its advice to the Government about 
19-20 days after the reference - Held on facts, delay not 
unreasonable.365 
9. ADVISORY BOARD 
(a) Constitution of the Board 
Board not yet constituted - Passing of detention orders in such situation 
deprecated - Constihition of India, Art. 22(4). 
360. Salim Rajmohmad Muslim v. State of Gujarat, (1988).3 SCC 476 477- 1988 SCC fCri^  
688. ' ' ^ ' 
361. Iris Fernandes v. Union of India, (1981) 3 SCC 663:1981 SCC (Cri) 788. 
362. Fitrat Raza Khan v. State of U.P., (1982) 2 SCC 449:1982 SCC (Cri) 472- AIR 1982 SC146-
1982 Cri LJ 338. 
363. Raj Kishore Prasad v. State of BiJiar, (1982) 3 SCC 10:1982 SCC (Cri) 530- AIR 1983 SC 
320. 
364. Rama Dhondu Boradev. V.K. Sara, (1989) 3 SCC 173,180:1989 SCC (Cri) 520- AIR 1989 
SC 1861: (1989)2 Cri LJ 653. 
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That an order for preventive detention was passed knowing fully well 
that there was no Advisory Board to whom it could be referred to betrays a 
casual and indifferent approach to citizens' rights and has to be deprecated. ^^ 
Constitution of Advisory Board under National Security Act — Held, cannot 
be judged with respect to proposed amendment to Art. 22(4) by the 
Constitution 44th Amendment— States, however, free to constitute Advisory 
Boards according to proposed amendment — National Security Act, 1980, Ss. 
9,10 & 11. 
The constitutionality S. 9, NSA providing for constitution of Advisory 
Boards cannot be judged with reference to Art. 22(4) as it would stand 
amended when S. 3 of the Constitution 44th Amendment is enforced. 
Of course Parliament is free to amend S, 9 to bring it in line with the 
proposed Art. 22(4). So also can the executive appoint members according to 
the proposed amendment. The standard of the present Art. 22(4) cannot be 
derogated from but can be improved upon. It is hoped that the Parliament 
will take the earliest opportunity to amend S. 9 of the NSA by bringing it in 
line with S. 3 of the 44th Amendment as the Ordinance did and that, the 
Central Government and the State Governments will constitute Advisory 
Boards in their respective jurisdictions in accordance with S. 3 of the 44th 
Amendment, whether or not S. 9 of the Act is so amended.367 
(b) Reference to the Board 
Reference to— Statutory requirement to refer the case to the Board mandatory 
— Non compliance with the requirement will result in order ceasing to be in 
force after the specified period of three months— A.P. Prevention of 
Dangerous Activities of leggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, 
Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986, S. 10 — Constitution 
of India, Art, 22(7). 
The case of the appellant was not at all referred to the Advisory Board 
as required by S. 10 of the Act and by Art. 22. Section 10 prescribes a period of 
three weeks from the date of detention irrespective of whether the person 
continues to be in detention or not. Therefore, even though the detenu was 
released, if the detention order was in force, his case was required to be 
the Advisory Board. This being a mandatory provision and having not been 
complied with the detention order even if otherwise it was in force cannot be 
said to have been in force after three weeks. ^^ ^ 
Detenu's right to make representation against detention order and right to be 
heard by Advisory Board — Requirement to apprise detenu of his rights, 
mandatory — But failure to do so would not vitiate the detention order where 
the detenu, being an enlightened person, is well aware of such rights — 
366. Abdul Latif Abdul Wahab Sheikh v. B.K. Jha, (1987) 2 SCC 22, 25:1987 SCC (Cri) 244: 
AIR 1987 SC 725:1987 Cri LJ 700. 
367. A.K. Roy v. Union of India, (1982) 1 SCC 271:1982 SCC (Cri) 152: AIR 1982 SC 710:1982 
Cri LJ 340:1982 MLJ (Cri) 524 
368. SMD. Kiran Pasha v. Govt, of A.P., (1990) 1 SCC 328,343,344:1990 SCC (Cri) 110. 
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Constitution of India, Art 22(5) - National Security Act, 1980 (65 of 1980) S, 
8.369 
Statutory requirement to refer the case to the Board mandatory — Non-
compliance with the requirement mil result in order ceasing to be in force 
after the specified period of three months — A. P. Prevention of Dangerous 
Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral 
Traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986, S. 10— Constitution of India, 
Ar. 22(7). 370 
Duty to make a reference to Advisory Board is on Government and not on 
any officer of the Government - COFEPOSA ACT, 1974, S. 8. 
In the matter of making a reference of the case of a detenu to the 
Advisory Board under S. 8(b), the duty of making the reference is cast only on 
the Central Government or the State Government as the case may be, and not 
on the officer of the Central Government or the State Government ii he makes 
the order of detention in exercise of the powers conferred on him under S. 
3(1). 371 
(c) Delay in placing representation before the Board 
Delay in placing the representation before Advisory Board — In absence of 
negligence on the part of the State Government and prejudice to the detenu. 
High Court erred in quashing the detention order on ground of such delay — 
But in view of long lapse of time since the quashing of the detention order, no 
interference with High Court's order called for— Constitution of India, Art. 
136.372 
Hari Singh Thakur v. Union of India, 1985 All LJ1126, reversed 
Placing of representation before Advisory Board — Requirement under S. 
10, National Security Act, held, mandatory — Where representation made by 
detenu "within reasonable time, the same must be placed before the Board 
promptly — Failure to do so fatal to the detention — Where detention order 
made on August 7 but representation made by detenu on August 16 which 
reached State Government through jail authorities and District Magistrate on 
August 25 and received by the Board on August 29 i.e. 22 days after 
detention, held, detention not vitiated. 3"3 
Requirement of placing before the Board detenu's representation "within 
three weeks from the date of detention" under S. 10 of National Security Act 
— Held, not mandatory but conditional upon making of the representation 
and date of its receipt by the appropriate Government — Belated 
369. Wasiuddin Ahmed v. D.M., (1981) 4 SCC 521, 531:1982 SCC (Cri) 4; AIR 1981 SC 2166: 
1981 Cri LJ 1825. 
370. SM.D, Kiran Pasha v. Govt, of A.P„ (1990) 1 SCC 328:1990 SCC (Cri) 110. 
371. State of Maharashtra v. Sushila Mafatlal Shah, (1988) 4 SCC 490, 501: 1989 SCC (Cri) 1: 
AIR 1988 SC 2090:18 EEC 322. 
372. State of U.P. v. Hari Singh Thakur, 1987 Supp SCC 190:1988 SCC (Cri) 44: AIR 1987 SC 
2080:1987 Cri L] 1923. 
373. State of U.P. v. Mahant Singh, (1985) 4 SCC 624, 626: 1986 SCC (Cri) 56: AIR 1986-SC 
207:1985 All LJ 1314. 
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representation of detenu resulting in one day's delay in placing it before the 
Board despite expeditious action of the Government — Advisory Board 
having the representation four days before the date of hearing — In absence 
of any prejudice caused to the detenu and any negligence on the part of the 
Government and in view of impossibility to forward the representation 
within time, held, detention not vitiated. 
An order of detention was passed under S. 3(2) of the National Security 
Act against the respondent on August 14,1984 and he was taken into custody 
on the following day. On August 22,1984 the State Government referred the 
matter to the Advisory Board comprising three Judges of High Court and 
placed before it the grounds of detention as also the materials referred to 
therein. The respondent made a representation on August 28,1984, which was 
received by the Superintendent of the Central Jail where the detenu had been 
lodged and the same was received by the State Govermiient on August 30, 
1984. After looking into the contents of the representation of the State 
Government caused it to be placed before the Advisory Board on September 
6,1984. The Board having already fixed the consideration of the respondent's 
detention at the meeting on September 10,1984, it got the representation four 
days before the date of hearing. The Board recommended detention of the 
respondent. The High Court quashed the detention order. 
While making of the reference to the Advisory Board under S. 10 of the 
National Security Act and forwarding of the grounds of detention to it are 
mandatory, the requirement of placing before it the representation is condi-
tional upon it having been made and receipt thereof by the appropriate 
Government, It is, however, obligatory for the appropriate Government to 
forward the representation, when received, to the Board without delay. 
In the present case there had been a day's delay in placing the 
representation of the respondent before the Board, though reference to the 
Board furnishing grounds of detention was made within a week of 
commencement of the detention in compliance with S. 10 of the Act. As by the 
time of making the reference and furnishing grounds no representation from 
the respondent had been received, it was not possible to place the same before 
the Board along with the grounds. The doctrine of impossibility of 
performance (lex non cogit ad impossibilid) indicates that however 
mandatory the provision may be, where it is impossible of compliance that 
would be a sufficient excuse for non-compliance, particularly when it is a 
question of the time factor. 
The first meeting of the Advisory Board was fixed within four weeks 
from the date of detention and the consideration of the matter by the Board 
was not required to be adjourned on account of any delay in receiving the 
copy of the representation of the detenu. The legislative scheme in fixing the 
limit of three weeks in S. 10 and the further limit of seven weeks in S. 11 
allows at least four weeks' time to the Board to deal v/ith the matter. 
In the facts of the present case, it cannot be said that there has been any 
negligence or remissness on the part of the State Government in dealing with 
the representation of the detenu or in the matter of causing the same to be 
placed before the Advisory Board. No prejudice has been caused to the 
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detenu on account of the delay of a day beyond the statutory period in 
placing the representation before the Advisory Board inasmuch as the Board 
had caused the matter to be heard on September 10, 1984, and before the 
appointed date the representation was before the Board. 374 
(d) Proceedings before the Board 
Procedural fairness must be observed by Advisory Board. There is no 
particular procedure prescribed for the Advisory Board since there is no lis to 
be adjudicated. Section 11 of the Act provides only the broad guidelines for 
observance. The Advisory Board, however, may adopt any procedure 
depending upon varying circumstances. But any procedure that it adopts 
must satisfy the procedural fairness. ^^ ^ 
Procedure — Board should send all the relevant materials to the Government 
along with its report to enable the Government to apply its mind and decide 
whether to confirm the detention or revoke the same — National Security Act, 
1980, S. 11. 
Though the procedure established by law i.e. S. 11 of the National 
Security Act, does not require the entire record to be sent by the Advisory 
Board to the State Government, yet it is certainly proper that the entire record 
or at least all relevant materials should be made available to the State 
Government when it proceeds to apply its mind to decide whether the 
detention should be continued or revoked on the basis of the report of the 
Board under S. 12(1). The Board should, therefore, forward the record 
containing the papers placed before it at the of the matter along with its report 
so that the matter can be attended by the State Government with due 
despatch and on taking a full view of the matter. 
In the present case the grounds of detention as well as materials 
referred to in the grounds were available with the State Government. Only the 
documents which the detenu claimed to have produced before the Board 
were not available to the Government. But on a perusal of those documents it 
appeared to the Court that they did not contain any material which could 
persuade the Govermnent to act in a different way. Though it is for the 
Government and not for the Court to act as the confirming authority and non-
compliance with the procedure laid down by law makes the order of 
detention liable to be quashed, but as non-placing of the record of the Board 
before the appropriate Government is not a failure of compliance with the 
prescribed procedure, the Court could look at the record to find out if it could 
be said to be a defect having material bearing on the question and a matter of 
prejudice so far as the detenu is concerned. 7^6 
374. State of Rajasthan v. Shamsher Singh, 1985 Supp SCC 416, 423-425: 1985 SCC (Cri) 421: 
AIR 1985 SC1082:1985 Cri LJ1348. 
375. State of A.P. v. Balajangam Subbarajamma, (1989) 1 SCC 193, 203: 1989 SCC (Cri) 75: 
AIR 1989 SC 389: (1988) 3 Crimes 729. 
376. State of Rajasthan v. Shamsher Singh, 1985 Supp SCC 416,428, 429:1985 SCC (Cri) 421: 
AIR 1985 SC 1082:1985 CriLJ 1348. 
256 
Must forward record of its proceedings along with its report to the State 
Government — If the Board fails to forward the record, confirmation of 
detention order only on the basis of Board's report would amount to non-
application of mind and violation of Art 21, which would render the 
detention order illegal — Prevention of Black marketing and Maintenance of 
Supplies of Essential Commodities Act 1980 (7 of 1980), Ss. 11(1) and 12 The 
State Government while confirming the detention order under S. 12 of the Act 
has not only to peruse the report of the Advisory Board, but also to apply its 
mind to the material on record. If the record itself was not before the State 
Government, it follows that the order passed by the State Government under 
S. 12 of the Act was without due application of mind and the procedure 
adopted was not in consonance with the procedure established by law. This is 
a serious infirmity in the case which makes the continued detention of the 
detenu illegal.377 
Failure to forward detenu's letter retracting his confessional statement to the 
Board — Held, will not vitiate the detention order where the detenu, a highly 
qualified and highly placed person, was himself present before the Board 
— Detenu would have informed the Board about the retraction.^''^ 
Held on the basis of counter-affidavit of the State, necessary materials 
despatched to Advisory Board and Central Government — Detenu failed to 
clearly aver what material had not been despatched — Hence detention order 
not vitiated on ground of non-despatch of materials, A. Alangarasamy v. State 
of T.N., (1987) 3 s e c 159:1987 SCC (Cri) 477: AIR 1987 SC1725. 
Proceedings before the Board cannot be made public — National Security Act, 
1980, Ss, 9,10,11.379 
It is not possible to accept the plea that proceedings of the Advisory 
Board should be made public. The right to a public trial is not one of the 
guaranteed rights under our Constitution as it is under the 6th Amendment of 
the American Constitution which secures to persons charged with crimes a 
public, as well as a speedy trial. Considering the nature of the inquiry which 
the Advisory Board has to undertake, the interests of justice will not be served 
better by giving access to the public to proceedings of the Advisory Board. 
Carrying on correspondence with the detenus through Government — Held, 
justified where the Board consisting of High Court Judges having no 
administrative office of its own — No mala fide intention made out.^ ^o 
Writ petition under Art. 32 challenging the detention filed during pendency 
of detenu's representation before Advisory Board is maintainable — 
Representation — Constitution of India, Art. 32. ^^ i 
377. Nand Lai Bajaj v. State of Punjab, (1981) 4 SCC 327, 334:1981 SCC (Cri) 841: AIR 1981 
SC2041:1981 Cri LJ.1501. 
378. Raverdy Marc Germain Jules v. State of Maharashtra, (1982) 3 SCC 135:1982 SCC 
(Cri) 638: AIR 1983 SC 311. 
379. A.K. Roy v. Union of India, (1982) 1 SCC 271:1982 SCC (Cri) 152: AIR 1982 SC 710:1982 
Cri LJ 340:1982 MLJ (Cri) 524. 
380. Phillippa Anne Duke v. State of T.N., (1982) 2 SCC 389:1982 SCC (Cri) 444: AIR 1982 SC 
1178:1982 Cri LJ 1389. 
381. Piyush Kantilal Mehta v. Commr. of Police, 1989 Supp (1) SCC 322,325:1989 SCC (Cri) 
438: AIR 1989 SC 491:1989 Cri LJ 956. 
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Prabhu Dayal Deorah v, DM, Kamrup. (1974) 1 SCC 103:1974 SCC (Cri) 18, 
followed 
(ii) Hearing 
Proceedings — Hearing — Failure to afford opportunity to detenu to appear 
and produce witnesses before the Board within the statutory period of 
submission of report by the Board — Held, fatal to the detention — Effect of 
amendments of National Security Act — National Security Act 1980, Ss. 11, 
14-A (as applicable to Punjab and Chandigarh) — National Security 
(Amendment) Act, 1984 - National Security (Second Amendment) Act, 1984 
— National Security (Amendment) Act 1987. 
It was decided to hold the sitting of the Advisory Board at Indore on 
November 12, 1988 which was a week before the mandatory last date for 
submitting the report. On November 8,1988 the detenu at Agartala prayed for 
postponement of the Board sitting. The State Government informed the Board 
on the basis of teleprinter message dated November 8, 1988 received from 
Agartala that the detenu was unable to undertake the journey from Agartala 
to Indore. Thereafter, the arrangements made to carry the detenu and his 
witnesses to Indore by plane were also cancelled by the State Government of 
Punjab and the detenu was told through the Inspector-General of Prisons, 
Tripura by communication dated November 11, 1988 that the next date of 
hearing as fixed by the Board will be intimated. It was contended that 
opportunity was not afforded to the detenu to appear and produce his 
witnesses before the Advisory Board. 
There was a communication gap. Though the Advisory Board is not a 
judicial body and is charged with the responsibility of advising the executive 
government, but when it advises in favour of the detenu, namely, that there 
was no sufficient cause for detention, it would be binding upon the 
government under S. 12(2) of the Act to release the detenu forthwith. The 
detenu in this case did not have the opportunity to show that there was no 
sufficient cause for his detention. Expressing inability to appear once could 
not have been treated as the detenu's not desiring to be heard under S. 11(2) of 
the Act. In fact he desired to be heard and to produce his witnesses. The result 
was that despite the State Government's communication he was deprived of 
this opportunity. 
As a result of the amendments of the National Security Act applicable 
to, the State of Punjab and the U.T. of Chandigarh, on one hand there is 
addition to the grounds of detention and on the other, there is extension of the 
period during which a person could be detained without obtaining the 
opinion of the Advisory Board. There is, however, no amendment as to the 
safeguards provided under Art. 22 and Ss. 9, 10 and 11 of the Act. Indeed, 
there could be no such amendment. Lex uno ore omnes alloquitur. Law 
addresses all with one mouth or voice. Quotiens dubia interpretatio libertatis 
est secundum libertatem respondendum erit — Whenever there is a doubt 
between liberty and bondage, the decision must be in favour of liberty. State 
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of Punjab v. Sukhpal Singh, (1990) 1 SCC 35, 55? 59: 1990 SCC (Cri) 1: AIR 
1990 SC 231:1990 Cri LJ 584. 
(iii) Representation by friend/lawyer before Board 
Detenu's request for being represented by lawyer must be made before the 
Advisory Board and not before Government — On receipt of such request the 
Board must take a decision in the matter considering the merits of each case 
- Constitution of India, Arts. 22(1) and 21 - COFEPOSA Act} 1974, S. 8(e) 
While S. 8(e) disentitles a detenu from claiming as of right to be 
represented by a lawyer, it does not disentitle him from making a request for 
the services of lawyer. Often adequate legal assistance may be essential for the 
protection of right to procedural fairness, which is a part of the fundamental 
right guaranteed by Art. 21 of the Constitution, as also right to be heard given 
to the detenu under S. 8(e), COFEPOSA Act. Therefore, where a detenu makes 
a request for legal assistance, his request would have to be considered on its 
own merit in each individual case. In the present case, the Government 
merely informed the detenu that he had no statutory right to be represented 
by a lawyer before the Advisory Board. Since it was for the Advisory Board 
and not for the Government to afford legal assistance to the detenu the latter, 
when he was produced before the Advisory Board, could have, if he was so 
minded, made a request to the Advisory Board for permission to be 
represented by a lawyer. He preferred not to do so. In the special circum-
stances of the present case it cannot be held that the detenu was wrongfully 
denied the assistance of counsel so as to lead to the conclusion that procedural 
fairness was denied to him.382 
Legal assistance in proceedings before Advisory Board — Though detenu has 
no right to such assistance, held, he is entitled to make a request in that regard 
and the Board is bound to consider the same and take a reasonable decision 
— Permitting the detaining authority to be represented by counsel while 
denying legal assistance to the detenu despite his requests, held, violative of 
Arts. 14 and 21 — Constitution of India, Arts. 14 and 21 — Prevention of 
Blackmarketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 
1980 (7 of 1980), S. 11 - COFEPOSA Act, 1974, S, 8(e) 
Arbitrariness is the very antithesis of Art. 14. The principle of 
reasonableness is an essential element of equality and the procedure 
contemplated by Art. 21 must answer the test of reasonableness in order to be 
in conformity with Art. 14. The history of personal liberty is largely the 
history of procedural safeguards for observance of procedural safeguards, 
particularly in cases of deprivation of life and liberty is, therefore, of prime 
importance to the body politic. It is increasingly felt that in the context of 
"deprivation of life and liberty" under Art. 21, the "procedure established by 
law" carries with it the inherent right to legal assistance. The right to be heard 
before the Advisory Board would be in many cases, of little avail if it did not 
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. 
382. Kavita v. State of Maharashtra (I), (1981) 3 SCC 558, 564, 565: 1981 SCC (Cri) 743: AIR 
1981 SC 1641. 
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The Advisory Board is expected to act in a manner which is just and 
fair to both the parties. It is the arbitrariness of the procedure adopted by the 
Advisory Board that vitiates the impugned order of detention. While there is 
no right under S. 11(4) of the Prevention of Black-marketing and Maintenance 
of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980 or S. 8(e) of the COFEPOSA 
Act to legal assistance to a detenu in the proceedings before the Advisory 
Board, he is entitled to make such a request to the Board and the Board is 
bound to consider such a request when so made. 
In the present case? the detenu made such a request, but in the absence 
of the record of the Advisory Board, it is not possible to infer whether the 
request was considered. Even if it was denied, as the petitioner himself 
allegess there was no rational basis for a differential treatment. Under S. 11(4) 
the detenu had no right to legal assistance in the proceedings before the 
Advisory Board, but it did not preclude the Board to allow such assistance to 
the detenu, when it allowed the State to be represented by an array of 
lawyers. 383 
Legal representation before Advisory Board - No right in detenu to claim -
Board has discretion to such representation in particular circumstances -
COFEPOSA Act, 1974 (52 of 1974), S. 8(e) - Constitution of India, Art. 21 
Section 8(e) of the COFEPOSA Act only lays down that the detenu cannot 
claim representation by a lawyer as of right. It has given the Board a 
discretion to permit or not to permit representation of the detenu by counsel 
according to the necessity in a particular case. Certain cases may be 
complicated and assistance of lawyers may be necessary on behalf of the 
parties to explain the facts and law involved in the case. 
However, the contention that the Advisory Board's rejection of the 
detenu's request for representation by a lawyer on the ground that in the past 
no legal representation had been allowed on behalf of any detenu was based 
on misconception of law is not acceptable because in this case: (1) the Board 
was not a party before the Court and (2) and Court's decision on the point 
would be merely academic as after the rejection of the request the Board 
reviewed the case of the detenu and gave its opinion whereupon the 
Government confirmed the detention. 3^4 
Board directing presence of Customs Officers with files before it while 
disallowing detenu's request for being represented by someone - Held, Art. 
14 not violated - Constitution of India, Art 14 - COFEPOSA Act 1974 S 
8(c). 385 
[Ed.: In Phillippa Anne Duke v. State of T.N., (1982) 2 SCC 389, the Court held 
that merely allowing some Customs Officers to be present in the corridor so 
as to enable them to produce the relevant files whenever required for perusal 
383. Nand Lai Bajaj v. State of Punjab, (1981) 4 SCC 327; 1981 SCC (Cri) 841: AIR 1981 SC 
2041:1981 CriLJ 1501. 
384. Hemlata Kantilal Shah v. State of Maharashtra, (1981) 4 SCC 647, 652- 1982 SCC (Cri) 
16: AIR 198 ISC 8. 
385. Suresh Bhojraj Chelani v. State of Maharashtra, (1983) 1 SCC 382: 1983 SCC (Cri) 202-
AIR 1983 SC 181:1983 Cri LJ 342. 
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by the Board while disallowing the detenu's demand for representation 
would not amount to inequality of treatment before the Board.] 
Detenu has a right to be represented by a friend who is not a legal practitioner 
- Denial of such right would amount to non-compliance with the procedure 
by the Board which would vitiate entire proceedings before it and render 
continued detention of the detenu illegal - Constitution of India, Art, 21 -
COFEPOSA Act, 1974, S. 3.386 
A.K. Roy V. Union of India, (1982) 1 SCC 271: 1982 SCC (Cri) 152; Devji 
Vallabhbhai Tandel v. Administrator cfGoa, Daman & Diu, (1982) 2 SCC 222:1982 
SCC (Cri) 403, followed 
Detenu's right to be represented by a friend - Arises when detaining 
authority is allowed to be represented by high-ranking government officers -
In such circumstances, derual of representation by a friend to detenu "would 
vitiate his detention - Prevention of Blackmarketing and Maintenance of 
Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980, Ss. 11 and 12 - Constitution of 
India, Art. 22(4) and (5). 
The opinion of the Advisory Board under S. 11(2) as to sufficient cause 
is required to be reached with equal opportunity to the State as well as the 
person concerned, no matter what the procedure. It is important for laws and 
authorities not only to be just but also appear to be just. The action that gives 
the appearance of unequal treatment or unreasonableness — whether or not 
there is any substance in it — should be avoided by the Advisory Board. 
Therefore, it is the duty of the Advisory Board to see that the case of detenu is 
not adversely affected by the procedure it adopts. It must be ensured that the 
detenu is not handicapped by the unequal representation or refusal of access 
to a friend to represent his case. 
In the instant case, since the Advisory Board has heard the high-
ranking officers of the Police Department and others on behalf of the 
government and detaining authority, it ought to have permitted the detenu to 
have the assistance of a friend who could have made an equally effective 
representation on his behalf. Since that has been denied to the detenu, the 
High Court, was justified in quashing the detention order. 3«7 
Legal representation - Denial of right of counsel to detenu not 
unconstitutional - He can, however, take help of a friend - Government not 
allowed to put up lawyers or officers to put forward its case before Advisory 
Boards unless it gives the same right to the detenu -National Security Act, 
1980, Ss. 9,10,11. 
Regarding procedure before the Advisory Board the Constihition itself 
by Art. 22(3) (fr) denies to a detenu under preventive detention the right to 
consult a legal practitioner or to be defended by him. Since the Constitution as 
originally constituted so provided it cannot be said to be unfair, unjust or 
386. Abdul Zabbar v. State of Rajasthan, (1984) 1 SCC 443:1984 SCC (Cri) 106- AIR 1983 SC 
505:1983 Cri LJ 853:1983 MLJ (Cri) 526. 
387. State of A.P. v. Balajangam Subbarajamma, (1989) 1 SCC 193, 203- 1989 SCC (Cri) 75-
AIR 1989. SC 389: (1989) 21 ECC17:1989 Cri LJ 853. ' 
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unreasonable since the standard of reasonableness and fairness for Arts. 19 
and 21 is provided by the Constitution itself. The rights available to an 
accused can be different from those available to a detenu. 
Also under Art. 22(5) the written representation of the detenu does not 
have to be expatiated upon by a legal practitioner. 
While the detenu has no right to appear through a legal practitioner in 
the proceedings before the Advisory Board, the detaining authority or the 
Government also cannot take the aid of a legal practitioner or a legal adviser 
before the Advisory Board. This bar would apply also to officers of the 
Government in the concerned departments even though they are not legal 
practitioners or legal advisers. Else Art, 14 requires that if the detaining 
authority or the Government takes the aid of a legal practitioner or an adviser 
before the Advisory Board, the detenu must be allowed the facility of 
appearing before the Board through a legal practitioner. 
The embargo on the appearance of legal practitioners, however, does 
not extend to preventing the detenu from being aided or assisted by a friend 
who, in truth and substance, is not a legal practitioner. A detenu, taken 
straight from his cell to the Board's room, may lack the ease and composure to 
present his point of view. The friend would assist him to give coherence to his 
stray and wandering ideas. Incarceration makes a man and his thoughts dis-
hevelled. So whenever demanded the Advisory Board must grant this facility. 
388 
Legal representation — Detenu's right to - Detention order passed by 
Administrator of a Union Territory under COFEPOSA Act — Held, detenu 
has no right to appear through a lawyer before the Administrator or before 
the Advisory Board — A friend or agent of the detenu may, however, 
represent the detenu provided he is not a legal practitioner — COFEPOSA 
Act, 1974 (52 of 1974), S. 8(e) - Constihition of India, Art. 22(5). 
A detention matter which is pending before the Administrator is a 
'matter connected with the reference to the Advisory Board' within the 
meaning of S. 8(e) of the COFEPOSA Act and therefore, the detenu has no 
right to appear before the detaining authority or before the Advisory Board 
by a legal practitioner. 
In view of Art. 22(3) any law providing for preventive detention would 
not be unconstitutional even if it contravenes Art. 22(1) and (2). Thus a person 
detained under a law providing for preventive detention cannot claim as a 
matter of constitutional right to consult and be defended by a lawyer of his 
choice. 
Assuming that the right to make a representation and the 
corresponding obligation cast on the detaining authority to consider the 
representation expeditiously is not a matter connected with the reference to 
the Advisory Board and that both are independent stages, it cannot be said 
that the refusal of the Administrator to hear the Advocate of the detenu while 
388. A. K. Roy v. Union of India, (1982) 1 SCC 271: 1982 SCC (Cri) 152: AIR 1982 SC: 710: 
1982 Cri LJ 340:1982 MLJ (Cri) 524. 
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considering the representation would be denial of conimon law right of the 
to be represented by an agent. It is implicit in Art. 22(5) that the 
representation has to be a written representation communicated through the 
Jail Authorities or through any other mode which the detenu thinks fit of 
adopting but the detaining authority is under no obligation to grant any oral 
hearing at the time of considering the representation. Now, if the 
representation has to be a written representation, there is no question of 
hearing anyone much less a lawyer. 
A 'friend' who, in truth and substance, is a friend of the detenu may 
appear for the detenu but if such a 'friend' also happens to be a legal 
practitioner, he can not as of right, appear before the Advisory Board on 
behalf of the detenu. The same reasoning will apply to appearance by an 
'agent'. In passing it must be stated that a man has a right to appoint an agent 
which may be called a common law right, but there is no obligation on the 
other side to deal with the agent. The other side has an equal right to refuse to 
deal with an agent. But a 'friend' or an 'agent' of the detenu who is essentially 
a comrade in the profession of the detenu for which he is detained, such a 
'friend' or 'agent' will also be barred from appearance on of the detenu. 
In the present case in response to the telegram of the detenu's lawyer to 
the Administrator asking for time and place for appearing before him on 
behalf of the detenu, the Administrator only advised the lawyer that the 
detenu could make representation to him through Jail Authorities. Such 
gratuitous9 advice can hardly mislead a lav^er. 389 
Legal representation before the Board — Where Advisory Board, consisting of 
High Court Judges, after hearing the detenus considered it not necessary to 
provide legal representation to the detenus, held, Supreme Court's 
interference is not called for — Representation by a 'friend' can be allowed by 
the Board only when so demanded by the detenus — Proceedings before the 
Board, held, not vitiated on ground of absence of a friendly representation 
where no such demand made — Merely allowing some Customs Officers to 
be present in the corridor so as to enable them to produce the relevant files 
whenever required by the Board, while disallowing detenus' demand for 
representation, held, would not amount to inequality of treatment before the 
Board - Constitution of India, Arts, 14 and 22(7) - COFEPOSA Act, 1974 (52 
of 1974), S. 8(e). 39o 
Natural justice - Detenu's allegation that opportunity of being represented 
by a friend who was not a lawyer denied by the Board - Statement of 
secretary of the Board in his affidavit that officers of the Department were not 
present at the time of hearing and that no request was made by detenu for 
being represented, being of a responsible officer, acceptable - Detention 
order not vitiated on ground of violation of natural justice. 3^1 
389. Devji Vallabhbhai Tandel v. Administrator, (1982) 2 SCC 222:1982 SCC (Cri) 403- AIR 
1982 SC 1029:1982 Cri L] 799. 
390. Phillippa Anne Duke v. State of T.N., (1982) 2 SCC 389:1982 SCC (Cri) 444: AIR 1982 SC 
1178:1982 Cri LJ1389. 
391. Tusher Govindji Shah v. Union of India, (1985) 1 SCC 571:1985 SCC (Cri) 135- AIR 1985 
SC 511:1985 Cri LJ 793. 
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Representation by friend — Though Board permitted detenu to be 
represented by a friend, detenu failed to take friends help — No 
representation made before the Board that adequate time had not been given 
to get the services of a friend — In the circumstances held, cannot take the 
advantage of his own lapses and raise a contention that detention order was 
illegal because he was not represented by a friend before the Board's meeting 
— National Security Act, 1980, S. 1L.392 
Representation by lawyer or friend -
Services of two persons available for understanding the statement of 
the detenu and deciphering his representation in Gujarati which was 
forwarded to the Board by State Government — On facts held, ground of not 
allowing the detenu to be represented properly before Advisory Board cannot 
be sustained - COFEPOSA Act, 1974, S. 8.393 
Representation by nest friend — 
Whether absence of next friend would vitiate proceeding before the 
Board — Test to determine is one of prejudice in making effective 
representation of case at the hearing before the Board — Detenu failing to 
available his friend on the date of hearing when Board enquired about such a 
— Board finding the detenu to be worldly wise, sufficiently educated, not 
suffering from any deficiency and in a fit condition to represent his case, 
declining to adjourn and proceeding without any representation of detenu by 
a friend — Held, detenu not prejudiced in making effective representation of 
his case before the Board in absence of a friend. Asha Keshavrao Bhosale v. 
Union of India, (1985) 4 SCC 361,369:1985 SCC (Cri) 561: AIR 1986 SC 283. 
Taking assistance of a friend in proceedings before, where detaining authority 
assisted by high officials — When should be allowed — Triend in the context 
— of— Detenu seeking assistance of a retired official was justified — On 
refusal detention vitiated - COFEPOSA Act, 1974, S. 8(e). 
The detenu, a clearing and forwarding agent aged around 26 or 27 
years was detained under S. 3(l)(i) of the COFEPOSA Act. On the date of 
hearing of the representation of the detenu by the Advisory Board, while the 
detaining authority was being assisted by a Deputy Collector and a 
Superintendent of Customs and Central Excise the specific request of the 
detenu to permit a retired Assistant Collector of Central Excise to assist him 
as a friend was rejected by the Board on the ground that on being asked the 
said retired Assistant Collector had admitted that he was not a friend of the 
detenu, though he was inclined to assist the detenu because of his 
professional experience. The detenu contended that he had sought assistance 
of the friend the retired Asstt Collector because the case before the Board 
involved certain facts which required acquaintance with the legal provisions 
and the procedure and practice adopted by the customs authorities with 
which he was not well versed. The present appeal by special leave was 
preferred by the father of the detenu against the dismissal of writ petition by 
392. Sharad Kumar Tyagi v. State of U.P., (1989) 1 SCC 736:1989 SCC (Cri) 294: AIR 1989 SC 
764: (1989)1 SCR 257. 
393. Prakash Chandra Mehta v. Commr. and Secy, Govt, of Kerala, 1985 Supp SCC 144,170: 
1985 SCC (Cri) 332: AIR 1986 SC 687. 
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the High Court challenging the order of detention against his son. Allowing 
the appeal. 
Held: 
In the facts of the case if the retired Assistant Collector had been 
permitted to the detenu his case would have been better placed before the 
Advisory Board. Moreover, as the detaining authority had the assistance of 
the Deputy Collector of Central Excise and a Superintendent of Central 
Excise, who play the role of legal advisers, the Board had no justification to 
refuse assistance of the retired Assistant Collector to the detenu. In view of 
the position of law and the facts of the case, the refusal by the Advisory Board 
to permit the detenu to be assisted by the retired Assistant Collector as a 
friend was bad and continued detention of the became vitiated. 
The term 'friend' used In the judgments of the Court was more in the 
sense of an 'ally' or a 'supporter' than meaning a person known well to 
another and regarded with liking, affection and loyalty'. A person not being a 
friend in the normal sense could be picked up for rendering assistance within 
the frame of the law as settled by the Supreme Court. The Advisory Board 
has, of course, to be careful in permitting assistance of a friend in order to 
ensure due observance of the policy of law that a detenu is not entitled to 
representation through a lawyer. What cannot be permitted directly should 
not be allowed to be done in an indirect way. 
It is, however, not for the Court to examine and assess what prejudice 
had been caused to the detenu on account of assistance by a friend. Matters 
relating to preventive detention are strict proceedings and warrant full 
compliance with the requirements of law. 394 
(iv) Evidence 
Evidence — Detenu entitled to present his own evidence oral, or 
documentary, to rebut the allegations made against him — National Security 
Act, 1980, Ss, 9,10 & 11. 
There can be no objection in granting to the detenu the right to lead 
evidence in rebuttal before the Advisory Board. Neither the Constitution nor 
the National Security Act contains any provision denying to the detenu the 
right to his in rebuttal of the allegations made against him. The detenu 
therefore offer oral and documentary evidence before the Advisory Board in 
order to rebut the allegations which are made against him. 
But, if the detenu desires to examine any witnesses, he shall have to 
keep them present at the appointed time and no obligation can be cast on the 
Advisory Board to summon them. The Advisory Board, like any other 
tribunal, is free to regulate its own procedure within the constraints of the 
Constitution and statute. It would be open to it, in the exercise of that power, 
to limit the time within which the detenu must complete his evidence.^^s 
Whether Board considered documentary evidence produced by the detenu — 
Affirmative inference drawn from the facts that the Board comprised High 
394. Johney D'Couto v. State of T.N., (1988) 1 SCC 116,119 to 121: 1988 SCC (Cri) 70: AIR 
1988 SC109; (1988) 63 Com Cas 781:1988 Cri LJ178. 
395. A.K. Roy v. Union of India, (1982) 1 SCC 271:1982 SCC (Cri) 152: AIR 1982 SC 710:1982 
Cri LJ 340:1982 ML] (Cri) 524. 
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Court Judges and that the detenu himself was a practising advocate — Board 
is required to furnish its conclusion only and not the reasons, pleas, evidence 
produced by the parties etc. in its report — It is therefore not proper to 
conclude from the report that the Board did not consider documentary 
evidence. 
* 
There was no justification to hold that the documentary evidence 
produced by the detenu had not been considered by the Board. The Board is 
not required to write out a judgment wherein one would expect mention of 
the respective pleas, materials produced by the parties, specification of 
contentions advanced and reasons for the conclusion as may have been 
drawn. What is required is the unbiased and impartial conclusion on the 
materials available with reference to the grounds of detention as to whether 
the detention order when made and the continued detention of the person 
concerned are justified. 
The Advisory Board in the instant case was constituted by three Judges 
of the High Court, one of them being the Chairman. That would justify the 
assumption that the members of the Board by their professional ability and 
acumen were capable to assess the matter in a proper way and form an 
objective opinion on the basis of materials produced. The detailed conclusion 
with reasons given by the Board has also been disclosed. That shows that the 
detenu made before the Board very lengthy arguments and cited a number of 
authorities in support of his submissions. The detenu in the instant case is a 
practising advocate and it can be assumed that such a practising advocate 
must have very properly placed his points before the Board. ^^ ^ 
(v) Examination and cross-examination of witnesses 
Cross-examination — Detenu does not have right to cross-examine the 
persons on whose statements the detention is based or the detaining authority 
itself - National Security Act, 1980, Ss. 9,10,11. 
Regarding a right to the detenu of cross-examination, the primary 
question that arises is whether it is an integral and inseparable part of the 
principles of natural justice. 
A detenu cannot claim the right of cross-examination in the proceeding 
before the Advisory Board. The question for consideration of the Board is not 
whether the detenu is guilty of any charge but whether there is sufficient 
cause for the detention of the person concerned. The proceeding of the 
Advisory Board has therefore to be structured differently from the proceeding 
of judicial or quasi-judicial tribunals, before which there is a lis to adjudicate 
upon. 
Also in cases of preventive detention, witnesses would be most 
reluctant to testify and often it may harm public interest to disclose their 
identity. It is therefore, difficult, in the very nature of things, to give to the 
detenu the full panoply of rights which an accused is entitled to have in order 
to disprove the charges against him. Just as there can be an effective hearing 
396. State of Rajasthan v. Shamsher Singh, 1985 Supp SCC 416, 427, 428:1985 SCC (Cri) 421: 
AIR 1985 SC1082:1985 Cri LJ1348. 
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without legal representation even so, there can be an effective hearing 
without the right of cross-examination. The nature of the inquiry involved in 
the proceeding in relation to which these rights are claimed determines 
whether these rights must be given as components of natural justice. 
Hence, in the proceedings before the Advisory Board, the detenu has 
no right to cross-examine either the persons on the basis of whose statement 
the order of detention is made or the detaining authority. ^^ '^  
Detenu has no right to cross-examine in proceedings before the Board. 
398Detenu has right to examine defence witnesses in rebuttal of allegations 
against him if the witnesses are present and willing — In absence of any 
statutory prohibition in this regard, this right must be read into the statute — 
Any contrary procedural regulation of the Board would be invalid — Board 
erred in denying this right to the detenu, and instead allowing him only to 
produce affidavits of the witnesses - COFEPOSA Act, 1974, S. 8(b) and (c) 
The detenu has a right to lead evidence in rebuttal of the allegation 
against him before the Advisory Board. This right being a right in the nature 
of a constitutional safeguard embodied in Art, 22(5) as construed by Supreme 
Court in A.K. Roy case has necessarily to be deemed to be incorporated in the 
statute dealing with detention without trial viz. S. 8(b) and (c) of the 
COFEPOSA Act S. 8 of the COFEPOSA Act is a sequel to Art. 22(7)(e). There is 
nothing in S. 8 prohibiting oral evidence of the witnesses tendered by a 
detenu being taken. The concept of inquiry by the Advisory Board takes 
within its ambit this aspect of 'hearing' also. If this right is denied to a detenu 
the necessary consequence must follow. 
All that is necessary is that the detenu should keep the witnesses ready 
for examination at the appointed time since there is no obligation on the 
Advisory Board to summon them. The Board is entitled to regulate its own 
procedure within the constraints of the Constitution and the statute and this 
procedure is referable to the time limit within which the Advisory Board must 
complete its inquiry. The Board had not regulated any procedure that oral 
evidence will not be permitted when it inquires into orders of detention. Even 
if there was any such procedure it would be of no legal consequence after the 
law in this behalf had been laid down in A.K. Roy case. 
Unless there is any legal bar for oral evidence of the detenu being 
adduced before the Advisory Board it should be left to the detenu to choose 
between affidavit evidence and oral evidence subject of course to the rigorous 
limitation placed upon this right by the Court in A.K. Roy case relating to 
constraints of time. 
It is wrong to say that the witnesses on behalf of the detenu produced 
in rebuttal of the allegation against him cannot be cross-examined. Cross-
examination of such witnesses has to be by the detaining authority and that 
right cannot be denied to them. ^^ ^ 
397. A.K. Roy v. Union of India, (1982) 1 SCC 271:1982 SCC (Cri) 152: AIR 1982 SC 710:1982 
Cri LJ 340:1982 MLJ (Cri) 524. 
398. Devji Val-labhbhai Tandel v. Administrator, (1982) 2 SCC 222:1982 SCC (Cri) 403: AIR 
1982 SC 1029:1982 Cri LJ 799. 
399. Harbans Lai v. ML. Wadhawan, (1987) 1 SCC 151, 155 to 159: 1987 SCC (Cri) 47: AIR 
1987 SC 217:1987 Cri LJ 324: (1987) 12 ECC128. 
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Natural justice — Examination of detenu's witnesses and assistance of 
detenu's friend — Specific prayer regarding, must be made by detenu in 
proceedings before the Board and not merely in his representation to the 
Board — In absence of such a prayer, held, the Board cannot be said to have 
acted illegally and in violation of principles of natural justice in taking a 
decision without examining the witnesses and without assistance of detenu's 
friend. 4oo 
Advisory Board cannot consider continuation of detention beyond the date of 
its report. 
The obligation on the Advisory Board under S. 11(2), National Security 
Act, to find sufficient cause for the detention cannot be extended to the 
consideration of the question as to whether it is necessary to continue the 
detention of the person beyond the date on which it submits its report or 
beyond the period of three months after the date of detention. Such question 
is for the detaining authority and not the Board. 
The duty and function of the Advisory Board is to determine whether 
there was sufficient cause for detention of the person concerned on the date 
on which the order of detention was passed and whether or not there is 
sufficient cause for the detention of that person on the date of its report, o^i 
Opinion of Advisory Board for detention exceeding one year — COFEPOSA 
Act, 1974 - Ss. 8(b), (c) and (f), 9(1) and (2) and 10 - Board must specifically 
opine that there was sufficient cause for 'continued detention' of the 
detenu — Omission of words 'continued detention' in the opinion not mere 
clerical or typographical error — Mere opinion regarding necessity of 
'detention', would vitiate detention under Ss. 8 and 9. 0^2 
Jusub Haji Ismail v. State of Gujarat, 1985 Guj LH 617, reversed 
Whether detention continued to be justified on the date of the report of the 
Board even if it was justified on the date of making the detention order — 
Board's failure to consider the question, would not vitiate proceedings before 
it in view of short passage of time (one month) between the two dates and in 
absence of any intervening circumstances requiring compartnientwise 
consideration of the detention on those dates — In the circumstances held, the 
Board's report that there was sufficient cause for detention necessarily 
implied that the detention was found to be justified on both the dates.^ os 
Report of the Board 
Advisory Board's failure to submit its report to the Government within eight 
weeks from the date of detention, held, would render further detention of 
the detenus illegal - J&K Public Safety Act, 1978, S. 16(1) - Constitution of 
India, Art. 22(4) to (7). 
Clauses (4) and (7) of Art. 22 envisage time-bound stages for thb 
processing of a case as it reaches its determination. The obligation placed on 
400. Vijay Kumar v. Union of India, (1988) 2 SCC 57, 66:1988 SCC (Cri) 293: AIR 1988 SC 
934: 17 ECC 82: (1988) 3 Crimes 50. 
401. A.K, Roy v. Union of India, (1982) 1 SCC 271:1982 SCC (Cri) 152; AIR 1982 SC 710:1982 
Cri LJ 340:1982 MLJ (Cri) 524. 
402. Satar Habib Hamdani v. K.S. Dilipsinhji, (1986) 1 SCC 544:1986 SCC (Cri) 91: AIR 1986 
SC 418:1986 Cri LJ 378: (1986) 8 ECC 133. 
403. PhilUppa Anne Duke v. State of T.N.. (1982) 2 SCC 389:1982 SCC (Cri) 444: AIR 1982 SC 
1178:1982 Cri LJ 1389. 
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the Advisory Board under S. 16(1) of the J & K Public Safety Act to submit its 
report within the prescribed period must be construed strictly inasmuch as 
the personal liberty of a person is involved and having regard to the emphasis 
which the Constitution has placed, and which emphasis is reflected in the Act, 
on the necessity of expeditiously determining whether the detention of the 
person concerned should be continued. Any proceedings taken by the 
Advisory Board after the expiry of the prescribed period of eight weeks from 
the date of detention can be of no consequence in supporting the further 
detention of the detenu and the Court cannot grant any adjournment where 
the Board is programmed to sit after expiry of the prescribed period. 0^4 
Advisory Board is required under S, 11 to dispose of within 7 weeks the 
matter 'placed before' it by Government within three weeks from the date of 
detention under S, 10 of National Security Act, 1980. 
Section 10 casts a duty on the appropriate Government to forward to 
the Advisory Board within three weeks from the date of detention, the 
relevant papers pertaining to the detention. Therefore, the words 'place 
before' in that section does not mean anything more than forward to or 
submit before the Advisory Board the relevant papers relating to the 
detention of the detenu. The Advisory Board is a wholly independent body 
which can regulate its schedule of holding meetings and conducting its 
business in accordance with the procedure laid down under S. 11 of the Act 
which has specified a time limit of seven weeks from the date of detention for 
the submission of the Board's report to the appropriate Government, In the 
present case, the Advisory Board disposed of the petitioner's case well within 
the period of seven weeks specified in S. 11(1), Consideration of the case 
beyond three weeks would not therefore, vitiate the detention on the alleged 
ground of violation of S. 10. o^s 
10. REVOCATION OR CONFIRMATION 
(a) Revocation 
The meaning of the verb 'revoke*' and its noun seem to signify that 
revocation is a process of recall of what had been done.^ o^ 
Revocation of detention order — Duty to exercise power of revocation arises 
only when new and relevant facts and circumstances come to light. O^' 
The power of revocation of detention order conferred on the 
appropriate Government under S. 11 of the COFEPOSA Act is independent of 
the power of confirming or setting aside an order of detention under S. 8(f). It 
is an overriding power and is intended to be a check or safeguard against 
arbitrary or improper exercise of power of detention by the detaining 
authority or the State Government, in addition to the protection under Art. 
22(5) available to the detenu by way of making a representation against the 
404. Ashok Kumar Binny v, State ofJ&K, (1982) 1 SCC 174:1982 SCC (Cri) 128: AIR 1982 SC 
978:1982 Cri LJ 848. 
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1985SC697:1985 Cri LJ 533. 
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detention order to the detaining authority, which has to be referred by the 
appropriate Government to the Advisory Board constituted under S. 8(a). 
The power of revocation of detention order under S. ll(l)(b) may 
either be exercised on information received by the Central goverriment from 
its own sources including that supplied by the State Government under 
S. 3(2), or, from the detenu in the form of a petition or representation. It is for 
the Central Government to decide whether or not, it should revoke the order 
of detention in a particular case. The use of the words "at any time" in S. 11, 
gives the power of revocation an overriding effect on the power of detention 
under S. 3. Ordinarily, the Central Government would in such a case like to 
await the Report of the Advisory Board under S. 8(c), before taking any action 
under S. ll(l)(b) but the circumstances may differ, and there may be a case 
where the Central Government finds that the order of detention passed under 
S. 3 is mala fide or constitutes an abuse of power on the part of the State 
Government or an officer of the State Government specially empowered in 
that behalf, it may "at any time", revoke the order of detention, o^s 
Revocation of detention order must be made by the Govt, concerned specified 
in S. 11(1) of COFEPOSA Act - Quashing of order of detention by High 
Court under Art. 226 does not amount to revocation — COFEPOSA Act, 1974, 
S. 11(1). 
The words without prejudice to the provisions of S. 21 of the General 
Clauses Act, 1897, used in S. 11(1) of the Act give expression to the legislative 
intention that without affecting that right which the authority making the 
order enjoys under S. 21 of the General Clauses Act, an order of detention is 
also available to be revoked or modified by authorities named in clauses (a) 
and (b) of S. 11(1) of the Act. 
The power conferred under clauses (a) and (b) of S. 11(1) is an 
extension of the power recognised under S. 21 of the General Clauses Act and 
while under the General Clauses Act the power is exercisable by the authority 
making the order, the named authorities under clauses (a) and (b) of S. 11(1) 
are also entitled to exercise the power of revocation. When the High Court 
exercises jurisdiction under Art. 226 it does not make an order of revocation. 
'Revocation' is a process of recall of what had been done. By issuing a high 
prerogative writ like habeas corpus or certiorari it quashes the order 
impugned before it and by declaring the order to be void and striking down 
the same it nullifies the order. The ultimate effect of cancellation of an order 
by revocation and quashing of the same in exercise of the high prerogative 
jurisdiction vested in the High Court may be the same but the maimer in 
which the situation is obtained is patently different and while one process is 
covered by S. 11(1) the other is not known to the statute and is exercised by an 
authority beyond the purview of S, 11(1). In a situation where the order of 
detention has been quashed by the High Court, S. 11(2) is not applicable and 
the detaining authority is not entitled to make another order under S. 3 on the 
same grounds. 
408. Sat Pal v. State of Punjab, (1982) 1 SCC12:1982 SCC (Cri) 46: AIR 198 ISC 2230. 
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Once the orders of detention are held to be invalid, the declarations 
made subsequently under S. 9 could not be made and would have no 
consequence. 0^9 
Government counsel stating that Central Government had in fact considered 
the report sent by the State Government and saw no reason to revoke the 
order in exercise of its powers under S, 14, N.S. Act — There is no reason to 
doubt the correctness of this statement - Hence challenge on ground of 
non-application of mind not sustainable - National Security Act, 1980, Ss, 
3(2) and 4. 410 
Scope of power of revocation under S. 11 of COFEPOSA Act, 1974 — General 
Clauses Act, 1897, S. 21. 
Section 11 does not confer any power of revocation on an officer of the 
Central or State Government nor does it empower the Central or State 
Government to delegate the power of revocation to any of its officers. Even 
though S. 11 specifies that the powers of revocation conferred on the Central 
Government/State Government are without prejudice to the provisions of 
S. 21 of the General Clauses Act, this reservation will not entitle a specially 
empowered officer to revoke an order of detention passed by him because the 
order of the specially empowered officer acquires 'deemed approval' of the 
State or Central Government, as the may be, automatically and by reason of 
deemed approval the powers of revocation, even in terms of S. 21 of the 
General Clauses Act, will fall only within the domain of the State Government 
and/or Central Government. ^^^ 
Decision on continuation of detention three months need not be made till 
opinion of Advisory Board is received authorising it — Appropriate 
Government is only bound to make the reference to the Advisory Board 
within five weeks and not later — Hence making of reference within the 
statutory period without first determining the period for which detenu was to 
be detained not improper—Constitution of India, Art 22(4) and (7) — 
COFEPOSA Act, 1974, S. 8(b) and (f) 
Whenever any order of detention is made, whether the detention is to 
continue for a period than three months or a period of three months or less or 
the detaining authority has not yet applied its mind and determined how long 
the detention shall be continued, the appropriate Government is bound 
within five weeks from the of detention to make a reference to the Advisory 
Board and if it fails to do so, the continuance of the detention after the 
expiration of the period of five weeks would be rendered invalid. However, it 
is not at all necessary for the detaining authority to apply its mind and 
consider at the time of passing the order of detention or before making a 
reference to the Advisory Board, as to what shall be the period of detention 
409. Ibrahim Bachu Bafan v. State of Gujarat, (1985) 2 SCC 24: 1985 SCC (Cri) 149: AIR 1985 
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and whether the detention is to be continued beyond a period of three months 
or not. The only inhibition on the detaining authority is that it cannot lawfully 
continue the detention for a period longer than three months unless the 
Advisory Board has, before the expiration of the period of three months, that 
is in its opinion sufficient cause for such detention. ^^ ^ 
Government not obliged to record reasons for confirming the maximum 
period of detention - Act, 1974, Ss. 8(f), 10 and 11. 
PerDuttJ. 
Section 10 of the COFEPOSA Act does not provide that in imposing the 
maximum period of detention, any reason has to be given. In confirming the 
order of detention, it may be reasonably presumed that the government has 
applied its mind to all the relevant facts and, thereafter, if it imposes the 
maximum period of detention, it cannot be said that the government has not 
applied its mind as to the period of detention. In any event, under S. 11 of the 
Act, a detention order may, at any time, be revoked or modified by the 
government. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that the detenu was in the 
least prejudiced or that there has been non-application of mind by the 
government to the question of period of detention of the detenu. Per Shetty, J. 
(concurring). 
If the Advisory Board reports that there is in its opinion sufficient 
cause for the detention of the person, the concerned authority may confirm 
and continue the detention of the person for such period as it thinks fit. The 
expression "as it thinks fit" in S. 8(f) of the Act indicates that the concerned 
authority after considering the report of the Advisory Board may fix any 
period for detention. The authority is not required to give any special reason 
either for fixing a shorter period or for fixing the maximum period prescribed 
under S. 10. The opinion of the Advisory Board and the grounds of detention 
are the only basis for confirming and continuing the detention, for any period, 
even up to the maximum period prescribed. Section 11 provides for 
revocation of detention order. The detention order may at any time be 
revoked or modified. When the power to revoke the order of detention could 
be exercised at any time, it is not necessary for the authority to articulate 
special reasons for continuing the for any period much less for the period 
prescribed under the Act. 1^3 
(b) Confirmation 
Protection of Art. 22(4) by requiring confirmation of detention within three 
months by an Advisory Board, held, cannot be evaded by making successive 
detention orders before expiry of three months of the earlier order — S. 15 of 
Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 1985 must therefore be read 
down. 
412. Masuma v. State of Maharashtra. (1981) 3 SCC 566, 571, 572: 1981 SCC (Cri) 750; AIR 
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Even though S. 15(2) permits issuance of a subsequent detention order 
against the same person on the expiry or revocation of an earUer detention 
and that such detention on the same facts cannot exceed 12 months of the 
issuance of the first order, the same to be constitutionally valid in conformity 
with Art. 22(4) must be read down. It, therefore, becomes imperative to read 
down S. 15 of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 1985 which 
provides for the making of successive orders of detention so as to bring it in 
conformity with Art, 22(4) of the Constitution. If there is to be a collision 
between Art. 22(4) of the Constitution and S. 15 of the Act, S. 15 has to yield. 
But by reading down the provision, the collision may be avoided and S. 15 
may be sustained. So read if the report of the Advisory Board is not made 
within three months of the date of detention, the detention becomes illegal 
notwithstanding that it is within three months from the date of the second 
order of detention. '^ ^^  
Confirmation of detention by Central Government — Non-application of 
mind - Failure of Advisory Board, to forward to the Central Government 
complete records of the proceedings) due to non-mention of the Board's 
refusal to allow the detenu to examine defence witnesses who were present 
and willing - Whether confirmation of detention by the Central Government 
amounted to non-application of mind — Question not considered — 
COFEPOSA Act, 1974, S. 8(f). 
The complaint by the detenu's counsel that the Advisory Board failed 
to send the entire records of proceedings before it to the Central Government 
inasmuch as it did not contain all the necessary information regarding the 
availability of the witnesses, the readiness of the detenu to examine them, 
rejection of the request to examine them and directing instead filing of the 
affidavits, cannot be said to be wholly unjustified. However, it is not 
necessary to go into the contention regarding non-application of mind of the 
Central Government on the ground of absence of full information before if 
due to failure of the Advisory Board to mention in the record forwarded by it 
to the Government about presence of the defence witnesses and the Board's 
refusal to record their evidence, ^ is 
Competent authority to pass — Detention order passed by Secretary but con-
firmation order passed by the Minister of State for Home Affairs - That 
Minister being duly authorised by the Chief Minister to pass requisite 
confirmation orders, held, order passed by him valid - COFEPOSA Act, 
1974, S. 8(f). 416 
Failure to mention period of detention in confirmation order passed by 
Government, held, would not vitiate that order - Such failure implies that 
the detention is for the maximum period specified in the Act - Detention 
414. Abdul Latif Abdul Wahab Sheikh v. B.K. Jha, (1987) 2 SCC 11, 25: 1987 SCC (Cri) 244-
AIR 1987 SC 725:1987 Cri LJ 700. 
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AIR 1983 SC 181:1983 Cri LJ 342. ' 
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beyond the maximum period will be illegal - COFEPOSA Act, 1974, Ss. 8(f), 
9 and 10. «7 
Application of mind by confirming authority - Whether deposition of 
defence witness not considered by confirming authority — Advisory Board in 
its report referring to evidence of the defence witness — Confirming 
authority, having considered the report of Advisory Committee, held, cannot 
be said to have not applied his mind to the evidence of the defence witness -
Advisory Board not obliged to refer in detail evidence of the defence witness 
in its report and hence non-mention of relevant portion of evidence of such 
witness in the report would not indicate confirming authority's failure to 
consider the same. ^^ ^ 
Confirmation or revocation by Government - National Security Act, 1980, Se 
12 - If Advisory Board's report is against the detention, State Government is 
duty-bound to release the detenu - But if the Board reconmiends the 
detention. Government has option either to confirm or to revoke the 
detention. 4i9 
Detention order passed on September 11 confirmed by State Government 
on October 21 — Confirmation having been made beyond the period of 15 
days prescribed by S. 3(4) of National Security Act, 1980, held, continued 
detention of the petitioner illegal, ^^ o 
11. ORDER OF DETENTION 
Order passed immediately after revocation of the earlier order on the basis 
of report of Advisory Board — State Government failing to defend its 
action despite two adjournments given by the Court — Held, further 
detention of the petitioner would be unconstitutional in the circumstances — 
Constitution of India, Arts. 21 and 22. 2^1 
Basic materials constituting subjective satisfaction in the earlier order of 
detention, which was quashed by High Court, considered along with other 
materials by detaining authority in drawing subjective satisfaction for 
passing the fresh order of detention and not merely for showing the 
antecedents of the detenu — Held, fresh order of detention liable to be 
quashed - Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 1935, S, 3(2).422 
Chhagan Bhagivan Kahar v. N.L Kalna, (1989) 2 SCC 318:1988 SCC (Cri) 367, 
followed 
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Consideration of grounds set out in previous orders of detention which had 
been quashed by court - Held, fatal to the fresh order of detention - Gujarat 
Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 1985, S. 15. 
Under S. 15 of the Gujarat PASAA the modification and revocation of 
detention order by the State Government shall not bar making of another 
detention order on fresh facts when the period of detention has come to an 
end either by revocation or by expiry of the period of detention. However, an 
order of detention cannot be made after considering the previous grounds of 
detention when the same had been quashed by the court, and if such previous 
grounds of detention are taken into consideration while forming the 
subjective satisfaction by the detaining authority in making a detention order 
the order of detention will be vitiated. It is of no consequence if the further 
fresh facts disclosed in the grounds of the impugned detention order have 
been considered. 
In the present case in the grounds of detention specific reference had 
been made to the earlier two orders of detention against the petitioner-detenu. 
In the schedule of documents annexed to the grounds of detention not only 
the copies of the order of detention but also of the grounds of detention in the 
earlier detention cases had been given to the petitioner. Thus the detaining 
authority while considering the fresh facts disclosed in the grounds had taken 
into consideration the previous grounds of detention as well as the orders 
made therein even though the same were nullified by the High Court as well 
as by the Advisory Board, for the purpose of showing that the detenu in spite 
of those earlier orders of detention was continuing in his bootlegging 
activities. 2^3 
Abdul Latif Abdul Waheb Sheikh v. B.K. Jha, (1987) 2 SCC 22; Chhagan 
Bhagwan Kahar v. N.L Kalna, (1989) 2 SCC 318, followed. 
Fresh facts — Grounds taken in earlier detention, which was quashed by 
High Court by issuing writ of habeas corpus, considered as one of the 
material documents, along with other materials, in drawing subjective 
satisfaction in the subsequent order — Held, fresh order of detention vitiated 
thereby - Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 1985, Ss. 3(2) and 
15 - Constitution of India, Art. 226. 
Even if the order of detention comes to an end either by revocation or 
by expiry of the period of detention there must be fresh facts for passing a 
subsequent order. A fortiori when a detention order is quashed by the court 
issuing a high prerogative writ like habeas corpus or certiorari the grounds of 
the said order should not be taken into consideration either as a whole or in 
part even along with the fresh grounds of detention for drawing the requisite 
subjective satisfaction to pass a fresh order because once the court strikes 
down an earlier order by issuing rule it nullifies the entire order. In the 
present case the detaining authority took into consideration, along with the 
other grounds of detention, also the grounds taken in the earlier detention 
423. Jahanglrkhan Fazalkhan v. Police Commr., (1989) 3 SCC 590, 594 595- 1989 SCC (rri\ 
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which had been nullified by the High Court by issuing a prerogative writ of 
habeas corpus. Hence the fresh order of detention is Uable to be set aside.424 
Fresh order of detention on the same grounds cannot be made under S. 11(2) 
read with S, 3 of COFEPOSA Act where previous order quashed by High 
Court under Art. 226 - Such afresh order being invalid, subsequent 
declaration under S. 9 inconsequential - COFEPOSA Act, 1974, Ss. 11(2), 9 
and 3.425 
Referring to incident which stituted subject-matter of an earlier order of 
detention would vitiate the order. 2^6 
(a) Affidavit 
Affidavit must be filed by the detaining authority who actually passed the 
Girder - Mere holder of office of that authority cannot arrogate to substitute 
subjective satisfaction of that authority and therefore not competent to file 
affidavit justifying the detention - National Security Act, 1980 (65 of 1980), 
S. 3. 427 
Though normally detaining authority should personally affirm on oath the 
stand by him, but this is not an inflexible rule and depends upon 
circumstances of each - Where Home Minister who was detaining authority 
was not available having ceased to be a minister before filing of affidavit, and 
the then Deputy Secretary, Home who was fully conversant with the case had 
filed his affidavit and original file was also produced before Court to dispel 
any doubt as to subjective satisfaction of detaining authority, held, failure of 
detaining authority to file affidavit personally not of much importance — 
Detention order- Application of mind - COFEPOSA Act, 1974, S. 3.428 
Counter-affidavit — Should disclose all such facts and documents as are 
relevant for the purposes of the writ petition and necessary for its disposal — 
Constitution of India, Art, 32.429 
Counter-affidavit in response to writ petition filed by detenu — Should be 
filed by detaining authority especially in sensitive cases of detention - But 
failure to do so would not ordinarily vitiate the detention in absence of 
allegations of mala fides - Constitution of India, Arts. 226 and 32 - Habeas 
corpus, writ of. 
In matters of a routine nature, if indeed are any matters of a routine 
nature in the field of detention, a counter-affidavit may be sworn by a person 
424. Chhagan Bhagwan Kahar v. N.L Kalna, (1989) 2 SCC 318? 324:1989 SCC (Cri) 367- AIR 
1989 SC1234:1989 Cri LJ1145. 
425. Ibrahim Bachu Bafan v. State of Gujarat, (1985) 2 SCC 24:1985 SCC (Cri) 149- AIR 
1985 SC 697:1985 Cri LJ 533. 
426. Ahmed-hussain Shaikhhussain v, Commr. of Police, Ahmedabad (1989) 4 SCC 751 
757:1990 SCC (Cri) 86: AIR 1989 SC 2274:1989 Cri LJ 2312. 
427. Biru Mahato v. DM, (1982) 3 SCC 322:1983 SCC (Cri) 31: AIR 1982 SC 1539:1982 Cri LJ 
2354. 
428. State of Gujarat v. Sunil Fulchand Shah, (1988) 1 SCC 6005 604:1988 SCC fCri^  201 • AIR 
1988 SC 723: (1988) 16 ECC16: (1988)1 Crimes 854. y ) • ^ 
429. Ram Jethmalani v. Union of India, (1984) 3 SCC 571:1984 SCC (Cri) 451. ' 
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who derives his knowledge from the record of the case. However, in. sensitive 
matters of the present nature, the detaining authority ought to file his own 
affidavit in answer to the writ petition and place the relevant facts before the 
court which the court is legitimately entitled to know. However, failure to 
furnish the counter-affidavit of the detaining authority may not be of much 
consequence, especially if there was no allegation of mala fides against the 
detaining authority. In the present case there were no allegations of mala fides 
against the D.M., the detaining authority. There are degrees of impropriety 
and the line which divides grave impropriety from illegality is too thin to 
draw and even more so to judge. Conceivably, there can be cases in which 
such impropriety arising out of the failure of the detaining authority,in filing 
his own affidavit may vitiate the order of detention. 430 
Counter-affidavit - Must be filed by detaining authority himself - Affidavit 
of a clerk in the judicial section on behalf of the defaming authority not 
acceptable -Detaining authority failing to file the counter-affidavit despite 
Supreme Court's specific direction in that regard - In absence of any 
explanation or return before the Court to rebut the allegations made by the 
detenu in the writ petition, detention order must be set aside.^ s^ 
Counter-affidavit- Should be of the detaining authority - Counter-affidavit 
filed by Police S.O. indicates that subjective satisfaction of the detaining 
authority was influenced by police personnel. 
The detaining authority had not forward to file an affidavit stating 
whether he had taken into consideration the fact that the appellant was 
already in judicial custody and on considering his past activities he was 
subjectively satisfied that if set free or released from jail custody on bail, there 
was likelihood of the appellant indulging in criminal activities endangering 
public order. On the other hand, the Station Officer of the Police Station, filed 
a counter stating that the District Magistrate passed the impugned detention 
order when the appellant was already in jail on the apprehension that the 
appellant was likely to be on bail in .the near future and if the appellant is 
bailed out, the public order problem will become worse. 
Held: 
This clearly goes to show that the Sub-Inspector had arrogated to 
himself the knowledge about the subjective satisfaction of the District 
Magistrate on whom the -power is conferred by the Act. The District 
Magistrate, the detaining authority in this case, had not to file his affidavit. 
The affidavit-in-opposition filed by the Station Officer of Police implies that 
he had access to the file of the District Magistrate or he influenced the 
decision of the District Magistrate for making the detention order. 432 
430. state of v. Jagdev Taiwandi, (1984) 1 SCC 596, 609, 610:1984 SCC (Cri) 135- AIR 1984 SC 
4441984 Cri LI 177. ' V ; • mivo^^^ 
431. Murnia Tuin v. Distt, Magistrate, (1982) 3 SCC 320; 1983 SCC (Cri) 29- AIR 1982 SC 878-
1982 Cri LJ 630(1). ' ^"^=>^°^o. 
432. Gukb Mehra v. State of U.P., (1987) 4 SCC 302, 316,317:1987 SCC (Cri) 721: AIR 1987 SC 
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Counter-affidavit - Not detaining authority himself - That will not in all 
circumstances be fatal to the sustenance of the order of detention - Though 
could not state whether the documents were relied upon by detaining 
authority or not but in the facts stated in the counter-affidavit, held, this part 
of the statement of the deponent should be taken to be his submission - A 
deponent who has no personal knowledge about any fact may, on the basis of 
some other facts make his submissions to the court.^ ^^ 
Detention order passed by Joint Secretary - But counter-affidavit filed by 
Under Secretary who was dealing with the papers relating to the particular 
order of detention and had placed those papers before the Minister concerned 
- In the circumstances, held, the counter-affidavit can be considered in 
absence of any allegation of mala fide or malice or extraneous consideration 
personally against the detaining authority in making the impugned 
order of detention.^s^ 
Filing of counter-affidavit by detaining authority himself essential where 
personal allegations of mala fide or bias made by detenu against the 
detaining authority^^^ 
Filing of counter-affidavit by detaining authority himself essential where 
personal allegations of mala fide or bias made by the detaining authority, 
Madan Lai Anand v. Union of India, (1990) 1 SQC 81, 92:1990 SCC (Cri) 51: 
AIR 1990 SC176: (1990) 25 ECC 277:1990 Cri LJ 659: (1990) 45 ELT 204. 
Rule Nisi - Counter-affidavit - Who should file - Detention order 
passed by Administrative Secretary and Commissioner, Home Department 
'while counter filed by a Dy. Superintendent of Police claiming himself to be 
person appointed as officer-in-charge of the case but who was not 
connected with the of the detention order and subsequent processing of the 
case — In the circumstances, explanation given in the counter for delay in 
disposal of detenu's representation not acceptable. 
In response to the rule nisi a counter-affidavit should normally be filed 
by the detaining authority himself though it cannot be suggested as a rigid or 
inflexible rule applicable in all cases of detention under all circumstances. 
However, when allegation of mala fide or abuse of powers or personal bias is 
attributed to the detaining authority, the said authority should himself swear 
to the counter-affidavit. In the absence of any such allegation in the petition a 
counter-affidavit may be sworn by a responsible officer who personally dealt 
with or processed the case or by an officer duly authorised under the Rules of 
Business of the government concerned. 
In the present case the reply affidavit and the additional affidavit 
before the High Court as well as the Supreme Court were filed by the Deputy 
AK l^x\ZAmcTml^"'°'' " '"'"• <"^* ' ^ = '''' '^•- '*» ^^ ( « , 500: 
f™5'"'°" '•'" * " " ' ' "• '^ "'™ °""''«' ("*) 1 see 81:1990 SCC (Cril 51' AIR 1<m ^  MI. (1990) 25 ECC 277:1990 Cri LJ 659: (1990) 45 ELT 204. ' 
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Superintendent of Police stating that he was 'appointed as officer in charge in 
this case'. It was shocking and surprising that a poHce officer who had no 
connection whatsoever with the detention order and who had not at any 
relevant time personally dealt with the case has come forward to swear about 
the entire proceedings from the beginning right up to the rejection of the 
representation including the holding of the meeting of the Advisory Board on 
behalf of the appropriate authority, This practice of allowing a police officer 
who has not dealt with the case at any point of time at any level and who in 
the very nature of the case could not have any personal knowledge of the 
proceedings, to swear the counter and reply affidavits on behalf of the 
appropriate authorities should be highly deprecated and condemned and the 
counter and reply affidavits sworn by such officer merit nothing but 
rejection.436 
Counter-affidavit - Pleas not taken up in counter-affidavit cannot be raised 
for the first time before court in writ petition - Constitution of India, Arts. 32 
and 226.437 
Counter-affidavit - When detention order challenged on ground of non-
application of mind, return to the rule of the court should be filed either by 
the detaining authority or a person directly connected with the making of the 
order — Affidavit filed in a casual manner by some other official on the basis 
of record of the case not acceptable — Detention Order.^ ^s 
Detaining authority not filing affidavit justifying detention order — 
Affidavit in opposition filed by Sub-Inspector of Police on behalf of District 
Magistrate, the detaining authority, indicating his knowledge about sub-
jective satisfaction of the detaining authority — Held, amounts to abdication 
of power and hence such affidavit not acceptable — National Security Act, 
1980 (65 of 1980), S. 3. 
A Sub-Inspector of Police cannot arrogate to himself the knowledge 
about the subjective satisfaction of the District Magistrate on whom the power 
is conferred by the Act. In absence of any averment of the Sub-Inspector 
clarifying as to how he came to know about the subjective satisfaction of the 
District Magistrate, whether he had access to the file or he was making the 
affidavit on the basis of the record maintained by the District Magistrate, the 
inference is irresistible that at the behest of Sub-Inspector of Police who was 
the investigating officer in some criminal case in which each of the detenu 
was implicated, the District Magistrate completely abdicating his 
responsibilities, made the detention order. In the circumstances it is not 
possible to take notice of the affidavit in opposition. Merugu Satyanarayana v 
State of A.P., (1982) 3 SCC 301:1983 SCC (Cri) 18: AIR 1982 SC1543-1982 Cri 
LJ 2357. 
436. Gazi Khan v. State of Rajasthan, (1990) 3 SCC 459,462,463- AIR 1990 SC 1361-1990 Cri T1 
1420: (1990) 29 ECC 5. ^ 
437. Piara Singh v. State of Punjab, (1987) 4 SCC 550, 556: 1987 SCC (Cri) 783: AIR 1987 SC 
438. Tsering Dolkar v. Administa-ator, Union Territory of Delhi, (1987) 2 SCC 69- 1987 ^C 
(Cri) 275: AIR 1987 SC 1192:1987 Cri LJ 988. ; ^ ^^^ oy. i w bCC 
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Persons competent to file counter-affidavit on behalf of the State 
In return to a rule nisi issued by Supreme Court or the High Court in a 
habeas corpus petition, the proper person to file the same is the District 
Magistrate who had passed the impugned order of detention and he must 
explain his subjective satisfaction and the grounds therefor ; and if for some 
good reason the District Magistrate is not available, the affidavit must be 
sworn by some responsible officer like the Secretary or the Deputy Secretary 
to the government In the Home Department who personally dealt with or 
processed the case in the Secretariat or submitted it to the Minister or other 
officer duly authorised under the Rules of Business framed by the 
Government under Art. 166 of the Constitution to pass orders on behalf of the 
government in such matters.^ 39 
Counter-affidavit made in writ petition under Art. 32 before Supreme 
Court by Desk Clerk of Home Department - Defect fatal - But affidavits of 
the concerned Police Commissioners filed in detenu's identical writ petition 
under Art. 226 upholding issuance of the detention order and explaining 
grounds and reasons for the same must be considered — So considered, 
held, Government's view expressed in the counter-affidavits could be 
taken into account — Constitution of India, Arts. 32 and 226.^° 
(b) Pleadings 
Impugning High Court's decision before Supreme Court on the ground of 
being based on a wrong statement of facts —In absence of affidavit of the 
counsel who appeared before the High Court, held, such a plea not 
maintainable— Constitution of India, Art 136.441 
Plea — Detenu claiming to have been rendered unable to give proper 
instructions to counsel before Advisory Board - No grievance made by detenu 
in that regard before the Board — Advocate representing the detenu before 
the Board, arguing the detenu's case along with the cases of other detenus — 
Held, the detenu cannot challenge his detention before the Court on ground 
of his advocate's failure to effectively represent his case in absence of proper 
instructions from him - Advisory Board.442 
Plea for release - Whether detenu should be released since other like detenus 
and the detenus had already undergone a substantial period (more than two-
third) of the detention, to be decided by the detaining authority and Court 
cannot give any direction in that regard .443 
439. Mohinuddin v. D.M, (1987) 4 SCC 58, 63,64:1987 SCC (Cri) 674; AIR 1987 SC1977. 
440. Suraj Pal Sahu v. State of Maharashtra, (1986) 4 SCC 378:1986 SCC (Cri) 452- AIR 1986 SC^  
2177:1986 Cri LJ 2047. ^ ^ • 
441. State of Maharashtra v. Ramesh Kumar Shobhraj Jain, (1988) 1 SCC 597-1988 SCC (Cri) 
199: AIR 1988 SC 2138. ' ^ ' 
442. State of Punjab v. Jagdev Talwandi, (1984) 1 SCC 596, 610:1984 SCC (Cri) 135- AIR 1984 
SC 444:1984 Cri LJ 177. ' 
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Even though the High Court was In error in quashing the order of 
detention made against the detenu, he will not be re-arrested and placed in 
custody for the rest of the period of detention having regard to the facts that 
the detenu was a young boy of 19/20 years and that he had already been in 
custody for 5 months and 3 weeks and that no adverse information against 
the detenu had come to the notice of the authorities after he was set at liberty 
by the High Court.444 
State of Bombay v. Purushottam Jog Naik, 1952 SCR 674: AIR 1952 SC 317: 1952 
Cri L] 1269 and Emperor v. Vimalbhai Deshpande, ILR 1946 Nag 651: AIR 1946 PC 
123: (1946) 2 MLJIO, relied on 
Filing of return by State — State counsel requesting adjournment even though 
service effected in New Delhi eight days before— Held, such 
for filing a return and where the detenu's petition shows a prima facie good 
case, detenu entitled to be released provisionally on filing bail bonds — 
Constitution of India, Arts. 32 and 72{5).^^ 
Order wrongly quashed by High Court about 16 months back — While dis-
approving the view taken by the High Court, its judgment and order not 
interfered with by Supreme Court because of long lapse of time — Practice 
and Procedure.^^ 
Statement-of detenu recorded under S. 161 CrPC accepting allegations 
against himself — Can be relied upon for the purposes of preventive 
detention — Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, S. 161. 
The detenu's statement recorded under S. 161 CrPC accepting 
allegations against himself may noH>e a legally recorded corifession which 
can be used as substantive evidence against the accused in the criminal case, 
but it cannot be completely brushed aside on that ground for the of his 
preventive detention.'^'' 
13. FACILITIES AND AMENITIES TO 
Detenu to be afforded all reasonable facilities and amenities including 
meetings with family members. 
It must be impressed on the Government that the detenus must be 
afforded all reasonable facilities for an existence consistent with human 
dignity. There is no reason why they should not be permitted to wear their 
own clothes, eat their own food, have interviews with the members of their 
families at least once a week and, last but not the least, have reading and 
writing material according to their reasonable requirements. 
444. state of Maharashtra v. Sushila Mafatlal Shah, (1988) 4 SCC 490- 1989 SCC iCrW l- ATR 
1988 SC 2090:18 EEC 322. ' \^n) i. ^n^ 
445. Tahira Begum v. B.B. Gujral, (1982) SCC 374:1983 SCC (Cri) 57(1). 
446. State of U.P. v. Ekhlaq Ahmad, 1987 Supp SCC 68:1987 SCC (Cri) 622 
227:' fmlrtlHT ' ' """ ' '^ ^ '^" ^^^^^^' ^^^ ^^^' ^^^'^ ^^^^ ^^^ ^^ "^  "^^ ^^^ 9^88 SC 
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The courts are open to the detenu to determine whether the restraints 
imposed upon the detenu in any particular case are excessive and unrelated 
to the object of detention. If so, they shall have to be struck down.448 
Failure to inform .detenu's members about passing of the order and place of 
detention - Held, not fatal to the detention where detenu was already 
an undertrial prisoner and his relatives knew the fact as one of them had 
visited him in jail within two days of passing the order of detention -
Constitution of India, Art. 21 - COFEPOSA Act, 1974, S. 3(1). 
The object and purpose of the imperative requirement (as enjoined by 
the Supreme Court in A.K. Roy case) of informing the members of the 
detenu's household in writing of the passing of the order of detention and 
taking in custody of the detenu as also the place of detention immediately 
after the detenu is taken in custody pursuant to the order, is that the family 
members of the detenu should not be kept in darkness by withholding the 
information about the passing of the order of detention and the place of 
detention thereby preventing them from having any access and from 
rendering any help or assistance to the detenu and similarly the detenu 
should not be deprived of the privilege of meeting his relations and getting 
any help or assistance. In the present case the family members had sufficient 
knowledge about the detention of the detenu by virtue of the mittimus issued 
as well as about the place of detention.*^? 
Facilities to detenu in jail — Government having no objection to grant the 
desired facilities to the detenu - Matter disposed of.^ so 
DETENTION OF FOREIGNER 
Detention of a foreign national — Not justified having regard to the object of 
preventive detention as also international law and human rights concept — 
International Law - COFEPOSA Act, 1974, S. 3. 
Preventive detention of a foreign national who is not resident of the 
country involves an element of international law and human rights and the 
appropriate authorities ought not to be seen to have been oblivious of its 
international obligations in this regard. The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights include the right to life, liberty and security of a person, freedom from 
arbitrary arrest and detention; the right to fair trial by an independent and 
impartial tribunal; and the right to presume to be an innocent man until 
proved guilty. When an act of preventive detention involves a foreign 
national, though from the national point of view the municipal law alone 
counts in its application and interpretation, it is generally a recognised 
principle in national legal system that in the event of doubt the national rule is 
to be interpreted in accordance with the State's international obligations. 
448. A.K. Roy v. Union of India, (1982) 1 SCC 271; 1982 SCC (Cri) 152: AIR 1982 SC 710-1982 
CriLJ 340:1982 MLJ(Cri) 524. 
449. Union of India v. Vasanbharthi, (1990) 2 SCC 275, 277:1990 SCC (Cri) 317- AIR 1990 ST 
1216:1990 Cri LJ1244: (1990)48ELT 169. 
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There is need for harmonisatior\ whenever possible bearing in mind the spirit 
of the Covenants. Crimen trahit personam. The crime carries the person. The 
commission of a crime gives the court of the place where it is committed 
jurisdiction over the person of the offender. Legal relations associated with 
the effecting of legal aid on criminal matters is governed in the international 
field either by the norms of multilateral international conventions relating to 
control of crime of an international character or by special treaties concerning 
legal cooperation. Smuggling may not be regarded as such a crime. The 
system of extradition of criminals represents an act of legal assistance by one 
State (the requestee) to another State (the requestor) with the aim of carrying 
out a criminal prosecution, finding and arresting a suspected criminal in 
order to bring him to court or'for executing the sentence. In concluding such 
the States themselves on principles of humanitarianism in their, efforts to 
contribute to the more effective achievement of the objectives of the correction 
and re-education of violators of the law. Where such conventions exist, the 
citizens of a State who were convicted to deprivation of freedom in another 
signatory State are in accordance with mutual agreement of the States, 
transferred to the country of which they are citizens to serve their sentences. 
The transfer of the convicted person may take place only after the verdict has 
entered into legal force and may be carried out on the initiative of either of the 
interested States. The punishment decided upon with regard to a convicted 
person is served on the basis of the verdict of the State in which he was 
convicted. On the strength of that verdict the competent court of the State of 
which the person is a citizen adopts a decision concerning its implementation 
and determines. In accordance with the law of Its own State, the same period 
of deprivation of freedom as was assigned under the verdict. While 
ameliorative practices may be available in case of the foreign national being 
criminally prosecuted, tried and punished, no such proceedings are perhaps 
possible when he is preventively detained. There May be where while a 
citizen and resident of the country deserves preventive detention apart from 
criminal prosecution, in case of a foreign national not resident of the country 
he may not be justifiably subjected to preventive detention In the event of 
which no international legal assistance is possible unlike in case of criminal 
prosecution and punishment.^s^ 
Foreign nationals directly involved in smuggling not entitled to be differently 
treated and cannot seek deportation.'*52 
CHALLENGE TO DETENTION AFTER RELEASE 
Detention challenged after release - Action taken under Ss. 6 and 7 of 
SAFEMA on the basis of order of detention under COFEPOSA - Failure of 
detenu to challenge. 
SC 6^5''^'' ^ ' '" '^ ^' ""'''" °^  ^"'^''' ^'^^^^ ^ ^^^ ^^ '^ ^^ '^ ^^ -^ ^^ ^^  ^^^ (C") 227: AIR 1990 
452. Plaridel-0-Daysor v. State of T.N., 1988 Supp SCC 535:1988 SCC (Cri) 883. 
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Particular statutes 
The detention order during his detention due to prevalence of 
Emergency, held, would not operate as estoppel against his right to move the 
court after his release for having his detention order quashed in order to 
challenge the action taken under Ss. 6 and 7 of the SAFEMA - Smugglers 
and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976. Ss, 6 
and 7 - Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling 
Activities Act, 1974, Ss. 3(1) and 5.453 
PARTICULAR STATUTES 
[Note: The cross-references below are not exhaustive and the reader is 
advised to study the synopsis at pages 2654-55 and follow the approach for 
full advantage,] 
(a) A. P. Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug 
Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land 
Grabbers Act, 1986 
S. 2(3) - Afprwal of State gov-eminent - Failure to obtain State Gov-
ernment's approval within statutory period - Held, detention order would 
cease to be in force after that period - A. P. Prevention of Dangerous 
Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic 
Offenders, and Land Grabbers Act, 1986, S. 2(3). 
The detention order had not been approved by the State Government 
within 12 days of its being made as required by S. 3(3) of the AJP, Prevention 
of Dangerous Activities of Boot-leggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, 
Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act. The result is that the order 
could not remain in force more than 12 days after making thereof and as such 
must be treated as to have ceased to be in force and non-existent thereafter.^ 54 
Legal relations associated with the effecting of legal aid on criminal 
matters is governed in the international field either by the norms of 
multilateral international conventions relating to control of crime of an 
international character or by special treaties concerning legal cooperation. 
Smuggling may not be regarded as such a crime.455 
Ss. 2(e) and 3(1) - Smuggling - Raw material imported under Duty Exemption 
Entitlement Scheme by detenu in the name of two fictitious benami firms 
created for that purpose and instead of complying with the condition to 
manufacture its product with the raw material and export the product 
abroad within six months, the goods disposed of in local market - Held, 
activity amounted to smuggling or abetment of smuggling within the 
meaning of Ss. 2(e) and 3(1) of COFEPOSA Act read with Ss. 2(39) and ll(o) 
of Customs Act - Abeyance order passed against the firm before expiry of the 
six-month period cannot be said to be the reason for failure to manufacture 
453. Union of India v. Haji Mastan Mirza. (1984) 2 SCC 427,430:1984 SCC (Cri) 271' AIR 1984 
SC 681:1984 Cri L] 610: (1984) 2 ECC137. ^ ' 
454. S.M.D. Kiran Pasha v. Govt, of A.P., 1 SCC 328,343:1990 SCC (Cri) 110 
Bihar Control of Crime Act, 1981 
455. Kubic Damsz v. Union of India, (1990) 1 SCC 568,581:1990 SCC (Cri) 227: AIR 1990 
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the product when the firms were actually nonexistent and there was neither 
any factory nor any manufacturing device - Customs Act, 1962, Ss. 2(39) and 
11(0).456 
Per Shetty, ]. 
The order made under S. 3(1) is in the nature of an interim order. It is 
subject to the opinion of the Advisory Board under S. 80 of the COFEPOSA 
Act.457 
In the enforcement of a law relating to preventive detention like the 
Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities 
Act, 1974 there is apt to be some delay, between the prejudicial activities com-
plained of under S. 3(1) of the Act and the making of an order of detention. 
When a person is detected in- the act of smuggling or foreign exchange 
racketeering, the Directorate of Enforcement has to make a thorough 
investigation into all the facts with a view to determine the identity of the 
persons engaged in these operations which have a deleterious effect on the 
national economy. Quite often these activities are carried on by persons 
forming a syndicate or having a wide network and therefore this includes 
recording of statements of persons involved, examination of their books of 
accounts and other related documents. Effective administration and 
realisation of the purposes of the Act is often rendered difficult by reason of 
the clandestine manner in which the persons engaged in such operations 
carry on activities and the consequent difficulties in securing sufficient 
evidence to comply with the rigid standards, insisted upon by the courts. 
Sometimes such investigation has to be carried on for months together due to 
the magnitude of the operations. Apart from taking various other measures 
i.e. launching of prosecution of the persons involved for contravention of the 
various provisions of the Acts in question and initiation of the adjudication 
proceedings, the Directorate has also to consider whether there was necessity 
in the public interest to direct the detention of such person or persons under 
S. 3(1) of the Act with a view to preventing them from acting in any manner 
prejudicial to the conservation and augmentation of foreign or with a view to 
preventing them from engaging in smuggling of goods etc. The proposal has 
to be cleared at the highest quarter and is then placed before a Screening 
Committee. The Screening Committee may meet once or twice a month. If the 
Screening Committee approves of the proposal, it would place the same 
before the detaining authority. Being conscious that the requirements of Art. 
22(5) would not be satisfied unless the 'basic facts and materials' which 
weighed with him in reaching his subjective satisfaction, are communicated to 
the detenu and the likelihood that the court would examine the grounds 
specified in the order of detention to see whether they were relevant to the 
circumstances under which the impugned order was passed, the detaining 
authority would necessarily insist upon sufficiency of the grounds which 
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would justify the taking of the drastic measure of preventively detaining the 
person. 
Hence, a distinction must be drav/n between the delay in making of an 
order of detention under a law relating to preventive detention like the 
Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of .Smuggling Activities 
Act, 1974 and the delay in complying with the procedural safeguards of Art 
22(5) of the Constitution. It has been laid down-by this Court in a series of 
decisions that the rule as to unexplained delay in taking action is not 
inflexible. Quite obviously, in cases of mere delay in making of an order of 
detention under a law like the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and 
Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 enacted for the purpose of 
dealing effectively with persons engaged in smuggling and foreign exchange 
racketeering who, owing to their large resources and influence have been 
posing a serious threat to the economy and thereby to the security of the 
nation, the courts should not merely on account of delay in making of an 
order of detention assume that such delay, if not satisfactorily explained, 
must necessarily give rise to an inference that there was no sufficient material 
for the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority that such subjective 
satisfaction was not genuinely reached. Taking of such a view would not be 
warranted unless the court finds that the grounds are 'state' or illusory or that 
there is no real nexus between the grounds and the impugned order of 
detention.458 
Anil Kumar Bhasin v. Union of India, 1987 Cri L] 1632; Bhupinder Singh v. Union 
of India, 1985 DLT493; Anwar Esmail Aibani v. Union of India, Crl Writ No. 375 of 
1986, decided on December 11, 1986 (Del); Surinder Pal Singh v. M. L Wadhazuan, 
(1987) 2 Crimes 449 (Del) and Ramesh Lai v, Delhi Administration, Cri. Writ No, 43 
of 1984, decided on April 16,1984 (Del), overruled 
S. 9(1) — Declaration under - Satisfaction of declaring authority — Whether 
based on materials or vitiated by non-application of mind 
Nothing contained in S. 9 shall affect the power of the appropriate 
government in either case to revoke or modify the detention order at any 
earlier time. This may imply an obligation on the part of the detaining 
authority to place the facts and materials that occurred between the date of 
detention and the date of declaration, so as to justify prolongation of the 
period of detention. However, since non-furnishing of the copies of the bail 
application and the bail order has resulted in violation of Art. 22(5), no 
opinion need be expressed on this submission.^ss 
The purpose and object of S. 10 is to prescribe not only for the 
maximum period but also the method by which the period is to be com-
puted.460 
458. Rajendrakumar Natvarlal Shah v. State of Gujarat, (1988) 3 SCC 153 162-1988 SCC ICri) 575: AIR 1988 SC1255. ^ iJo. lo^. iyoB bLL (Lri) 
459. M Ahamedkutty v. Union of India, (1990) 2 SCC 1,18-1990 SCC (Cri) 258 
ZT^cX^li,7;1'^^^,^::'^ ' ""^ '*'- '''•• « « ' s ee (C„, 506: A« »87 SC 
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The key to the interpretation of S. 10 of the Act is in the words 'may be 
detained'. The subsequent words 'from the date of detention' which follow the 
words 'maximum period of one year' merely define the starting point from 
which the maximum period of detention of one year is to be reckoned in a 
case not falling under S. 9. There is no justifiable reason why the word 'detain' 
should not receive its plain and natural meaning. According to the Shorter 
Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. 1, p. 531, the word 'detain' means "to keep in 
confinement or custody". Webster's Comprehensive Dictionary, International 
Edition at p, 349 gives the meaning as "to hold in custody".46i 
The scheme of S. 12, unless release by the appropriate government is 
taken to be one of parole, keeps away parole from the subject of preventive 
detention. At any rate, it is the appropriate government and not the court 
which deals with a case of temporary release of the detenu. Since the Act 
authorises the appropriate government to make an order of temporary 
release, invariably the detenu seeking to have _ the benefit of temporary relief 
must go to the appropriate government first. It may be that in a given case the 
court may be required to consider the propriety of an adverse order by the 
government in exercise of the jurisdiction under S. 12 of the Act. On the 
principle that exercise of administrative jurisdiction is open to judicial review 
by the superior court, the High Court under Art. 226 or this Court under Art. 
32 may be called upon in a suitable case to examine the legality and property 
of the governmental action. There is no scope for entertaining an application 
for parole by the court straightway.^^2 
Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act 
S. 2(b) — Prejudicial activities — 'Bootlegger' — Person involved in illicit 
liquor traffic business of importing Indian-made foreign liquor into a 
prohibited area, held, falls within S. 2(b) read with S. 3(1). 463 
S. 2(b) — 'Bootlegger' under — 
Reference to crimes under Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 made in the grounds 
but detenu not figured in any one of them and no material of his involvement 
in those cases produced — Held, detenu cannot be said to be a bootlegger —. 
Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 1985, S. 2(b).464 
Ss. 2(b) and 3(4) - 'Bootlegger' -
Activities of bootlegger must be shown to adversely affect maintenance of 
public order under S. 3(4) - Held on facts, disturbance of public order not 
proved — Hence detention on ground of the detenu being a bootlegger not 
sustainable — Basis of detention — Public order 
461. Poonam Lata v, ML. Wadhawan, (1987) 3 SCC 347, 357: 1987 SCC (Cri) 506: AIR 1987 SC 
1987, Cri LJ 1130: (1987) 12 ECC 346. 
462. Poonamlata v. ML. Wadhawan, (1987) 3 SCC 347, 359:1987 SCC (Cri) 506: AIR 1987 SC 
1383:1987 Cri LJ 1130: (1987) 12 ECC 346. 
463. Rajendrakumar Natvarlal Shah v. State of Gujarat, (1988) 3 SCC 153:1988 SCC (Cri) 575: 
AIR 1988 SC 1255. 
464. Ayub v. S.N. Sinha, (1990) 4 SCC 552,554:1990 SCC (Cri) 664: AIR 1990 SC2069. 
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A conjoint reading of S. 2(b) and S. 3(4) with the explanation annexed thereto 
clearly spells out that in order to clamp an order of detention upon a 
'bootlegger* under S, 3 of the Act, the detaining authority must not only be 
satisfied that the person is a bootlegger within the meaning of S. 2(b) but also 
that the activities of the said bootlegger affect adversely or are likely to affect 
adversely the maintenance of public order. In the present case the vague 
allegations in the grounds of detention that the detenu was the main member 
of the gang indulging in bootlegging activities and that the detenu was taking 
active part in such dangerous activities, are not sufficient for holding that the 
activities affected adversely or were likely to affect adversely the maintenance 
of public order in compliance with S. 3(4) of the Act, that the activities of the 
detenu had caused harm, danger or alarm or a feeling of insecurity among the 
general public or any section thereof or a grave or widespread danger to life, 
property or public health as per the explanation to S. 3(4). Therefore, the 
impugned order of detention cannot be sustained on the ground that the 
detenu was a 'bootlegger'. '^^ 
S. 2(c) — 'Dangerous person' under — Habitual offender — Who is — Three 
crimes registered against the detenu out of which detenu acquitted in respect 
of two and the only case pending against him lacking in supporting evidence 
— Held, appellant not a habitual offender and hence not a dangerous person 
— Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 1985, S. 2(c) — Words and 
Phrases— 'Habitual' 
The expression 'habitually' in S. 2(c) of the Gujarat PASA Act is very 
significant. A person is said to be a habitual criminal who by force of habit or 
inward disposition is accustomed to commit crimes. It implies commission of 
such crimes repeatedly or persistently and prima facie there should be a 
continuity in the commission of those offences. 
Though three cases had been registered against the detenu-petitioner, 
he had acquitted in respect of two. Though lengthy counter was filed averring 
in general that the detenu was indulging in prejudicial activities but from the 
solitary case pending investigation against him it cannot be inferred that the 
petitioner was a 'dangerous person' within the meaning of S. 2(c). The 
Sessions Judge in his order releasing the petitioner on bail in the pending case 
has noted that there was no medical evidence to prove that anyone was 
injured in the occurrence alleged in the FIR. If such is the only crime pending 
in which the detenu is alleged to have participated, it cannot be said that he 
comes within the meaning of 'dangerous person' and the conclusions drawn 
by the detaining authority are bereft of sufficient material as required under S. 
2(c) of the Act. This betrays non-application of mind by the detaining 
authority. Consequently, the grounds on which the detention order is passed, 
are irrelevant and non-existing. Therefore, the detention order cannot be 
sustained. 6^6 
465. Rashidmiya v. Police Commr., (1989) 3 SCC 3215 327: 1989 SCC (Cri) 559: AIR 1989 SC 
1703. 
466. Ayub v. S.N. Sinha, (1990) 4 SCC 552,555,556:1990 SCC (Cri) 664: AIR 1990 SC 2069. 
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S. 2(c) — Dangerous person — Detenu must be shown to be a habitual 
offender under Chapter XVI or XVII or XXII of IPC or under Chapter V of 
Arn\s Act — Registration of only one case under S. 307 IPC and S. 25 of Arms 
Act against the detenu falling within the definition — General and vague 
allegations of taking part in communal riots and conspiring to create terror 
being member of a gang made against the detenu in the grounds — Held on 
facts, ground of detenu being a dangerous person not made out 
To bring a person within the definition of 'dangerous person' in S, 2(c) 
of the Act, it be shown that he is habitually committing or to commit or 
abetting the commission of offences punishable Under Ch. XVI or XVII or XXII 
of IPC or under Ch. V of Arms Act. In the instant case, the registration of only 
one case was mentioned under S. 307 of IPC and S, 25 of the Arms Act which 
fell within the definition clause. This solitary incident would hardly be 
to conclude that the detenu was habitually committing or attempting to 
commit or abetting the commission of offences. The general and vague 
made in the grounds of detention that the detenu was taking active part in 
communal riots and entered into conspiracy to spread an atmosphere of 
being a member of a gang, in the of any specific instance or registration of any 
case thereof, cannot be construed as offences falling under any of the above 
three chapters of the IPC or Chapter V of the Arms Act enumerated under S. 
2(c) so as to charac-the detenu as a 'dangerous person'. Thus the conclusions 
drawn by the detaining authority that the detenu is a dangerous person is 
bereft of sufficient material as required under S. 2(c). Therefore, the detenu 
cannot be termed as a 'dangerous person'.^ 67 
S. 3(2). Expln. — Acts of removing permanent way material stocked along rail 
lines for maintenance of rail tracks and removing parts of carriages wagons 
and signal telecommunication materials utilised for repair of railway wagons 
and maintenance of signals fall under. 
For maintaining supplies throughout the country the railways is per se 
essential, and, therefore, interference with railway lines would be 
endangering the maintenance of supplies.'*^^ 
S. 3(2) Expln. — Acts prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services 
to the community — S. 3(2) of National Security Act contemplates acts of 
general nature whereas S, 3(1) read with Explanation of PBMSEC Act 
contemplates acts of particular nature — Prevention of Black-marketing and 
Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980 (Act 7 of 1980). 
S. 3(1) Expln.- The conduct of the detenu was prejudicial to the maintenance 
of supplies and services essential to the community in general as con-
templated by S. 3(2) of the National Security Act and not in any particular 
467. Rashidmiya v. Police Commr., (1989) 3 SCC 321, 326, 327: 1989 SCC (Cri) 559: AIR 1989 
SC1703. 
468. Suraj Pal Sahu v. State of Maharashtra, (1986) 4 SCC 378; 1986 SCC (Cri) 452: AIR 1986 SC 
2177:1986 Cri LJ 2047. 
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mode contemplated by Expln. of S. 3(1) of Act 7 of 1980 and as such is not 
excluded by the Expln. to S. 3(2) of the National Security Act.469 
Ss. 3(3), 5, 8,13 and 16 - Constitutionality of - S. 3(3) upheld - S. 5 only in 
exceptional circumstances can the detenu be put in a jail distant from his 
home — Family must be informed of arrest and place of detention of detenu 
and transfers if any — Ss. 8 13, read are constitutional — Protection to honest 
acts of officers under S. 16 justified — General Clauses Act, 1897, S. 3(22) (1). 
(1) Regarding the constitutionality of S. 3(3), in view of the in-built 
safeguards, it cannot be said that excessive or unreasonable power is 
conferred upon the District Magistrate or the Commissioner of Police to pass 
orders under i sub-section (2). 
(1) Regarding the power to regulate place and conditions of detention under 
S. 5 it is neither fair nor just that a detenu should have to suffer detention in 
'such place' as the Government may specify. The normal rale has to be that 
the detenu will be kept in detention in a place which is near his or her 
ordinary place of residence. To keep a person in a far off place is a punitive 
measure. That makes it impossible for his friends and relatives to meet him 
and for him to claim the advantage of facilities like having his own food etc. 
The requirements of administrative convenience, safety and security may 
justify in a given case the transfer of a to a place other than that where he 
ordinarily resides, but that can only be by way of an exception and not as a 
matter of general rule. Whatever smacks of punishment must be scrupulously 
avoided in matters of preventive detention. 
Moreover, in order that the procedure attendant upon detentions 
should confirm to the mandate of Art, 21 in the matter of fairness, justness 
and reasonableness, it is imperative that immediately after a a person is taken 
in custody in pursuance of an order of detention, the members of his 
household, preferably the parent, the child or the spouse, must be informed in 
writing of the passing of the order of detention and of the fact that the detenu 
has been taken in custody. Intimation must also be given as to the place of 
detention, including the place where the detenu is transferred from time to 
time. It is necessary to treat the detenu consistently with human dignity and 
civilised norms of behaviour. 
(3) No objection can be taken against the provisions of S. 8(1) since 
furnishing of grounds of detention 'as soon as may be' is the normal rule. 
Exceptional circumstances only permit delay within defined days. 
(4) No objection can also be taken against S. 13 providing 12 months as the 
maximum period of detention. There is no obligation to pass detention order 
for 12 months and again, any order can be revoked or modified at an earlier 
point of time. 
(5) Under S. 16 a mala fide order cannot be protected. Only those passed in 
good faith and in pursuance of the National Security Act are protected. 
469. Suraj Pal Sahu v. State of Maharashtra, (1986) 4 SCC 378:1986 SCC (Cri) 452: AIR 1986 SC 
2177:1936 CriLJ 2047. 
290 
Also the challenge to S. 1.6 as being unreasonable is without any force. 
If the policy of a law is to protect honest acts, whether they are done with care 
or not, it cannot be said that the law is unreasonable. In fact, honest acts 
deserve the highest protection. Then again, the line which divides a dishonest 
act from a negligent act is often thin and, speaking generally, it is not easy for 
a defendant to justify his conduct as honest, if it is accompanied by a degree 
of negligence. The fact, therefore, that the definition contained in S. 3(22) of 
the General Clauses Act includes negligent acts in the category of acts done in 
good faith will not always make material difference to the proof of matters 
arising in proceedings under S. 16 of the Act.^ o^ 
S. 3(4) — "No such order shall remain in force for more than twelve days after 
the making thereof unless, in the meantime, it has been approved by the State 
Government" — Computation of period of twelve days — Held, day on which 
order made to be excluded, having regard to the significance of the "word 
'after' — Confirmation of detention — Words and Phrases — 'After' 
In computing the period of twelve days referred to in sub-section (4) of 
S. 3 of the National Security Act, the day on which the cause of action arises 
i.e. the order of detention was passed should be excluded. Though the officer 
making the order of detention shall forthwith report the fact to the State 
Government, but the word 'forthwith' will not be taken into consideration for 
the purpose of computing the period of twelve days inasmuch as there is a 
clear indication that the said period shall be computed 'after' the order is 
made. The word 'after' in sub-section (4) is very significant and clearly 
excludes any contention that in computing the period of twelve days the day 
on which the ojder of detention is passed should be included. The expression 
ssin the meantime" in sub-section (4) clearly indicates that the State 
Government can approve of the order of detention even on the day it is 
passed. The language of sub-section (4) is plain and simple and the question 
whether the order of detention can be approved on the day it is passed or not 
does not at all arise. In the present case the approvaL of the order of detention 
was made within twelve days after the making of the order of detention.*^! 
Prabhu Narain Singh v. Supdt, Central jail, Varanasi, ILR (1961) 1 All 427, 
overruled 
Manjuli v. Civil. Judge, AIR 1970 Bom I; 71 Bom LR 560: 1969 Mah L] 435; V.S. 
Mehta, In re, AIR 1970 AP 234:1970 Cri LJ 797: (1970) 1 Andh LT 98, approved 
A ground of detention which is invalid for any reason whatsoever, 
shall be treated as non-existent and the surviving grounds which remain after 
excluding the invalid grounds shall be deemed to be the foundation of the 
detention order. However, in the present case, it is not necessary to express 
any concluded opinion on this point. N. Meera Rani v. Govt, of T.N., (1989) 4 
s e c 418: 1989 SCC (Cri) 732: AIR 1989 SC 2027: 1989 Crl LJ 2190: (19«9) 3 
Crimes 173. 
470. A.K. Royv. Union of India, (1982) 1 SCC 271:1982 SCC (Cri) 152: AIR 1982 SC 710:1982 
Cri LJ 340:1982 MLJ (Cri) 524. 
471. Jitender Tyagi v. Delhi Admn., (1989) 4 SCC 653:1989 SCC (Cri) 787; AIR 1990 SC487. 
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S. 5-A — Invalidity of one or some of the grounds of detention would not 
render the entire order of detention bad. 
If more than one ground are stated In the grounds of detention then 
the fact that one of the grounds is bad, would not alter order of detention after 
the amendment of the National Security Act in 1984, provided the other 
grounds were valid. But quite apart from the same, none of the grounds were 
vague. The grounds must be understood in the light of the background and 
the context of the facts.^ ^^ 
Prisoners Act, 1900 
The 'places' envisaged for confinement of transportation prisoners 
under S. 32 of the Prisoners Act, 1900 can be the places in the jails. Moreover, 
as we shall point out later paragraph 719 of the Punjab Jail Manual clearly 
shows that by several Notifications or orders issued by the Punjab 
Government certain local jails within the Province have been constituted the 
"places" under S. 32 of the Act for confinement of transportation prisoners. It 
is thus clear that under S. 32 of Act 3 of 1900 a sentence of transportation 
either for a term or for life could be and a sentence of life imprisonment can 
be made executable in local jails by constituting such jails as the "places" 
within the meaning of S. 32 under orders of the State Governments.*^^ 
Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 
1976 
Ss. 2(2)(b), 6 and 7 — Condition precedent for taking action against any 
person under Ss. 6 and 7 is existence of a valid order of detention under 
COFEPOSA Act against him - Where detention order under COFEPOSA Act 
found to be invalid and illegal due to any legal or constitutional infirmity, 
such as non-supply of copies of documents and materials relied on in grounds 
of detention to the detenu, held, action under Ss. 6 and 7 would be baseless 
and unsustainable— Preventive Detention— Conservation of Foreign 
Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974, S. 3. 7^4 
472. Shafiq Ahmad v. D.M., (1989) 4 SCC 556,565:1989 SCC (Cri) 774: AIR 1990 SC 200. 
473. Naib Singh v. State of Punjab, (1983) 2 SCC 454,463,464:1983 SCC (Cri) 536: AIR 1983 SC 
855:1983 Cri LJ1345. 
474. Union of India v. Haji Mastan Mirza, (1984) 2 SCC 427,423,433:1984 SCC (Cri) 271- AIR 
1984 SC 681:1984 Cri LJ 610: (1984) 2 ECC137. 
Condusion and Suggestions 
292 
Chapter-VI 
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS 
To conclude it is submitted that the Preventive detention is the arch 
enemy of the right to personal liberty. It envisages detention without trial 
which is against the basic canons of criminal jurisprudents. At times when 
the liberty of the individuals crosses the limit and threatens the very existence 
of the State and at that point of time it fails to control the enjoyment of 
individual's liberty, then the State uses the preventive detention measures. 
This measure is not unknown in the dictatorial and the democratic regimes; 
the capitalist, the socialist and the communist governments. However, there 
was a difference in the exercise of the said power; some countries tried to 
handle this measure carefully and cautiously. They adopted it casually and 
only in grave situation affecting the very existence of the State. They used the 
measure indiscriminately in time of war and peace. And thus in such 
countries the right to personal liberty remained in eclipse. 
Now coming to the Indian experience, before Independence, the British 
regime in order to establish a strong foothold in India used the preventive 
detention measure for an indefinite period, when Indian got independence 
the provincial legislatures enacted laws relating to preventive detention. 
Though the freedom fighters were aiming towards securing better rights to 
the citizens of Free India, yet it was unfortunate that the preventive detention 
measure at the central level was put into force immediately after the 
commencement of the Constitution of India. Sardar Patel, who piloted the 
first Bill with respect to preventive detention, conceded that he had two 
sleepless nights before introducing such a Bill in Parliament. The Preventive 
Detention Act, 1950, was amended thrice to give some nnore protection to the 
person detained under the Act. In the beginning the Act was renewed every 
year; thereafter, every two years; and finally, every three' years Parliament 
continued the operation of the Act. The Act of 1950 came to and ends in the 
year 1969. But thereafter no vacuum was created in the area of preventive 
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detention. The state legislatures immediately passed laws relating to 
preventive detention. This state of affairs continued until the Maintenance of 
Internal Security Act, 1971, came into force. This Act was amended thrice so 
as to impose more restrictions on the persons detained under the Act and to 
allow the executive a free hand in matters of preventive detention. On June 
27, 1975, the Presidential order gave blanks power to the executive authority 
to deal with persons preventively detained. It imposed a blanket ban on the 
detenue to claim any safeguard against the measure. This resulted in the 19 
months emergency. During the period between 26-27 June, 1975 a large 
numbers of persons were put behind the bars without trial and without 
affording to them any basic safeguards. Brief survey of the Preventive 
Detention in this country shows that this law has been misused and innocent 
citizens oppose to be establishment were sent to Jail on flimsy ground. 
Therefore, this law should be escarped and repeal. 
The Supreme Court of India during Emergency has failed to protect the 
rights of the citizens and has not been able to protect the citizens from torture 
and ill treatment. In Kashmir the Preventive Detention Laws have been 
blatantly misused and the arbitrary arrest and detention of those peacefully 
voicing dissent is continuing in Jammu and Kashmir, India, with the Public 
Security Act (PSA) increasingly being used to punish those who criticise the 
government. Amnesty International warned today. Political activists were 
detained and beaten last week following public protests over the killing of six 
women. Amnesty International is calling for the immediate release of those 
who remain in detention and considers them to be prisoners of conscience, 
held solely for the peaceful exercise of their right to freedom of expression 
and association. On 8 June 2001 an unidentified attacker threw a hand 
grenade at a group of women picnicking at a shrine in Chara-e-Sharief. Four 
women were killed outright and two more died later of their injuries. Local 
observes believe that the attacker was a member of the Special Operations 
Group (SOG) which is a division of the police created to deal with militancy. 
Amnesty International urges the government of Jammu and Kashmir to 
immediately initiate an independent, impartial and transparent inquiry into 
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this incident. Several associates of the Human Rights Front, including their 
patron Mr. Untoo, were taken from their homes at around 4:00 a.m. on the 9* 
June and held in detention until that evening. At the same time members of 
the Islamic Students League were also picked up and placed in preventive 
detention. A two year detention order was issued for Shakil Ahmad Bakhsi, a 
student leader under the Public Safety Act. Dr. Hubbi, a leader of the All 
Parties Hurriyet Conference (APHC) and Vice-Chairman of the Jammu and 
Kashmir People's Conference, and his wife attended a demonstration on 
Saturday 9 June. At the demonstration the couple were beaten by police and 
Dr. Hubbi was taken into preventive detention. A two year detention order 
was issued against Dr. Hubbi's who is now being held in Kotbalwal jail. 
There are reports that the home of Dr. Hubb's brother, Abdul Kabir Hubbi, 
was also raided by the SOG on the night of 12 June. Dr. Hubbi, who has no 
connections with the armed opposition, has served earlier periods in 
preventive detention, including eight months in 1999-2000 along with 25 other 
leaders of the APHC. Other APHC leaders including Shahidul Islam and 
Javed Ahmad Mir were also arrested. Amnesty International has also seen 
reports that APHC leader Sheikh Abdul Aziz was stopped from attending the 
demonstration by the police at Awantipora and that, together with activists 
Mukhtar Waza, Zahoor Sheikh and Khalil Ahmad Khalil, he was beaten by 
Police. Amnesty International is concerned about the widespread use of 
excessive force by the police when detaining activists. In March 2001, Syed 
Shah Geelani, who is known to the authorities as having a serious heart 
disease, was pushed to the floor and beaten unconscious by police when he 
was being released from detention. Amnesty International is also concerned 
that the PSA continues to be abused in Jammu and Kashmir to detain 
opposition politicians. AI is aware of many cases of activist being held for 
years without recourse to the judicial process. As most people detained under 
the PSA are denied access to lawyers and family members, they also run a 
high risk of being subjected to torhire or ill-treatment. The Jammu and 
Kashmir Public Safety Act of 1978 is the main law relating to preventive 
detention in Jammu and Kashmir and permits administrative detention 
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without trial for a period of up to one year if a person is deemed likely to act 
in a way "prejudicial to the maintenance of public order" or up to two years if 
their actions are likely to be "prejudicial to the safety of the state".1 
Integrity and uruty of the nation depends on the quality of the 
judiciary to a great extent. The Supreme Court performance in the last 
decades has not been upto the expectation of the people of India.,I subscribe 
to the view of Mr. Rajiv Dhavan when he says in his book "Justice on Trial: 
The Supreme Court Today", that the court has failed to fulfil its assigned role 
and that it is a "dying institution".2 The standard of Supreme Court of India 
has fallen for the reason that the judges are appointed in the High Court from 
the panels of the State and the judiciary does not attract talented worthy 
lawyers for being appointed as Judge. A government panel advocate 
appointed in the High Court becomes a judge of the High Court then on the 
basis of seniority, he goes up to the Supreme Court. So, most of the judges are 
politically committed the people in power and therefore, they deliver such 
judgements which can guarantee them jobs even after retirement from the 
Supreme Court of India. 
The existence of Supreme Court gives the people in general and the 
opposition groups in particular an easy feeling that there is an independent 
authority to check the arbitrar}'^  and extreme actions of the party in power and 
to uphold the constitution. An erosion of the authority of the court would 
deprive them of this sense of security and may entail political upheavals. By 
and large, the judiciary is still held in high esteem and its authority, 
impartiality and commitment to constitutional values is widely recognised. 
The judiciary being the guarantee of democracy, rule of law and human rights 
under our Constitution, any dilution of its authority or diminution of its 
status is bound to endanger the delicate balance of our republic. 
In the beginning, the court denied freedom to Gopalan,^ but in the 
subsequent cases it stood firmly on the side of personal freedom and social 
1. Amnesty Internationa], 600 Pennsylvania Avenue SE, Washington, DC, 2003. 
2. Rajeev Dhavan, Justice on Trial: The Supreme Court Today, Allahabad- Wheeler 
Publishers, 1980), p. 215. 
3. A.K. Gopakn vs. State of Madras, 19501 SCR, 88 
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progress and change. Even if one among the several grounds for detention 
was vague or irrelevant, it set the detenu at liberty. This progressive 
interpretation of law was virtually halted when, during the internal 
emergency, Shivakant Sukla's case,* the court rejected the writ of habeas 
corpus and shut its doors for such writs. This deviation from the 
unimpeachable standards of judicial review, for which there was a controlling 
authority in the Makhan Sing¥ decision of the court, greatly damaged the 
credibility of the judicial system as a guardian of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. However, the court soon asserted itself in the sphere 
of civil liberties and made full use of the principles of natural justice and 
procedural fairness in the subsequent cases. The principle of procedural 
fairness was first enunciated in Bank Nationalisation^ and culminated in 
Maneka Gandhi's ^ case. The court consciously gave judicial review a creative 
and civil libertarian content, and its activism revived public cor\fidence in the 
judicial process. 
Independent of the Constitution, there is no sphere which is 
exclusively within the ambit of the executive and out of bound for the judicial 
branch. For practical purposes, there may be such a sphere but its boundaries 
can never be really drawn, and it varies from society to society, depending 
upon the circumstances. The recent judicial activism of the Supreme Court 
may be justified in view of the increasing inefficiency of administration, lack 
of political will and societal apathy towards the plight of the poor and the 
weak. 
Those who operate the political system also play an important role in 
creating social harmony and promoting social justice. The success of a system 
largely depends on the human element that operates it. Even the best of 
systems fails to deliver the goods if it is operated by incompetent people, and 
even an archaic system can adapt itself to modern conditions and work 
4. A. DM. ]abalpur vs. Shivakant Shukla, AIR, 1976, SC1207 
5. Makhan Singh vs. The State of Punjab, AIR, 1964, SC 381 
6. Rustom Cavasjee Cooper vs. Union of India, 1970 3 SCR, 530 
Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597 7 
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satisfactorily it those in charge of it have a sense of urgency, dedication and 
awareness of responsibility.^ 
The Preventive Detention Laws should not be used in a democracy and 
the submission of researches is all the acts and statutes which have been used 
for serving the interest of the people in power should be repeal, this will be in 
consciousness with the wishes of the founding father of the Constitution who 
believed in person liberty and a society established according to the rule of 
law. 
Recently the Supreme Court of India has granted compensation for 
Illegal Detention without trial for months or years is bad, for it takes away a 
slice of the detenu's life; and the legal system which permits this outrage 
surely owes it to the detenue that he be compensated financially if his 
detention is declared illegal. Suits for damages for wrongful imprisonment 
offer no remedies because the statutes sanctioning preventive detention 
protect the erring officials and the government.^ A safer remedy is that, while 
releasing the detenu, the Court should have the power to determine damages 
and award compensation. However, the Supreme Court hesitated to 
recognise the principle of monetary compensation for violation of 
fundamental rights, even though it acknowledged the inadequacy of 
conventional judicial remedies in such situations. 
8. H. R. Khanna, The Judicial System in the Dock-II: Mediocrity of Talent, The Hindustan 
Times, 29 April 1980, p. 9 
9. A.G. Noorani, "Civil Liberties: Compensating the Wronged", Economic and Pohtical 
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UNSTARRED QUESTION N0.1199 
(TO BE ANSWERED ON THE 14™ DECEMBER, 1994) 
COMPLAINTS AGAINST TADA 
1199. SHRI S.S. AHLUWALIA: 
Will the Minister of Home Affairs be pleased to state: 
(a) Whether it is a fact that detention of persons under the Terrorist 
and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (TADA) has been 
extensively resorted to by administration of several States. 
(b) What are the State-wise details of persons who have been detained 
under TADA as on 31=^* December, 1991, 31^' December, 1992, 31^' 
December, 1993 and as on 31^ '^ October, 1994. 
(c) Whether it is a fact that complaints of abuse of TADA by the 
adiTiinistration have been received by Government from various 
sections of the society from different parts of the country. 
(d) If so, state-wise details of the basic nature of the complaints that 
have been found to be common among them. 
(e) The details of the steps, if any, taken by Government in response to 
those complaints of abuse of the provisions of the TADA; and 
(f) The State-wise details of the TADA detenus died in custody duririg 
the last five years? 
The Minister of State in the Ministry of Home Affairs (Shri Rajesh Pilot) 
(a) No, Sir; the States have been requested to invoke the provisions of 
the Act only for those indulging in terrorist of disruptive activities. 
(b) Based on available information received from the State Govts., a 
statement regarding persons detained under TADA as on 31^ * 
December 1991, 31=' December 1992 and 31=' December 1993 is 
appended. 
(c) & (d): As and when complaints are received from the various sections, 
these are referred to the State Govts. For immediate appropriate 
action. However, State-wise compilation of complaints are not 
being maintained. 
(e) The State Govts. Have been directed to constitute State Review 
Committees of the Chief Secretary, Home Secretary and DGP and to 
review individual cases and, redress the situation wherever there 
has been a miscarriage of justice. 
(g) The State-wise details of TADA detenues died in custody is being 
collected and will be laid on the Table of the House. 
JLppencCv(:I 
RAJYA SABHA 
STARRED QUESTION NO. 46 
(TO BE ANSWERED ON THE 29™ NOVEMBER, 1995) 
PERSONS DETAINED UNDER TADA 
46. Shri Mohammed Afzal alias Meem Afzal 
Will the Minister of Home Affairs be pleased to state: 
(a) What is the State-wise number of persons arrested under TADA 
till the repeal of TADA Act; and 
(b)What is the State-wise number of persons released under the 
review order as on 30* September, 1995? 
The Minister of Home Affairs: (Shri S.B. Chavan) 
(a) and (b) Statement as per available information is attached. 
iii Ji-ppendiK:! 
StatetTient referred to part b) of Rajya Sa'bha Uns"tarred Question 
Ko.il99 for answer on 14.12,94. 
S.No. Nair.e of the State/ Available information rogarrlng 




































































































Total 14408® 23882® . 33659® ' 
I^nforn'.stion is maintained only Quarterly and not monthly, and, hence 
the data for Oct, 1994 is not available, 
@ 7975 persons, 17675 oersons and 24554 oersons were released on bail 
as on Dec.'91, Dec,'92 and Dec.'93 respectively.' 
Note;-. The provisicRs of TADA are invoked by 19 States at present. 
IV Jippendhjl 
Reply to port (a) and (b) of the RaJYa Sabha Starred QuestJor. 
No„ 46 for 29.11.95. 
S.No. Name of S ta tes / 
UTs 
1. 2. 
hJo. of parsons 
arrested under 
TADA till the 
repeal of the 
TADA Act. 
Cumultative » In 
from 1985 i»Live» 















TADA by the 
review coinnittees 
under the review 
order as 
on 30.9.95 
of TADA ACT 
5. 
1. Andhra Pradesh 7485 5255 158 
2. Arunachai Pradesh 109 92 7 
3. Assaa 13637 11507 427 
4. Bihar 359 85 81 
5. Goa 4 3 2 
6. Gujarat 18686 828 234 
7. Har/ana 2658 573 lOO 
8. Himachal Pradesh 30 28 6 
9. J&K 11616 9853 3049 
iO. Karnataka 236 229 127 
11. Kerala 14 
12. Manipur 1694 1694 143 
13. Madhya Pradesh 731 716 32 
14. ."Aaharashtra 2537 1600 635 
15. M.eghalaya 21 21 12 
16. Punjab 15525 3659 286 
17. Rajasthan 477 285 192 
IB, Taaiil Nadu 384 328 91 
19. Uttar Pradesh 1137 79 21 
20. West Bengal 531 8 6 
21. Chandigarh /Sdmn. 249 . 22 4 


















TOTAL 79332 37748 5998 8184 
yippendh^I 
LOK SABHA 
UNSTARRED QUESTION NO. 3608 
(To be answered on the 17* December, 1996) 
3608 Shri Iliyas Aznii 
Shri Madhavrao Scindia 
Will the Minister of Home Affairs be pleased to state: 
(a) the number of persons detained under TADA since the 
enforcement of the Act, State-wise. 
(b) The number of persons found guilty alongwith the number of 
persons acquitted by the courts. 
(c) Whether any action has been taken against the officials 
responsible for booking the persons and keeping them in 
detention under TADA for long periods; and 
(d) If riot, the reasons therefore? 
ANSWER 
The Minister of State in the Ministry of Home Affairs (Shri Mohd. 
Maqbool Dar) 
(a) A Statement as per available information attached. 
(b) This Ministry does not maintain information regarding persons 
found guilty and persons acquitted. 
(c) & (d) Since Law and order is a State subject, the provisions of the Act 
are invoked by States/UTs in the light of public order and 
internal security conditions prevailing over thee. As such 

















































USO No. 3608 
No. of persons arrested 
under TADA till the 
repeal of the TADA 
Act/Cumulative from 

























UNSTARRED QUESTION NO. 2555 
(TO BE ANSWERED ON THE 12™ AUGUST, 1993) 
2555. SHRI RAJENDRA AGNIHOTRI: 
Will the Minister of HOME AFFAIRS be pleased to states 
(a) the number of occassions on, which the National Security 
Act (NSA) was put into use by the Government during 
1992 and 1993 so far; 
(b) whether complaints regarding misuse of the provisions 
of NSA by State Governments have been received by the 
Union Government; 
(c) if so, the details thereof; and 
(d) the action taken thereon? 
ANSWER 
THE MINISTER OF STATE IN THE MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS ( SHRI 
RAJESH PILOT 
(a) The Central Govt, has not ordered any detention since the 
promulgation of the National Security Ordinance/Act, though 
empowered to do so. Actual detentions under the Act are made by 
the State Govts./Union Territory Admns. Who are mainly 
responsible for maintenance of law and order and to the 
maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community 
etc. A statement showing the number of persons ordered to be 
detained under the provisions of the National Security Act, 1980 
duria-ig 1992 & 1993 (upto May) by various State Govts./U.T. 
Admns., is attached herewith. 
(b) (b) to (d) - The Act contains sufficient inbuilt safeguards against its 
possible misuse. From time to time, it has been impressed on the 
State Govts./U.T. Admns. To use this Act very sparingly, 
judiciously and only when it is absolutely necessary. Whenever, 
complaints regarding the misuse of the provisions of the Act 
whenever received, are forwarded to the concerned State 
Governments/Union Territory Administi-ations for appropriate 
action. 
viii Jippendi^I 
STATE/ZiuNT RcFliRft^ D TO'IN R£PLY TO PART, (a)" OF LOK SABM 
UNST ARRED_ qjIsnON NO. 2555 WE. FOR MSim ON 12.8.1993 
Statement_shCTi/ing_the_Numtei: fif_perioas_ord2Jid_tfi ise^ditaJ-DM 
under the_ g_royisions of the Natign^l_S£curitY. Act,_i980 duririg_ 










































































































Note:- 1, The National Security Act, 1980 is not applicable tc 
Janmu and Kashmir. 
2. The State Goveranients of j<sraia, West Bengal, Arunachal 
Pradesh, and U.T.Administrations of Dadra and Nagar 
Hc,veli, Lakshadweep, Pondicherry, and Daman and Diu 
h.ave not invoked the provisions of NSA. 
IX JippencCi^I 
LOK SABHA 
UNSTARRED QUESTION No. 1741 
(TO BE ANSWERED ON THE 5™ AUGUST, 1993) 
Persons arrested/Detained under TADA and NSA 
1741: Shri Satya Deo Singh 
Shri Brij Bhushan Sharan Singh 
Shrimati Bhavna ChikhaUa 
Dr. Ramesh Chand Tomar 
Will the Minister of Home Affairs be pleased to state: 
(a) the number of persons arrested/detained under TADA and NSA 
during each of the last three years and the current year so far, 
State-wise and Union Territory-Wise. 
(b) Whether complaints regarding misuse of provisions of TADA by 
State Governments have been received by the Uiiion Government. 
(c) If so, the details thereof including the name of such states/Union 
Territories; and 
(d) The reaction of the Government thereto? 
ANSWER 
The Minister of State in the Ministry of Home Affairs (Shri Rajesh Pilot) 
(a) Statement showing the number of persons arrested/detained 
under TADA/NSA is attached. 
(b) (c) & (d) : Some complaints were received regarding alleged 
misuse of TADA by the States of Bihar,Guiarat, Haryana, 
Maharashtra, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and Tamil Nadu. Since 
law and order is a State subject, the matter was referred to the 
state Governments concerned with the request that the provisions 
of TADA be invoked with utmost care and caution. 
JippencCv(:I 
STATEMENT REFERRED TO IN REPLY TO PART (A) OF 
LOK SABHA UNSTARRED QUESTION NO. 1741 FOR 

















































Andaman & Nikobar 
Chandigarh 
Delhi 




































































































STATEMENT REFERRED TO REPLY TO PART (A) OF 
LOK SABHA UNSTARRED QUESTION N0.1741 FOR 



































































































































XI I Jippendv(:I 
ARRESTS AND DETENTION IN VARIOUS STATES/UNION 




































































































































Andaman & Nikobar 
Arunachal Pradesh 
Chandigarh 
D & N Haveli 
Delhi 



































Source: Shah Commission of Inquiry, Third & Final Report (August 1978) 
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CENTRAL ACTS 
The National Security Act, 1980 
[No. 65 of 1980 as amended by Act No. 27 of 1987] 
(27 December, 1980) 
Be it enacted by- Parliament in the Thirty-first year of the Republic of India as 
follows: — 
1. Short title and extent 
(1) This Act may be called the National Security Act, 1980. 
(2) It extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu 
and Kashmir. 
2. Definitio7^s — ln this Act, unless the context otherwise requires — 
a) "appropriate Government" means, as respects, a detention order made by 
the Central Government or a person detained under such order, the 
Central Govermnent, and as respects a detention order made by a State 
Government or by an officer subordinate to a State Government or as 
respects a person detained such order, the State Government; 
b) "detention order" means an order made under Section 3; 
c) "foreigner" has the same meaning as in the Foreigners Act, 1946 (31 of 
1946); 
d) "person" includes a foreigner; 
e) "State Government", in relation to a Union territory, means the 
administrator thereof. 
3. Power to make orders detaining certain persons.— 
(1) The Central Government or the State Goverrmient may— 
a) if satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him 
from acting in any manner prejudicial to the defence of India, the 
relations of India with foreign powers, of the security of India, or 
b) if satisfied with respect to any foreigner that with a view to regulating -his 
continued presence in India or with a view to making arrangements for 
his expulsion from India, it is necessary so to do, make an order directing 
that such person be detained. 
(2) The Central Government or the State Government may, if satisfied with 
respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any 
manner prejudicial, to the security of the State or from acting in any manner 
prejudicial to the maintenance of public order or from acting in any manner 
prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services to the community it is 
necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained. 
Explanation-for the purposes of this sub-section, "acting: in any manner 
prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies services essential to the 
community" does not include "acting". 
In any mamier prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of essential to the 
community" as defined in the to sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Prevention 
of and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Act, 1980 (7 of 1980), and 
XV JLppendhcII 
accordingly, no order of detention shall be made under this Act, on any 
ground on art order of detention may be made under tills Act, (3) If, having 
regard to the circumstances prevailing or likely to prevail In any area within 
the local limits of the jurisdiction of a District Magistrate or a Commissioner 
of Police, the Government is satisfied that it is necessary so to do, it may, by 
order in writing, direct, that during such period as may be specified in the 
order, such District Magistrate or Commissioner of Police may also9 if 
satisfied as provided in (2), exercise the powers conferred by the said sub-
section: Provided that the period specified in an order made by the State 
Government under this sub-section shall not, in the first instance, exceed 
three months, but the State Government may, if as aforesaid that it is 
necessary so to do from time to time by any period not exceeding three 
months at any one time. 
(4) When any order is made under this section by an officer mentioned in sub-
section (3), he shall forthwith report the fact to the Stale Government to which 
he is subordinate together with the grounds on which the order has been 
made and such other particulars as, in his opinion, have a bearing on the 
matter, and no such order shall remain in force for more than twelve days 
after the making tliereof unless, in the meantime, it has been approved by the 
State Government: 
Provided tliat where under Section 8 the grounds of detention are 
communicated by the officer making the order after five days but not later 
than ten days from the date of detention, this sub-section shall apply subject 
to the modification that, for the words "twelve days", the words "fifteen days" 
shall be substituted. 
(5) When any order is made or approved by the State Government under this 
section, the State Government shall, within seven days, report the fact to the 
Central Government with the grounds on which the order has been made and 
other particulars as, in the opinion of the State Government, have a. bearing 
on the necessity for the order. 
4) Execution of detention orders —A detention order may be executed at any place in 
India in the manner provided for the execution of warrants of arrest under the 
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2, of 1974). 
(5) Power to regulate place and conditions of detention— Every person in respect of 
whom a detention order has been made shall be liable — 
(a) let be detained in such place and under such conditions, including conditions 
as to maintenance, discipline and punishment for breaches of discipline, as 
the appropriate Government may, by general or special order, specify; and 
(b) to be removed from one place of detention to another place, of detention, 
whether within the same State or in^  another State, by order of the 
appropriate Government: 
Provided that no order shall be made by a State Government under clause (b) for the 
removal of a person from one State to another State except with the consent of the 
Government of tliat other State. 
Grounds of detention severable- Where a person has been detained in pursuance of 
an order of detention [whether made or before or after the commencement of the 
National Security (Second Amendment) Act, 1984] under section 3 which has been 
made on two or more grounds, such order of detention shall be deemed to have been 
made separately on each of such grounds and accordingly — 
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(a) such order shall not be deemed to be invalid or inoperative merely because 
one or some of the grounds Is or are — 
I. vague, 
II. non-existent, 
III. not relevant, 
IV. not connected or not proximately connected with such person, or 
V. invalid for any other reason whatsoever, and it is not, therefore, possible 
to hold that the Government or officer making such order would have 
been satisfied as provided in Section 3 with reference to the remaining 
ground or grounds and made the order of detention; 
(b) the Government or officer making the order of detention shall be deemed to 
have made the order of detention under the said section after being satisfied 
as provided in that section with reference to the remaining ground or 
grounds. 
6. Detention orders not to be invalid or inoperative on certain grounds — No 
detention order shall be invalid or inoperative merely by reason — 
(a) that the person to be detained thereunder is outside the limits of the territorial 
jurisdiction of the Government or officer making the order, or 
(b) that the place of detention of such person is outside the said limits. 
7. Powers in relation to absconding persons — 
(1) If the Central Government or the State Government or an officer mentioned in 
sub-section (3) of Section 3, as the case may be, has reason to believe that a 
person in respect of whom a detention order has been made has absconded or 
is concealing himself so that the order cannot be executed, that Government 
or officer may — 
(a) make a report in writing of the fact to a Metropolitan Magistrate or a 
Judicial Magistrate of the first class having jurisdiction in the place 
where the said person ordinarily resides; 
(b) by order notified in the official Gazette direct the said person to appear 
before such officer, at such place and within such period as may be 
specified in the order. 
(2) Upon the making of a report against any person under clause (a) of sub-
section (1), the provisions of Sections 82,83, 84 and 85 of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), shall apply in respect of such person and his 
property as if the detention order made against him were a warrant issued by 
the Magistrate. 
(3) If any person fails to comply with an order issued under clause (b) of sub-
section (1), he shall, unless he proves that it was not possible for him to 
comply therewith and that he had, within the period specified in the order, 
informed the officer mentioned in the order of the reason which rendered 
compliance therewith impossible and of liis whereabouts, be punish-, able 
with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or 
with both, 
(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 
(2 of 1974), every offence under subsection (3) shall be cognizable. 
8. Grounds of order of detention to be disclosed to persons affected by the order — 
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(1) When a person is detained in pursuance of a detention order, the authority 
making the order shall, as soon as may be, but ordinarily not later than five 
days in exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing, 
not later than ten days from the date of detention, to him the grounds on 
which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity 
of making a against the order to the appropriate Government. 
(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall require the authority to disclose facts which it 
considers to be against- the public interest to disclose. 
9. Constitution of Advisory Boards— 
(1) The Central Government and each State Government shall whenever 
necessary, constitute one or more Advisory Boards for the purposes of Act. 
(2) Every such Board shall consist of three persons who are or have been, or are 
qualified to be appointed as. Judges of a High Court, and such persons shall 
be appointed by the appropriate Government. 
(3) The appropriate Government shall appoint one of the members of the 
Advisory Board who is, or has been, a Judge of a High Court to be its 
Chairman, and in the case of a territory, the appointment to the Advisory 
Board of any who is a Judge of the High Court; of a State shall be with the 
previous approval of the' State Government concerned. 
10. Reference to Advisory Boards—Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, 
in every case where a detention order has been made under this Act, the 
appropriate Government shall, within three weeks from the date of detention of a 
person under the order, place before tlie Advisory Board constituted by it under 
Section 9, the grounds on which the order has been made and the representation, 
if any, made by the person affected by the order, and in case where the order has 
been made, by an officer mentioned in sub-section (3) of Section 3, also tlie report 
by such officer under sub-section (4) of that section. 
11. Procedure of Advisory Boards — 
(1) The Advisory Board shall, after considering the materials placed before it and, 
after calling for such further information as it may deem necessary from the 
appropriate Government or from any person called for the purpose through 
the appropriate Government or from tlie person concerned, and if, in any 
particular case, it considers it essential so to do or if the person concerned 
desires to be heard, after hearing him in person, submit its report to the 
appropriate Government within seven weeks from the date of detention of 
the person concerned. 
(2) The report of the Advisory Board shall specify in a separate part thereof the 
opinion of the Advisory Board as to whether or not there is sufficient cause 
for the detention of the person concerned. 
(3) When there is a difference of opinion among the members forming the 
Advisory Board, the opinion of the majority of such members shall be 
deemed to be the opinion of the Board. 
(4) Nothing in this si-ction shall entitle any person against whom a detention 
order has been made to appear by any legal practitioner in any matter 
connected with tlie reference to the Advisory Board; and the proceedings of 
the Advisory Board and its report, excepting that part of the report in which 
the opinion of the Ad\'isory Board is specified, shall be confidential. 
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12. Action upon the report of the Advisory Board — 
(1) In any case where the Advisory Board has reported that there is, in its 
opinion, sufficient cause for the detention of a person, the appropriate 
Government may confirm the detention order and continue the detention of 
tlie person concerned for such period as it thinks fit. 
(2) In any case where the Advisory Board has reported that there is, in its 
opinion, no sufficient cause for the detention of a person, the appropriate 
Government shall revoke the detention order and cause the person concerned 
to be released forthwith. 
13. Maximum period of detention - The maximum period for which any person 
may be detained in pursuance of any detention order which has been confirmed 
under Section 12 shall be twelve months from the date of detention: 
Provided that nothing contained in this section shall affect the power of the 
appropriate Government to revoke or modify the detention order at any earlier 
time. 
14. Revocation of detention orders — 
(1) Without prejudice to the provisions of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 
1897 (10 of 1897), a detention order may, at any time, be revoked or modified, 
(a) Notv\'ithstanding that the order has been made by an officer mentioned in 
sub-section (3) of Section 3, by the State Government to which the 
officer is subordinate or by the Central Government; 
(b) Notwithstanding that the order has been made by a State Government, by 
the Central Government. 
(2) The expiry or revocation of a detention order (hereafter in this sub-
section referred to as the earlier detention order) shall not [whether such 
earlier detention order has been made before or after the commencement* of 
the National Security (Second Amendment) Act, 1984] bar the making of 
another detention order (hereafter in this sub-section referred to as the 
subsequent detention order) under Section 3 against the same person. 
Provided that in a case where no fresh facts have arisen after the expiry or 
revocation of the earlier detention order made against such person, the maximum 
period for which such person may be detained in pursuance of the subsequent 
detention order shall, in no case, extend beyond the expiry of a period of twelve 
months from the date of detention under the earlier detention order. 
Note: Punjab and Chandigarh-In its application to Punjab and Chandigarh add the 
following provision vide Act 27 of 19S75Section 3 (w.e.f. 9-64987). 
14-A. Circumstances in which persons may be detained for periods longer than three 
months without obtaining the opiiiion of Advisory Boards - (1) Notwithstanding 
anything in the foregoing provisions of this Act, or in any judgement, decree or order 
of any court or other authority, any person in respect of whom an order of detention 
has been made under Act at any time before the 8tli day. of June, 1988 may be 
without obtaining the opinion of the Advisory Board for a longer than three months, 
but not exceeding six months, the date of his dpfention where such person had been 
with a view to preventing him, in any disturbed area -
(1) from interfering with the efforts of Government in coping with tiie terrorist and 
disruprive activities; and from acting in any manner prejudicial to — 
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(a) the defence of India; or 
(b) the security of India; or 
(c) the security of the State; or 
(d) the maintenance of public order; or 
(e) the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community. 
Explanation 1 - The provisions of the Explanation to sub-section(2) of Section 3 shall 
apply for the purposes of this sub-section as they apply for the purposes of that sub-
section. 
Explanation 2 - In this sub-section,, "disturbed area" means an area which is for the 
time being - declared by notification under Section 3 -of the Punjab Dishirbed Areas 
Act, 1983 (32 of 1983), or under Section 3 of the Chandigarh Disturbed Areas Act, 
1983 (33 of .1983), to be a disturbed area. 
Explanation 3- In this sub-section, "terrorist and disruptive activities" means 
"terrorist acts" and "disruptive activities" within the meaning of the Terrorist, and 
Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Ordinance, 1987 (Ord. 2 of 1987). 
(2) In the case of any person to whom sub-section (1) applies. Sections 3, 8 and 10 to 
1.4 shall have effect subject to the following- modifications, namely : — 
(a) in Section 3, — 
(i) In sub-section (4), in the proviso,-
(A) for the words "ten days", the words "fifteen days" shall be substituted; 
(B) for the words "fifteen days", the words "twenty days" shall be 
substituted; 
(ii) In sub-section (5), for the words "seven days", the words "fifteen, 
days" shall be substituted; 
(b) in Section 8, in sub-section (1), for the words "ten days", the 
words "fifteen days" shall be substituted; 
(c) in Section 10, for the words "shall, within three weeks", the 
words "shall, within four months and two weeks" shall be 
substituted; 
(d) in Section 11,~ 
(i) in sub-section (1), for the words "seven weeks", the words "five 
months and three weeks" shall be substituted; 
(ii) in sub-section (2), for the words' "detention of the person concerned", 
the words "continued detention of the person concerned" shall be sub-
stituted; 
(e) in Section 12, for the words "for the detention",, at both the places where they 
occur, the words "for the continued detention" shall be substituted; 
(f) In Section 13, for the words "twelve months" the words "two years" shall be 
substituted; 
(g) m Seclit)n 14, in the proviso to svib-section (2), for the words "twelve 
months", the words "two years" shall be substituted. 
15. Temporary release of detained-
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1. The appropriate Governmei^t at may, at any time, direct that any person 
detained in pursuance of a detention order may be released for any 
specified period either without conditions or upon such conditions 
specified in the direction as person accepts, and may, at any time cancel 
his release. 
2. In directing the release of any person under sub-section 
(1) the appropriate Government may require him to enter into 
a bond with or without sureties for the due observance of the 
conditions specified in the direction. 
3. Any person released under subsection (1) shall surrender himself at the 
time and place, and to the authority, specified in the order directing his 
release or cancelling his release, as the case may be. 
4. If any person fails without sufficient cause to surrender 
himself in the manner specified in sub-section (3), he shall be 
punishable with imprisonment for 'a term which may extend to 
two years, or with fine, or with both. 
5. (5) If any person released under (1) fails to fulfill any of the conditions 
Imposed upon him under the said sub-section or in the bond entered 
into by him, the bond shall be declared to be forfeited and any person 
bound thereby shall be to liable to pay the penalty thereof. 
16. Protection of action taken in good faith- No suit or other proceeding shall lie 
against the Central Government or a State Government and no suit 
prosecution or other legal proceeding shall lie against any person, for 
anything in good faith done or-intended to be done in' pursuance of this 
Act. 
17. Act not to effect with respect to detentions understate laws — 
(1) Nothing in this Act shall apply or have any effect with respect to of 
detention, made under any State law, which are in force immediately 
before the commencement of the National Ordinance, 1980 (11 of 1980), 
and accordingly every person in respect of whom an order of detention 
made under any State law is in force immediately before such 
commencement, shall be governed with respect to such detention by the 
provisions of such State law or where the State law under which such order 
of detention is made is an Ordinance (hereinafter referred to as the State 
Ordinance) promulgated by the Governor of State and the State 
Ordinance has been replaced -
(i) before such commencement by an enactment passed by the Legislature 
of that Sate, by such enactment, or 
(ii) after such commencement, by an enactment which is passed by the 
Legislature of the State and the application of which is confirmed to 
orders of detention made before such commencement under the State 
Ordmance, by such enactment as if this Act had not been enacted. 
(2) Noticing in tliis section shall be deemed to bar the making under section 3 of 
a detention order agamst any person referred to in sub-section (1) after'die 
detention order in force m respect of liim as aforesaid immediately before Uie 
commencement of Hie National &curity Ordinance, 1980 (11 of 1980), ceases to have 
effect for any reason whatsoever. 
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Explmiatwn — For the purposes of this section, "State law" means any law 
providing for preventive detention on all or any of the grounds on which an 
order of detention may be made under sub-section(2) of Section 3 and in force in 
State immediately before tlie commencement of the said Ordinance. 
18. Repel and saving — 
(1) The National Security Ordinance, 1980 (11 of 1980), is hereby repeated. 
(2) Notwithstanding such repel, anything done or any action taken under 
the said ordinance shall be deemed to have been done or taken under 
the corresponding provisions of this Act, as if this Act had come into 
force on the 23rd day of September 1980, and, in particular, any 
reference made under section 10 of the said Ordinance and pending 
before any Advisory Board immediately before the date on which 
this Act receives the assent of the President may continue to be 
dealt with by date Board after that date as if such Board had been 
constituted under section 9 of this Act. 
References: 
1. Received the assent of the President on December 27,1980, published in the 
Gazette of India, Extra, Part II, Section 1, dated 27th December, 1980, pp. 697-
703. 
2. Ins. by NSA (Second Amendment) Act, 1984, S. 2 (w.e.f. 21-6-1984). 
1. *June21,1984 




The Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling 
Activities Act, 1974i [No. 52 of 1974 as amended by Act No. 23 of 1987] (13th 
December, 1974) 
Whereas violations of foreign exchange regulations and smuggling activities 
are having an increasingly deleterious effect on the national economy and thereby a 
serious adverse effect, on the security of the State; 
And whereas having regard to the persons by whom and the manner in which such 
activities or violations are organised carried on and having regard to the fact that in 
certain which are highly vulnerable to smuggling,, smuggling activities of a 
considerable magnitude are clandestinely organised on, it is necessary for the 
effective prevention of and 'violations to provide for detention, of in any manner 
therewith; 
Be it enacted by Parliament in the Twenty-fifth Year of the. Republic of India as 
follows: — 
1. Short title, extent and commencement—(1) This Act may be called the 
Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974. 
(2) It extends to the whole of India. 
(3) It shall come into force on such date (being a date not later than the twentieth day 
of December, 1974), as the Central Government may, by notification in the 
Official Gazette, appoint.^ 
2. Definitions — In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires -
(a) "appropriate Government" means as respects a detention order made by 
Central Government or by an officer of the Central Government or a detained 
wader such order, the Central. Government and as respects a detention order 
made by a State Government or by an officer of a State Government or a 
person detained under such order, the State Government; 
(b) "detention order" means an order under Section 3; 
(c) "foreigner" has the same meaning as in the Foreigners Act, 1946 (31 of 
1946); 
(d) Indian customs waters" has the same meaning as in clause (28) of 
Section 2 of the Customs Act, 1962 (52 of 1962); 
(e) "smuggling" has the same meaning as in clause (39) of section 2 of the 
Customs Act, 1962 (52 of 1962), and all its grammatical variations and 
cognate expressions shall be constiued accordingly; 
(f) "State Government", In relation to a Union territory, means the 
administrator thereof; (g) any reference in this Act to a law which is 
not in force in the State of Jammu Kashmir shall, in relation to the State 
be construed as a reference to the corresponding law, if any, in force in 
that State. 
3. Power to make orders detaining certain persons -
(1) The Central Govermnent or the State Government or any officer of the Central 
Government, not below the rank of Joint Secretary to tiiat Government, 
specially empowered for the purposes of this section by tiiat Government, or 
any officer of a Government, not below the rank of a Secretary to that 
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Government, specially empowered for the purposes of this section by that 
Government may, if satisfied, with respect to any (including - a foreigner), 
that, with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to 
the conservation or augmentation of foreign exchange or with a view to him 
from-
(i) smuggling goods, or 
(ii) abetting the smuggling of good, or 
(iii) engaging in transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods, or 
(iv) dealing in smuggled goods otherwise than by engaging in 
transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods, or 
(v) . harbouring persons engaged in smuggling goods or in abetting the 
smuggling of goods. 
It is necessary so to do, make an order directing that person, be detained: 
2a ["Provided that no order of detention shall be made on any of the grounds 
specified in this subsection on which an of detention may be made under Sec 
3 of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Act, 
1988 or under Sec 3 of the Jammu and Kashmir of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic 
Dregs and Psychotropic Ordinance, 1988." (J&K' Ordinance 1 of 1988). 
(2) When any order of detention is made by a .State Goverrunent or by an officer 
empowered by a State Goverrunent, the State Government shall, within ten 
days, forward to the Central Government a report in respect of the order, 
(3) For the purposes of clause (5) of Article 22 of the constitution, the 
communication to a person, detained in pursuance of a detention order of the 
grounds on which the order has been made shall be made as soon as may be 
after the detention, but ordinarily not later than five days, and in exceptional-
circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing, notlater than fifteen 
days, from the date of detention. 
(4) Execution of detention orders, — A detention order may be executed at any 
place in India in the manner provided for the execution of warrants of arrest 
under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974). 
(5) Power to regulate place and conditions of detention ~ Every person in respect 
of whom a detention order has bee made shall be liable -
(a) to be detained in such place and under such lions including conditions as to 
maintenance, interviews or communication with others, discipline and punishment 
for breaches of discipline, as the appropriate Government may, by general or special 
order, specify; and 
(b) to be removed from one place of detention to another place of detention, whether 
within the same State or in another State by order of the appropriate Government: 
Provided that no order shall be made by a State Government under clause (b) for the 
removal of a person from one State to another State except with the consent of the 
Government of that other State, 
3[5-A. Grounds of detention severable - Where a person has been detained in 
pursuance of an order of detention under sub-section (1) of Section 3 which has been 
made on two or more such order of detention shall be deemed to have been made 
separately on each of such grounds and accordingly — 
(a) such order shall not be deemed to be invalid or inoperative merely because 




(iii) not relevant, 
(iv) not connected or not proximately connected with such person, or 
(v) invalid for any other reason whatsoever, and it is not therefore possible to 
hold that the Government -or officer making, such order would have been 
satisfied as provided in sub-section (1) of 3 with reference to the remaining 
ground or grounds and made the order of detention; 
(b) the Government or officer making the order of detention shall be deemed to 
have made the order of detention under the said sub-section (1) after being satisfied 
as provided in that sub-section with reference to the remaining ground or grounds] 
6. Detention orders not to be invalid or inoperative on grounds— No detention order 
shall be invalid or inoperative merely by reason— 
(a) that the person to be detained thereunder is outside the limits of the territorial 
jurisdiction of the Government or the officer making the order of detention, or 
(b) that the piece of detention of such person is outside the said limits. 
7. Powers in relation to absconding persons - (1) If the appropriate Government has 
reason to believe that a person in respect of whom a detention order has been made 
has absconded or is concealing himself so that the order cannot be executed, that 
Goveriiment may -
(a) make a report in writing of the fact to a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Magistrate 
of the first class having jurisdiction in the place where the said person ordinarily 
resides; and thereupon the provisions of Sections 82, 83, 84 and 85 of the code of 
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), shall apply in respect of the said person and his 
property as if the order directing that he be detained were a warrant issued by the 
Magistrate; 
(b) by order notified in the official Gazette direct the said person to appear before 
such officer, at such place and within such period as may be specified in the order; 
and if the said person fails to comply with such direction, he shall, unless he proves 
that it was not possible for him to comply therewith and that he had, within tlie 
period specified in the order of the reason which rendered compliance therewith 
impossible and of his whereabouts, be punishable with imprisonment for a term 
which may extend to one year or with fine or with both. 
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in the code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 
of 1974), every offence under clause (b) of subsection (1) shall be cognisable. 
8. Advisory Boards - For the purposes of sub-clause (a) of clause (4) and sub-clause 
(c) of clause (7), of Article 22 of the Constitution, -
(a) the Central Government and each Sate Government shall, wherever necessary, 
constitute one or more Advisory Boards each of which shall consists of a 
Chairman and two other persons possessing the qualification specified in such 
clause (a) of clause (4) of Article 22 of the constitution. 
(b) as otherwise provided in Section 9, the appropriate Government shall, within 
hve weeks from the date of detention of a person under a detention order make 
a reference in respect thereof to the Advisory Board constituted under clause 
(a) to enable the Advisory Board to make report under sub-clause (a) of clause 
(4) of Article 22 of the Constitution; 
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(c) the Advisory Board to which a reference is made under clause (b) shall after 
considering the reference and the materials placed before it and after calling for 
such further information as it may deem necessary from the appropriate 
Government or from any person called for the purpose through the appropriate 
Government or from the person concerned, and if in any particular case, it 
considers it essential so to do or if the person concerned desires to be heard in 
person, after hearing him in person, prepare its report specifying in a separate 
paragraph thereof its opinion as to whether or not there is sufficient cause for 
the detention of tine person concerned and submit the same within eleven 
weeks from the date of detention of the person concerned; 
(d) when there is a difference of opinion among the members forming the 
Advisory Board, the opinion of the majority of such members shall be deemed 
to be the opinion of the Board; 
(e) a person against whom an order of detention has been made under this Act 
shall not be entitled to appear by any legal practitioner in any matter 
connected with the reference to the Advisory Board, and the proceedings of the 
Advisory Board and its report, excepting that part of the report in which the 
opinion of the Advisory Board is specified shall be confidential; 
(f) in every case where the Advisory Board has reported that there is in its opinion 
sufficient cause for the detention of a person, the appropriate Government may 
confirm the detention order and continue the detention of the person concerned 
for such period as it thinks fit and in every case where the Advisory Board has 
reported that there is in its opinion no sufficient cause for the detention of the 
person concerned, the appropriate Government shall revoke the detention 
order and cause the person to be released forthwith. 
*[9. Cases in which and circumstances under which persons be detained for periods 
longer than three months without obtaining the opinion of Advisory Board - (1) 
Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, any person (including a foreigner) 
in respect of whom an order of detention is made under this Act at any time before 
the 4!>[31st day of July, 1993*], may be detained without obtaining, in accordance with 
the provisions of sub-clause (a) of clause (4) of Article 22 of the Constitution, the 
opinion of an Advisory Board for a period longer than three months but not 
exceeding six months from the date of his detention, where' the order of detention, 
has been made against such person with a view to preventing him from smuggling 
goods or abetting the smuggling of goods or engaging in transporting or concealing 
or keeping smuggled goods and the Central Government or -any officer of the 
Central Government, not below the rank of an Additional Secretary to that 
Government, specially empowered for the purposes of this section by that 
Government, is satisfied that such person — 
(a) smuggles or is likely to smuggle goods into, out of or through any area liighly 
vulnerable to smuggling; or 
(b) abets or is likely to abet the smuggling of goods into, out of 'or through any 
area highly vulnerable to smuggling; or 
(c) engages or is likely to engage in transporting or concealing or keeping 
smuggled goods- in any highly vulnerable to smuggling, and makes a 
declaration to that effect within-five Vv'eeks of the detention of such person. 
Explanation 1 - In this sub-section, "area highly vulnerable to smuggling" means-
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(i) the Indian customs waters contiguous to '^'[the States of Goa, Gujarat, 
Karnataka, Kerala, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu and the Union territories of 
Daman and Diu and Pondicherry]; 
(ii) the inland area fifty kilometres in width from the coast of India failing within 
the territories of *[the States of Goa, Gujarat, Karnataka, Kerala, Maharashha 
and Tamil Nadu and the Union territories of Daman and Diu and 
Pondicherry;] 
(iii) the inland area fifty kilometres in width from the India-Pakistan border in 
the States of Gujarat, Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab and Rajasthan; 
(iv) the, customs airport of Delhi; 
(v) and such further or oilier Indian customs waters, or. inland area not 
exceeding one hundred kilometres in width from any other coast or border of 
India, or such other customs station, as the Central Government may, having, 
regard to the vulnerability of such waters, area- or customs station, as the 
case may be, to smuggling, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify in 
this behalf. 
Explanation 2. — For tlie purposes of Explanation. 1, "customs airport" and "customs 
station" shall have the same meaning, as in clauses (10) and (13) of Section 2 of the 
Customs Act, 1962 (52 of 1962), respectively. 
(2) In the case of any person detained under a detention order to which the. 
provisions of sub-section (1) apply. Section 8 shall have effect subject to the following 
modifications, namely: — 
(i) in clause (b), for the words "shall, within five weeks", the words 
"shall, within four months and two weeks" shall be substituted; 
(ii) in clause (c),— 
(1) for the words "the detention of the person concerned", the words "the continued 
detention of the person concerned" shall be substituted; 
(2) for the words "eleven weeks", the words "five months and three weeks" shall be 
substituted; 
(iii) in clause (f), for the words "for the detention" at both the places where they 
occur, the words "for the continued detention" shall be substituted. 
lO.Maximum period of detention—The maximum period for which any person may 
be detained in pursuance of any detention order to which the provisions of 
Section 9 do not apply and which has been confirmed under clause (f) of Section 
8 shall be 5[a period of one year from the date of detention or the specified period, 
whichever period expires later] and the maximum period for which any person 
may be detained in pursuance of any detention order to which the provisions of 
Section 9 apply and which has been confirmed under clause (f) of Section 8 read 
with sub-section (2) of Section 9 shall be ''[a period of two years from the date of 
detention or the specified period, whichever period expires later]: 
Provided that nothing contained in this section shall affect the power of the 
appropriate Government in either case to revoke or modify the detention order at 
any earlier time. 
7[Explanation.-In this section and in Section 10-A, "specified period'' means the 
period during which the Proclamation of Emergency issued under clause (1) of 
Article 352 of the Constitution on the 3rd day of December, 1971 and the Proc-
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lamation of Emergency issued under that clause on the 25th day of June, 1975, are 
both in operation.] 
7[10-A. Extension of period of detention. —(1) Notwithstanding anything 
contained in any other provision of this Act, the detention of every person 
detained under a detention order which has been confirmed under clause (f) of 
Section 8 before the commencement of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and 
Prevention of Smuggling Activities (Amendment) Act, 1976, and which is in force 
immediately before such commencement shall, unless his detention has been 
continued by the appropriate Government under the said clause for a period 
shorter than one year from the date of his detention, continue until the expiry of a 
period of one year from the date of his detention under such order or until the 
expiry of the specified period whichever period expires later: 
Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall affect tlie power of the 
appropriate Government to revoke or modify such detention order at any earlier 
time.] 
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of this Act, the 
detention of every person detained under a detention order which has been 
confirmed under clause (f) of Section 8 read with sub-section (2) of Section 9 before 
the commencement of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of 
Smuggling Activities (Amendment) Act, 1976, and which is in force immediately 
before such commencement, shall, unless his detention has been continued by the 
appropriate Government under the said clause (f) read with the said subsection (2), 
for a period shorter than two years from the date of his detention, continue until the 
expiry of a period of two years from the date of his detention under such order or 
until the expiry of the specified period, whichever period expires later: 
Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall affect the power of the 
appropriate Government to revoke or modify such detention order at any earlier 
time.] 
11. Revocation of detention orders — (1) Without prejudice to the provisions of 
Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897), a detention order may, at 
any time, be revoked or modified-
(a) notwithstanding that the order has been made by an officer of a State 
Government, by that State Government or by the Central Government; 
(b) notwithstanding that the order has been made by an officer of the Central 
Government or by a State Government, by tlie Central Goverrmient 
(2) The revocation of a detention order shall not bar the making of another detention 
order under Section 3 against the same person. 
12. Temporary release of persons detained. - ^[(l) The Central Government may, at 
any time, direct that any person detained in pursuance of a detention order made 
by that Government or an officer subordinate to that Government or by a State 
Government of fey an officer subordinate to a State Government, may be released for 
any specified period either without condition or upon such conditions specified in. 
the direction as that person accepts, and may/at any time, cancel liis release. 
(1-A) A State Government, may at any time, direct that person detained in pursuance 
of a detention order made by that Government or by an officer subordinate to that 
Government may be released for any specified period either without condition or 
upon such condition specified in the direction as person accepts, and may, at any 
fime, cancel his release,] 
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(2) In directing the release of any person ^(under sub-section (1) or sub-section (1-A), 
the Government directing the release], may require him to enter into a bond with 
sureties for the observance of the conditions specified in the direction, 
(3) Any person released under i"[sub-section (1) or subsection (1-A)] shall 
surrender himself at the time and place, and to the authority, specified in the order 
directing his release or canceling his release, as the case may be. 
(4) If any person fails witliout sufficient cause to surrender himself in the manner 
specified in sub-section (3), he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term 
which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both. 
(5) If any person released under "[sub-section (1) or subsection (1-A)] fails to fulfill 
any of the conditions imposed upon him under the said sub-section or in the bond 
entered into, by him., the bond shall be declared to be forfeited and any person 
bound thereby shall be liable to pay the penalty thereof,] 
'2[(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law and" save as otherwise 
provided in this section, no person against whom a detention order made under this 
Act is in force shall be released whether on bail or bail bond or otherwise. 
"[12-A. Special provisions for dealing with emergency -
(1) (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or any rules of natural 
justice, the provisions of this section shall have effect during the period of 
operation of the Proclamation of Emergency issued under clause (1) of 
Article 352 of the Constitution on the 3rd day of December, 1971, or the 
Proclamation of Emergency issued under that clause on the 25th day of June, 
1975, or a period of [twenty-four months] from the 25th day of June, 1975, 
whichever period is the shortest. 
(2) When making an order, of detention under this Act against-any person 
after the commencement of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and 
Prevention of Smuggling Activities (Amendment) Actg 1975, the Central 
Government or the State Government or, as the case may be, the officer 
making the order of detention shall consider whether the detention of such 
person under this Act is necessary for dealing with the emergency In 
respect of which the referred to in sub-section. (1) have been issued 
(hereafter In section referred to as the emergency) and if, on such 
consideration, the Central Government or the State Government or, as the 
case may be, the officer is satisfied that it Is necessary to detain such person 
for effectively dealing with the emergency, that Government or officer, may 
make a declaration to that effect and communicate a copy of the declaration 
to the person concerned: 
Provided that where such declaration is made by an officer, it shall, be by the 
appropriate Government within fifteen days from the date of making of the 
declaration and such declaration shall cease to have effect unless it is 
confirmed by that Government, after such review, within the said period of 
fifteen days, 
(3) The question whether the detention of any person in respect of whom a 
declaration has been made under sub-section (2) contii^ues to be necessary for 
effectively dealing with the emergency shall be reconsidered by the 
appropriate Government witliin four months from the date of such 
declaration and thereafter at intervals not exceeding months, and if, on such 
reconsideration, it appears to the appropriate Government that the detention 
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of the person is no longer necessary for effectively dealing with the 
emergency, that Government may revoke the declaration. 
(4) In making any consideration, review or reconsideration under sub-section (2) 
or (3), the appropriate Government or officer may, if such Government or 
officer considers it to be against the public interest to do otherwise, act on the 
basis of the information and materials in its or his possession without 
disclosing the facts or giving an opportunity of making a representation to 
the person concerned. 
(5) It shall not be necessary to disclose to any person detained under a detention 
order to which the provisions of sub-section (2) apply, the grounds on which 
the order has been made during the period the declaration made in respect of 
such person under that sub-section is in force, and, accordingly, such period 
shall not be taken into account for the purposes of sub-section (3) of Section 3, 
(6) In the case of every person detained under a detention order to which the 
provisions of sub-section (2) apply, being a person in respect of whom a 
declaration has been made thereunder, the period during which such 
declaration is in force shall not be taken into account for the purpose of 
computing-
(i) the periods specified in clauses (b) and (c) of Section 8; 
(ii) the periods of "one year" and "five weeks" specified in sub-section (1), the 
period of "one year" specified in sub-section (2) (f) and the period of "six 
months" specified in. sub-section (3) of Section 9.] 
13. Protection of action taken in good faiths-No suit or other legal proceeding shall 
lie against the Central Government or a State Government and no suit, prosecution 
or other legal proceedings shall lie against any person, for anything in good faith 
done or intended to be done m pursuance of this Act. 
14. Repeal -The Maintenance of Internal Security (Amendment) Ordinance, 1974 (11 
of 1974), shall, on the commencement of this Act, stand repealed and accordingly the 
amendments made in the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 (26 of 1971), by 
the said Ordinance shall, on such commencement, cease to have effect. 
XXX JLppencCv(:II 
References: 
1. Received the assent of the President on December 13,1974, published m Gazette of 
India, Extra., Part II, Section 1, dated 13th December, 1974, pp. 761-767. 
2. The Act came Into force on 19th December, 1974, vide Noti. No. G.S.R. 690(E), 
dated 16-12-1974. 
2a. Inserted by .I.S. of P.I.T. in N.D.P.S. Act, 1988 (No. 46 of 1988) 
3. Ins. by the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling 
Activities (Amendment) Act, 1975 (35 of 1975), S. 2 (w.e.f. 1-7-1975). 
4. Subs, by Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling 
Activities (Amendment) Act, 1984 (58 of 1984), S. 2 (w.e.f. 13-7-1984). 
4a. Subs, by Act.23 of 1987, S. 2, (w.e.f. 2-7-1987), 
* The COFEPOSA (Amendment) Ordinance, 1990. 
4b. Subs by Act 23 of 1987, S.2 (w.e.f. 2.7.1987) 
5. Subs, temporarily for the words "one year from the date of detention" for the 
duration of the Proclamation of Emergency of 3-12-1971 and 25-6-1975 by S. 3, 
ibid. 
6. Subs, temporarily for the words "two years from the date of detention", ibid. 
7. Ins. temporarily for the duration of the Proclamation of Emergency of 3-12-1971 
and 25-6-1975 by S. 3, ibid. 
8. Subs. By Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling 
Activities (Amendment) Act, 1976 (20 of 1976), S. 4, 
9. Subs, by ibid. 
10. Subs, by ibid. 
11. Ins. by the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling 
Activities (Amendment) Act, 1975 (35 of 1975), S, 3 (w.e.f. 1-7-1975). 
12. Ins, by ibid, S. 4. 
13. Subs, by Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling 
Activities (Second Amendment) Act, 1976 (90 of 1976) S 2, (w.e.f. 16-6-1976). 
xxxi Jippendi^II 
APPENDIX-III 
The Prevention of Blockmarketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential 
Commodities Act, 1980i 
[No. 7 of 1980] 
(12th Fehruanj, 1980) 
Be it enacted by Parliament in the Thirtieth Year of the Republic of India as 
follows: — 
1. Short title, extent and commencement. - (1) This Act be called the Prevention of 
Blackmarketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980. 
(2) It extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir. 
(3) It shall be deemed to have come into force on the 5th day, of October, 1979. 
2. Definitmis- In this Act unless the context otherwise requires,-
(a) "appropriate Government" means, as respects a Retention order made by the 
Central Government or by an officer of the Central Government or a person 
detained under such order, the Central Government, and as respects a 
detention order made by a State Government or by an officer of a State 
Government or as respects a person detained under such order, tlie State 
Government; 
(b) "detention order" means an order made under Section 3; 
(c) "State Government", in relation to a Union Territory, means the administrator 
thereof. 
3. Power to make orders detaining certain persons. - (1) -The Central. Government or a 
State Government or any officer of the Central Government, not below the rank of a 
Joint Secretary to that Government specially empowered for the purposes of this 
section by that Government, or any officer of a State Government, not below the rank 
of a Secretary to that Government specially empowered for the purposes of this 
section by that Government, may, if satisfied, with respect to any person that with a 
view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of 
supplies of commodities essential to the community it is necessary so to do, make an 
order directing that such person be detained. 
Explanation—¥oT the purposes of this sub-section, the expression "acting in any 
manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of commodities essential to the 
community" means-
(a) committing or instigating any person to commit any offence punishable under 
the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (10 of 1955), or under any other law for the time 
being in force relating to the control of the production, supply or distribution of, or 
trade commerce in, any commodity essential to the community; or 
(b) dealing in any commodity — 
(i) which is an essential commodity as defined in the Essential Commodities 
Act, 1955 (10 of 1955), or 
(ii) with respect to which provisions have been made in any such other law as is 
referred to in clause (a), with a view to making gain in any manner which , 
directly or indirectly' defeat or tend to defeat the : provisions of that Act or 
other law aforesaid. 
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(2) Any of the following officers, namely: — 
(a) District Magistrates; 
(b) Commissioners of Police, wherever they have been appointed, may also, if 
satisfied as provided in subsections (!}, exercise the powers conferred by the said 
sub-section. 
(3) When any order is made under this section by an-officer mentioned in sub-
section. (2), he shall forthwith report the fact to the State Government to which he is 
subordinate together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such 
other particulars as in his opinion have a bearing on the matter and no such order 
shall remain in force for more than twelve days after the making thereof unless-in the 
meantime it has been approved by the State Government: 
Provided that where under Section 8 the grounds of detention are 
communicated by the authority making the order after five days but not later than 
ten days from the date of detention, this sub-section shall apply subject to the 
modification that for the words "twelve- days", the words "fifteen days" shall be 
substituted. 
(4) When any order is made or approved by the State Government under this section 
or when, any order is made under this section by an officer of the State Government 
not below the rank of Secretary to that Government specially empowered under 
sub-section (1), .the State Government shall, within seven days,-report-the -fact to the 
Central Government togetlier with the grounds on which the order has been made 
and such other particulars as, in the opinion of the State Government have a bearing 
on the necessity for the order. 
4. Execution of detention orders, -A detention order may be executed at any place in 
India in the manner provided for the execution of warrants of arrest' under the Code 
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974). 
5. Power to regulate place and conditions of detention - Every person in respect of 
whom a detention order has been made shall be liable: 
(a) to be detained in such place and under such conditions, including conditions as to 
maintenance, discipline and punishment for breaches of discipline, as the 
appropriate Government may, by general or special order, specify' and 
(b) to be removed from one place shall be made by a State Government under clause 
(b) for the removal of a person from one State to another State except with the 
consent of the Government of that other State. 
6. Detention orders not to be invalid or inoperative on certain grounds - No 
detention order shall be invalid or inoperative merely by reason-
(a) that the person to be detained thereunder is outside the limits of the territorial 
jurisdiction of the Government or officer making the order, or 
(b) that the place of detention of such person is outside the said limits. 
7. Powers in relation to absconding persons -
(1) if 2[the appropriate Government or an officer mentioned in sub-section (2) of 
Section 3 a the case may be,] has reason to believe that a person in respect of 
whom a detention order has been made has absconded or is concealing himself 
so that the order caiinot be executed, that Government 3[or officer] may-
(a) make a report in writing of the fact to a Mehopolitan Magistrate or a judicial 
Magistrate of the first class having jurisdiction in the place where the said 
person ordinarily resides; and thereupon the provisions of Section 82, 83, 84 
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and 85 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), shall apply in 
respect of the said person and his property as if the order directing that he be 
detained were a warrant issued by the Magistrate. 
(b) By order notified in the Official Gazette direct the said person to appear 
before such officer, at such place and within such period as may be specified 
in the order; and if the said person fails to comply with such direction he 
shall, unless he proves that it was not possible for him to comply therewith 
and that he had, within the period specified in the order, informed the officer 
mentioned in the order of the reason which rendered compliance therewith 
impossible and of his whereabouts, be punishable with imprisonment for a 
term which may extend to one year or with imprisonment for a term which 
may extend to one year or with fine or with both. 
2. Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 
(2 of 1974), every offence under clause (b) of sub-section (1) shall be cognizable. 
8. Grounds of order of detention to be disclosed to person affected by the order -
1. When a person is detained in pursuance of a detention order, the authority 
making the order shall, as soon as may be, but ordinarily not later than five days and 
in exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing, not later than 
ten days from the date of detention, communicate to him the grounds on which the 
order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a 
representation against the order to the appropriate Government. 
2. Nothing in sub-section (1) shall require the authority to disclose facts which it 
considers to be against the public interest to disclose. 
9. Constitution of Advisory Boards - (1) The Central Government and each State 
Government shall, whenever necessary, constitute one or more Advisory Boards for 
the purposes of this Act. 
*[(2) Every such Board shall consist of three persons who are, or have been, or 
are qualified to be appointed as. Judges of a High Court, and such persons shall be 
appointed by appropriate Government. 
(3) The appropriate Government shall appoint one of the members of the 
Advisory Board who is, or has been, a Judge of a High Court to be its Chairman, and 
in the case of a Union territory, the appointment to the Advisory Board of any person 
who is a Judge of the High Court of a State shall be with the previous approval of the 
State Government concerned.J 
Explanation - In this section "appropriate High Court" means-
(a) in the case of the detention of a person in pursuance of an order of detention 
made by the Central Government or the administration of the Union territory 
of Delhi or an officer subordinate to such administrator, the High Court for 
the Union territory of Delhi; 
(b) in tlie case of the detention of a person in pursuance of an order of detention 
made by any State Government (other than the administrator of a Union 
territory) or an officer of such State Government, the High Court for that 
State; and 
(c) in the case of the detention of a person in pursuance of an order of detention 
made by tiie administi-ator of a Union territory (other than the Union territory 
of Delhi) or an officer subordinate to such administrator, such High Court as 
the Central Government may, by order published in the Official Gazette, 
specify with respect to such Union territory. 
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10. Reference to Advisory Boards - Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, 
in every case where a detention order has been made under this Act, the appropriate 
Government shall, within three weeks from the date of detention of a person under 
the order, place before the Advisory Board constituted by it under Section 9, the 
grounds on which the order has been made and the representation, if any, made by 
the person affected by the order, and in case where the order has been made by an 
officer referred to in sub-section (2) of Section 3, also the report by such officer under 
sub-section (3) of that section. 
11. Procedure of Advisory Boards -
(1) The Advisory Board shall, after considering the materials placed before it 
and after calling for such further information as it may deem necessary from 
the appropriate Government or from any person called for the purpose 
through the appropriate Government or from the person concerned, and if, 
in any particular case, it considers it essential so to do or if the person 
concerned desires to be heard, after hearing him in person, submit its report 
to the appropriate Government within seven weeks from the date of 
detention of the person concerned. 
(2) The report of the Advisory Board shall specify in a separate part thereof the 
opinion of the Advisory Board as to whether or not there is sufficient cause 
for the detention of the person concerned. 
(3) When there is a difference of opinion among the members forming the 
Advisory Board, the opinion of the majority of such members shall be 
deemed to be the opinion of the Board. 
(4) Nothing in this section shall entitle any person against whom a detention 
order has been made to appear by any legal practitioner in any matter 
connected with the reference to the Advisory Board, and the proceedings of 
the Advisory Board, and its report, excepting that part of the report in which 
the opinion of the Advisory Board is specified, shall be confidential. 
12. Action upon the report of Advisory Board -
(1) In any case where the Advisory Board has reported that there is in its opinion 
sufficient cause for the detention of a person, the appropriate Government may 
confirm the detention order and continue the detention of the person concerned 
for such period as it thinks fit. 
(2) In any case where the Advisory Board has reported that there is in its opinion 
no sufficient cause for the detention of the person concerned, the appropriate 
Government shall revoke the detention order and cause the persori to be 
released forthwith. 
13. Maximum period of detention -
The maximum period for which any person may be detained in pursuance of 
any detention order which has been confirmed under Section 12, shall be six months 
from the date of detention: 
Provided that nothing contaii^ ied in this section shall affect the power of the 
appropriate Government to revoke or modify the detention order at any earlier time. 
14. Revocation of detention orders: 
(1) Without prejudice to the provisions of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 
1897 (10 of 1897), a detention order may, at any time, be revoked or modified -
XXXV Jippendv(:II 
(a) notwithstanding that the order has been made by an officer of a State 
Government, by that State Government or by the Central Government; 
(b) notv^'ithstanding that the order has been made by an officer of the 
Central Government or by a State Government, by the Central 
Government. 
(2) The revocation or expiry of a detention order shall not bar the making of a 
fresh detention order under Section 3 against the same person in any case where 
fresh facts have arisen after the date of revocation or expiry on which the Central 
Government or a State Government or an officer, as the case may be, is satisfied 
that such an order should be made. 
15. Temporary release of persons detained: 
(1) The appropriate Government may, at any time, direct that any person 
detained in pursuance of a detention order may be released for any specified 
period either without conditions or upon such conditions specified in the 
direction as that person accepts, and may, at any time, cancel his release. 
(2) In directing the release of any person under sub-section (1), the appropriate 
Government may require him to enter into a bond with or without sureties 
for the due observance of the conditions specified in the direction. 
(3) Any person released under sub-section (1) shall surrender himself at the time 
and place, and to tlie authority, specified in the order directing his release or 
canceling his release, as the case may be. 
(4) If any person, fails without sufficient cause to surrender himself in the 
manner specified in sub-section (3), he shall be punishable with 
imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or 
with both. 
(5) If any person released under sub-section (1) fails to fulfill any of the 
conditions imposed upon him under the said sub-section or in the bond 
entered into by him, the bond shall be declared to be forfeited and any 
person bound thereby shall be liable to pay the penalty thereof. 
16. Protection of action taken in good faith: 
No suit or other legal proceeding shall lie against the Central Government or a 
State Government, and no suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall lie 
against any person, for anything in good faith done or intended to be done in 
pursuance of this Act. 
17. Repeal and Saving: 
(1) The Prevention of Black-marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential 
Commodities Ordinance, 1979 (10 of 1979), is hereby repealed. 
(2) Notwithstanding such repeal anything done or any action taken under the 
Ordinance so repealed shall be deemed to have been done or taken under the 
corresponding provisions of this Act. 
xxxvi Ji-ppenc[U:II 
References: 
1. Received the assent of the President on February 12,1980, published in the Gazette 
of India, Extra., Part II, Section 1, dated 12th February, 1980, pp. 21-27. 
2. Subs, by Act 27 of 1982,5.2 
3. Ins. by Act 27 of 1982, S.2 
4. Subs, by Act 19 of 1981. Section 3 of Act 19 of 1981 in this regard provides: 
"3. Saving as to pending references under Section 10 - Any reference made under 
Section 10 of the principal Act and pending before any Advisory Board immediately 
before the commencement of this Act may, notwithstanding anything contained in 
this Act, continue to be dealt with by that Board after such commencement as if this 
Act had not been enacted." 
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APPENDIX-IV 
The Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) 
Act, 19761 
Whereas for the effective prevention of smuggling activities and foreign 
exchange manipulations which are having a deleterious effect on the national 
economy it is necessary to deprive persons engaged in such activities and 
manipulations of their ill-gotten gains; 
And whereas such persons have been augmenting such gains by violations of 
wealth-tax, income-tax or other laws or by other means and have thereby been 
increasing their resources for operating in a clandestine manner; 
And whereas such persons have in many cases been holding the properties 
acquired by them through such gains in the names of their relatives, associated and 
confidants; 
Bet it enacted by Parliament in the Twenty-sixth Year of the Republic of India 
as follows:-
1. Short title, extent and commencement - (1) This Act may be called the 
Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 
1976. 
(2) It extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir. 
(3) It shall be deemed to have come into forced on the 5* day of November, 
1975. 
2. Application - (1) The provisions of this Act shall apply only to the persons 
specified in sub-section (2). 
(2) The persons referred to in sub-section (1) are the following, namely:-
(a) every person-
(i) who has been convicted under the Sea Customs Act, 1878 (8 of 
1878), or the Customs Act, 1962 (52 of 1962), of an offence in relation 
to goods of a value exceeding one lakh of rupees; or 
(ii) who has been convicted under the Foreign Exchange Regulation 
Act, 1947 (7 of 1947), or the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 
(46 of 1973), of an offence, the amount or value involved in which 
exceeds one lakh of rupees; or 
(iii) who having been convicted under the Sea Customs Act, 1878 (8 of 
1878), or the Customs Act, 1962 (52 of 1962), has been convicted 
subsequently under either of those Acts; or 
(iv) who having been convicted under tlie Foreign Exchange Regulation 
Act, 1947 (7 of 1947), or the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 
(46 of 1973), has been convicted subsequently under either of those 
Acts; 
(b) every person in respect of whom an order of detention has been made 
under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of 
Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (52 of 1974): 
I. Received the assent of the President on January 25. 1976, published in Gazette oflndia. i;xtra., Part 
II, Section 1, dated 25"' January, 1976, pp. 95-105. 
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Provided that -
(i) such order of detention, being an order to which the provisions of Section 9 or 
Section 12-A of the said Act do not apply, has not been revoked on the report 
of the Advisory Board under Section 8 of the said Act or before the receipt of 
the report of the Advisory Board or before making a reference to the 
Advisory Board; or 
(ii) such order of detention, being an order to which the provisions of Section 9 of 
the said Act apply, has not been revoked before the expiry of the time for, or 
on the basis of, the review under sub-section (3) of Section 9, or on the report 
of the Advisory Board under Section 8, read with sub-section (2) of Section 9, 
of the said Act; or 
(iii) such order of detention, being an order to which the provisions of Section 12-
A of the said Act apply, has not been revoked before the expiry of the time 
for, or on the basis of, the first review under sub-section (3) of that section, or 
on the basis of the report of the Advisory Board under Section 8, read with 
sub-section (6) of Section 12-A, of that Act; or 
(iv) such order of detenhon has not been set aside by a court of competent 
jurisdiction; 
(c) every person who is a relation of a person referred to in clause (a) or 
clause (b); 
(d) every associate of a person referred to in clause (a) or clause (b); 
(e) any holder (hereafter in this clause referred to as the present holder) 
of any property which was at any time previously held by a person 
referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) unless the present holder or, as 
the case may be, any one who held such property after such person 
and before the present holder, is or was a transferee in good faith for 
consideration. 
Explanation 1- For the purposes of sub-clause (i) of clause (a), the value of any goods 
in relation to which a person has been convicted of an offence shall be the wholesale 
price of the goods in the ordinary course of trade in India as on the date of the 
commission of the offence. 
Explanation 2- For the purposes of clause (c), "relative", in relation to a person, 
means-
(i) spouse of the person; 
(ii) brother or sister of the person; 
(iii) brother or sister of the spouse of the person; 
(iv) any lineal ascendant or descendant of the person; 
(v) any lineal ascendant or descendant of the spouse of the person; 
(vi) spouse of a person referred to in clause (ii), clause (iii), clause (iv) or clause 
(V); 
(vii) any lineal descendant of a person referred to in clause (ii) or clause (iii). 
Explanation 3- For the purposes of clause (d), "associate", \x\ relation to a person, 
means-
(i) any individual who had been or is residing in the residential premises 
(including outhouses) of such person; 
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(ii) any individual who had been or is managing the affairs or keeping the 
accounts of such person; 
(iii) any association of persons, body of individuals, partnership firm, or 
private company within the meaning of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), 
of which such person had been or is a member, partner or director; 
(iv) any individual who had been or is a member, partner or director of an 
association of persons, body of individuals, partnership firm or private 
company referred to in clause (iii) at anytime when such person had been or 
is a member, partner or director of such association, body, partnership firm or 
private company; 
(v) any person who had been or is managing the affairs, or keeping the accounts, 
of any association of persons, body of individuals, partnership firm or private 
company referred to in clause (iii); 
(vi) the trustee of any trust, where,-
(a) the trust has been created by such person; or 
(b) tlie value of the assets contributed by such person (including the value of 
the assets, if any, contributed by him earlier) to the trust amounts, on the 
date on which the contribution is made, to not less than twenty per cent of 
the value of the assets of the trust on that date; 
(vii) where the competent authority, for reasons to be recorded in writing, 
considers that any properties of such person are held on his behalf by any 
other person, such other person. 
Explanation 4. — For the avoidance of doubt, it is hereby provided that the question 
whether any person is a person to whom the provisions of this Act apply may be 
determined with reference to any facts, circumstances or events (including any 
conviction or detention) which occurred or took place before the commencement of 
this Act. 
Definitions— (1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires-
(a) "Appellate Tribunal" means the Appellate Tribunal for Forfeited Property 
constituted under Section 12; 
(b) "competent authority" means an officer of the Central Government 
authorised by it under subsection (1) of Section 5 to perform the functions of a 
competent authority vmder this Act; 
(c) "illegally acquired property", in relation to any person to whom this Act applies 
means — 
(i) any property acquired by such person, whether before or after the 
commencement of this Act, wholly or partly out of or by means of any 
income, earnings or assets derived or obtained from or attributable to any 
activity prohibited by or under any law for the time being in force relating 
to any matter in respect of which Parliament has power to make laws; or 
(ii) any property acquired by such person, whether before or after the 
commencement of tliis Act, wholly or partly out of or by means of any 
income, earnings or assets in respect of which any such law has been 
contravened; or 
(iii) any property acquired by such person, whether before or after the 
commencement of this Act, wholly or partly out of or by means of any 
income, earnings or assets the source of which cannot be proved and which 
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cannot be shown to be attributable to any act or thing done in respect of any 
matter in relation to which Parliament has no power to make laws; or 
(iv) any property acquired by such person, whether before or after the 
commencement of this Act, for a consideration, or by any means, wholly or 
partly traceable to any property referred to in sub-clauses (i) to (iii) or the 
income or earnings from such property; 
and includes — 
(A) any property held by such person which would have been, in relation to any 
previous holder thereof, illegally acquired property under this clause if such 
previous holder had not ceased to hold it, unless such person or any other person 
who held the property at any time after such previous -holder or, where there are 
two or more, such previous holders, the last of such previous holders is or was a 
transferee in good faith for adequate consideration; 
(B) any property acquired by such person, whether before or after the 
commencement of this Act, for a consideration, or by any means, wholly or partly 
traceable to any property falling under item (A), or the income or earnings 
therefrom; 
(d) "prescribed" means prescribed by rules made, under this Act; 
(e) "property" includes any interest, in property, movable or immovable; 
(f) "bust" includes any other legal obligation, 
(2) Any reference in this Act to any law which is not in force in any area shall, in 
relation to that area, be construed as a reference to the corresponding law, if any, in 
force in that area. 
(3) Any reference in this Act to any officer or authority shall, in relation to any area 
in which there is iio officer or authority with tlie same designation, be construed as a 
reference to such officer or authority as may be specified by the Central Government 
by notification in the Official Gazette. 
4. Prohibition of holding illegally acquired property —(1) As from the 
commencement of this Act, it shall not be lawful for any person to whom this Act 
applies to hold any Illegally acquired property either by himself or through any oilier 
person on this behalf. 
(2) Where any person holds any illegally acquired property in contravention of the 
provisions of sub-section. (1) property shall be liable to be forfeited to the Central 
Government in accordance with the- provisions of this Act 
5. Competent authority —(1) The Cential Government by order published in the 
Official Gazette, authorises as officers of the Central Government (not below the rank 
of a Joint Secretary to the Government), as it thinks fit, to the functions of the 
competent authority under this Act. 
(2) The competent authorities shall perform their functions in respect of such persons 
or classes of persons as the Government may, by order, direct. 
6. Notice of forfeiture - (1) If, having regard to the value of the properties held by 
any person to whom this Act applies, eitlier by himself or, through any otiier person 
on his behalf, his known sources of income, earnings or assets, and any other 
information or material available to it as a result of action taken under Section 18 or 
otherwise, the competent autiiority has reason to believe (the reasons for such belief 
to be recorded in writing that all or any of such properties are illegally acquired 
properties, it may serve a notice upon such person (hereinafter referred to as the 
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person affected) calling upon him within such time as may be specified in the notice, 
which shall not be ordinarily less than thirty days, to indicate the sources of his 
income, earnings or assets, out of which or by means of which he has acquired such 
property, the evidence on which he relies and other relevant information and 
particulars, and to show cause why all or any of such properties, as the case may be, 
should not fee declared to be illegally acquired properties and forfeited to the Central 
Government under this Act. 
(2) Where a notice under sub-section (1) to any person any property as held on 
behalf of such person by any other person, a copy of the notice shall also be served 
upon such other person. 
7. Forfeiture of property in certain cases —(1) The competent authority may, 
after considering the explanation, if any, to the show-cause notice issued under 
Section 6, and the materials available before it after giving to the person affected (and 
in a case where the person affected holds any property specified 
in the notice through any other person, to such other person also) a reasonable 
opportunity of being heard, by order, record a finding whether all or any of the 
properties in question are illegally acquired properties. 
(2) Where the competent authority is satisfied that some of the properties referred to 
In the show-cause notice are illegally acquired properties but is not able to identify 
specifically such properties, then. It shall be lawful for the competent authority to 
specify the properties which, to the of its judgment, are illegally acquired properties 
and record a finding accordingly under sub-section (1). 
(3) Where the competent authority records a finding under this section to the effect 
that any property is illegally acquired property, it shall declare that such property 
shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, stand forfeited to the Central Government 
free from all encumbrances. 
(4) Where any shares in a company stand forfeited to the Central Government under 
this Act, then, the company shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the 
Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), or the articles of association of the company, 
forthwith register the Cential Government as the transferee of such shares. 
8. Burden of proof—In any proceedings under this Act, the burden of proving that 
any property specified in the notice served under Section 6 is not illegally acquired 
property shall fee on the person affected. 
9. Fine in lieu of forfeiture —(1) Where the competent authority makes a declaration 
that any property stands forfeited, to the Central Government under Section 7 and it 
is a case where the source of only a part, being less than one-half, of the income, 
earnings or assets with which, such property was acquired has not been 
proved to the satisfaction of the competent authority, it shall make an order giving 
an option to the person affected to pay in lieu of forfeiture, a fine equal to one and 
one-fifth times the value of such part. 
Explanation - For the purposes of this sub-section, the value of any part of income, 
earnings or assets, with which any property has been acquired, shall b e -
(a) in the case of any part of income or earning, the amount of such part of income or 
earnings; 
(b) in the case of any part of assets, the proportiojiate part of the full value of the 
consideration for the acquisition of such assets. 
(2) Before making an order imposing a fine under section, (1) the person affected 
shall be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard. 
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(3) Where the person affected pays the fine due under section (1), within such time as 
may be allowed in that behalf the competent authority may, by order, revoke the of 
forfeiture under Section 7 and thereupon such property stand released. 
10. Procedure in relation to certain trust properties — In the case, of any person 
referred to in clause (vi) of Explanation 4 to sub-section (2) of Section 2, if the 
competent authority, on the basis of the information and materials available to it, has 
reason to believe (the reasons for such belief to be recorded In writing) that any 
property held in trust is illegally acquired property, it may serve a notice upon the 
author of the trust or, as the case may be, the contributor of the assets out of or by 
means of which such property was acquired by the trust and the trustees, calling 
upon them within such time as may be specified in the notice which shall not 
ordinarily be less than thirty days, to explain the source of the money or other assets 
out of or by means of which such property was acquired, or, as the case may be, the 
source of the money or other assets which were contributed to the trust for acquiring 
such property and thereupon such notice shall be deemed to be a notice served 
under Section 6 and all the other provisions of this Act shall apply accordingly. 
Explanation—For the purposes of this section "illegally acquired property", in 
relation to any property held in trust, includes — 
(i) any property which if it had continued to be held, by the author of the trust or 
the conti'ibutor of such property to the trust would have been illegally 
acquired property in relation to such author or contributor; 
(ii) any property acquired by the trust out of any contributions made by any 
person which would have been illegally acquired property in relation to such 
person had such person acquired such property out of such contributions. 
11. Certain transfers to be null and void —Where after the issue of a notice under 
Section 6 or under Section 10, any property referred to in the said .notice is 
transferred by any mode whatsoever such transfer shall, for the purposes of the 
proceedings under this Act, be ignored and if such property is subsequently forfeited 
to the Central Government under Section 7, then, the transfer of such property shall 
be deemed to be null and void. 
12. Constitution of appellate tribunal —(1) The Central Government may by 
notification in, the Official Gazette, constitute an Appellate Tribunal to, be called the 
Appellate Tribunal for Forfeited Property consisting of a Chairman and such number 
of other members (being officers of the Central Government not below the rank of a 
Joint Secretary to the Government) as the Central Government thinks fit, to be ap-
pointed by the Government for hearing appeals against the orders made ender 
Section 7, sob-section (1) of Section 9 or Section 10. 
(2) The Chairman of the Appellate. Tribunal shall be a person who is or has been or is 
qualified to be a Judge of the Supreme Court or of a High Court. 
(3) The terms and conditions of service of the Chairman and members shall be such 
as may be prescribed. 
(4) Any person aggrieved by an order of the competent authority made ender 
Section 7, sub-section (1) of Section 9 or Section 10, may, within forty-five days from 
the date on which the order is served on him, prefer an appeal to the Appellate 
Tribunal: 
Provided that the Appellate Tribunal may entertain any appeal after- the said period 
of forty-five days, but not after sixty days from, the date aforesaid if it is satisfied that 
the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal in time, 
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(5) On receipt of an appeal under sub-section (4), the Appellate Tribunal may, after 
giving an opportunity to the appellant to be heard, if he so desires, and after making 
such further enquiry as it deems fit, confirm, modify or set aside the order appealed 
against. 
(6) The powers and functions of the Appellate Tribunal may be exercised and 
discharged by Benches consisting of three members and constituted by the Chairman 
of the Appellate Tribunal. 
[(6-A) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (6), where the Chairman 
considers it necessary so to do for the disposal of appeals under this section, he may 
constitute a Bench of two members and a Bench so constituted may exercise and 
discharge the powers and functions of the Appellate Tribunal. 
Provided that if the members of a Bench so constituted differ on any point or points, 
they shall state the point or points on which they differ and refer the same to a third 
member (to be specified by the Chairman) for hearing on such point or points and 
such point or points shall be decided according to the opinion of that member."; 
(7) The Appellate Tribunal may regulate its own procedure, 
-[{8) On application to the Appellate Tribunal and on payment of the 
prescribed fee, the Tribunal may allow a party to any appeal or any person, 
authorised in this behalf by such party to inspect at any time during office hours, any 
relevant records and registers of the Tribunal and obtain a certified 
copy of any part thereof.] 
13. Notice or order not to be invalid for error in description. — 
No notice issued or served, no declaration made, and no order passed, under this 
shall be deemed to be invalid by reason of any error in the description of the 
property or person mentioned therein if such property or person is identifiable from 
the description, so mentioned. 
14. Bar of jurisdiction.—No order passed or declaration made under this Act shall 
be appealable except as provided therein, and no civil court shall have jurisdiction in 
respect of any matter which tlie Appellate Tribunal or any competent authority is 
empowered by or under this Act to determine, and no injunction shall be granted by 
any court or other authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken in 
pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Act. 
15. Competent authority and Appellate Tribunal to powers of civil court—The 
competent authorit}' and the Appellate Tribunal shall have all the powers of a civil 
court while trying a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), in 
respect of the following, matters, namely — 
(a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of person and examining him on 
oath; 
(b) requiring the discovery and production of documents; 
(c) receiving evidence on affidavits; 
(d) requisitioning ,any public record or copy thereof from any court or office; 
(e) issumg commissions for examination of wihiesses or documents; 
(f) any other matter which niay be prescribed. 
16. Information to competent authorit)' - (1) Notwithstanding anything contained 
in any other law, the competent authority shall have power to require any officer or 
authority of the Central Government or a State Government or a local authority to 
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furnish information in relation to such persons, points or matters as in the opinion of 
the competent authority will be useful for, or relevant to, the purposes of this Act. 
(2) Any officer of the Income-tax Department, the Customs Department or the 
Central Excise Department or any officer of enforcement appointed under the 
Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (46 of 1973), may furnish suo motu any 
information available with him to the competent authority if in the opinion of the 
officer such information will be useful to the competent authority for the purposes of 
this Act. 
17. Certain officers to assist competent authority and Appellate Tribunal- For the 
purposes of any proceedings under this Act, the following officers are hereby 
empowered and required to assist the competent authority and the Appellate 
Tribunal, namely: — 
(a) officers of the Customs Department; 
(b) officers of the Central Excise Department; 
(c) officers of the Income-tax Department; 
(d) officers of enforcement appointed under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 
1973 (46 of 1973); 
(e) officers of police; 
18. such other officers of the Central or State Government as are specified by the 
Central Government in this behalf by notification in the Official Gazette. 
18. Power of competent authority to require certain officers to exercise certain 
powers— (1) For the purposes of any proceeding under this Act or the initiation of 
any such proceedings, the competent authority shall have power to cause to be con-
ducted any inquiry, investigation or survey in respect of any person, place, property, 
assets, documents, books of account or any other relevant matters. 
(2) For the purposes referred to in sub-section (1) the competent authority may, 
having regard to the nature of the inquiry, investigation or survey, require an officer 
of the Income-tax Department to conduct or cause to be conducted such inquiry, 
investigation or survey. 
(3) Any officer of the Income-tax Department who is conducting or is causing to be 
conducted any inquiry, investigation, or survey required to be conducted under sub-
section (2), may, for the purpose of such inquiry, investigation or survey, exercise 
any power (including the power to authorise the exercise of any power) which may 
be exercised by him for any purpose under the Income-tax Act, 1961 (43 of 1961), and 
the provisions of the said Act shall, so far as may be, apply accordingly. 
19. Power to take possession. —(1) Where any property has been declared to be 
forfeited to the Central Government under this Act, or where the person affected has 
failed to pay the fine due under sub-section (1) of Section 9 within the time allowed 
therefore under sub-section (3) of that section, the competent authority may order the 
person affected as well as any other person who may be in possession of the property 
to surrender or deliver possession thereof to the competent authority or to any 
person duly authorised by it in this behalf within thirty days of the service of the 
order. 
(2) If any person refuses or fails to comply with an order made under sub-
section (1), the competent authority may take possession of the property and may for 
that purpose use such force as may be necessary. 
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(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2), the competent authority 
may, for the purpose of taking possession of any property referred to in sub-section 
(1), requisition the service of any police officer to assist the competent authority and 
it shall be the duty of such officer to comply with such requisition. 
20. Rectification of mistakes- With a view to rectifying any mistakes apparent from 
record, the competent authority or the Appellate Tribunal, as the case may be, amend 
any order made by it within a period of one year from the date of the order: 
Provided that if any such amendment is likely to affect any person prejudicially, it 
shall not be made without giving to such person a reasonable opportunity of being 
heard. 
21. Findings under other laws not conclusive for proceedings under-this Act— No 
finding of any officer or authority under any other law shall be conclusive for the 
purposes of any proceedings under this Act. 
22. Services of notices and orders - Any notice or order issued or made under this 
Act shall be served — 
(a) by tendering the notice or order or sending it by registered post to the person for 
whom it is intended or to his agent; 
(b) if the notice or order cannot be served in the provided in clause (a), by affixing it 
on a place in the -property in relation to which the notice or order is issued or made, 
or on some 'conspicuous part of the premises in which the person for it is intended is 
known to have last resided or on business or personally worked for gain. 
23. Protection of action taken in good faith — No suit, prosecution or other 
proceeding shall lie against the Central Government or any officer of the Central or 
State Government for anything which is done, or intended to be done, in good faith, 
in pursuance of this Act or the rules made thereunder. 
24. Act to have overriding effect — The provisions of this Act shall have effect 
notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the 
time being in force. 
25. Provisions of the Act not to apply to certain properties held in fcrust—Nothing 
contained in this Act shall apply in relation to any property held by a trust, or an 
institution created or established, wholly for public religious or charitable purposes 
if— (i) such property has been so held by such trust or institution from a date prior to 
the commencement of this Act; or 
(ii) such property is wholly traceable to any property held by such trust or institution 
prior to the commencement of this Act. 
26. Power to make rules. —(1) The Central Government may, be notification in the 
Official Gazette, make rules to carry out the provisions of this Act. 
(2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such 
rules may provide, for all or any of the following matters, namely — 
(a) the terms and conditions of service of the Chairman and other members of tlie 
Appellate Tribunal sub-section (3) of Section 12; 
3[(aa) the fees which shall be paid for the inspection of the records and registers of 
the Appellate Tribunal or for obtaining a certified copv of any part thereof under 
sub-section (8) of Section 12;] 
(b) the powers of a civil court that rnay be exercised by the competent authority and 
the Appellate Tribunal under clause (f) of Section 15; 
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(c) any other matter which has to be, or may be, prescribed. 
(3) Every rule made under this Act shall be laid, as soon as may be after it is made, 
before each House of Parliament, while it is In session, for a total period of thirty 
days which may be comprised in one session or in two or more successive sessions, 
and if, before the expiry of the session immediately following the session or 
successive sessions aforesaid, both Houses agree in making any modification in the 
rule, or both Houses agree that the rule should not be made, the rule shall thereafter 
have effect only in such modified form or be of no effect, as the case may be; so, 
however, that any such modification or annulment shall be without prejudice to the 
validity of anything previously done under that rule, 
27. Repeal and saving - (1) The Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators 
(Forfeiture of Property) Ordinance, 1975 (20 of 1975), is hereby repealed. 
(2) Notwithstanding such repeal, anything done or any action taken under the 
Ordinance so repealed shall be deemed to have been done or taken under the 
corresponding provisions of this Act. 
References: 
1. Ins. by Act 55 of 1980, S. 2 w.e.f. 1-7-1981. 
2. Ins. by Act 55 of 1980, S. 3 w.e.f. 1-7-1981. 
3. Ins. by Act 55 of 1980, S. 3 w.e.f. 1-7-1981. 
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APPENDIX-V 
The Preventive Detention Act, 1950 
[Act No. 4 of 19501] (25th February, 1950) 
Be it enacted by Parliament as follows: — 
1. Short title, extent and duration-(1) Thus Act may be called the Preventive 
Detention Act, 1950. 
2[(2) It extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir.] 
(3) It shall cease to have effect on the 3[31st day of December, 1969], save as respects 
things done or omitted to be done before that date. 
2. Definitions. - In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires — 
^[(a) "State Government" in relation to a Union territory, means the administrator 
thereof;] 
(b) "detention order" means an order made under Section 3 5[; and] 
5[(c) "appropriate Government" means, as respects a detention order made by the 
Central Government or a person detained under- such order, the Central Gov-
ernment, and as respects a detention order made by a State Government or by an 
officer subordinate to a State Government or as respects a person detained under 
such order, the State Government] 
3. Power to make orders detaining certain persons —(1) The Central Government or 
the State Goveniment may — 
(a) if satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from 
acting in any manner prejudicial to — 
(i) the defence of India, the relations of India with foreign powers, or the 
security of India, or 
(ii) the security of the State or the maintenance of public order, or 
(iii) the maintenance of supplies and services essential-to the community, or 
(b) if satisfied with respect to any person who is a foreigner within the meaning of 
the Foreigners Act, 1946 (31 of 1946), that with a view to regulating his continued 
presence in India or with a view to making arrangements for his expulsion from 
India, 
it is necessary .-so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained. 
(2) 6[Any of the following officers, namely: — 
(a) District Magistrates, 
(b) Additional District Magistrates specially empowered in this behalf by the State 
Government, 
''[(c) the Commissioner of Police for Bombay, Calcutta, Madras or Hyderabad, 
(d) Collectors in the ^[territories which, immediately before the 1st November, 1956, 
were comprised in the State of Hyderabad]], may,] 
if satisfied as provided in sub-clauses (ii) and (iii) of clause (a) of sub-section (1), 
exercise the power conferred by the said subsection. 
(3) When any order is made under this section [^by an officer mentioned in sub-
section (2),] he shall forthwith report the fact to the State Government to which he is 
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subordinate together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such 
other particulars as in his opinion io[have a bearing on the matter,-and no such order 
made after the commencement of the Preventive Detention. (Second Amendment) 
Act, 1952 (61 of 1952), shall remain in force for more than twelve days after the 
making thereof unless in the meantime it has been approved by the State 
Government.] 
"[(4) When any order is made or approved by the State Government under this 
section, the State Goverrvment shall, as soon as may be, report the fact to the Central 
Government together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such 
other particulars as in the opiriion of the State Government have a bearing oh tlie 
necessity for the order.] 
i2[3-A. Execution of detention orders—A. detention order be executed at any place in 
India in the manner provided for the execution of warrants of arrest under the Code 
of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898).] 
i3[4. Power to regulate place and conditions of detention— Every person in respect of 
whom a detention order has been made shall be liable — 
(a) to be detained in such place and under such conditions, including conditions as to 
maintenance, discipline and punishment for breaches of discipline, as the 
appropriate Government may, by general or special order, specify; and 
(b) to be removed from one place of detention to another place of detention, whether 
within the same State or in another State, by order of the appropriate Goverrm:ient: 
Provided that no order shall be made by a State Government under clause (b) for the 
removal of a person from one State to another State except with the consent of the 
GoverraTient of that other State. 
5. Detention orders not to be invalid or inoperative on certain grounds. —No 
detention order shall be invalid or inoperative merely by reason— 
(a) that the person to be detained thereunder is outside the limits of the territorial 
jurisdiction of the Government or officer making the order, or 
(b) that the place of detention of such person is outside the said limits.] 
6. Powers in relation to absconding persons - '^'[(1)] If the Central Government or the 
State Government or an officer specified in sub-section (2) of Section 3, as the case 
may be, has reason to believe that a person in respect of whom a detention order has 
been made lias absconded or is concealing himself so that the order cannot be 
executed, that Government or officer may — 
(a) make a report In writing of the fact to a Presidency Magistrate or a Magistrate of 
the first class having jurisdiction in the place where the said person 
ordinarily resides; and thereupon the provisions of Sections 87, 88 and 89 of the 
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898), shall apply in respect of the said 
person and his property as if the order directing that he be detained were a warrant 
issued by the Magistrate; 
(b) by order notified in the Official Gazette direct the said person to appear before 
such officer, at such place and witliin such period as may be specified in the order; 
and if the said person fails to com.ply with such direction he shall, unless he proves 
that it was not possible for him to comply therewith and that he had, withui the 
period specified in the order, iiiformed the officer mentioned in the order of the 
reason which rendered compliance therewith impossible and of his whereabouts, be 
punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year or with fine 
or with both. 
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i5[(2) Notwithstanding anything contained In the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 
(5 of 1898), every offence under clause (b) of sub-section (1) shall be cognizable.] 
7. Grounds of order of detention to be disclosed to persons affected by the order.— 
(1) When a person is detained in pursuance of a detention order, the authority 
making the order shall, 16[as soon as may be, but not later than five days from the 
date of detention], communicate to him the grounds on which the order has been 
made, and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation 
^''[against the order to the appropriate Government]. 
(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall require the authority to disclose facts which it 
considers to be against the public interest to disclose. 
8. Constitution of Advisory Boards —(1) The Central Government and each State 
Government shall, whenever necessary, constitute one or more Advisory Boards for 
the purposes of this Act. 
(2) Every such Board shall consist of is [three] persons who are, or have been, or are 
qualified to be appointed as. Judges of a High Court, and such persons shall be 
appointed by the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be. 
20 [3) The appropriate Government shall appoint one of the members of the Advisory 
Board who is or has been a Judge of a High Court to be its Chairman, and in the case 
of a 2'[Union territory] the appointment to the Advisory Board, of any person who is 
a Judge of the High Court of a 22[State] shall be with the previous approval of the 
State Government concerned: 
Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall affect the power of any Advisory 
Board constituted before the commencement of the Preventive Detention (Second 
Amendment) Act, 1952 (61 of 1952), to dispose of any reference under Section 9 
pending before it at such commencement] 
23[9. Reference to Advisory Board —In every case where a detention order has been 
made under this Act, the appropriate Government shall, within thirty days from the 
date of detention under the order, place before the Advisory Board constituted by it 
under Section 8 the grounds on which the order has been made and tlie 
representation, if any, made by the person affected by the order, and in case where 
the order has been made by an officer, also the report by such officer under sub-
section (3) of Section 3.] 
10. Procedure of Advisory Boards—^^[(l) The Advisory Board shall after considering 
the materials placed before it and, after calling for such further information as it may 
deem necessary from the appropriate Government or from any person called for tlie 
purpose through the appropriate Govermnent or from the person concerned, and if 
in any particular case it considers it essential so to do or if the person concerned 
desires to be heard, after hearing him in person, submit its report to the appropriate 
Government within ten weeks from the date of detention.] 
(2) The report of the Advisory Board shall specify in a separate part thereof the 
opinion of tlie Advisory Board as to whether or not there is sufficient cause for tlie 
detention of the person concerned.] 
25 [(2-A) When there is a difference of opinion among the members forming the 
Advisory Board, the opinion of the majority of such members shall be deemed to be 
tiie opinion of the Board.] 
(3) Nothing in this section shall entitle any person against whom a detention order 
lias been made ^°* * * to appear by any 27[legal practitioner] in any matter connected 
with [he reference to the Advisory Board, and the proceedings of the Advisory Board 
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and its report, excepting that part of the report in which the opinion of the Advisory 
Board is specified, shall be confidential 
28[11. Action upon the report of Advisory Board. — (1) In any case where the Advisory 
Board has reported that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for the detention of a 
person, the appropriate Government may confirm the detention order and continue 
the detention of the person concerned for such period as it thinks fit. 
(2) In any case where tlie Advisory Board has reported that there is in its opinion no 
sufficient cause for the detention of the person concerned, the appropriate 
Government shall revoke the detention order and cause the person to be released 
forthwith.] 
29[11-A, Maximum period of detention—(1) The maximum period for which any 
person may be detained in pursuance of any detention order which has been 
confirmed under Section 11 shall be twelve months from the date of detention. 
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), every detention order 
which has been confirmed under Section 11 before the commencement of the 
Preventive Detention (Second Amendment) Act, 1952 (61 of 1952), shall, unless a 
shorter period is specified in the order, continue to remain in force until the 1st day 
of April, 1953, or until the expiration of twelve months from the date of detention, 
whichever period of detention expires later. 
(3) The provisions of sub-section (2) shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the 
contrary contained in Section 3 of the Preventive Detention (Amendment) Act, 1952 
(34 of 1952), but nothing contained in this section shall affect the power of the 
appropriate Government to revoke or modify the detention order at any earlier 
time,] 
-*^ [12. Validity and duration of detention in certain cases— For the avoidance of 
doubt it is hereby declared that— 
(a) every detention order in force at the commencement of the Preventive Detention 
(Amendment) Act, 1951 (4 of 1951), shall continue in force and shall have effect as if 
it had been made under this Act as amended by the Preventive Detention 
(Amendment) Act, 1951; and 
(b) nothing contained in sub-section (3) of Section 1 or sub-section (1) of Section 12 of 
this Act as originally enacted shall be deemed to affect the validity or duration of any 
such order.] 
13. Revocation of detention orders —(1) Without prejudice to the provisions of 
Section 21 of tlie General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897), a detention order may at any 
time be revoked or modified — 
(a) notwithstanding that the order has been made by an officer mentioned in sub-
section (2) of Section 3, by the State-Government to which that officer is subordinate 
or by the Central Government; 
(b) notwithstanding that the order has been made by a State Government, by the 
Central Government 
'"1(2) The revocation or expiry of a detention order shall not bar the making of a fresh 
detention order under Sechon 3 against the same person in any case where fresh facts 
ha\e arisen after the date of revocation or expiry on which tlie Centra! Govermnent 
or a State Government or an officer, as tlie case may be, is satisfied that such an order 
should be made.] 
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'^[14. Temporary release of persons detained —(1) The appropriate Government may 
at any time direct that any person detained in pursuance of a detention order may be 
released for any specified period either without conditions or upon such conditions 
specified in the direction as that person accepts, and may at any time cancel his 
release. 
(2) In directing the release of any person under sub-section (1), the appropriate 
Government may require him to enter into a bond with or without sureties for the 
observance of the conditions specified in the direction, 
(3) Any person release under sub-section (1) shall surrender himself at the time and 
place, and to the authority, specified in the order directing his release or cancelling 
his release, as the case may be. 
(4) If any person fails without sufficient cause to surrender himself in the mamier 
specified in sub-section (3), he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term 
which may extend to two years or with fine or with both, 
(5) If any person released under sub-section (1) fails to fulfil any of the conditions 
imposed upon him under the said subsection or in the bond entered into by him, the 
bond shall be declared to be forfeited and any person bound thereby shall be liable to 
the penalty thereof.] 
15. Protection of action taken under the Act - No suit, prosecution or other legal 
proceeding shall lie against any person for anything in good faith done or intended 
to be done in pursuance of this Act. 
16. Repeal - The Preventive Detention (Extension of Duration) Order, 1950, is hereby 
repealed. 
References: 
1. This Act has been extended to Pondicherry by Reg. 7 of 19635 S. 3 and Sch. I (w.e.f. 
1-10-1963). 
2. Subs, by Act 51 of 1954, S. 2, for the former sob-section (2). 
3. Subs, by. Act 48 of 1966 for "31st day of December, 1966". 
4. Subs, by tlie Adaptation of Laws (No. 3) Order, 1956, for cl. (a). 
5. Added by Act 4 of 1951, S. 3. 
6. Subs, by Act 50 of 1950, S. 2 for "Any District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional 
Magistrate, or, in a Presidency-town, the Commissioner of Police, may," 
7. Subs, by Act 4 of 1951, S.4 for clauses (c), (d) and (e). 
8. Subs, by the Adaptation of Laws (No. 3) Order, 1956, for "State of Hyderabad". 
9. Subs, by Act. 50 of 1950, S, 2, for "by a District Magistrate,. Sub-Divisional 
Magistrate or Commissioner of Police". 
10. Subs, by Act 61 of 1952, S. 4, for "have a bearing on the necessity for the order". 
ll.Ins. byS.4, ibid, 
12. Ins. by Act 4 of 1951. S. 5. 
13. Ss. 4 and 5 subs, by S. 6, ibid. 
14. S. 6 renumbered as sub-section (1) of that section by Act 61 of 1952, S. 5. 
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15. Ins. by Act 61 of 1952. S. 5. 
16. Subs, by S. 6, ibid., for "as soon as may be". 
17. Subs, by Act 4 of 1951, S. 7, for certain original words. 
18. Subs, by S. 8, ibid, for "two". 
19. The proviso to sub-section (2), ins. by Act 4 of 1951, S. 8, omitted by Act 61 of 
1952, S. 7. 
20. Ins. by Act 61 of 1952, S. 7. 
21. Subs, by the Adaptation of Laws (No 3) Order, 1956, for "Part C Stats". 
22. Subs, by the Adaptation of Laws (No. 3) Order, 1956. 
23. Subs, by Act 61 of 1952, S. 8. 
24. Subs, by S. 9, ibid. 
25. Ins. by Act 4 of 1951,5.10. 
26. The words "to attend in person or" omitted by Act 61 of 1952, S. 9. 
27. Subs, by S. 9, ibid., for "legal representative". 
28. Subs, by Act 4 of 1951, S. 11, for the former section. 
29. Ins. by Act 61 of 1952,5.10. 
30. Subs, by Act 61 of 1952, S. 11. 
31. Ins. by Act 4 of 1951,5.12. The original S. 14 was omitted by Act 50 of 1950, S. 3. 
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APPENDIX-VI 
The West Bengal (Prevention of Violent Activities) Act, 1970i 
[President's Act No. 19 of 1970] 
(22nd November, 1970) 
In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 3 of the West Bengal State 
Legislature (Delegation of Powers) Act, 1970 (17 of 1970), the President is pleased to 
enact as follows: — 
1. Short title, extent and commencement— 
(1) This Act may be called the West Bengal (Prevention of Violent Activities) Act, 
1970. 
(2) It extends to the whole of the State of West Bengal 
(3) It shall come into force at once. 
2. Definition-In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, "detention order" 
means an order made under Section 3. 
3. Power to make orders detaining certain persons —(1) The State Government may, 
if satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting 
in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or the maintenance of public 
order. It is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained. 
(2) For the purposes of sub-section (1), the expression "acting in any manner 
prejudicial to the security of the State or the maintenance of public order" means -
(a) using, or instigating any person by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or 
by visible representations or otherwise, to use, any lethal weapon— 
(i) to promote or propagate any cause or ideology, the promotion or 
propagation of which affects, or is likely to affect, adversely the security of the Slate 
or the maintenance of public order; or 
(ii) to overthrow, or to overawe the Government established by law in India. 
Explanation —In this clause, 'lethal weapon' includes firearms, explosive or corrosive 
substances, swords, spears, daggers, bows and arrows; or 
(b) committing mischief, within the meaning of Section 425 of the Indian Penal Code, 
by fire or any explosive substance on any property of Government or any local 
authority or any corporation owned or controlled by Government or any University 
or other educational institution or on any public building, where the commission 
of such mischief disturbs, or is likely to disturb, public order; or 
(c) causing insult to tlie Indian National Flag or to any other object of public 
veneration, whether by mutilating, damaging, burning, defiling, deshoying or 
otherwise, or instigating any person to do so. 
Explanation-In this clause, 'object of public veneration' includes any portrait or 
statue of an eminent Indian, installed in a public place as a mark of respect to him or 
to his memory; or 
(d) committing, or instigating any person to commit, any offence punishable with 
death or imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term extending to seven years 
or more or any offence under the Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959) or the Explosive 
Substances Act, 1908 (6 of 1908) where the commission of such offence disturbs, or is 
likely to disturb, public order; or 
(e) in the case of a person referred to in clauses (a) to (f) of Section 110 of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898), committing any offence punishable with 
imprisonment where the commission ,of such offence disturbs, or is likely to disturb, 
public order. 
(3) Any of the following officers, namely:-
(a) District Magistr'ates, 
(b) Additional District Magistrates specially empowered in this behalf by the 
State Government, 
(c) in the Presidency-town of Calcutta, the Commissioner of Police, Calcutta, 
may, if satisfied as provided in sub-section (1), exercise the power conferred 
by the said sub-section. 
(4) When any order is made under this section by an officer specified in subjection 
(3), he shall forthwith report the fact to tlie State Government together with tlie 
grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as in his 
opinion have a bearing on the matter and no such order shall remain in force for 
more than twelve days after the making thereof unless, in the meantime, it has been 
approved by the State Government. 
(5) When any order is made or approved by the State Government under this section, 
the State Government shall, as soon as may be, report the fact to the Central 
Government together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such 
other particulars as, in the opinion of tlie State Government, have a bearing on the 
necessity for the order. 
4. Execution of detention orders —A detention order may be executed at any place in 
the State of West Bengal in the manner provided for the execution of warrants of 
arrest under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898). 
5. Power to regulate place and conditions of detention— Every person in respect of 
whom a detention order has been made shall be liable — 
(a) to be detained in such place and under such conditions, including conditions 
as to maintenance, discipline and punislunent for breaches of discipline, as 
the State Government may, by general or special order, specify; and 
(b) to be removed from one place of detention to another place of detention, 
within the State of West Bengal, by order of the State Government 
6. Detention orders not to be invalid or inoperative on certain grounds-No 
detention order shall be invalid or inoperative merely by reason— 
(a) that the person to be detained thereunder, though within the State of West 
Bengal, is outside the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of the officer making tlie 
order; or 
(b) that the place of detention of such person, though within the State of West Bengal, 
is outside the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of the officer making the order. 
7. Powers in relation to absconding persons-(1) If tlie State Government or an 
office! specified in sub-section (3) of Section 3, as the case may be, has reason to 
believe that a person in respect of whom a detention order has been made has 
absconded or is concealing himself so that the order cannot be executed, that 
Government or officer may -
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(a) make a report in writing of the fact to a Presidency Magistrate or a Magistrate of 
the first class having jurisdiction in the place where the said person 
ordinarily resides; and thereupon the provisions of Sections 87, 88 and 89 of the 
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898), shall apply in respect of the said 
person and his property as if the order directing that he be detained were a warrant 
issued by the Magistrate; 
(b) by order notified in the Official Gazette direct the said person to appear before 
such officer, at such place and within such period as may be specified in the order; 
and if the said person fails to comply with such direction, he shall, unless he proves 
that it was not possible for him to comply therewith and that he had, within the 
period specified in the order, informed the officer mentioned in the order of the 
reason which rendered compliance therewith impossible and of his whereabouts, be 
punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with 
fine, of with both. 
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 
of 1898), every offence under clause (b) of sub-section (1) shall be cognizable. 
8. Grounds of order of detention to be disclosed to persons affected by the order—(1) 
When a person is detained in pursuance, of a detention order, the authority making 
the order shall, as soon, as may be, but not later than five days from the date of 
detention, communicate to him the grounds on the order has been made, shall afford 
him the earliest opportunity, of making a representation against the order to the State 
Government. 
(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall require the authority to disclose facts which it 
considers to be against the public interest to disclose. 
9. Constitution of Advisory Boards— (1) The State Government shall, whenever 
necessary, constitute one or more Advisory Boards for the purposes of this Act. 
(2) Every such Board shall consist of three persons who are, or have, been, or are 
qualified to be appointed as. Judges of a High Court, and such persons shall be 
appointed by the State. 
(3) The State Government shall appoint one -of the members of the Advisory 
who is or has been a Judge of a High Court to be its Chairman. 
10. Reference to Advisory Boards - In every case where a detention order has been 
made under this Act, the State Government shall, within thirty days from the date of 
detention under the order, place before the Advisory Board, constituted by it under 
Section 9, the grounds on which the order has been made and the representation, if 
any, made by the person affected by the order, and in case where the order has been 
made by an officer specified in sub-section (3) of Section 3, also the report made by 
such officer under sub-section (4) of Section 3. 
11. Procedure of Advisory Boards— 
(1) The Advisory Board shall, after considering the materials placed before it and, 
after calling for such further information as it may deem necessary from the 
State Government or from any person called for the purpose through the 
State Government or from the person concerned, and if in any particular case 
it considers it essential so to do or if the person concerned desires to be, 
heard, after hearing him in person, submit its report to the State Government 
within ten weeks from the date of detention. 
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(2) The report of the Advisory Board shall specify in a separate part thereof the 
opinion of the Advisory Board as to whether or not there is sufficient cause 
for the detention of the person concerned. 
(3) When there is a difference of opinion among the members forming the 
Advisory Board, the opinion of the majority of such members shall be 
deemed to be the opinion of the Board. 
(4) Nothing in this section shall entitle any person against whom a detention 
order has been made to appear by any legal practitioner in any matter 
connected with the reference to the Advisory Board, and the proceedings of 
the Advisory Board and its report, excepting that part of the report in which 
the opinion of the Advisory Board is specified, shall be confidential 
12. Action upon the report of Advisory Board —(1) In any case where the Advisory 
Board has reported that there is, in its opinion, sufficient cause for the detention of a 
person, the State Government may confirm the detention order and continue the 
detention of the person concerned for such period as it thinks fit. 
(2) In any case where the Advisory Board has reported that there is, in its opinion, no 
sufficient cause for the detention of the person concerned, the State Government 
shall revoke the detention order and cause the person to be released forthwith. 
13. Maximum period of detention—The maximum period for which any person may 
be detained in pursuance of any detention order which has been confirmed under 
Section 12 shall be twelve months from the date of detention. 
14. Revocation of detention orders —(1) Without prejudice to the provisions of 
Section 22 of the Bengal General Clauses Act, 1899 (Bengal Act 1 of 1899), a detention 
order may at any time be revoked or modified by the State Government 
notwithstanding that the order has been made by an officer specified in subsection 
(3) of Sections. 
(2) The revocation or expiry of a detention order shall not bar the making of a fresh 
detention order under Section 3 against the same person in any case where fresh facts 
have arisen after the date of revocation or expiry on which the State Government or 
an officer specified in sub-section (3) of Section 3, as the case may be, is satisfied that 
such an order should be made. 
15. Temporary release of persons detained —(1) The State Goverrmient may at any 
time direct that any person detained in pursuance of a detention order may be 
released for any specified period either without conditions or upon such conditions 
specified in the direction as that person accepts, and may at any time cancel his 
release. 
(2) In directing the release of any person under sub-section (1), the State Government 
may require him to enter into a bond with or without sureties for the due observance 
of the conditions specified in the direction. 
(3) Any person released under sub-section (1) shall surrender himself at the time and 
place, and to the authority, specified in the order directing his release or cancelling 
his release, as the case may be. 
(4) If any person fails without sufficient cause to surrender himself in the manner 
specified in sub-section (3), he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term 
which may extend to two years, or with fine or with both. 
(5) If any person released under sub-section (1) fails to fulfil any of the conditions 
imposed upon him under the said subsection or in the bond entered into by him, the 
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bond shall be declared to be forfeited and any person bound thereby shall be liable to 
pay the penalty thereof. 
16. Protection of action taken under the Act—No suit or other legal proceeding shall 
lie against the State Government, and no suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding 
shall lie against any person, for anything in good faith done or intended to be done 
in pursuance of this Act. 
References: 
1. President's rule in West Bengal was withdrawn on 2- 4 -1971 and so this Act 
ceased to have effect w.e.f., 2- 4 -1972. 
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APPENDIX-VII 
The Maintenance of Infernal Security Act, 1971 
[No. 26 of 1971]* (2nd July, 1971) 
Be it enacted by parliament in the Twenty-second Year of the Republic of India as 
follows. 
1. Short title and extent—(1) This Act may be called the Maintenance of Internal 
Security Act, 1971. 
(2) It extends to the whole of India [****] •} Provided that every person, in respect 
of whom an order of detention made under the Jammu and Kashmir Preventive 
Detention Act, 1964 (J & K Act XllI of 1964), is in force immediately before the 
commencement of the la[Defence and Internal Security of India Act, 1971], shall 
continue to be governed by the pro visions of that Act in respect of such detention as 
if this Act had-not been extended to the State of Jammu and Kashmir.] 
2. Definitions —In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires — 
(a) "appropriate Government" means, as respects a detention order made by the 
Central Government or a person detained under such order, the Centi-al Gov-
ernment, and as respects a detention order made by a State Government or by an 
officer subordinate to a State Government or as respects a person detained under 
such order, the State Government; 
(b) "detention order" means an order made under Section 3; 
(c) "foreigner" has the same meaning as in the Foreigners Act, 1946; 
(d) "State Government", in relation to a Union Territory, means the administrator 
thereof; 
2[(e) any reference in tWs Act to a law which is not in force in the State of Jammu and 
Kashmir shall, in relation to that State, be construed as a reference to the 
corresponding law, if any, in force in that State.] 
3. Power to make orders detaining certain persons— (1) The Central Government or 
the State Government may — 
(a) if satisfied with respect of any person (including a foreigner) that with a view to 
preventing him from acting in any maraier prejudicial to — 
(i) the defence of India, the relations of India with foreign powers, or the security of 
India, or 
(ii) the security of the State or the maintenance of public order, or 
(iii) the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community, or 
(b) if satisfied with respect to any foreigner that with a view to regulating his 
continued presence in India or with a view to making arrangements for his expulsion 
from India. 
it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that, such person be detained. 
(2) Any of the following officers, namely — 
(a) district magistrates, 
(b) additional district magistrates specially empowered in this behalf by the State 
Government, 
(c) Commissioner of Police, for Bombay, Calcutta, Madras or Hyderabad, 
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3[may also, if satisfied as provided in sub-section (1)], exercise the power conferred 
by the said sub-section. 
(3) When any order is made under this section by an officer mentioned in sub-
section (2), he shall forthwith report the fact to the State Government to which he Is 
subordinate together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such 
other particulars as in his opinion have a bearing on the matter and no such order 
shall remain in force for more than ^[twenty days] after the making thereof unless in 
the meantime it has been approved by the State Government: 
Provided that where under Section 8 the grounds of detention are communicated by 
the authority making the order after five days but not later than fifteen days from the 
date of detention, this sub-section shall apply subject to the modification that for the 
words •*["twenty days"], the words •*["twenty five days"] shall be substituted. 
(4) When any order is made or approved by the State Government under this section, 
the State Government shall, within seven days, report the fact to the Central 
Government together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such 
other particulars as in the opinion of the State Government have a bearing on the 
necessity for the order. 
4. Execution of detention orders —A detention order may be executed at any place in 
India in the manner provided for the execution of warrants of arrest under the 
4»[Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973]. 
5. Power to regulate place and conditions of detention— Every person in respect of 
whom a detention order has been made 'shall be liable — 
(a) to be detained in such place and under such conditions, including conditions as to 
maintenance, discipline and punishment for breaches of discipline, as the 
appropriate Government may, by general or special order, specify; and 
(b) to be removed from one place of detention to another place of detention, whether 
within the same State or in another State, by order of the appropriate Government: 
Provided that no order shall be made by a State Government under clause (b) for the 
removal of a person from one State to another State except with the consent of the 
Government of that other State. 
6. Detention orders ml to be invalid or inoperative on certain grounds—No detention 
order shall be invalid or inoperative merely by reason— 
(a) that the person to be detained thereunder is outside the limits of the territorial 
jurisdiction of the Government or officer making the order, or 
(b) that a place of detention of such person is outside the said limits. 
7. Powers in relation to absconding persons-(1) If the Central Government or the 
State Government or an officer specified in sub-section (2) of Section 3, as the case 
may be, has reason to believe that a person in respect oi whom a detention order has 
been made has absconded or is concealing himself so that the order cannot be 
executed, that Government or officer may— 
(a) make a report in writing of the fact to a ^[Metiopolitan Magistrate or a Judicial 
Magistiate of the first class having jurisdiction in the place where the said person 
ordinarily resides, and thereupon the provisions of Section 82 to 86 (both inclusive) 
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973] shall apply in respect of the said person 
and his property as if the order directing that he be detained were a warrant issued 
by the Magistrate; 
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(b) by order notified in the official Gazette direct the said person to appear before 
such officer, at such place and within such period as may be specified in the order; 
and if the said person fails to comply with such direction he shall, unless he proves 
that it was not possible for him to comply therewith and that he had, within the 
period specified in the order, informed the officer mentioned in the order of the 
reason which rendered compliance therewith impossible and of his whereabouts, be 
punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year or with fine 
or with both. 
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in the ''[Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973], 
every offence under clause (b) of sub-section (1) shall be cognizable. 
8. Grounds of order of detention to be disclosed to persons affected by the order —(1) 
When a person is detained in pursuance of a detention order, the authority making 
the order shall, as soon as may be, but ordinarily not later than five days and in 
exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing, not later than 
fifteen days, from the date of detention communicate to him the grounds on which 
the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a 
representation against the order to the appropriate Government. 
(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall require the authority to disclose facts which it 
considers to be against the public interest to disclose, 
9. Constitution of Advisory Boards—(1) The Central Government and each State 
Government shall, whenever necessary constitute one or more Advisory Boards for 
the purposes of this Act. 
(2) Every such Board shall consist of three persons who are, or have been, or are 
qualified to be appointed as. Judge of a High Court, and such persons shall be 
appointed by the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be. 
(3) The appropriate Government shall appoint one of the members of the Advisory 
Board who is, or has been, a Judge of a High Court to be its Chairman, and in the 
case of a Union Territory the appointment to the Advisory Board, of any person who 
is a Judge of the High Court of a State shall be with the previous approval of the 
State Government concerned. 
10. Reference to Advisory Boards—Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, 
in every case where a detention order has been made under this Act, the appropriate 
Government shall, within thirty days from the date of detention under the order, 
place before the Advisory Board constituted by it under Section 9 the grounds on 
which the order has been made and the representation, if any, made by the person 
affected by the order, and in case where the order has been made by an officer, also 
the report by such officer under sub-section (3) of Section 3. 
11. Procedure of Advisory Boards —(1) The Advisory Board shall, after considering 
the materials placed before it and, after calling for such further information as it may 
deem necessary from the appropriate Government or from any person called for the 
purpose through the appropriate Government or from the person concerned, and if, 
in any particular case, it considers it essential so to do or if the person concerned 
desires to be heard, after hearing him in person, submit its report to the appropriate 
Government within ten weeks from the date of detention. 
(2) The report of tlie Advisory Board shall specify in a separate part thereof the 
opinion of the Advisory Board as to whether or not there is sufficient cause for the 
detention of the person concerned. 
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(3) When there is a difference of opinion among the members forming the Advisory 
Board, the opinion of the majority of such members shall be deemed to be the 
opinion of the Board. 
(4) Nothing in this section shall entitle any person against whom a detention order 
has been made to appear by any legal practitioner in any matter cormected with the 
reference to the Advisory Board, and the proceedings of the Advisory Board and its 
report, excepting that part of the report in which the opinion of the Advisory Board 
is specified shall be confidential. 
12. Action upon the report of Advisory Board-(1) In any case where the Advisory 
Board has reported that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for the detention of a 
person, the appropriate Government may confirm the detention order and continue 
the detention of the person concerned for such period as it thinks fit. 
(2) In any case where the Advisory Board has reported that there is in its opinion no 
sufficient case for the detention of the person concerned, the appropriate 
Government shall revoke the detention order and cause the person to be released 
forthwith. 
13. Maximum period of detention-The maximum period for which any person may 
be detained in pursuance of any detention order which has been confirmed under 
Section 12 shall be twelve months from the date of detention ^[or until the expiry of 
the Defence and Internal Security of India Act 1971, whichever is later]: 
Provided that nothing contained in this section shall affect the power of the 
appropriate Government to revoke or modify the detention order at any earlier time. 
14. Revocation of detention orders —(1) Without prejudice to the provisions of 
Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897), a detention order may, at 
any time, be revoked or modified— 
(a) Notwithstanding that the order has been made by an officer mentioned in sub-
section (2) of Section 3, by the State Government to which that officer is subordinate 
or by the Central Government; 
(b) Notwithstanding that the order has been made by the State Government or by 
the Central Government 
[^(2) The expiry or revocation of a detention order (hereafter in this sub-section 
referred to as the earlier detention order) shall not bar the making of another 
detention order (hereafter in this sub-section referred to as the subsequent detention 
order) under Section 3 against the same person: 
Provided that in a case where no fresh facts have arisen after the expiry or revocation 
of the earlier detention order made against such person, the maximum period for 
which such person may be detained in pursuance of the subsequent detention order 
shall, in no case, extend beyond tlie expiry of a period of twelve months from the 
date of detention under the earlier detention order or the expiry of the Defence and 
Internal Security of India Act, 1971 (42 of 1971), whichever is later.] 
15. Temporary release of persons detained — (1) The appropriate Government may, at 
any time, direct that any person detained in pursuance of a detention order may be 
released for any specified period either without conditions or upon such conditions 
specified in the direction as the person accepts, and may, at any fime, cancel his 
release. 
(2) In directing the release of any person under sub-section (1) the appropriate 
Government may require him to enter into a bond with or without sureties for the 
due observance of the conditions specified in the direction. 
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(3) Any person released under sub-section (1) shall surrender himself at the time and 
place, and to the authority, specified in the order directing his release, or cancelling 
his release, as the case may be. 
9[(3-A) If the appropriate Government has reason to believe that any person who has 
failed to surrender himself in the manner specified in sub-section (3) has absconded 
or is concealing himself, that Government may make a report in writing of the fact to 
a Metropolitan Magish-ate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class having 
jurisdiction In the place where the said person ordinarily resides and .thereupon the 
provisions of Sections 82 to 86 (both Inclusive) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 
1973, shall apply In relation to such person as they apply In relation to a person who 
has absconded or is concealing himself so that a warrant Issued by the Magistrate 
carmot be executed.] 
(4) If any person fails without sufficient cause to surrender himself in the manner 
specified in sub-section (3), he shall, be punishable with imprisonment for a term 
which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both. 
(5) If any person released under sub-section (1) fails to fulfil any of the -conditions 
imposed upon him under the said subsection or in the bond entered into by him the 
bond shall be declared to be forfeited and any person bound thereby shall be liable to 
pay the penalty thereof. 
if[(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law and save as otherwise 
provided In this section, no person against whom a detention order made under this 
Act is in force shall be released whether on bail or bail bond or otherwise.] 
16. Protection of action taken in good faith—No suit or other legal proceeding shall 
He against the Central Government or a State Government, and no suit, prosecution 
or other Segal proceedings, shall lie against any person, for anything in good faith 
done or intended to be done in pursuance of this Act. 
ii[16-A. Special provisions for dealing with emergency - (1) Notwithstanding 
any tiling contained in this Act or any rules of natural justice, the provisions of this 
section shall have effect during the period of operation of the Proclamation of Emer-
gency issued 'under clause (1) of Article'352 of the Constitution on the 3rd day of 
December, 1971, or the Proclamation of Emergency issued under that clause on the 
25th day of June, 1975, or a period of ''^[twenty four months] from the 25th day of 
June, 1975, whichever period is the shortest. 
(2) The case of every person (including a foreigner) against whom an order, of 
detention was made under this Act on or after the 25th day of June, 1975, but before 
the commencement of this section, shall, unless such person is sooner released from 
detention, be reviewed within fifteen days from such commencement by the 
appropriate Government for the purpose of determining whether the detention of 
such person under this Act is necessary for dealing effectively with the emergency in 
respect of which the Proclamations referred to in sub-section (1) have been Issued 
(hereafter in this section referred to as the emergency) and if, on such review, the 
appropriate Government is satisfied that it is necessary to detain such person for 
effectively dealing with the emergency, that Government may make a declaration 
to that effect and communicate a copy of the declaration to tlie person concerned. 
'-[(2-A) If the State Government m.akes a declaration under sub-section (2) that the 
detention of any person in respect of whom a detention order is made by an officer 
subordinate to that Government is necessary for dealing effectively with the 
emergency, the State Goveniment shall be deemed to have approved such detention 
order and the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 3, in so far as they relate to the 
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approval of the State Government, and of sub-section (4) of that section, shall not 
apply to such detention order.] 
(3) When making an order of detention under this Act any person (including a 
foreigner) after the commencement of this section, the Central Government or the 
State Government or, as the case may be, the officer making the order of detention 
shall consider whether the detention of such person under this Act is necessary for 
dealing effectively with the emergency and if, on such consideration, the Central 
Government or the State Goverrunent or, as the case may be, the officer is satisfied 
that it is necessary to detain such person for effectively dealing with the emergency, 
that Government or officer may make a declaration to that effect and communicate a 
copy of the declaration to the person concerned: 
Provided that where such declaration is made by an officer, it shall be reviewed by 
the State Government to which such officer is subordinate within fifteen days from 
the date of making of the declaration and such declaration shall cease to have effect 
unless it is confirmed by the State Government, after such review, within the said 
period of fifteen days. 
(4) The question whether the detention of any person in respect of whom a 
declaration has been made under sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) continues to be 
necessary for effectively dealing with the emergency shall be reconsidered by the 
appropriate Government within four months from the date of such declaration and 
thereafter at intervals not exceeding four months, and if, on such reconsideration, it 
appears to the appropriate government that the detention of the person is no longer 
necessary for effectively dealing with the emergency, that Government may revoke 
the declaration. 
i3[(5) In making any review, consideration or reconsideration under sub-section (2), 
sub-section (3) or sub-section (4), the appropriate Government or officer may act on 
the basis of the information and materials in its or his. possession without 
communicating or disclosing any such information or materials to the person 
concerned or affording him any opportunity of making any representation against 
the making under sub-section (2), or the making or confirming under sub-section (3), 
or the non-revocation under sub-section (4), of the declaration in respect of him]. 
(6) In the case of every person detained under a detention order to which the 
provisions of sub-section (2) apply, being a person the review of whose case is 
pending under that sub-section or in respect of whom a declaration has made 
under that sub-section,— 
(i) Sections 8 to 12 shall not apply; and 
(ii) Section 13 shall apply subject to the modification that the words and 
figures "which has been confirmed under Section 12" shall be omitted. 
(7) In the case of every person detained under a detention order to which the 
provisions of sub-section (3) apply, being a person in respect of whom a declaration 
has been made under tliat sub-section, — 
(i) Section 3 shall apply subject to the modification that for sub-sections (3) and , (4) 
thereof, the following [** *]" shall be substituted, namely; — 
"(3) When any order of detention is made by a State Government or by an officer 
subordinate to it, the State Government shall, witliin 20 days, '=[report the fac'i to the 
Central Government] 
'^'[(4) At any time after the receipt of a report under sub-section ' (3), the Central 
Government may require the State Government to, furnish to,the Central 
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Government the grounds on which the order has been made and such other 
particulars as, in the opinion of the State Government, have a bearing on the 
necessity for the order,]; 
(ii) Sections 8 to 12 shall not apply;-and 
(iii) Section 13 shall apply subject to the modification that the words and figures 
"which has been confirmed under Section 12" shall be omitted. 
'"[(8) In the case of any person in respect of whom a declaration has been made by a 
State Government under subsection (2) or a declaration has been made by a State 
Government or an officer subordinate to it or confirmed by the State Government 
under sub-section (3), or a declaration has not been revoked by a State Government 
under sub-section (4), the Central Government may, whenever it considers it 
necessary so to do, require the State Government to furnish to the Central 
Government the information and materials on the basis of which such declaration 
has been made or confirmed, or not revoked, as the case may be, and such other 
information and materials as the Central Government may deem necessary. 
(9) Notwithstanding aiiything contained in any other law or any rule having the 
force of law, — 
(a) the grounds on which an order of detention is made or purported to be made 
under Section 3 against any person in respect of whom a declaration is made under 
sub-section (2) or sob-section (3) and any information or materials on which 
such grounds or a declaration under .sub-section (2) or a declaration or confirmation 
under sub-section (3) or the non-revocation under sub-section (4) of a declaration are 
based, shall be treated as confidential and shall be deemed' to refer to matters of a 
State and to be against the public/interest to disclose and save as otherwise provided 
In this-Act, no one shall communicate or disclose any such ground, information or 
material or any document containing such grounds, information or material; 
(b) no person against whom an order of detention is made or purported, to be made 
under Section 3 shall be Entitled to the communication or disclosure of any such 
ground, information or material as is referred to in clause (a) or the production to 
him of any document containing such ground, information 'or material.] 
17. Duration of detection in certain -cases of foreigners-
(1) Notwithstanding, anything contained in this Act, any foreigner in respect of 
whom an order of detention, has been made under this Act may be detained without 
obtaining the opinion of the Advisory Board for a period longer than three months, 
but not exceeding two years from the date of his detention, in any of the following-
classes of-cases or under any of the following circumstances, namely -
(a) where such foreigner enters or attempts to enter the territory of India ; or is 
found- therein with-arms, ammunition or explosives, or 
(b) where such foreigner enters or attempts to enter a notified area or is found 
therein in contravention of Section 3 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1961, or 
(c) where such foreigner enters or attempts to enter the local limits or is found 
within the local limits of such area adjoining the borders of India as may be specified 
in an order made under Section 139 of the Border Security Force Act, 1968, 
without a valid travel document, or 
(d) where the Central Government' has reason to believe that such foreigner 
commits or is likely to commit any offence under the Official Secrets Act, 1923. 
(2) In the case of foreigner to whom sub-section (1) applies. Sections; 10 to 13 shall 
have effect subject to the following modifications, namely-
(a) in Section 10, for the words "shall, within, thirty days", the words "may, at any 
time prior to but in no case later than three months before the expiration 
of two years" shall be substituted; 
(b) in Section 11,-
(i) in sub-section (1), for the words "from the date of detention" the words "from the 
date on which reference is made to it" shall be substituted; 
(ii) in sub-section (2), for the words "the detention of the person concerned" the 
words "the continued, detention of the person concerned" shall be substituted; 
(c) in Section 12, for the words "for the detention" in both the places where they 
occur, the words "for the continued detention" shall be substituted; 
(d) in Section 13, for the words "twelve months" the words "three years" shall be 
substituted. 
i8[17-A. Duration of detention in cases of detention oft certain grounds.- —(1) 
Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this Act, during 
the period of operation of the Proclamation of Emergency issued on the 3rd day of 
December, 1971, any person (including a foreigner) in respect 
of whom an order of detention has, been made under this Act, may be detained 
without obtaining the opinion of the Advisory Board for a period longer than three 
months, but not exceeding two years from the date of his detention in any of the 
following classes of cases or under any of the following circumstances, namely — 
(a) where such person had been detained with a view to preventing him from acting 
in any maraier prejudicial to the defence of India, relations of India with foreign 
powers or security of India; or 
(b) where such person had been detained with a view to preventing him from acting 
in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or the maintenance of public 
order. 
(2) In the case of any person to whom sub-section (1) applies. Section 10 to 13 shall 
have effect subject to the following modifications namely — 
(a) in Section 10, for the words "shall, within thirty days", the words "may, at any 
time prior to but in no case later than three months before the expiration of two 
years" shall be substituted; -
(b) In Section 11,— 
(i) in sub-section (]), for the words "from the date of detention", the words- "from the 
date on which reference is made to it" shall be substituted; 
(ii) in sub-section (2), for the words "the detention of tlie person concerned", the 
words "the continued detention of the person concerned" shall be substituted; 
(c) in Section 12, for the 'words "for the detention" in botli the places where they 
occur, the words "for the continued detention" shall be substituted; 
(d) In Section 13, for the words "twelve m.onths", the words "three years" shall be 
substituted.] 
|''[18. K>xlusion of common law or natural law rights, if any.-No person (including a 
foreigner) -°{m respect of whom an order is made or purported to be made under 
Ixvi Jippencfi^-n 
Section 3] shall have any right to personal liberty by virtue of natural law or common 
law, if any] 
2'[19] Repeal and Saving - (1) The Maintenance of Internal Security Ordinance, 1971, 
is hereby repealed. 
(2) Notwithstanding such repeal, anything done or any action taken under the said 
Ordinance shall be deemed to have been done or taken under the corresponding 
provisions of this At as if this Act had come into force on the 7* day of May, 1971. 
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References: 
* Repealed by Act 27 of 1978. 
1. The words "except the State of Jammu and Kashmir" shall remain omitted and a 
proviso inserted at the end of the section till the continuation in force of the Defence 
and Interna] Security of India Act, 1971 vide its Section 6(6). 
la. Ins. by the Defence of India (Amendment) Act, 1975 (32 of 1975), S. 7 (w.e.f. 31-7-
1975). 
2. A new clause (e) shall remain inserted during the continuation in force of Defence 
and Internal Security of India Act, 1971, vide its Section 6(6). 
3. The words in brackets shall remain substituted for the words "may, if satisfied as 
provided in sub-clauses («) and (hi) of clause (a) of sub-section (1) during the 
continuance in force of Defence arid Internal Security of India Act, 1971, vide its 
Section 6(6). 
4. Subs, by Act 14 of 1976 (w.ef. 25-6-1975). 
4. Subs, by Act 14 of 1976 (w.ef. 25-6-1975). 
4a. Subs, by MISA Amendment Act, 1975 (39 of 1975), S. 2 (w.e.f. 29-6-75). 
5. Subs, by MISA (Amendment) Act, 1975 (39 of 1975), S. 3 (w.e.f. 29-6-75). 
6. Subs, by ibid, (w.e.f. 29-6-1975). 
7. It shall remain inserted till the expiry of the Defence and Internal Security of India 
Act,1971 vide its S. 6(c). 
8. Subs, by Act 14 of 1976, S. 3 (w.e.f. 29-6-1975). 
9. Ins. by MSA (Amendment) Act, 1975 (39 of 1975), S. 5 (w.e.f. 29-6-75). 
10. Ins. by MTSA (Amendment) ActS 1975 (39 of 1975), S. 5 (w.e.f. 29-6-1975). 
11. Ins. by ibid., S.6. 
11a. Subs, by Act 78 of 1976 for "twelve months" (w.e.f. 16-6-1976). See-also S. 3 
of that Act [1976 CCL-lI-562]. 
12. Ins. by Act 14 of 1976, S. 4 (w.e.f. 29-6-1975). 
13. Subs, by Act 14 of 1976, S. 4 (w.e.f. 29-6-1975). 
14. Omitted by Act 14 of 1976, S. 4 (w.e.f.29-6-1975) 
15. Subs, by Act 14 of 1976, S. 4 (w.e.f. 29-6-1975), 
16. Ins. by Act 14 of 1976, S. 4 (w.e.f. 17-10-1975). 
17. Ins. by Act 14 of 1976, S. 4 (w.e.f. 29-64975). 
18 S. 17-A shall remain inserted during the continuation in force of the Defence and 
Internal Security of India Act, 1971, vide its S. 6(6). 
19. Ins. by MISA (Amendment) Act, 1975 (39 of 1975), S. 7 (w.e.f. 25-6-75). 
20. Subs, by Act 14 of 1976, S. 5 (w.e.f. 25-6-1975). 
21. Renumbered by MISA (Amendment) Act, 1975 (39 of 1975) S. 7 (w.e.f. 25.6.1975) 
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A P P E N D I X - V l l l 
The Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 
Act, 1988 
[No. 46 of 1988] 
(6th September, 1988) 
An Act to provide for detention in certain cases for the purpose of preventing illicit 
traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances and for matters connected 
therewith. 
Whereas illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances poses a serious 
threat to the health and welfare of the people and the activities of persons engaged in 
such illicit traffic have a deleterious effect on the national economy; 
And whereas having regard to the persons by whom and the manner in which such 
activities are organised and carried on, and having regard to the fact that in certain 
areas which are highly vulnerable to the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and 
psychotropic substances, such activities of a considerable magnitude are 
clandestinely organised and carried on, it is necessary for the effective prevention of 
such activities to provide for detention of persons concerned in any manner 
therewith. 
Be it enacted by Parliament in the Thirty-ninth Year of the Republic of India as 
follows; — 
1. Short title, extent and commencement - (1) This Act may be called the Prevention 
of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988. 
(2) It extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir. 
(3) It shall be deemed to have come into force on the 4th day of July, 1988. 
2. Definitions. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires— 
(a) "appropriate Government" means, as respects a detention order made by the 
Central Government or by an officer of the Central Government, or a person 
detained under such order, the Central Government, and as respects a 
detention order made by a State Government or by an officer of a State 
Government, or a person detained under such order, the State Government; 
(b) "customs airport" means any airport appointed under clause (a) of section 7 of 
the Customs Act, 1962 [52 of 1962] to be a customs airport; 
(c) "detention order" means an order made under section 3; 
(d) "foreigner" has the same meaning as in the Foreigners Act, 1946 [31 of 1946]; 
(e) "illicit traffic" in relation to narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, 
means-
(i) cultivating any coca plant or gathering any portion of coca plant; 
(ii) cultivating the opium poppy or any, cannabis plant; 
(iii) engaging in the production, manufacture, sale, purchase, transportation, 
warehousing, concealment, or consumption, import inter-State, export Inter-
State, import into India, export from India or transhipment, of narcotic drugs 
or psychohopic substances; 
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(iv) dealing in any activities in narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances 
other than those provided in sub-clauses (i) to (iii); or 
(v) handling or letting any premises for the carrying on of any of the activities 
referred to in sub-clauses (i) to (iv), other than those permitted under the 
Narcotic drugs and Psychoti'opic Substances Act, 1985 [61 of 1985]- or any 
rule or order made, or any condition of any licence, term or authorisation 
issued, thereunder and includes — 
(1) financing, directly or indirectly, any of the aforementioned activities. 
(2) abetting or conspiring in the furtherance of or in support of doing any of the 
aforementioned activities; 
(3) harbouring persons engaged in any of the aforementioned activities, 
(f) "Indian customs waters" has the same meaning as in clause (28) of section 2 of the 
Customs Act, 1962 [52 of 1962] 
(g) "State Government", in relation to a Union territory, means the Administrator 
thereof; 
(h) words and expressions used herein but not defined, and defined in the Narcotic 
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 [61 of 1985] have the meaning 
respectively assigned to them in that Act, 
3. Power to make orders detaining certain persons. (1) The Central Government or a 
State Government, or any officer of the Central Government, not below the rank of a 
Joint Secretary to that Government, specially empowered for the purposes of this 
section by that Government, or any officer of a State Government, not below the rank 
of a Secretary to that Government, specially empowered for the purposes of this 
section by Govenxment, may, if satisfied, with respect to any person (including a 
foreigner) that, with a view to preventing him from engaging in illicit traffic in 
narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, it is necessary so to do, make an order 
directing that such person be detained. 
(2) When any order of detention is made by a State Government or by an officer 
empowered by a State Government, the State Government, within ten days, forward 
to the Central Government a report in respect of the order. 
(3) For the purposes of clause (5) of article 22 of the Constitution, the 
communication to a person detained in pursuance of a detention order of the 
grounds on which the order has been made shall be made as soon as may be after the 
detention, but ordinarily not later than five days, and in exceptional circumstances 
and for reasons to be recorded in writing, not later than fifteen days, from the date of 
detention. 
4. Execution of detention orders- A detention order may be at any place in India in 
the manner provided for the execution of warrants of arrest under the Code of 
Criminal Procedure, 1973 [2 of 1974], 
5. Power to regulate place and conditions, of detention. Every person in respect of 
whom a detention order has been made shall be liable — 
(a) to be detained in such place and under such conditions including conditions as to 
maintenance, interviews or communication with others, discipline and punishment 
for breaches of discipline, as the appropriate Govermrient may, by general or special 
order, specify; and 
(b) to be removed from one place of detention to another place of detention, whether 
within the same State or in another State by order of the appropriate Government: 
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Provided that no order shall be made by a State Govermnent under clause (b) for tlie 
removal of a person from one State to another State except with the consent of the 
Government of that other State. 
6. Grounds of detention severable. Where a person has been detained in pursuance 
of an order of detention under subsection (1) of section 3 which has been made on 
two or more grounds, such order of detention shall be deemed to have been made 
separately on each of such grounds and accordingly — 
(a) such order shall not be deemed to be invalid or inoperative merely because one 
or some of the grounds is or are -
(i) vague, 
(ii) non-existent, 
(iii) not relevant, 
(iv) not connected or not proximately connected with such person, or 
(v) invalid for any other reason whatsoever, and it is not therefore possible to 
hold that the Government Or officer making such order would have been 
satisfied, as provided in sub-section (1) of section 3 with reference to 
the remaining ground or grounds and made the order of detention; 
(b) the Government or officer making the order of detention shall be deemed to have 
made the order of detention under the said sub-section (1) after being satisfied as 
provided in that subsection with reference to the remaining ground or grounds. 
7. Detention orders not to be invalid or inoperative on certain grounds. No 
detention order shall be invalid or inoperative merely by reason — 
(a) that the person to be detained thereunder is outside the limits of the territorial 
jurisdiction of the Government or the officer making the order of detention; or 
(b) that the place of detention of such person is outside the said limits. 
8. Powers in relation to absconding persons. (1) If the appropriate Government has 
reason to believe that a person in respect of whom a detention order has been made 
has absconded or is concealing himself so that the order cannot be executed, that 
Government may — 
(a) make a report in writing of the fact to a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Magistrate 
of the first class having jurisdiction in the place where the said person ordinarily 
resides; and thereupon the provisions of sections 82, 83, 84 and 85 of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure, 1973 [2 of 1974] shall apply in respect of the said person and his 
property as if the order directing that he be detained were a warrant issued by the 
Magistrate; 
(b) by order notified in the Official Gazette direct the said person to appear before 
such officer, at such place and within such period as may be specified in the order; 
and if the said person fails to comply with such direction, he shall, unless he proves 
that it was not possible for him to comply therewith and that he had, within the 
period specified in the order, informed the officer mentioned in the order of the 
reason which rendered compliance therewith impossible and of his whereabouts, be 
punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with 
fine, or with both. 
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [2 
of ] 974], every offence under clause (b) of sub-section (1) shall be cognizable. 
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9. Advisory Boards. For the purposes of sub-clause (a) of clause (4) ar\d sub-clause (c) 
of clause (7) of article 22 of the Constitution,— 
(a) the Central Government and each State Government shall, whenever 
necessary, constitute one or more Advisory Boards each of which shall consist of a 
Chairman and two other persons possessing the qualifications specified in sub-clause 
(a) of clause (4) of article 22 of the Constitution; 
(b) save as otlierwise provided in section 10, the appropriate Government shall, 
within five weeks from the date of detention of a person under a detention order, 
make a reference in respect thereof to the Advisory Board constituted under clause 
(a) to enable the Advisory Board to make the report under sub-clause (a) of clause (4) 
of article 22 of the Constitution; 
(c) the Advisory Board to which a reference is made under clause (b) shall after 
considering the reference and the materials placed before it and after calling for such 
further information as it may deem necessary from the appropriate Government or 
from any person called for the purpose through the appropriate Government or from 
the person concerned, and if, in any particular case, it considers it essential so to do 
or if the person concerned desires to be heard in person, after hearing him in person, 
prepare its report specifying in a separate paragraph thereof its opinion as to 
whether or not there is sufficient cause for the detention of the person concerned and 
submit tlie same within eleven weeks from the date of detention of the person 
concerned; 
(d) when there is a difference of opinion among the members forming the Advisory 
Board,, the opinion of the majority of such members shall be deemed to be the 
opinion of the Board; 
(e) a person against whom an order of detention has been made under this Act shall 
not be entitled to appear by any legal practitioner in any matter connected with the 
reference to the Advisory Board and the proceedings of the Advisory Board and its 
report, excepting that part of the report in which the opinion of the Advisory Board 
is specified, shall be confidential; 
(0 in every case where the Advisory Board has reported that there is in its opinion 
sufficient cause for the detention of a person, the appropriate Government may 
confirm the detention order and continue the detention of the person concerned for 
such period as it thinks fit and in every case where the Advisory Board has reported 
that there is in its opinion no sufficient cause for the detention of the person 
concerned, the appropriate Government shall revoke the detention order and cause 
the person to be released forthwith. 
10. Cases in wliich and circumstances under which persons may be detained for 
periods longer than three months without obtaining the opinion of Advisory 
Board. (1) Notwithstanding anything, contained in this Act, any person (including 
a foreigner) in respect of whom aw order of detention is.made under this Act at any 
time before the 31st day of July, 1993*, may be detained v/ithout obtaining, in 
accordance with the provisions of sub-clause (a) of clause (4) of article 22 of the 
Constitution, the opinion of an Advisory Board for a period longer than three 
months but not exceeding six months from the date of his detention, where the order 
of detention has been made against such person with a view to preventing him from 
engaging in traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, and the Central 
Goverraiient or any officer of the Central Government, not below the rank of an 
Additional Secretary to that Government, specially empowered for the purposes of 
this section by that Government, is satisfied that such person engages or is likely to 
engage in illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances into, out of. 
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through or within any area highly vulnerable to such illicit traffic and makes a 
declaration to that effect within five weeks of the detention of such person. 
Explanation 1— In this sub-section, "area highly vulnerable to such illicit traffic" 
means — 
(i) the Indian customs waters; 
(ii) the customs airports; 
(iii) the metropolitan cities of Bombay, Calcutta, Delhi, Madras and the city of 
Varanasi; 
(iv) the inland area one hundred kilometres in width from the coast of India falling 
within the territories of the State of Andhra Pradesh, Goa, Gujarat, Karnataka, 
Kerala, Maharashtra, Orissa, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal and the Union territories 
of Daman and Diu and Pondicherry; 
(v) the inland area one hundred kilometres in width from — 
(a) tlie India-Pakistan border in tlie States of Gujarat, Punjab and Rajasthan; 
(b) the India-Nepal border in the States of Bihar, Sikkim, Uttar Pradesh and West 
Bengal; 
(e) the India-Burma border in the States of Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Mizoram 
and Nagaland; 
(d) the India-Bangladesh border in the States of Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and 
West Bengal; 
(e) the India-Bhutan border in the States of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Sikkim and 
West Bengal, 
(vi) such other area or customs station, as the Central Goverrmient may, having 
regard to the vulnerability of such area or customs station, as the case may be, to 
illicit traffic, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf. 
Explanation 2- For the purposes of Explanation 1, "customs station" has the same 
meaning as in clause (13) of section 2 of the Customs Act, 1962 [52 of 1962]. 
(2) In the case of any person detained under a detention order to which the 
provisions of sub-section (1) apply, section 9 shall have effect subject to the following 
modifications, namely: — 
(i) in clause (b), for the words "shall, within five weeks", the words "shall, within four 
months and two weeks, shall be substituted; 
(ii) in clause (c), -
(a) for the words "the detention of the person concerned", the words "the continued 
detention of the person concerned" shall be substituted; 
(b) for the words "eleven weeks", the words "five months and three weeks" shall be 
substituted; 
(iii) in clause (f), for the words "for the detention", at both the places where they 
occur, the words "for the continued detention" shall be substituted. 
n . Maximum period of detention- The maximum period for which an}' person may 
be detained in pursuance of any detention order to which tl-ie provisions of section 10 
do not apply and which has been confirmed under clause (f) of section 9 shall be one 
year from the date of detention, and tlie maximum period for which any person may 
be detained in pursuance of any detention order to which tlie provisions of section 10 
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apply and which has been confirmed under clause (f) of section 9, read with sub-
section (2) of section 10, shall be two years from the date of detention: 
Provided that nothing contained in this section shall affect the power of appropriate 
Government in either case to revoke or modify the detention order at any earlier 
time. 
12. Revocation of detention orders- (1) Without prejudice to the provisions of section 
21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 [10 of 1897], a detention order may, at any time, 
be revoked or modified — 
(a) notwithstanding that the order has been made by an officer of a State 
Government, by that State Government or by the Central Government; 
(b) notwithstanding that the order has been made by an officer of the Central 
Government or by a State Government, by the Central Government. 
(2) The revocation of a detention order shall not bar the making of another detention 
order under section 3 against the same person. 
13. Temporary release of person detained. (1) The Central Government may, at any 
time, direct, that any person detained in pursuance of a detention order made by that 
Government or by an officer subordinate to that Government or by a State 
Government or by an officer subordinate to a State Government, "may be released for 
any specified period either without conditions or upon such conditions specified in 
the direction as accepts, and may, at any time, cancel his release. 
(2) A State Goverrmient may, at any time, direct that any person detained in 
pursuance of a detention order made by that Government or by an officer 
subordinate to that Government be released for any specified period either without 
conditions or upon such conditions specified in the direction as the person, accepts, 
and may, at any time, cancel his release, 
(3) In directing the release of any person under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), tiie 
Government directing; the release may require him to enter into a bond with sureties 
for the due observance of the conditions specified in the direction. 
(4) Any person released under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall surrender 
himself at the time and place, and to the authority, specified in the order 
directing his release, or canceling his release, as the case may be. 
(5) If any person fails without sufficient cause to surrender himself in the manner 
specified in sub-section (4), he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term 
which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with botii, 
(6) If any person released under sub-section (1) or subsection (2) fails to fultill any of 
the conditions imposed upon him under the said sub-section or in the bond entered 
into by him, the bond shall be declared to be forfeited and any person bound thereby 
shall be liable to pay the penalty thereof. 
(7) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law and save as otherwise 
provided in this section, no person against whom a detention order made under tiiis 
Act is in. force shall be released whether on bail bond or otherwise. 
14. Protection of action taken in good faith. No suit or other legal proceeding shall lie 
against the Central Governm.ent or a State Government and no suit, prosecution of 
other legal proceeding shall lie against any person for anything in good faith done or 
intended to be done in pursuance of this Act 
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15. Amendment of Act 52 of 1974. In section 3 of the Conservation of Foreign 
Excliange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974, to sub-section (1), the 
following proviso shall be added, namely:-
"Provided that no order of detention shall be made on any of the grounds specified 
in this sub-section on which an order of detention may be made under section 3 of 
the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 
1988 or under section 3 of the Jammu and Kashmir Prevention of Illicit Traffic in 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Ordinance, 1988." [J. & K. Ordinance 1 
of 1988], 
16. Repeal and saving- (1) The Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances Ordinance, 1988 [Ord. 7 of 1988], is hereby repealed. 
(2) Notwithstanding such repeal, anything done or any action taken under the said 
Ordinance shall be deemed to have been done or taken under the corresponding 
provisions of this Act. 
Reference: 
*PITNDPS (Amendment) Ordinance 1990, dated 30th July, 1990. 
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APPENDIX-IX 
Forfeiture of Property Derived from, or Used In, Illicit Traffic 
[Chapter VA of the NDPS Act, 1985, Sec. 68A to 66Y] (Ins. by Act 2 of 1989, Sec. 19) 
68A. Application, (1) the provisions of this Chapter shall apply only to the persons 
specified in sub-section (2). 
(2) The persons referred to in sub-section (1) are tlie following, namely — 
(a) every person who 'has been convicted of air offence punishable under this Act 
with imprisonment for a term of five years or more; 
(b) every person who has been convicted of a similar offence by a competent court of 
criminal jurisdiction outside India; 
(c) every person in respect of whom an order of detention has been made under the 
Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988, 
or under the Jammu and Kaslimir Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988. 
Provided that such order of detention has not been revoked on the report of the 
Advisory Board constituted under the said Acts or such order of detention has not 
been set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction; 
(d) every person who is a relative of a person referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) or 
clause (c); 
(e) every associate of a person referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) or clause (c); 
(f) any holder (hereafter in this clause referred to as the "present holder") of any 
property which was at any time previously held by a person referred to in clause (a) 
or clause (ft) or clause (c) unless the present holder or as the case may be, any one 
who held such property after such person and before the present holder, is or was a 
transferee in good faith for adequate consideration. 
68B, Definitions. In this Chapter, unless the context otherwise requires — 
(a) "Appellate Tribunal" means the Appellate Tribunal for Forfeited Property 
constituted under section 68N; 
(b) "associate" in relation to a person whose property is liable to be forfeited under 
this Chapter, means-
(i) any individual who had been or is residing in tiie residential premises 
(including out-houses) of such person; 
(ii) any individual who had been or is managing the affairs or keeping the 
accounts of such person; 
(iii)) any association of persons, body of individuals, partner-firm, or private 
company within the meaning of the Companies Act, 1956, of which such 
person had been or is a member, partner or director; 
(iv) any individual who had been or is a member, partiier or director of an 
association of persons, body of individuals, partnership firm or private 
company referred to in sub-clause (iii) at any time when such person had 
been or is a member, partiier or director of. such association, body, 
partnership firm or private company; 
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(v) any person, who had been or is managing the affairs, or keeping the accounts, 
of any association of persons, body of individuals, partnership firm or private 
company referred to -in sub-clause (iii); 
(vi) the trustee of any trust, where — 
(1) the trust has been created by such person; or 
(2) the value of the assets contributed by such person (including the value of the 
assets, if any, contributed by him earlier) to the trust amounts, on the date on which 
contribution is made, to not less than twenty 'per cent of the value of the assets of the 
trust on that date; 
(vii) where the competent authority, for reasons to be recorded in writing,, 
considers that any properties of such person are held on his behalf by any 
other person, such other person; 
(c) "competent authority" means an officer of the Central Government authorised by 
it under section 68D; 
(d) "concealment" means the concealment or disguise of the nature, source, 
disposition, movement or ownership of and includes the movement or conversion of 
such property by -electronic transmission or by any other means; 
(e) "freezing" means temporarily prohibiting the transfer, conversion, disposition or 
movement of property by an order issued under section 68F; 
(f) "identifying" includes establishment of proof that the property was derived 
from, or used in, the illicit traffic; 
(g) "illegally acquired propert}'", in relation to any person to whom this Chapter 
applies, means,— 
(i) any property acquired by such person, whether before or after the commencement 
of this Chapter, wholly or partly out of or by means of any income, earnings or assets 
'derived or obtained from or attributable to illicit traffic; or 
(ii) any property acquired by such person, whether before or commencement of 
this Chapter, for a consideration, or by any means wholly or partly traceable to any 
property referred to in sub-clause (i) or the income of eaining from such property, 
and includes — 
(A) any property held by such person which would have been, in relation to any 
previous holder thereof, illegally acquired property under this clause if such 
previous holder had not ceased to hold, it, unless such person or any other person 
who held tlie property at any, time after such previous holder or, whei'e there are 
two or more such previous holders, the last of such previous holders is or was a 
transferee in good faith for adequate consideration; 
(B) any property acquired by such person, whether before or after the 
commencement of this Chapter, for a consideration, or by any means, wholly or 
partly traceable to any property falling under item (A), or the income or earnings 
therefrom; 
(h) "property" means property and assets of every description, whether corporeal or 
incorporeal, movable or immovable, tangible or intangible and deeds and 
instruments evidencing title to, or interest in, such property or assets, derived from, 
or used in, tlie illicit traffic; 
(i) "relative" means — 
(]) spouse of the person; 
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(2) brother or sister of the person; 
(3) brother or sister of the spouse of the person; 
(4) any lineal ascendant of descendant of the person; 
(5) any lineal ascendant or descendant of the spouse oi the person; 
(6) spouse of a person referred to in sub-clause (2), sub-clause (3), sub-clause (4) or 
sub-clause (5); 
(7) any lineal descendant of a person referred to in sub-clause (2) or sub-clause (3); 
(j) "tracing" means determining the nature, source, disposition, movement, title or 
ownership of property; 
(k) "trust" includes any other legal obligation. 
68C. Prohibition of Holding Illegally Acquired Property, (1) As from the 
commencement of this Chapter, it shall not be lawful for any person to whom this 
Chapter applies to hold any illegally acquired property either by himself or through 
any other person on his behalf, 
(2) Where any person holds any illegally acquired property in contravention of the 
provisions of sub-section (1), such property shall be liable to be forfeited to the 
Central Government in accordance with tlie provisions of this Chapter; 
Provided that no property be forfeited under this Chapter if such property was by a 
to whom this Act applies before a period of six the on which fee was charged for an 
offence relating to -illicit traffic. 
68D. Competent Authority. (1) The Central Government may, by order published in 
the Official Gazette authorize any Collector of Customs or Collector of Central Excise 
or Commissioner of Income-tax or any other officer of the Central Government of 
equivalent rank to perform the functions of the competent authority under this 
Chapter. 
(2) The competent authorities shall perform their functions in respect of such persons 
or classes of persons as the Central Government may, by order, direct 
68E. Identifying Illegally Acquired Property. (1) Every officer empowered under 
section 53 and every officer-in-charge of a police station, shall, on receipt of 
information that any person to whom this Chapter applies has been charged with 
any offence punishable under this Act, whetlier committed in India or outside, 
proceed to take all steps necessary for tracing and identifying any property illegally 
acquired by such, person, 
(2) The steps referred to in sub-section (1) may include inquiry, investigation or 
survey in respect of any person, place, properly, assets, documents, books of account 
in any book or public financial institution or any other relevant matters. 
(3) Any inquiry, investigation or survey referred to in subsection (2) shall be carried 
out by an officer mentioned in subsection (1) in accordance with such directions or 
guidelines as the Competent authority may make or issue in this behalf. 
63F. Seizure or Freezing of Illegally Acquired Property- (1) Where any officer 
conducting an inquiry or investigation under 68E has reason to believe that any 
property in relation to which such inquiry or investigation is being conducted is an 
illegally 'acquired property and such propi;rly is likely to be concealed, transferred or 
dealt with in any manner which will result in frustrating any proceeding relating to 
forfeiture of such property under this Chapter, he may make an order for seizing 
such property and where it is not practicable to seize such property, he may make an 
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order that such property shall not be transferred or otherwise dealt with except with 
the prior permission of the officer making such order, or of the competent 
authority and a copy of such order shall be served on the person concerned. 
Provided that the competent authority shall be duly informed of any order made 
under this sub-section and a copy of such an order shall be sent to the competent 
authority within forty-eighth hours of its being made. 
(2) Any order made under sub-section (1) shall have no effect unless the said order is 
confirmed by an order of the competent authority within- a period of thirty days of 
its being made. 
Explanation - For the purposes of this section, "transfer of property" means any 
disposition, conveyance, assignment, settlement, delivery, payment or other 
alienation of property and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, 
includes — 
(a) the creation of a trust in a property; 
(b) the grant or creation of any lease, mortgage, charge, 
easement, license, power, partnership or interest in property; 
(c) the exercise of a power of appointment, of property vested in any person, not the 
owner of the property, to determine its disposition in. favour of any person, oilier 
than the donee of the power; 
(d) any transaction entered into by any person with intent thereby to diminish 
directly or indirectly the value of his own propert}' and to increase the value of the 
property of any other person. 
68G. Management of Properties Seized or forfeited under this Chapter. (1) The 
Central Government may, by order published in the Official Gazette, appoint as 
many, of its officers (not below the rank of a Joint Secretary to the Government) as it 
tliinks fit, to perform the functions of an Administrator. 
(2) The Administrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall receive and manage the 
property in relation to which an order has been made under sub-section (1) of section 
68F or under section 681 in such manner and subject to such conditions as may be 
prescribed. 
(3) The Adminishator shall also take such measures, as the Central Government 
may direct, to dispose of the property which is forfeited to the Central 
Government. 
68H. Notice of Forfeiture of Property. (1) If, haying regard to the value of tlie 
properties held by anv person to whom tliis Chapter applies, either by himself, or 
through any other person on his behalf, his known sources of income, earnings or 
assets, and any other information or material available to it as a result of a report 
from any officer' making an investigation under section 68E or otherwise, the 
competent autliority has reason to believe (the reasons for such belief to be recorded 
in writing) that all or any of such properties are illegally acquired properties, it may 
serve a notice upon such person (hereinafter referred to as the person affected) 
calling upon him within a period of thirty days specified in the notice to indicate the 
sources of his income, earnings or assets, out of which or by means of which he has 
acquired such property, the evidence on which he relies and otiier relevant 
information and particulars, and to show cause why all or any of such properties, as 
the case may be, should not "be declared to be illegally acquired properties and 
forfeited to the Central Government under this Chapter. 
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(2) Where a notice under sub-section (1) to any person specifies any property as 
being held on behalf of such person by any other person, a copy of the notice shall 
also be served upon such other person. 
68L Forfeiture of Property in Certain Cases. (1) The competent authority may, after 
considering the explanation, if any, to the show cause notice issued under section 
68H, and the materials, available before it and after giving to the person affected (and 
in- a -"case where the. person affected holds any property specified in the notice 
through any other person, to such other person also) a reasonable opportunity of 
being heard, by order, a: finding whether all or any of the properties in question are 
illegally acquired properties; 
Provided that if the person affected (and in a case where the person affected holds 
any property specified in the notice tlirough any other person such other person, 
also) does not appear before the competent authority or represent his case before it 
within a period of thirty days specified in the show 
cause notice, the competent authority may proceed to record a finding this sub-
section ex parte on the basis of evidence available before it 
(2) Where the competent authority is satisfied that some of the properties referred to 
in the show cause notice are illegally, acquired properties but is not able to identify 
specifically such properties, then, it shall be lawful for the competent authority to 
specify the properties wliich, to tlie best of its judgement,, are illegally acquired 
properties and record a finding accordingly under sub-section (1). 
(3) Where the competent authority records a finding under this section to the effect 
that any property is illegally acquired property, it shall declare that such property 
shall, subject to the provisions of this chapter, stand forfeited to the Central 
Government free from all encumbrances. 
(4) Where any shares in a company stand forfeited to the Central Government under 
this Chapter, then, the company shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the 
Companies Act, 1956, or the articles of association of the company, forthwith register 
the Central Government as the transferee of such shares. 
68J. Burden of Proof. In any proceedings under this Chapter, the burden of proving 
that any property specified in the notice served under section 68H is not illegally 
acquired property shall be on the person affected. 
68K. Fine in Lieu of Forfeiture. (I) Where the competent authority makes a 
declaration that any property stands forfeited to the Central Government under 
section 681 and it is a case where the source of only a part of the illegally acquired 
property has not been proved to the satisfaction of the competent authority, it shall 
make an order giving an option to the person affected to pay, in lieu of forfeiture, a 
fine, equal to the market value of such part. 
(2) Before making an order imposing a fine due under sub-section (1), the person 
affected shall be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard. 
(3) Where the person affected pays the fine due under, subsection (1), within such 
time as may be allowed in that behalf, the competent authority may, by order, revoke 
the declaration of forfeihire under section 681 and thereupon such property shall 
stand released. 
681.. Procedure in relation to Certain Trust Properties, In the case of any person 
referred to in sub-clause (vi) of clause (b) of section 68B, if the competent authority, 
on the basis of the information and materials available to it, has reason to believe , 
(the reasons for such belief to be recorded in writing) that any property held in trust 
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is illegally acquired property, it may serve a notice upon the author of the trust or, as 
the case may be, the contributor of the assets out of or by means of which such 
property was acquired by the trust and the trustees, calling upon them within a 
period of thirty days specified in the notice, to explain the source of money or other 
assets out of or by means of which such property was acquired or, as the case may 
be, the source of money or other assets which were contributed to the trust for 
acquiring such property and thereupon such notice shall be deemed to be a notice 
served under section 68H and all the other provisions of the Chapter shall apply 
accordingly. 
Explanation—For the purposes of this section "illegally acquired property", in 
relation to any property held in trust, includes — 
(i) any property which if it had continued to be held by the author of the trust or the 
contributor of such property to the trust would have been illegally acquired property 
in relation to such author or contributor; 
(ii) any property acquired by the trust out of any contributions made by any person 
which would have been illegally acquired property in relation to such person had 
such person acquired such property out of such contributions. 
68M. Certain Transfers to be Null and Void. Where after the making of an order 
under sub-section (1) of section 68F or the issue of a notice under section 68H or 
under section 68L, any property referred to in the said order or notice is transferred 
by any mode whatsoever such transfer shall, for the purposes of the proceedings 
under this Chapter, be ignored and if such property is subsequently forfeited to the 
Central Government under section 681, then, the transfer of such property shall be 
deemed to be null and void. 
68N. Constitution of Appellate Tribunal. (1) The Central Goverrmient may, by 
notification in the Official Gazette, constitute an Appellate Tribunal to be called the 
Appellate Tribunal for Forfeited Property consisting of a Chairman and such number 
of other members (being officers of the Central Government not below the rank of a 
Joint Secretary, to the Government) as the Central Government thinks, fit, to. be 
appointed by that-Government for hearing appeals against the orders made under 
section 68F, section 681, sub-section (1) of section 68K or section 68L. 
(2) The Chairman of the Appellate Tribunal shall be a person who is or has been or Is 
qualified to be a Judge of the Supreme Court or of a High Court. 
(3) The terms and conditions of service of the Chairman and other members shall be 
such as may be prescribed 
680. Appeals. (1) Any person aggrieved by an order of the competent authority 
made under section 68F, section 681, subsection (I) of section 68K or section 68L, 
may, within forty-five days from the date on which the order is served on him, prefer 
an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal: 
Provided that the Appellate Tribunal may entertain an appeal after the said period of 
forty-hve days, but not after sixty days, from the date aforesaid if it is satisfied that 
the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal in time. 
(2) On receipt of an appeal under sub-section (1), the Appellate Tribunal may, after 
giving an opportunity to the appellant to be heard, if he so desires, and after making 
such further inquiry as it deems fi*^ , confirm, modify or set aside the order appealed 
against 
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(3) The powers and functions of the Appellate Tribunal may fee exercised and 
discharged by Benches consisting of members and constituted by the Chairman of 
the Appellate Tribunal. 
(4) Notwithstanding- anything contained in sub-section (3), where the Chairman 
considers it necessary so to do for the expeditious disposal of appeals under this 
section, he may constitute a Bench of two members and a Bench so constituted may 
exercise and discharge the powers and functions of the Appellate Tribunal: 
Provided that if the members of a bench so constituted differ on any point or points, 
they shall state the point or points on which they differ and refer the same to a third 
member (to be specified by the Chairman) for hearing of such point or points and 
such point or points shall be decided according to the opinion of that member. 
(5) The Appellate Tribunal may regulate its own procedure, 
(6) On application to the Appellate Tribunal and on payment of the prescribed fee, 
the Tribunal may allow a party to any appeal or any person authorised In his behalf 
by such party ' to inspect at any time during office hours, any relevant records and 
registers of tlie Tribunal and obtain a certified copy of any part thereof. 
68P. Notice or Order not to be Invalid for Error in Description. No notice issued or 
served, no declaration made, and no. order passed, under this Chapter shall be 
deemed to be Invalid by reason of any error in the description of the property or 
person mentioned therein if such property or person is identifiable from the 
description so mentioned. . 
68Q. Bar of Jurisdiction- No order passed or made under this Chapter shall be 
appealable except as provided therein and no civil court shall have jurisdiction in 
respect of any matter which the Appellate Tribunal or any authority is empowered 
by or under tliis Chapter to and no injunction shall be granted by any court or 
oilier authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken In pursuance of any 
power conferred by or under -this Chapter. 
68R. Competent Authority and Appellate Tribunal to have Powers of Civil Court. 
The competent authority and the Appellate Tribunal shall have all the powers of.a 
civil court while trying a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in respect of 
the following matters, namely— 
(a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on 
oath; 
(b) requiring the discovery and production of documents; 
(c) receiving evidence on affidavits; 
(d) requisitioning any public record or copy thereof from any court or office; 
(e) issuing commissions for examination of witnesses or documents; 
(f) any other matter which may be prescribed. 
68S. Information to Competent Authority. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained 
in any other law, the competent authority shall have power to require any officer or 
authority of the Central Government or a State Government or a local authority to 
furnish information in relation to such persons, points or matters as in the opinion of 
the competent authorib' will be useful for, or relevant to, the purposes of this 
Chapter. 
(2) Every officer referred to in section 68T may furnish suo motu any information 
available with him to the competent authority if in the opinion of the officer such 
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information will be useful to the competent authority for the purposes of this 
Chapter. 
68T. Certain Officers to Assist' Administrator, Competent Authority and Appellate 
Tribunal. For the purposes of any proceedings under this Chapter, the following 
officers are hereby empowered and required to assist the Administrator appointed 
under section 68G, competent authority and the Appellate Tribunal, namely -
(a) officers of the Narcotics Control Bureau; 
(b) officers of the Customs Department; 
(c) officers of the Central Excise Deparhnent; 
(d) officers of the Income-Tax Department; 
(e) officers of enforcement appointed under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 
1973 (46 of 1973); 
(f) officers of police; 
(g) officers of the Narcotics Department; 
(h) officers of the Central Economic Intelligence Bureau; 
(i) officers of the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence; 
(j) such other officers of the Central or State Government as are specified by the 
Central Government in this behalf by notification in the Official Gazette. 
68U. Power to Take Possession. (1) Where any property has been declared to be 
forfeited to the Central Government under this Chapter, or where the person affected 
has failed to pay the fine due under sub-section (1) of section 68K within the time 
allowed - therefore under sub-section (3) of that section, the competent authority 
may order the person affected as well as any other person who may be in possession 
of the property to surrender or deliver possession thereof to the Administrator 
appointed under section 68G or to any person duly authorised by him in this behalf 
within thirty days of the service of the order. 
(2) If any person refuses or fails to comply with an order made under sub-section (1), 
the Administrator may take possession of the property and may for that purpose use 
such force as may be necessary, 
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2), the Administrator may, 
for the purpose of taking possession of any property referred to in sub-section (1), 
requisition the service of any police officer to assist him and it shall be the duty of 
Such officer to comply with such requisition. 
68V. Rectification of Mistakes. With a view to rectifying any mistakes apparent from 
record, the competent authority or the Appellate Tribunal, as the case may be, may 
amend any order made by it within a period of one year from the date of the order: 
Provided that if any such amendment is likely to affect any person prejudicially, it 
shall not be made without giving to such person a reasonable opportunity of being 
heard, 
68W. Findings under Other Laws not Conclusive for Proceedings under this Chapter. 
No finding of any officer or authority under any other law shall be conclusive for the 
purpose of any proceedings under this Chapter. 
68X. Service of Notices and Orders. Any notice or order issued or made under this 
Chapter shall be served — 
Ixxxiii Jippen(fb(;II 
(a) by tendering the notice or order or sending it by registered post to the person for 
whom it is intended or to his agent; 
(b) if the notice or order cannot be served in the manner provided in clause (a) by 
affixing it on a conspicuous place in the property in relation to which the notice or 
order is Issued or macie or on some conspicuous part of the premises in which the 
person for whom it is intended is known to have last resided or carried on business, 
or personally worked for gain. 
68Y. Punishment for Acquiring Property in relation to which Proceedings have been 
taken under this Chapter. Any person who too knowingly acquired, by any mode 
whatsoever, any property in relation to which proceedings are pending under this 
Chapter shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to five 




Andhra Pradesh Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug-
Offenders, Goondas, immoral Traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986.1 [1 
of 1986] (21st February, 1986)i 
Whereas pubHc order is adversely affected every now and then by the 
dangerous activities of certain persons, who are known as bootleggers, dacoits, drug-
offenders, goondas, immoral traffic offenders and land-grabbers. 
And whereas having regard to the resources and influence of the persons by whom, 
the large scale on which, and the manner in which the dangerous activities are being 
clandestinely organised and carried on in violation of law by them, as bootleggers, 
dacoits, drug-offenders, goondas, immoral traffic offenders or land-grabbers in the 
State of Andhra Pradesh and particularly in its urban areas, it is necessary to have a 
special law in the State of Andhra Pradesh to provide for preventive detention of 
these six classes of persons and for matters connected therewith. 
Be it enacted by the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly in the Thirty-sixth Year of 
the Republic of India as follows:-
L Short title and extent (1) This Act may be called the Andhra Pradesh Prevention of 
Dangerous Activities of Bootlegars, Dacoits, Drug-Offenders, Goondas, Immoral 
Traffic Offenders and Land-Grabbers Act, 1986. 
(2) It extends to the whole of the State of Andhra Pradesh. 
2. Definitions. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,-
(a) "acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order" means 
when a bootlegger a dacoit, a drug-offender, a goonda, an immoral traffic offender or 
a land-grabber is engaged or is making preparations for engaging, in any of the 
activities as such, which affect adversely, or are likely to affect adversely, the 
maintenance of public order: 
Explanation: For the purpose of this clause public order shall be deemed to have 
been affected adversely, or shall be deemed likely to be affected adversely inter alia, 
if any of the activities of any of the persons referred to in tliis clause directly, 
indirectly, is causing or calculated to cause any harm, danger or alarm or a feeling of 
insecurity among the general public or any section thereof or a grave widespread 
danger to 
life or public health; 
(b) "boot-legger" means a person, who distils, manufactures, stores, transports, 
imports, exports, sells or distributes any liquor, intoxicating drug or other 
intoxicant in contravention of any of the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Excise 
Act, 1968 and the rules, notification and orders made thereunder, or in contravention 
of any other law for the time being in force, or who knowingly expends or applies 
any money or supplies any animal, vehicle, vessel or other conveyance or any 
receptacle or any other material whatsoever in furtherance or support of the doing 
.of any of the above mentioned firings by himself or through any other person, or 
who abets in any other manner the doing of any such thing; 
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(c) "dacoit" means a person who either by himself or as a member of or leader of a 
gang commits or abets the commission of any of the offences punishable under 
sections 395 to 400 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860; 
(d) "detention order" means an order made under section 3; 
(e) "detenu" means a person detained under a detention order; 
(f) "drag-offender" means a person, who manufactures, stocks, imports, exports, 
sells or distributes any drug or cultivates any plant of does any other thing in 
contravention of any of the provisions of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 or the 
^Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 and the rules, notifications 
and orders made under either Act, of in contravention of any other law for the time 
being in force, or who knowingly expends or applies any money in above mentioned 
things by himself or through any other person or who abets in any other marmer the 
doing of any such thing; 
(g) "goonda" means a person, who either by himself or as a member of or leader of a 
gang, habitually commits, or attempts to commit or abets the commission of offences 
punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII or Chapter XXII of tlie Indian Penal 
Code; 
(h) "Government" means the State Government of Andhra Pradesh; 
(i) "immoral traffic offender" means a person who commits or abets the commission 
of any offence under the Suppression of .Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 
1956; 
(j) "land-grabber" means a person,' who illegally takes possession of any land 
(whether belonging to Government, local authority or any other person) or enters 
into or creates illegal tenancies or leave and licence, agreements or any other agree-
ment in respect of such lands; or who constructs unauthorised structures thereon for 
sale or hire, or give such lands to any person on rental or lease and licence basis or 
for consti'uction or use and occupation of unauthorised structures or he knowingly 
gives financial aid to any person for taking illegal possession of such lands, or for 
construction of unautliorised structures thereon or who collects or attempts to collect 
from any occupier of such lands, rent, compensation or other charges by criminal 
intimidation or who evicts or attempts to evict any such occupier by force without 
resorting to the lawful procedure; or who abets in any manner the doing of any of 
the above mentioned things; 
(k) "unautliorised structure" means any structure constructed without express 
permission in writing, of the appropriate authority under and in accordance with 
any law for the time being in force in the area concerned. 
3. Power to make orders detaining certain persons- (1) The Government, may, if 
satisfied with respect to any bootlegger, dacoit, drug-offender, goonda, immoral 
traffic offender or land-grabber that with a view to preventing him from acting in 
any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it is necessary so to do, 
make an order directing that such person be detained. 
(2) If, having regard to the circumstances prevailing or likely to prevail in any area 
within the local limits of the jurisdiction of a Dishict Magistrate or a Commissioner 
of Police, the Government are satisfied that it is necessary so to do, they may, by 
order in writing, direct thai during- such period as may be specified in the ordei', 
such- District Magistrate or Commissioner of Police may also, if satisfied as provided 
in sub-section (1), exercise the powers conferred by the said sub-section: 
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Provided that the period specified in. the order made by the Government under this 
sub-section shall not in the first in-stance, exceed three months, but the Government 
may, if satisfied as aforesaid that it is necessary so to do, amend such order to extend 
such period from time to time by any period not exceeding three months at any one 
time. 
(3) When any -order is made under, this section by an officer mentioned in sub-
section (2), he shall forthwith report the fact to the Government together with the 
grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as in his 
opinion, have a bearing on the matter, and no such order shall remain in force for 
more than twelve days after the making thereof, unless, in the meantime, it has been 
approved by the 
Government. 
4. Execution of detention orders. A detention order may be executed at any place in 
the State in the manner provided for the execution of warrants of arrest under the 
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, 
5. Power to regulate place and conditions of detention. Every person in respect of 
whom a detention order has been made 
shall be liable-
(a) to be detained in such place and under such conditions, including conditions as 
to maintenance, discipline and punishment for breaches of discipline, as the 
Government may, by general or special order, specify; and 
(b) to be removed from one place of detention to another place of detention, within 
the State by order of the Government. 
6. Detention orders not to be invalid or inoperative on certain grounds. No detention 
order shall be invalid or inoperative, merely by reason— 
(a) that the person to be detained thereunder, though within the State, is outside the 
limits of the territorial jurisdiction of the officer making the order, or; 
(b) that the place of the detention of such person though within the State, is outside 
the said limits. 
7. Power in relation to absconding persons. (1) If the Government have, or an officer 
mentioned in sub-section (2) of section 3, has reason to believe that a person in 
respect of whom, a detention order has been made has absconded, or is concealing 
himself so that the order cannot be executed then the provisions of sections 82 to 86 
(both inclusive) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, shall apply in respect of 
such person and his property, subject to the modifications mentioned in this sub-
section, and, irrespective of the place where such person ordinarily resides, the 
detention order made against him shall be deemed to be a warrant issued by a 
competent Court. Where the detention order Is made by the Government, an Officer, 
not below the rank of Dishict Magishate or Commissioner of Police authorised by 
the Government in this behalf, or where the detention order is made by an officer 
mentioned in sub-section (2) of section 3,-such officer, as the case may be, shall 
irrespective of his ordinary jurisdiction, be deemed to be empowered to exercise all 
the powers of the competent Court under sections 82, 83, 84 and 85 of the said Code 
for issuing a proclamation for such person and for attachment and sale of. his 
property situated in any part of the State and for taking any other action under thie 
said sections. An appeal from any order made by any such officer rejecting an 
application for restoration of attached property shall lie to the Court of Session, 
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having jurisdiction in the place where the said person ordinarily resides, as provided 
in section 86 of the said Code. 
(2) (a) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), if the Government 
have, or an Officer mentioned in sub-section (2) of section 3 has reason to believe that 
a person in respect of whom a detention order has been made has absconded or is 
concealing himself so that the order cannot be executed, the Government or the 
Officer, as the case may be, may by order notified in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette, 
direct the said person to appear before such officer, at such place and within such 
period as may be specified in the order. 
(b) If such person fails to comply with such order, unless he proves that it was not 
possible for him to comply therewith, and that he had within the period specified in 
the order, informed the, officer mentioned in the order of the reasons which rendered 
compliance therewith impossible and of his whereabouts, or proves that it was not 
possible for him to so inform the officer mentioned in the order, he shall, on 
conviction, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one 
year, or with fine, or with both. 
(c) Notwithstanding anything contained in the said Code, offence under clause (b) 
shall be cognizable. 
8. Grounds of order of detention to be disclosed to by the order, (1) When a person is 
detained in pursuance of a detention order, the authority making the order shall, as 
soon may be but not later than five days from the date of detention, communicate to 
him the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest 
opportunity of making a representation against the order to the Government. 
(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall require the authority to disclose facts which it 
considers to be against the public interest to disclose. 
9. Constitution of Advisory Boards. (1) The Government shall, whenever necessary, 
constitute one or more Advisory Boards for the purpose of this Act. 
(2) Every such Board shall consist of a Chairman and two other members, who are, 
or have been judges or are qualified to be appointed as Judges of a High Court. 
10. Reference to Advisory Board. In every case where a detention order has been 
made under this Act, the Government three weeks from the date of detention of a 
person under the order, place before the Advisory Board constituted by them under 
section 9, the grounds on which the order has been 
made and the representation, if any, made by the person affected by the order, and in 
the case where the order has been made by an officer, also the report by such officer 
under subsection (3) of-section 3. 
11. Procedure of Advisory Board. (1) The Advisory Board shall, after the 
materials placed before it and, after calling for such further information as it may 
deem necessary from the Government or from any person called for the purpose 
through the Government or from the person concerned, and if, in any particular case, 
the Advisory Board considers it essentia] so to do or if the person concerned desires 
to-be heard, after him in person, submit its report to the Goverrunent within seven 
weeks from the date of detention of the person concerned. 
(2) The report of the Advisory Board shall specify in a separate part thereof the 
opinion of the Advisory Board as to whether or not tliere is sufficient cause for the 
detention of the person concerned. 
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(3) When there is a difference of opinion among the members forming the Advisory 
Board, the opinion of the majority of such members shall be deemed to be the 
opinion of the Board. 
(4) The proceedings of the Advisory Board and its report, excepting that; part of the 
report in which the opinion of the Advisory Board is specified, shall be confidential, 
(5) Nothing in this section shall entitle any person against whom a detention order 
has been made to appear by any legal practitioner in any matter connected with the 
reference to the Advisory Board. 
12. Action upon report of Advisory Board. (1) In any case where the Advisory Board 
has reported that there is, in. its opinion, sufficient cause for the- detention of a 
person, the Government may confirm the detention order and continue the detention 
of the person concerned for such period, not exceeding the maximum period 
specified in section 13 as they think fit. 
(2) In any case where the Advisory Board has reported that there is, in its opinion, no 
sufficient cause for the detention of the person concerned, the Government shall 
revoke the detention order and cause the person to be released forthwith. 
13. Maximum period of detention. The maximum period for which any person may 
be detained, in pursuance of any detention order made under this Act which has 
been confirmed under section 12, shall be twelve months from the date of detention. 
14. Revocation of detention orders. (1) Without prejudice to the provisions of section 
15 of the Andhra Pradesh General Clauses Act 1891 a detention order may, at any 
time, be revoked or modified by the Government, notwithstanding that the order has 
been made by an officer mentioned in sub-section (2) of section 3. 
(2) The revocation or expiry of a detention order shall not bar the making of a fresh 
detention order under section 3 against the same person, in any case, where fresh 
facts have arisen after the date of revocation or expiry, on which the Government or 
an Officer, as the case may be, are or is satisfied that such an order should be made. 
15. Temporary release of persons detained. (1) The Government may, at any time 
direct that any person detained in pursuance of a detention order may be released for 
any specified period, either without conditions or upon such conditions specified in 
the direction as that person accepts, and may, at any time cancel his release. 
(2) In directing the release of any person under sub-section (1), the Government may 
require him to enter into a bond, with or without sureties for the due observance of 
the conditions specified in the direction. 
(3) Any person released under sub-section (1) shall surrender himself at the time and 
place and to the authority, specified in the order directing his release or canceling his 
release, as the case may be. 
(4) If any person fails without sufficient cause to surrender himself in the manner 
specified in sub-section (3), he shall, on conviction, be punished with imprisonment 
for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both. 
(5) If any person released under sub-section (1) fails to fulfill any of the conditions 
imposed upon him under the said subsection or in the bond entered into by him, the 
bond shall be declared to be forfeited and any person bound thereby shall be liable to 
pay the penajt}- thereof. 
16. Protection of action taken in good faith. No suit, prosecution or other legal 
proceeding shall lie against the Government or any officer or person, for anything in 
good faith done or intended to be done in pursuance of this Act. 
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A P P E N D I X - X I 
The Assam Preventive Detention Acts, 19801 
[President's Act No. 5 of 1980] 
(19th July, 1980) 
In exercise of the powers conferred by section 3 of the Assam State 
Legislature (Delegation of Powers) Act, 1980 (38 of 1980) the President is pleased to 
enact as follows:-
1. Short title and extent. (1) This Act may be called the Assam Preventive Detention 
Act, 1980. 
(2). It extends to the whole of the State of Assam. 
2. Definitions- In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires-
(a) "Advisory Board" means the Board constituted under section 9; 
(b) "detention order" means an order made under section 3; 
(c) "State" means tlie State of Assam; 
(d) "State Government" means the State Government of .Assam. 
3. Power to make orders detaining certain persons. (1) The State Government or any 
officer of the State Government not below the rank of a Secretary to the State 
Government or a District Magistrate if satisfied with respect to any persons a view to 
preventing him from acting in any manner to the security of the State, the 
maintenance of public order or the maintenance of supplies and services essential, to 
the community, it is necessary so to do, make am order directing that such person be 
detained: 
Provided that no order of detention shall be made under this sub-section with 
respect to any person with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner 
prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of commodities essential to the 
community, and for the purposes of the proviso the expression "acting in any 
manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of commodities essential to tlie 
community" shall have the same meaning as in the to sub-section (1) of Section 3 of 
the Prevention of Blackmarketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential 
Commodities Act, 1980. Central Act of 1980. 
(2) When any order is made under the preceding sub-section by any officer 
mentioned therein, he shall forthwith report the fact to the State Government 
together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such other 
particulars as in his opinion have a bearing on tlie matter, and no such, order remain 
in force for more-than twelve days after the making thereoJf unless in the meantime it 
has been approved by the; State Government: 
Provided that where under section 8 the grounds of detention are communicated by 
the officer making the order after five days but not later than ten days from the date 
of detention this sub-section shall apply subject to the modification that for the 
words "twelve days", the v/ords "fifteen days" shall be substituted. Central Act 2 of 
1974. 
4. Execufion of detention order. A detention order may be executed at any place in 
India in the maimer provided for the execution of warrants of arrest 'under the Code 
of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Centi'al Act 2 of 1974. 
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17. Detention orders against any bootlegger, dacoit, drug-offender, goonda, 
immoral traffic offender or land-grabber to be made under this Act and not under 
National Security Act Central Act, 1980: 
On and after the commencement of tliis Act no order of detention under the National 
Security Act, 190 shall be made by the Government or any of their officers under that 
Act in respect of any bootlegar, dacoit, drug-offender, goonda, immoral traffic 
offender or land-grabber in the State of Andhra Pradesh on the ground of preventing 
him from acting ion any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, 
where an order of detention may be or can be made against such person, under this 
Act. 
References: 
1. Published in the Andhi-a Pradesh Gazette, pt. IV-B, Extraordinary, dated 28tl"i 
February, 1986, pp. 1-11. 
2. Subs, by Act 23 of 1986. 
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5. Powers to regulate place and conditions of detention. Every person in respect of 
whom a detention order has been-made shall be liable-
(a) to be detained in such place and under such conditions, including conditions as 
to maintenance, discipline and punishment for breaches of discipline, as the State 
Government may, by general or special order specify; and 
(b) to be removed from one place of detention to another place of detention, whether 
within the State of Assam or in another State, by order of the State Government: 
Provided that no order shall be made by the State Government under clause (b) for 
the removal of a person from the State to another State except with the consent of the 
Government of that other State, 
6. Detention order not to be invalid or inoperative on certain grounds. No detention 
order shall be invalid or inoperative merely by reason-
(a) that the person to be detained thereunder is outside the limits of the territorial 
jurisdiction of the State Goverraiient or the officer making the order, or 
(b) that place of detention of such person is outside the said limits. 
7. Powers in relation to absconding persons. (1) If the State Government or the officer 
making an order under sub-section (1) of section's has reason to believe that a person 
in respect of whom a detention order has been made has absconded or is concealing 
himself so that the order cannot be executed the State Government or the officer 
making the order may — 
(a) make a report in writing of the fact to a Judicial Magistrate of the first class having 
jurisdiction in the place where the said person ordinarily resides, and thereupon the 
provisions of sections 82, 83, 84 and 85 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, shall 
apply in respect of the said person and his property as if the order directing that he 
be detained were a warrant issued by the Magistrate. 
(b) by order notified in the official Gazette direct the said person to appear before 
such officer at such place and within such period as may be specified in the order 
and if the said person fails to comply with such direction he shall, unless he proves 
that it was not possible for him to comply therewith and that he had, within the 
period specified in the order, informed the officer mentioned in the order of the 
reason which rendered compliance therewith impossible and of his whereabouts, be 
punishable and imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine 
or with both. 
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, 
every offence under clause (b) of sub-section (1) shall be cognizable. 
8. Grounds of order of detention to be disclosed to person affected by the order. (1) 
When a person is detained in pursuance of a detention order, the authority making 
the order shall, as soon as may be, but ordinarily not later than five days and in 
exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing not later than ten 
days from the date of detention, communicate to him the grounds on which the 
order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a 
representation against the order to the State Government. (2) Nothing in sub-section 
(1) shall require the autliority to disclose facts which it considers to be against the 
public interest to disclose. 
9. Constitution of Advisory Board. (1) The State Government shall constitute one or 
more Advisory Boards for the purposes of this Act in accordance with the 
recommendation of the Chief Justice of the Gauhati High Court. 
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(2) Every such Board shall consist of a Chairman who shall be a serving Judge of the 
Gauhati High Court and of not less than two other members who shall be serving or 
retired Judges of any High Court. 
10. Reference to Advisory Board. In every case where a detention order has been 
made under this Act- the State Government shall within three weeks from the date of 
detention of a person under the order, place before the Advisory Board, the grounds 
on which tlie order has been made and the representation, if any, made by the person 
affected by the order, and in case where the order has been made by an officer 
referred to in sub-section (1) of section 3, also the report by such officer under sub-
section (2) of that section* 
11. Procedure of Advisory Board. (1) The Advisory shall after considering the 
materials place before it and 'after calling for such further ir\formation as it 
necessary from the State Government or from any person called for the purpose 
through the State Government or from the person concerned and if in any 
particular case, it considers It essential so to do or if the person concerned desires to 
be heard after bearing him in person, submit its report to the State Government 
within seven weeks from the date of detention of the person concerned. 
(2) The report of the Advisory Board shall specify in a separate part thereof the 
opinion of the Advisory Board as to whether or not there is sufficient cause for the 
detention of the person concerned. 
(3) When there is a difference of opinion among the members of the Advisory Board, 
the opinion of the majority of such members shall be deemed to be the opinion of the 
Board. 
(4) Nothing in this section shall entitle any whom a -detention order has been, made 
to appear by any practitioner in any matter connected with the to the 
Advisory Board, 
(5) The proceedings of the Advisory Board and the report of the Advisory Board 
excepting that part of the report in which the opinion of the Advisory Board is 
specified shall be confidential. 
12. Action upon the report of Advisory Board. (1) In any case where the Advisory 
Board has reported that there is in its sufficient cause for the detention of a person, 
the State Government may confirm the detention order and continue the detention of 
the person concerned for such period as it thinks fit. 
(2) In any case where the Advisory Board has reported that there is in its opinion no 
sufficient cause for the detention of the person concerned, the State Government 
shall revoke the detention order and cause the person to be released forthwith. 
13. Maximum period of detention. The maximum period for which any person may 
be detained in pursuance of any detention order which+ias been confirmed under 
section 12 shall be six months from the date of detention but in no case shall exceed 
the period fixed by law of Parliament, if any. 
Provided that nothing contained in this section shall affect the power of the State 
Government to revoke or modify the detention order at any earlier time. 
14. Revocation or modificahon of detention order. (1) Without prejudice to the 
provisions of section 23 of the Assam General Clauses Act, 1915 a detention order 
made by any officer may, at any time, be revoked or modified by the State Govern-
ment. 
(2) The revocation or expiry of a detention order shall not bar the making of a fresh 
detention order under section 3 against the same person in any case where fresh facts 
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have arisen after the date of revocation or expiry on which the State Government or 
an officer, as the case may be, is satisfied that such an order should be made. 
15. Temporary release of persons detained. (1) The State in Government may at any 
time, direct that any person detained in pursuance of a detention order may be 
released for any specified period either without conditions or upon such conditions 
specified in the direction as that person accepts and may, at any time, cancel his 
release. 
(2) In directing the release of any person under sub-section 
(1). the State Government may require him to enter into a bond with or without 
sureties for the due observance of the conditions specified in the direction. 
(3) Any person released under sub-section (1) shall surrender himself at the time and 
place and to the authority, specified in the order directing his release or cancelling 
his release, as the case may be. 
(4) If any person fails without sufficient cause to surrender himself in the manner 
specified in sub-section (3), lie shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term 
which may extend to two years, or with fine or with both. 
(5) If any person released under sub-section (1) fails to fulfil any of the conditions 
imposed upon him under the said subsection or in the bond entered into by him, the 
bond shall be declared to be forfeited and any person bound thereby shall be liable to 
pay the penalty thereof. 
16. Protection of action taken in good faith. No suit, prosecution or other legal 
proceedings shall lie against the State Government or any officer of the State 
Government or any other person, for anything in good faith done or intended to be 
done in pursuance of this Act 
17. Repeal and saving. (1) The Assam Preventive Detention Ordinance, 3 of 1980, is 
hereby repealed. 
(2) Notwithstanding such repeal, anything done or any action taken under the said 
Ordinance shall be deemed to have been done or taken under the corresponding 
provisions of this Act as if this Act had come into force on the 18th day of April, 1980. 
Reference: 
1. Enacted by the President of India on 19th July 1980; published in the Gazette of 
India, Extra, Part II, S. 1, date 19tl-i July, 1980, pp. 285-90. 
xciv JAp-pendiK:!! 
A P P E N D I X - X I I 
The Bihar Control of Crimes Act, 1981i 
[7 of 1981] 
(11"> August, 1981) 
Be it enacted by the legislature of the State of Bihar in the thirty-second Year 
of the Republic India as follows:-
Chapter I 
1. Short title and extent. (1) This Act may be called the Bihar Control of Act, 1981. 
(2) It extends to the whole of the State of, Bihar. 
2. Definitions. In this Act unless the context otherwise requires — 
(a). "Commissioner" means the Commissioner of a Division and includes any officer 
specially empowered by the State Government to exercise all or any of the powers of 
Commissioner under this Act; 
(b) "District Magistrate" includes an Additional District Magistrate or Sub-
divisional Officer specially empowered by the State Government in this behalf: 
(c) "detention order" means an order made under Section-12; 
(d) "anti-social element" means a person who is-
(i) either by himself or as a member of or leader of a gang, habitually commits, or 
attempts to commit or abets- the commission of offences, punishable under Chapter 
XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code, or 
(ii) habitually commits or abets the commission of offences under the Suppression of 
Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956; or 
(iii) who by words or otherwise promotes or attempts to promote on grounds of 
religion, language, caste or community or any other grounds whatsoever, 
feelings of enmity or hatred between different religions, racial or groups of castes or 
communities; or (iv) has been found habihially passing indecent remarks to, or 
teasing women or girls; or (v) who has convicted of an offence under Sections 25, 26, 
27,28 or 29 of the Arms Act of 1959. 
3. Externment etc., of Anti-Social Elements. (1) Where it appears to the District 
Magistrate that-
(a) any person is an Anti-Social Element, and 
(b) (i) that his movements or acts in the district or any part thereof are causing or are 
calculated to cause alarm, danger or harm to persons or property; or 
(ii) that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is engaged or about to 
engage in the district or any part thereof, in the commission of any offence 
punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code, or the 
Suppression of Immoral Traffic in and Girls Act, 1956 or abetment of any offence; 
the District Magishate shall by notice In writing Inform him of the general nature of 
the material allegation, against him in respect of clauses (a) and (b) and shall give 
him a reasonable Opporhmity of tendering an explanation regarding them. 
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(2) The person against whom an order under this, section is proposed to be made 
shall have the right to consult and be defended by a counsel of his choice and shall be 
given a reasonable opportunity of examining himself, if lie so desires, and also of 
examining any other witnesses that he may wish to produce in support of his 
explanation, unless for reasons to be recorded-in-writing the District Magistrate is of 
opinion that the request is made for purpose of vexation of delay. 
(3) The District Magistrate on being satisfied that the conditions, specified in 
clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) exist, may by .order in writing-
(a) direct him to remove himself outside the district or part thereof as the case may 
be, by such route, if any and within such time as may be specified in the order and to 
desist from entering the district or the specified part thereof, until the expiry of such 
period,, not exceeding six months as may be specified in the order; 
(b) (i) require such person to notify his movements, or to report himself or to do both, 
in such manner, at such time and to such authority or person as may be specified in 
the order; 
(ii) prohibit or restrict possession or use by him of any such article as may be 
specified in the order; 
(iii) direct liim otherwise to conduct himself in such manner as may be specified in 
the order; until the expiry of such period not exceeding six months as foe specified in 
the order, 
4. Permission to return temporarily. The District Magistrate by an order permit any 
person in respect of whom an order has been made under clause (a) of sub-section, 
(3) of Section 3 or enter or return for temporary period into or to the area from 
which-he was directed to remove himself subject to such conditions as the District 
Magistrate may specify and may at any time rescind any such permission. 
5. Extension of period of order. The District Magistrate may, after giving, except 
where for-reasons to be recorded in writing he is satisfied that it is impracticable so 
to do, to the person concerned an opportunity of making a representation in that 
behalf extend from time to time in the interest of the general public, the period 
specified in the order made under Section 3, but the period so extended shall in no 
case exceed two years in the aggregate. 
6. Appeal. (1) Any person aggrieved by an order made under Section 3, Section 4 or 
Section 5 may appeal to the Commissioner witliin fifteen days from the date of such 
order. 
(2) The Commissioner may either confirm the order, with or modification or set it 
aside, and may, pending disposal of the appeal, stay the operation of the order 
subject to such terms, if any, as he thinks fit. 
7. Recognizance for certain purpose. (1) The District Magistrate or Commissioner 
may, for the purpose of-
(a) securing the attendance of any person against whom an order is proposed to be 
made under Section 3 or has been made but its operation has under Section 6; or 
(b) seeping the doe observance of any direction, requirement, prohibition, restriction 
or condition specified in an order made in respect of any person under Section 
3,'Section 4, Section 5 or Section 6, require such person to enter into a bond, with or 
without sureties, and the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 shall 
mutatis mutandis apply in relation to such bond as they apply in relation to bonds 
executed or required to be executed under the said Code. 
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(2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of tlie foregoing provisions — 
(a) District Magistrate while issuing notice to any person under sub-section (1) of 
Section 3, may issue warrant for his arrest with endorsement thereon of a direction in 
terms of the provisions of Section 71 of the said Code and the provisions of Sections 
70 to 89 of the said Code shall, so far as may be, apply in relation to such warrant as 
if the District Magistrate were a Court; 
(b) If any person who is required to execute a bond for the observance of any 
direction, requirement, prohibition, restriction, or conditions fails to do so, he, shall 
be committed to prison or if he is already in prison, be detained in prison until the 
period for which the direction, requirement, promotion, restriction or condition is 
to operate or until, the time he executes the bond with or without sureties, as the case 
may be, in terms of the order and the provisions of Section 119,120,121,122,123-and 
124 of the said Code shall mutatis mutandis apply as if the District Magistrate or the 
Commissioner were a Court. 
(c) Sections 445, 447, and 448 of the said Code shall mutatis mutandis apply in 
relation to all bonds executed under this section as If District Magistrate or the 
Commissioner were a Court. 
8. Nature of evidence. The District Magistrate or the Commissioner may for the 
purpose of satisfying himself as to whether the conditions necessary for the 
making of confirmation of an order under Section 3 or Section 5 or exist or not take 
into consideration any evidence which he considers to have probative value and the 
provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 shall not apply thereto. 
9. Rescission of order. The District Magistrate or the Commissioner may at any time 
rescind an order made under Section 3, whether or not, such order was confirmed on 
appeal under Section 6. 
10. Revocation or modification of orders. Orders under Section 3, 4, 5 and 6 
may at any time be revoked or modified by the State Government provided that 
the revocation or modification shall not be a bar to the making of a fresh order 
under section 3 against the same person in any case where fresh after an order of 
revocation or modification of the order by the Government. 
11. Forcible removal of external anti-social element in case of contravention of order. 
(1) Where, after an order is made against person under Section 4, Section 5 or Section 
6 such person, -
(a) has failed to remove himself from the district or part thereof as directed by the 
order; or 
(b) has re-entered the area, from which has ordered to remove himself during the 
period of operation of that order, the District Magistrate may cause him to be 
arrested and removed in police custody to such place outside the area specified in 
the said order as he may direct. 
(2) Any Police officer may arrest without warrant any person reasonably suspected 
of an act or omission specified in sub-section (1), and shall forthwith forward the 
person so arrested to the nearest Executive Magistrate who shall cause him to be 
forwarded to the District Magistrate who may thereupon cause person to be 
removed in police custody to such place outside the area specified in the said order 
as lie may direct, 
(3) The provisions of this section shall be in addition to and not in derogation of the 
provisions of Section 24. 
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Chapter 11 
12. Power to make orders detaining certain persons. (1) The State Government may if 
satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting 
in any marmer prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and there is reason to 
fear that the activities of anti-social elements cannot be prevented, otherwise than by 
the immediate arrest of such person, make an order directing that such anti-social 
element be detained. 
(2) If, having regard to the circumstances prevailing or likely to prevail in any area 
within the local .limits of the jurisdiction of a District Magistrate, the State 
Government is satisfied that it is necessary so to do, it may by an order in writing 
direct, that daring such period as may be specified in the order such District 
Magistrate may also, if satisfied as provided in section (1) exercise the power 
conferred upon by-the said subsection. 
Provided that the period specified in an order made by the Slate Government under 
this sub-section shall not, In the first instance exceed three months, but the State 
Government may, if satisfied as aforesaid that it is necessary so to do, amend such 
order to extend such period from time to time' by any period not exceeding three 
months at any one time. 
(3) When any order is made by Distiict Magistrate, he shall forthwith report the fact 
to the State Govermnent together with the grounds on which the order has been 
made and such other particulars as, in his opinion have a bearing on the matter, and 
no such order shall remain in force for more than 12 days after the making thereof 
unless, in the meantime it has been approved by the State Government. 
Provided that where under Section 17 the grounds of detention are communicated by 
the officer making the order after five days but not later than ten days from the date 
of detention, this sub-section shall apply subject to the modification that, for the 
words "twelve days", the words "fifteen days" shall be substituted. 
13. Execution of detention order. The detention order may be executed in any place 
in India in the manner provided for the execution of warrants of arrest under the 
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974). 
14. Power to regulate place and condition of detention. Every person in respect of 
whom a detention order has been made shall be liable,— 
(a) to be detained in such place and under such conditions including conditions as to 
maintenance of discipline and punishment for breaches of discipline as the State 
Govermnent may, by genera! or special order, specify; and 
(b) to be removed from the place of detention to another place of detention, by order 
of the State Government. 
15. Detention orders not to be invalid or inoperative on certain No detention order 
shall be invalid or inoperative merely by reasons-
(a) tliat the person to be detained ti:\ereunder is outside tiie limits of the territorial 
jurisdiction of the State Government, or officer making the order, or 
(b) that the place of detention of such person is outside the said limits. 16. 
Powers in relation to absconding person. (1) If the State Government or the District 
Magistrate mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 12 has reason to believe that a 
person, in respect of whom a detention order has been made, has absconded or is 
concealing himself so that the order cani^ot be executed the Government or the 
District Magistrate may-
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(a) make a report in writing, of the fact to a Chief Judicial Magistrate of the first class 
having jurisdiction in the place where the said person ordinarily resides; 
(b) by order notified in the official Gazette direct the said person to appear before 
such officer, at such and within such period as may be specified in the order. 
(2) Upon the making of a report against any person under (a) of sub-section (1)' the 
provisions of Sections 82, 83, 84 and 85 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 
1974) apply in respect of such person and his property as if the detention order made 
against him were a warrant issued by the Magistrate. 
(3) If any person fails to comply with an order issued under clause (b) of sub-section 
(1), he shall, unless he proves that it was not possible for him to comply therewith 
and that he had, within the period specified in the order, informed the officer 
mentioned in the order of the reason which rendered compliance therewith 
impossible and of his whereabouts, be punishable with imprisormient for a term 
which may extend to one year, or witli fine, or with both. 
(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 
of 1974) every offence under sob-section (3) shall be cognizable. 
17. Grounds of order of detention to be disclosed to person affected by the order. (1) 
When a person is detained in pursuance of a detention order, the authority making 
the order shall, as soon as may be, but ordinarily not later than five days and in 
exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing, not later than 
ten days from the date of detention, communicate to him the grounds on which the 
order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a 
representation against the order to the State Government. 
(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall require the authority to disclose facts which it 
considers to be against the public interest to disclose. 
18. Constitution of Advisory Boards, (1) The State Government shall, whenever 
necessary, constitute Advisory Board for the purposes of this Act. 
(2) The Board shall consist of three persons who are, or have been or are qualified to 
be appointed as. Judges of High Court, and such persons shall be appointed by the 
Government 
(3) The Government shall appoint one of the members of the Advisory Board who is, 
or has been, a Judge of a High Court to be its Chairman. 
19. Reference to Advisory Board, Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act in 
every case where a detention order has been made under this Act the Govermiaent 
shall, within three weeks from the date of detention of a person under the order, 
place before the Advisory Board constituted by it under Section 18 the grounds on 
which the order has been made and representation, if any, made by the person 
affected by the order, and in case where the order has been made by the District 
Magistrate mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 12 also the report by such under 
sub-section (3) of that section. 
20. Procedure of Advisory Boards, (1) The Advisory Board after considering the 
materials placed before it and, after calling for such further information as it may 
deem necessary from the Goverrunent or from any person called for the purpose 
through the Government or from the person concerned, and if In any particular case, 
it considers it essential so to do or if the person, concerned desires to be heard, after 
hearing him In person, submit its report to the Goveriunent within seven weeks from 
the date of detention of the person concerned. 
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(2) The report of the Advisory Board shall specify in a separate part thereof the 
opinion of the Advisory Board as to whether or not there is sufficient cause for the 
detention of the person concerned. 
(3) When there is a difference of opinion among the members forming the Advisory 
Board the opinion of the majority of such members shall be deemed to be the opinion 
of the Board. 
(4) Nothing in this section shall entitle any person against whom a detention order 
has been made to appear by any legal practitioner in connected with the 
reference to the Advisory Board and its report, excepting that part of the report in 
which the opinion of the Advisory Board is specified, shall be confidential 
21. Action upon the report of the Advisory Boards. (1) In any where the Advisory 
Board has reported that there is, in its opinion, sufficient cause for the detention of a 
person, the Government may confirm the detention of the person concerned for such 
period as it thinks fit. 
(2) In any case where the Advisory Board has reported that there is, in its opinion, no 
sufficient cause for the detention of a person, the Government shall revoke the 
detention order and cause the person concerned to be released forthwith. 
22. Maximum period of detention. The maximum period for which any person may 
be detained in pursuance of any detention order which has been confirmed under 
Section 21 shall be twelve months from the date of detention: 
Provided that nothing contained in this section shall affect the power of the 
Government to revoke or modify the detention order at any earlier time, 
23. Revocation of detention orders. (1) Without prejudice to the provisions of Section 
21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, (10 of 1897), a detention order may, at any time 
be revoked or modified-
(1) Notwithstanding that the order has been made by an officer mentioned in sub-
section (2) of Section 12 or by the State Government to what that officer is 
subordinate. 
(2) The revocation or expiry of a detention, order shall not bar the making of a fresh 
detention order under Section 12 against the same person in any case where fresh 
facts have arisen after the date of revocation or expiry on which the State 
Government or an officer mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 12, as the case may 
be, satisfied such an order should be made. 
24. Temporary release of persons detained - (1) The Government may at any time 
direct that any person detained In pursuance of a detention order may be released 
for any specified period either without conditions or upon such conditions specified 
in the direction as that person accepts and may, at any time, cancel his release. 
(2) In directing the release of any person under sub-section (1), the Government may 
require him to enter into a bond with or without sureties for the due observance of 
the specified in the direction. 
(3) Any person released under sub-section (1) himself at the time and place, and to 
the authority, specified in the order directing his release, as the case may be. 
(4) If any person fails without sufficient, cause to surrender himself in the manner 
specified in sub-section (3), lie shall toe punishable with imprisonment for a term 
which may extend to two years or with fine, or with both. 
(5) If any person released under sub-section (1) fails to any of the conditions 
imposed upon him under the section or in the bond entered into by him, tlie bond 
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shall be declared to be forfeited and any person bound thereby shall be liable to pay 
the penalty thereof. 
Chapter III 
25. Punishment for contravention of order under Sections 3 to 6, Whoever 
contravenes any order made under Section 3, Section 4, Section 5 or Section 6 shall 
be punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to three 
years but in no case it shall be less than three months and shall 
be, liable to-fine not exceeding Rs 5,000. 
26. Cognizance of offence. No Magistrate shall take Cognizance of an offence 
punishable under the Act, except-
(a) upon a report in writing of the facts constituting such offences made by a Police 
Officer not below the rank of Deputy of Police; or 
(b) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or from 
any gazetted officer that such offences has been committed. 
27. Saving as to orders. No order made in exercise of any conferred by or under this 
Act shall be called in question at any court. 
28. Protection of Action taken under the Act. (1) No suit, prosecution or other legal 
proceeding shall lie against any person for anything in good faith done or intended 
to be done in pursuance of this Act or of any order made thereunder. 
(2) No suit or other legal prosecution shall lie against the State Government or any 
officer of the State Government for any damage caused or likely to be caused by 
anything which is in good faith done or intended to be done in pursuance of this Act 
or of any order made thereunder. 
29. Power to make rules. (1) The State Government may by notification in the official 
gazette make rules consistent with the provisions of this Act for carrying out the 
purposes of the Act. 
(2) Every rule made by the State Government under this Act shall be laid, as soon as 
may be after it is made, before each house of the State Legislature while it is in 
session for a total period of 30 days which may be comprised in one session or in two 
successive session and if, before the expiry of session in which it is so laid or the 
session immediately following, both houses agree in making any modification in the 
rule or such house agree that the rule should not be made, the rule shall thereafter 
have affect only in such modified form or be of no affect as the case may be, so, 
however that any such modification or armulment shall be without prejudice to the 
validity of anything previously done under that rule. 
30. Repeal and saving. (1) The Bihar Control of Crimes (Second) Ordinance, 1981 
(Bihar Ordinance No. 115 of 1981) is hereby repealed. 
(2) Notwithstanding such repeal anything done or any action taken in the exercise of 
any power conferred by or under the said Ordinance shall be deemed to have been 
done or taken in the exercise of the powers conferred by or under this Act as if this 
Act were in force on the day on which such thing or action was done or taken. 
Reference: 
1. Published in Bihar Gazette, Extraordinary No. 857, dated 12th August, 1981. 
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APPENDIX-XIV 
The Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Acts 1985* 
[16 of 1985] 
(1*' August, 1985) 
An act to provide for preventive detention of bootleggers, dangerous persons, 
drug offenders, immoral traffic offenders and property grabbers for preventing their 
anti-social and dangerous activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. 
It is hereby enacted in the Thirty-sixth Year of the Republic of India as follows: 
1. Short title, extent and commencement. (1) This Act may be called the Gujarat 
Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act, 1985. 
(2) It extends to the whole of the State of Gujarat 
(3) It shall be deemed to have come into force on the 27th May, 1985 
2. Definitions. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,-
(a) ."authorised officer'* means a District Magistrate or a Commissioner of Police 
authorised under sub-section (2) of section 3 to exercise the powers conferred 
under sub-section (1) of that section; 
(b) "bootlegger" means a person who distils, manufactures, stores, transports, 
imports, exports, sells or distributes any liquor, intoxicating drug or other 
intoxicant in conti-avention of any provision of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949, 
(Bom. XXV of 1949) and the rules and orders made thereunder, or any other law for 
the time being in force or who knowingly expends or applies any money or supplies 
any animal, vehicle, vessel or other conveyance or any receptacle or any other 
material whatsoever in furtherance or support of the doing of any of the things 
described above by or through any other person, or who abets in any other manner 
the doing of any such thing; 
(c) "dangerous person" means a person, who either, by himself or as a member of or 
leader of a gangi habitually commits, or attempts to commit or abets the commission 
of offences, punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII or Chapter XXII of the 
Indian Penal Code, (XLV of 1860), or any of the offences punishable under Cfea^ter 
V df ttae Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), 
(d) "detention order" means an order made under section 3; 
(e) "detenu" means a person detained '-under a detention order; 
2(i) "drug offender" means a person who-
Imports any drug in contravention of section 10 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 
1940 (XXIII of 1940), (hereinafter in the definition referred to as "the Drugs Act"), 
(ii) manufactures for sale; or sells or stocks or exhibits for sale or distributes any frug 
in contravention of section 18 of the Drugs Act. 
(iii) manufactures for sale any Ayurvedic (includmg Siddha) or Unani drug in 
contravention of section 33D of the Drugs Act, 
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(iv) sells, or stocks or exhibits for sale or distr-ibutes any Ayurvedic (including 
Siddha) or Unani drug other than that manufactured by a manufacturer licensed 
under Chapter IV A, in contravention of section 33E of the Drugs Act. 
(v) cultivates any coca plant, opium poppy, of cannabis plant or provides, 
manufactures, possesses, sells, purchases, transports, warehouses, imports inter-
State, exports- inter-State, imports, into India, exports from India or tranship & any 
narcotic drug or psychotropic substance in contravention of section 8 of the Narcotic 
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), 
(vi) knowingly expends or supplies any money in furtherance or support of the 
doing of any of the things mentioned in any of the sub-clauses (i) to (v) by or through 
any other person, or (Vii) abets in any marmer the doing of any of the things 
mentioned in any of the sub-clauses (i) to (vi):] (g) "immoral traffic offender" means a 
person who habitually commits or abets the commission of any offence under the 
Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956, (104 of 1956); 
(h) "property grabber" means a person who illegally takes possession of any lands 
(whether belonging to Government, local authority or any other person) or enters 
into or creates illegal tenancies or leave and licence agreements or any other agree-
ments in respect of such lands or who constructs unauthorised structures thereon for 
sale or hire or gives such lands to any person on rental or leave and licence basis for 
construction or use and occupation of unauthorised structures or who knowingly 
gives financial aid to pay person for taking illegal possession of such lands or for 
Construction of unauthorised strictures thereon, or who collects or attempts to collect 
from any occupiers of such lands rent, compensation or other charges by criminal 
intimidation or who evicts or attempts to evict any such occupiers by force without 
resorting to the lawful procedure, or who abets in any manner the doing of any of 
the above mentioned things; 
(i) "unauthorised structure" means any structure constructed in any area without 
express permission in writing of the officer or authority laving jurisdiction in such 
area required under the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879 (Bom. V of 1879), and the 
Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976 (Presi. Act 27 of 1976), 
and the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949 (Bom. LIX of 1949), the 
Gujarat Municipalities Act, 1963, (Guj. 34 of 1964), or, as the case may be, the Gujarat 
Panchayat Act, 1961 (Guj. VI of 1962) or except in accordance with any other law for 
the time being in force in such area. 
3. Power to make orders detaining certain persons. (1) The State Government may if 
satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting 
in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it is necessary so to do 
make an order directing that such person be detained, (2) If, having regard to the 
circumstances prevailing or likely to prevail in any area within the local limits of the 
jurisdiction of a District Magisfa-ate or a Commissioner of Police, the State 
Government is satisfied that it is necessary so to do, it may, by order in writing, 
direct that the District Magistiate or the Commissioner of Police, may also, if 
satisfied as provided in sub-section (1) exercise the powers conferred by the said sub-
section. 
(3) When any order is made under tliis section by an authorised officer he shall 
forthwith report the fact to \he State Government, together with the grounds on 
which the order has been made and such other particulars as in his opinion, have a 
bearing on the matter, and no such order shall remain in force for more than twelve 
days after the making thereof, unless, in the meantime, it has been approved by the 
State Government (4) For the purpose of this section, a person shall be deemed to be 
"acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order" when such 
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person is engaged in or is making preparation for engaging in any activities, whether 
as a bootlegger or dangerous person or drug offender or immoral traffic offender or 
property grabber, which affects adversely or are likely to affect adversely the 
maintenance of public order. 
Explanation-For the purpose of this sub-section, public order shall be deemed to 
have been affected adversely or shall be deemed likely to be affected adversely inter 
alia if any of the activities of any person referred to in this sub-section directly or 
indirectly, is causing or is likely to cause any harm, danger or alarm or feeling of 
insecurity among the general public or any section thereof or a grave or widespread 
danger to life, property or public health. 
4. Execution of detention orders. A detention order may be executed at any place in 
the State in the manner provided for the execution of warrant of arrest under the 
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974). 
5. Power to regulate place and conditions of detention. Every person in respect of 
whom a detention order has been made shall be liable-
(a) to be detained in such place and under such conditions, including conditions as to 
maintenance, discipline and punishment For breaches of discipline, as the 
Government may, by general or special order, specify; and 
(b) to be removed from one place of detention to another place of detention, within 
the State by order of the State Government. 
6. Grounds of detention severable. Wliere a person has been detained in pursuance of 
an order of detention under section 3 which has been made on two or more grounds, 
such order of detention shall be deemed to have been made separately on each 
ground and accordingly-
(a) such order shall not be deemed to be invalid or inoperative merely because one or 
some of the grounds is or are-(i) vague, (ii) non-existent, (iii) not relevant, (iv) not 
connected or not proximately connected with such 
person, or 
(v) invalid for any other reason whatsoever, and it is not, therefore, possible to hold 
that the Government or the officer making such order would have been satisfied as 
provided in section 3 with reference to the remaining ground or grounds and made 
the order of detention; 
(b) the Government or the officer making the order-of detention shall be deemed to 
have made the order of detention under the said section after being satisfied as 
provided in that section with reference to the remaining ground or grounds. 
7. Detention orders not to be invalid or inoperative on certain grounds. No detention 
order shall be invalid or inoperative merely by reason-
(a) that the person to be detained thereunder, though within State, is outside the 
limits of the territorial jurisdiction of the autliorised officer making the order, or 
(b) that the place of detention of such person, though within the State, is outside the 
said limits. 
8. Powers in relation to absconding persons. (1) If the State Government or any 
authorised officer has reason to believe that person in respect of whom a detention 
order has been made has absconded, or is concealing liimself so that the order cannot 
be executed, then the provisions of sections 82 to 86 (both inclusive) of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) shall apply in respect of such person and his 
property, subject to the modifications mentioned in this sub-section and, irrespective 
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of the place where such person ordinarily resides, the detention order made against 
him shall be deemed to be a warrant issued by a competent Court Where the 
detention order is made by the State Government, an officer, not below the rank of a 
District Magistrate or a Commissioner of Police authorised by the State Government 
in this behalf, or where the detention order is made by an authorised officer, the 
authorised officer, as the case may be, shall, irrespective of his ordinary Jurisdiction, 
be deemed to be empowered to exercise all the powers of the competent Court under 
sections 82, 83? 84 and 85 of the said Code for issuing a proclamation for such person 
and for attachment and sale of his property situated in any part of the State and for 
taking any other action under the said sections. An appeal from any order made by 
any such officer rejecting an application for restoration of attached property shall lie 
to the Court of Sessions having jurisdiction in the place where the said person 
ordinarily resides, as provided in section 86 of the said Code. 
(2) (a) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), if the State 
Government or an authorised officer has reason to believe that person in respect of 
whom a detention order has been made has absconded or is concealing himself so 
that the order cannot be executed, the State Government or the officer, as the case 
may be, may by order notified in the Official Gazette, direct the said person to 
appear before such officer, at such place and within such period as may be specified 
in the order. 
(b) Where such person fails to comply with such order, then, unless he proves that it 
was not possible for him to comply therewith, and that he had, within the period 
specified in the order, informed the officer mentioned in the order of the reasons 
which rendered compliance therewith impossible and of his whereabouts, or proves 
that it was not possible for him to so inform the officer mentioned in the order, he 
shall, on conviction, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 
one year, or with fine, or with both. 
(c) Notwithstanding anything contained in the said Code, every offence under clause 
(b) shall be cognizable. 
9. Grounds of order of detention to be disclosed to detenu. (1) When a person is 
detained in pursuance of a detention order the authority making the order shall, as 
soon as may be, but not later than five days and in exceptional circumstances and for 
reasons to be recorded in writing, not later than ten days from the date of detention, 
communicate to him tlie grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford 
him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order to the State 
Government. 
(2) Notliing in sub-section (1) shall require the authority to disclose facts which it 
considers to be against the public interest to disclose. 
10. Constitution of Advisory Board. (1) The State Government shall, whenever 
necessary, constitute one or more Advisory Boards for the purposes of this Act. 
*[(2) Every such Board shall consist of a Chairman and tv/o other members, who are, 
or have been. Judges of any High Court or who are qualified under the Constitution 
of India to be appointed as Judges of a High Court: 
Provided that the Chairman of such Board shall be a person who is, or has been, a 
Judge of a High Court.] 
n . Reference to Advisory Board. In e\'ery case where a detention order has been 
m.ade under this Act the State Government shall, within three weeks from the date of 
detention of a person under the order, place before the Advisory Board constituted 
by it under Section 10 the grounds on which the order has been made and the 
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representation, if any, made by the person affected by the order, and where the order 
lias been made by an authorised officer, also the report made by such officer under 
sub-section (3) of section 3. 
12. Procedure of Advisory Board. (1) The Advisory Board shall, after considering the 
materials placed before it and, after calling for such further information as it may 
deem necessary from the State Government or from any person called for the 
purpose through the State Government or from the detenu and if, in any particular 
case, the Advisory Board considers it essential so to do or if the detenu desires to be 
heard, after hearing the detenu in person, submit its report to the State Government, 
within seven weeks from the date of detention of the detenu. 
(2) The report of the Advisory Board shall specify in a separate part thereof the 
opinion of the Advisory Board as to whether or not there is sufficient cause for the 
detention of the detenu. 
(3) When there is a difference of opinion among the members forming the Advisory 
Board the opinion of the majority of such members shall be deemed to be the opinion 
of the Board. 
(4) The proceedings of the Advisory Board and its report excepting that part of the 
report in which the opinion of the Advisory Board is specified shall be confidential. 
(5) Nothing in this section shall entitle any person against whom a detention order 
has been made to appear by any legal practitioner in any matter connected with the 
reference to the Advisory Board. 
13. Action upon report of Advisory Board. (1) In any case where the Advisory Board 
has reported that there is, in its opinion, sufficient cause for the detention of the 
detenu, the State Government may confirm the detention order and continue the 
detention of the detenu for a period, not exceeding the maximum period prescribed 
by section 14 as it thinks fit. 
(2) In any case where the Advisory Board has reported t]hat there is, in its opinion no 
sufficient cause for the detention for the person concerned, the State Government 
shall revoke the detention order and cause the detenu to be released forthwith. 
14. Maximum period of detention. The maximum period for which any person may 
be detained in pursuance of any detention order made under this Act which has been 
confirmed under Section 13, shall be one year from the date of detention. 
15. Revocation of detention orders. (1) Without prejudice to the provisions of section 
21 of the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904 (Bom. I of 1904), a detention order may, 
at any time for reasons to be recorded in writing, be revoked or modified by the State 
Government, notwithstanding that the order has been made by an authorised officer. 
(2) The expiry or revocation of a detention order (hereinafter in this sub-section 
referred to as "the earlier "detention order") shall not bar the making of another 
detention order (hereinafter in this subs-section referred to as "the subsequent 
detention order") under section 3 against the same person; 
Provided tliat in a case where no fresh facts have arisen after the expiry or revocation 
of the earlier detention order made against such person, the maximum period for 
which such person may be detained in pursuance of the subsequent detention order 
shall in no case extend beyond the expiry of a period of tvs'elve months from the date 
of detention under the earlier detention order. 
16. temporary release of persons detained. (1) The State Government may, at any 
time, for' reasons to be recorded in writing, direct that any person detained in 
pursuance of a detention order may be released for any specified period, either 
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without conditions or upon such conditions specified in the direction as that person 
accepts, and may, at any time, cancel his release. 
(2) In directing the release of any detenu under sub-section (1), the State 
Government may require him to enter into a bond, with or without sureties, for the 
due observance of the conditions specified in the direction. 
(3) Any detenu released under sub-section (1) shall surrender himself at the time 
and place, and to the authority, specified In the order directing his release or 
cancelling his release, as the case may be. 
(4) If any detenu fails without sufficient cause to surrender himself in the manner' 
specified in' sub-section (3), he shall on conviction, be punished with imprisonment 
for a term which extend to two years, or with fine, or with both. 
(5) If any detenu released under sub-section (1) fails to fulfil any of the conditions 
imposed upon him under the said subsection or in the bond entered into by him, the 
bond shall be declared to be forfeited and any person bound thereby shall be liable to 
pay tlie penalty thereof. 
17. Protection of action taken in good faith. No suit, prosecution or other legal 
proceeding shall lie against the State Government or any officer or person, for 
anything in good faith done or intended to be done in pursuance of this Act 
18. Matters within the purview of this Act to be dealt with under this Act only. On 
and after the commencement of this Act, no order of detention under the National 
Security Act, 1980 (65 of 1980), shall be mad^ by the State Government or any officer 
subordinate to it, in respect of any boot-legger, drug offender, dangerous person, 
immoral traffic offender, or property grabber in tlie State on the ground of 
preventing him from acting In any manner prejudicial to tlie maifitenance of public 
order, in so far as an order under this Act, could be made for detention of such 
person, 
19. Repeal and saving. (1) The Gujarat Prevention of Antisocial Activities Ordinance, 
1985 (Guj.OrdUL 11 of 1985), is hereby repealed. 
(2) Notwithstanding such repeal,-
(a) anything done or any action taken under the said Ordinance shall be 
deemed to have been done or taken under this Act; 
(b) every person in jespect of whom an order of detention has been made under 
section 3 of the said Ordinance by reason of his being a dangerous person and is in 
force immediately before the date on wliich the assent to this Act of the President is 
first published in the Official Gazette, (hereinafter referred to as "the said date"), 
shall, notwithstanding that his detention has been rendered inconsistent with 
section 3 of this Act, continue to be under detention subject to the provisions of this 
Act; 
(c) (i) an Advisory Board constituted under section 10 of the said Ordinance and 
functioning immediately before the same date shall, notwithstanding that its 
constitution has been rendered inconsistent with the provisions of section 10 of tliis 
Act, continue to so function after the said date subject to the provisions of this Act; 
(ii) any reference made under section 11 of the said Ordinance and pending before 
such Advisory Board immediately before the said date may continue to be dealt with 
by that Board after that date as if such Board had been constituted under section 10 
of this Act. 
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References: 
* Published in the Gujarat Government Gazette Pan IV, Dt 2nd August, 1985. 
1. Omitted by Act 26 of 1986. 
2. Subs. By ibid 
3. Subs by Act 26 of 1986. 
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APPENDIX - XV 
Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 
[Act No. VI of 1978] 
(8th April, 1978) 
Whereas it is necessary in the interest of the security of the and pubhc order 
to make law providing for the measures hereinafter appearing. 
Now, therefore it is enacted by the Jammu and Kashmir Slate Legislature in the 
Twenty-ninth Year of the Republic of as India as follows: 
Chapter I 
1. Short title and extent. (1) This Act may be called the Jammu and Kashmir Public 
Safety Act, 1978. 
(2) It extends to the whole of Jammu and Kashmir State, 
2. Definitions. In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or 
context, 
(1) "the Code" means the Code of Criminal Procedure, Samvat 1989; 
(2) "notified" and "notification" mean notified and notification respectively in the 
Government Gazette. 
Chapter II 
ACCESS TO CERTAIN PREMISES AND AREAS 
3. Prohibited places. (1) If as respects any place the Government considers it 
necessary or expedient that, special precautions should be taken to prevent the entry 
of unauthorised persons, the Government may by notified, order, declare that place 
to be a prohibited place. 
(2) No person shall, without the permission of the Government or the authority 
specified by the Government, enter, or be on or in or pass over, or loiter in the 
vicinity of, any prohibited place. 
(3) Where in pursuance of sub-section (2) any person is granted permission to enter, 
or to be on or in, or to pass over, a prohibited place, that person shall, while acting 
under such permission, comply with such orders for regulating his conduct as may 
be given by tlie Government or the authority specified by the Government. 
(4) Any Police Officer, or any other person authorised in this behalf by the 
Government, may search any person entering or seeking to enter or being on or in, or 
leaving a prohibited place and any vehicle, aircraft or article brought in by such 
person, and may, for the purpose of the search, detain such person, vehicle, aircraft 
and article: 
Provided that no female shall be searched in pursuance of this sub-section except by 
a female. 
(5) If any person is in a prohibited place in cont-avention of this section, then, 
without prejudice to any other proceedings which may be taken against him, he may 
be removed theie from by any Police Officer not below the rank of a Sub-Inspector or 
by any other person authorised in this behalf by the Government. 
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(6) If any person is in a prohibited place in contravention of any of the provisions of 
this section he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend 
to one month, or with fine, or with both. 
4. Protected areas. (1) If the Government considers it necessary or expedient in the 
interests of the defence or security of the State to regulate the entry of persons into 
any area, it may, by a notified order declare the area to be a protected area, and 
thereupon, for so long as the order is in force, such area shall be a protected area for 
the purposes of this Act 
(2) The Government or the authority specified by the Government may 
regulate the entry of any person into a protected area. 
(3) If any person is in a protected area in contiavention of the provisions of any 
order passed under this section then, without prejudice to any other proceedings 
which may be taken against him, he may be removed therefrom by or under the 
direction of any police officer not below the rank of a Sub-Inspector. 
(4) If any person is in a protected area in contravention of any of the provisions of 
this section, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend 
to two months, or with fine, or with both. 
5. Forcing or evading a guard. Any person who effects or attempts to effect entiy 
into a prohibited place or a protected after taking precautions to conceal his entry or 
attempts entry from any person posted for the purpose of protecting or of preventing 
or controlling access to such place or area shall fee punishable with imprisonment for 
a term which may extend to three months, or with fine, or with both. 
Chapter III 
MAINTENANCE OF COMMUNAL AND REGIONAL HARMONY 
6. Power to prohibit circulation within the State or entry into the State of certain' 
documents. (1) The Government, or any authority authorised by it in this behalf, if 
satisfied that such action is necessary for the purposes of preventing or combating 
any activity prejudicial to the maintenance of communal or sectarian, or regional 
harmony affecting or likely to affect public order, may, by notified order, regulate or 
restrict the circulation within the State, or prohibit or restrict the importation into the 
State, of any document: 
Provided that no such order shall remain in force for more than three months from 
the making thereof unless before the expiry of such period, and in case the High 
Court does not otherwise direct, the Government, by am order made in the like 
manner, extend it by any period not exceeding three months at a time as it thinks fit, 
so, however, that the total period of the original order does not exceed one year. 
Provided further that a person aggrieved by such order may, within ten days of the 
passing tliereof, make a representation to the Government which may on 
consideration confirm, modify or rescind the order within 21 days of the making of 
the representation, after giving the aggrieved party an opportunity of being heard: 
Provided also that in case the representation is rejected by the Government, the 
aggrieved person may within a period of two months from the date of the order 
rejecting the representation apply to the High Court to set aside such order. Every 
such application shall be heard and determined by a Special Bench of the High Court 
composed of three-
(2) Any person who contravenes an order made under this section shall be 
punishable with imprisonment for a term, which may extend to three months or with 
fine, or with, both. 
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(3) In tlie event of disobedience of an order-made under subsection (1) the 
Government or the authority issuing the order, 
without prejudice to the penalty to which the person guilty of the disobedience is 
liable under sub-section (2), order the seizure of all copies of any such 
7. Removal of doubts. For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that the 
restriction imposed by section 6 on the rights conferred by clause (1) of Article 19 of 
the Constitution of India shall be deemed to be reasonable restrictions. 
Chapter IV 
POWER TO MAKE ORDERS DETAINING CERTAIN PERSONS 
8. Detention of certain persons. (1) The Government may-
(a) if satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from 
acting in any manner prejudicial to -
(i) the security of the State or the maintenance of the public order, or 
i[(ii)**1 
2[(a-l) if satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him. 
from — 
(i) smuggling timber, or 
(ii) abetting the smuggling of timber, or, 
(iii) engaging in transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled timber, or 
(iv) dealing in smuggled timber otherwise than by engaging in transporting or 
concealing or keeping in smuggled timber, or 
(v) harbouring persons engaged in smuggling of timber or in abetting the smuggling 
of timber; or;] 
(b) if satisfied with respect to any person who is — 
(i) a foreigner within the meaning of the Foreigners Act, 1946, or 
(ii) a person residing in the area of the State under the occupation of Pakistan, 
that a view to regulating his continued presence in the State or with a view to 
making arrangements for his expulsion from the State, 
it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained. 
(2) any of the following officers namely: 
(i) Divisional Commissioners, 
(ii) District Magistrates, 
may, if satisfied as provided in sub-clauses (i) and (ii) of clause (a) or clause (I) (a) of 
sub-section (1), exercise the powers conferred by the said sub-section. 
(3) For the purposes of sub-section (1),— 
(b) "acting in any maimer prejudicial to the maintenance of public order" means-
(i) promoting, propagating, or attempting to create, feelings of enmity or hatred or 
disharmony on grounds of religion, race, caste, community, or region; 
(ii) making preparations for using, or attempting to use, or using, or instigating, 
inciting, provoking, or otherwise abetting, the use of force where such preparation. 
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using, attempting, instigation, inciting, provoking or abetting, disturbs or is likely .to 
disturb public order; 
(iii) attempting, to commit, or committing, or instigating, inciting, provoking or 
otherwise abetting the commission of, mischief within the meaning of section 425 of 
the Ranbir Penal Code where the commission of such mischief disturbs, or is likely to 
'disturb public order; 
(iv) attempting to commit, or committing, or instigating, inciting, provoking or 
otherwise abetting the commission of an offence punishable with death or 
imprisonment for life or imprisomnent for a term extending to seven years or more, 
where the commission of such offence disturbs, or is likely to disturb public order. 
''(c) "smuggling" in relation to timber means possessing or carrying of illicit timber 
and includes any act which will render the timber liable to confiscation under the 
Forest Act, Sam vat 1987; 
(d) "timber" means timber of Fir, Kail, Chir or Deodar tree whether in logs or cut up 
in pieces but does not include fire-wood.] 
(4) When any order is made under section by an officer mentioned in sub-section (2), 
lie shall, forthwith report the fact to the Government together, with the grounds on 
which the order has been made and such other particulars as in his opinion have a 
bearing on the matter, and no such order shall rernain in force for more than twelve 
days after the making thereof unless in the meantime it has been approved by the 
Government. 
9. Execution of detention orders. A detention order may be executed at any place in 
the maimer provided for the execution of warrants of arrest under the 
10. Power to regulate place and conditions of detention. Any person in respect of 
whom a detention order has been made under section 8 shall be liable-
(a) to be detained in such place and under such conditions including conditions as to 
the maintenance of discipline and punishment for breaches of discipline as tlie 
Government may, by general or special order, specify; and 
(b) to be removed from one place of detention to another place of detention in the 
State by order of the Government 
[^10-A. Grounds of detention severable. Where a person has been detained in 
pursuance of an order of detention under section 8 which has been made on tvvo or 
more grounds, such order of detention shall be deemed to have been made sepa-
rately on each of such grounds and accordingly-
(a) such order shall not be deemed to be invalid or inoperative merely because one or 
some of the ground is or are — 
(i) vague, 
(ii) non-existent, 
(iii) not relevant, 
(iv) not connected or not proximately connected with such person, or 
(\') invalid for- any other reasons whatsoever, and it is not, therefore, possible to hold 
tliat the Government or officer making such order would have been satisfied as 
piovided in section 8 with reference to the remaining ground or-grounds and made 
the order of detention; 
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(b) the Government or officer making the order of detention shall be deemed to have 
made the order of detention under the said section after being satisfied as provided 
in that section with reference to the remaining ground or grounds. 
11. Detention orders not to be invalid or inoperative on certain grounds, No 
detention order shall be invalid or inoperative merely era the ground — 
(a) that the person to be detained thereunder is outside the limits of the territorial 
jurisdiction of the officer making the order; or 
(b) that the place of detention of such person is outside the said limits. 
12. Powers in relation to absconding persons. If the Goverrunent, or an officer 
specified in sub-section (2) of section 8, as the case may be, has reason to believe that 
a person in respect of whom a detention order has been made has absconded or is 
concealing himself so that the order cannot be executed, the Government or the 
officer may — 
(a) make a report in writing of the fact to a Magistrate of the First Class having 
jurisdiction in the place where the said person ordinarily resides, and thereupon the 
provisions of sections 87, 88 and 89 of the Code shall apply in respect of the said 
person and his property as if the order directing that he be detained were a warrant 
issued by the Magistaate; 
(b) By notified order direct the said person to appear before such officer, at such 
place and within such period as may be specified in the order, and if the said person 
fails to comply with such direction, he shall, unless he proves that it was not 
possible, for him to comply therewith and that he had within the period specified in 
the order informed the officer mentioned in the order of the reason which rendered 
compliance therewith impossible and of his whereabouts, be punishable with 
imprisonment for a term wliich may extend to *[one year] or with fine or with both. 
13. Grounds of order of detention to be disclosed to persons affected by the order. 
(1) When a person is detained in pursuance of a detention order, the authority 
making the order shall, as soon as may be, ^[but ordinarily not later than five days 
and in exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing not later 
than ten days from the date of detention] communicate to him the grounds on which 
the order has made, and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a 
representation against the order to the Government. 
(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall require the authority to disclose facts which it 
considers to be against the public interest to disclose. 
14. Constitution of Advisory Board- (1) The Government shall, whenever 
necessary, constitute Advisory Board for the purposes of this Act. 
(2) Such Board shall consist of a Chairman who is or has been a Judge of tlie High 
Court, and two other members who are, or have been, or are qualified to be 
appointed as Judges of the High Court. 
(3) The Chairman and the other members of the Board shall be appointed by the 
Government in consultation with tiie Chief Justice of the High Court 
15. Reference to Advisory, Board, in every case where a detention order has been 
made under this Act9 the Government shall,, within for weeks from the date of 
detention place before the Advisory Board constituted by it under section 14, the 
grounds on which the order has been made, the representation, if any, made by the 
person affected by the order and In case where the order has been made by an 
officer, also the, report by such officer under sub-section (4) of section 8. 
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16. Procedure of Advisory Board. (1) The Advisory Board shall, after considering the 
material placed before it and, after calling for such further information as it may 
deem necessary from the Government or from the person called for the purpose 
thiough the Government or from the person concerned and if in any particular case 
it .considers it essential so to do or, if the person concerned desires to be heard, after 
hearing him in person, submit its report to the Government within eight weeks from 
the date of detention. 
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the Board may, if the 
person detained so demands, at any time before submitting its report, after affording 
an opportunity to the person detained and the Government or the officer, as the case, 
may be, of being heard, determine whether the disclosure of facts, not disclosed 
under sub-section (2) of section 13 to the person detained is or is not against public 
interest. Such finding of the Board be binding on the Government 
(3). The report of the Advisory Board shall specify in a the opinion of the Advisory 
Board as to whether or not there is sufficient cause for the detention, of the person 
concerned. 
(4) When there is a difference of opinion among the members forming the Advisory 
Board, the opinion of the majority of such members shall be deemed to be the 
opinion of the Board. 
(5) Nothing in this section shall entitle any person, against a detention order has been 
made to appear by any legal practitioner in any matter connected with the reference 
to the Advisory Board and the proceedings of the Advisory Board and its report, 
excepting that part of the report in which the opinion of the Advisory Board is 
specified, shall be confidential. 
17. Action upon the report of Advisory Board. (1) In any case where the Advisory 
Board has reported that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for the detention of a 
person, the Government may confirm the detention order and continue the detention 
of the person concerned for such period as it thinks fit. 
(2) In any case where the Advisory Board has reported that there is, in its opinion, no 
sufficient cause for the detention of the person concerned, the Government shall 
revoke the detention order and cause the person to be released forthwith. 
'*[18. Maximum period of detention. (1) The maximum period for which any person 
may foe detained in pursuance of any detention order which has been confirmed 
under section 17, shall be-
(a) twelve months from the date of detention in the case of persons acting in any 
manner prejudicial to, the maintenance of public order or indulging in smuggling of 
timber; and 
(b) two years from the date of detention in the case of persons acting in any manner 
prejudicial to the security of the State. 
(2) Nothing contained in this section shall affect the of the Government to revoke or 
modify the detention order at any earlier time, or to extend tlie period of detention of 
a foreigner in case his expulsion from the State has not been made possible.] 
19. Revocation of detention orders. (1) Without prejudice to the provisions of section 
21 of the General Clauses Act, Samvat 1977, a detention order may at any time be 
revoked or modified bv the Government, notwithstanding that tlie order has been 
made by any officer mentioned in sub-section (2) of section 8. 
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(2) There shall be no bar to making of a fresh order of detention against a person on 
the same facts as an earlier order of detention made against such-person in any case 
where-
(i) the earlier order of detention or its continuance is not legal on account of any 
technical defect; or 
(ii) the earlier order of detention has been revoked by reason of any apprehension, 
or for avoiding any challenge that such order or its continuance is not legal on 
account of any technical defect: Provided that in computing the maximum period for 
which a person against whom such fresh order of detention has been issued may be 
detained, the period during which such person was under the earlier order of 
detention shall be excluded. 
20. Temporary release of persons detained. (1) The Government may at any time 
order that a person detained in pursuance of detention order may be released for any 
specified period either without conditions or upon such conditions specified in the 
direction as that person accepts and may at any time cancel his release. 
(2) In directing the release of any person under sub-section (1), the Government may 
require him to enter into a bond with of without sureties for the due observance of 
the conditions specified in the direction, 
(3) Any person released under sub-section (1) shall surrender himself at the time and 
place and to the authority, specified in the order directing his release or cancelling 
his release as the case may be. 
(4) If any person fails without sufficient cause to surrender himself in the manner 
specified in sub-section (3) he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term 
which may extend to '[two years] or with fine, or with both. 
(5) If any person released under sub-section (1) fails to fulfil any of the conditions 
imposed upon him under the said subsection or in the bond entered into by him, the 
bond shall be declared to foe forfeited and any person bound thereby shall be liable 
to the penalty thereof, 
io[(6) The period of release shall not count towards the total period of detention 
undergone by the person released under this section.] 
Chapter V 
MISCELLANEOUS 
21. Cognizance of offences under this Act (1) No court shall take cognizance of any 
offence under this Act except on a report 
in writing made by a public servant. 
(2) Notwithstandiiig anything contained in the Second 
Schedule to the Code, offences under this Act shall be cognizable and non-bailable. 
22. Protection of action taken under this Act. No suit, prosecution or any other legal 
proceeding shall lie against any person for anything done or intended to be done in 
good faith in pursuance of the provisions of this Act. 
23. Power to make rules. The Government may, by notification, make such rules 
consistent with the provisions of tliis Act, as may be necessary for carrying out tlie 
objects of this Act. 
24. Repeal and saving. (1) The Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Ordinance, 1977 is 
hereby repealed. 
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(2) Notwithstanding such repealed, anything done or any action taken (including 
any rule or order made) under the said Ordinance shall, so far as consistent with the 
provisions of this Act, deemed to have been done or taken under the corresponding 
provisions of this Act. 
References: 
1. Omit by Act 12 of 1988. 
2. Ins. By Act 4 of 1985. 
3. Omit by Act 12 of 1988. 
4. Ins, By Act 4 of 1985. 
5. Ins. By Act 4 of 1985. 
6. Subs. By Act 12 of 1988. 
7. Subs. By Act 12 of 1988. 
8. Subs. By Act 12 of 1982. 
9. Subs. By Act 12 of 1988. 
10. Subs. By Act 12 of 1988. 
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The Jammu and Kashmir Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988i 
[Act No. XXIII of 1988] 
(31^ ' August, 1988) 
An Act to provide for detention in certain cases for the purpose of 
illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances and combating abuse of 
such drugs and substances for matters concerned therewith. 
Whereas illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances poses a 
serious threat to the health and welfare of the people and activities of persons 
engaged in such illicit traffic have deleterious effect on the national economy: 
And whereas having regard to the persons by whom and the manner in 
which such illicit haffic is organised and carried on, and having regard to the fact 
that In certain areas which are highly vulnerable to such illicit traffic, such activities 
of a considerable magnitude are clandestinely organised and carried on, it is 
necessary for the effective prevention of such activities to provide for detention of 
persons concerned in any manner therewitli. 
Be it enacted by the Jammu and Kaslimir State Legislature in the Thirty-ninth 
Year of the Republic of India as follows:-
1. Short title and extent. 
(1) Tlris Act may be called the Jammu and Kashmir Prevention of Illicit Traffic in 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988. 
2. Definition. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires: 
(a) "detention order" means an order made under section 3; 
(b) "foreigner" has the same meaning as in the Foreigners Act, 1946; 
(c) "illicit traffic" means-
(i) cultivating any coca plant or gathering any portion of coca plant; 
(ii) cultivating the opium poppy or any cannabis plant; 
(iii) engaging in the production, manufacture, possession, sale. Purchase, 
transportation, warehousing, concealment, use or consumption, import 
inter State, export inter-State or transhipment, of narcotic drugs or 
psychohopic substances; 
(iv) dealing in narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances otherwise than as 
provided in sub clauses (i) to (iii); 
(v) handling or letting any premises for use for any of the purposes referred 
to in sub-clauses (i) to (iv); 
(vi) financing any activity by himself or through any other person in the 
furtherance or in support of doing any of the aforesaid acts; 
(vii) harbouring persor\s engaged in any of the activities specified in sub-
clauses (i) to (vi); or 
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(viii) abetting or conspiring in the furtherance or in support of doing any of 
the aforesaid acts, 
Except to the extent permitted under the Narcotic Drugs Psychotropic Substances 
Act, 1985, or any rule or order made,, or any condition of any licence,, permit or 
authorisation issued thereunder; 
(d) words and expressions used herein but not defined, and defined in the Narcotic 
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985^ have the meanings respectively 
assigned to them in that Act. 
3. Powers to make orders detaining certain persons, (1) The Government or any 
officer of the Government, not below the rank of the Secretary to Government, 
specially empowered for the purposes of this section by the Government, may, if 
satisfied with respect to any person (including a foreigner) a view to preventing him 
from committing any of the acts within the meaning of "illicit traffic" as defined in 
clause (c) of section 2, it Is so to do, make an order directing that such 
person be detained. 
(2) For the purpose of clause (5) of Article 22 of the constitution, the communication 
to a person detained in of a detention order of the grounds on which the order has 
been made shall be made as soon as may be after the detention, but ordinarily not 
later than five days, and in exceptional and for reasons to be recorded In 
writing, not fifteen days, from the date of detention. 
4. Execution of detention orders. A detention order may be executed at any place in 
the State of Jammu and Kashmir In the manner provided for the execution of 
warrant of arrest under the Code of Criminal Procedure, Samvat 1989. 
5. Power to regulate place and conditions of detention. Every person la respect of 
whom a detention order has been made foe liable: — 
(a) to be detained in such place and under such conditions including conditions as to 
maintenance, interviews or communication with others , discipline and punishment 
for breach of discipline, as the Government may, by general or special order, specify; 
and 
(b) to be removed from one place of detention to another place of detention, within 
the State. 
6. Grounds of detention severable. Where a person has been, detained in pursuance 
of an order of detention under subsection (1) of section 3 which has been made on 
two or more such-order of detention shall be deemed to have been made separately 
on each of such grounds and accordingly-
(a) such order shall not be deemed to be invalid or inoperative merely because one 
or some of the grounds is or are 
(i) vague, 
(ii) non-existent, 
(iii) not relevant, 
(iv) not connected or not proximately connected with 
such person, or 
(v) invalid for any other reason whatsoever, and it is not therefore possible to hold 
that the Government or officer making such order would have been satisfied as' 
provided in sub-section (1) of section 3 with reference to the remaining ground or 
grounds and made the order of detention; 
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(b) the Government or officer making the order of detention shall be deemed to have 
made the order of detention under the said sub-section(l) after being satisfied as 
provided in that section with reference to the remaining ground or grounds. 
11. Detention orders not to be invalid or inoperative on certain grounds. No 
detention order shall be invalid or inoperative merely era the ground — 
(a) that the person to be detained thereunder is outside the limits of the territorial 
jurisdiction of the officer making the order; or 
(b) that the place of detention of such person is outside the said limits. 
12. Powers in relation to absconding persons. If the Government, or an officer 
specified in sub-section (2) of section 8, as the case may be, has reason to believe that 
a person in respect of whom a detention order has been made has absconded or is 
concealing himself so that the order cannot be executed, the Government or the 
officer may — 
(a) make a report in writing of the fact to a Magistrate of the First Class having 
jurisdiction in the place where the said person ordinarily resides, and thereupon the 
provisions of sections 87, 88 and 89 of the Code shall apply in respect of the said 
person and his property as if the order directing that he be detained were a warrant 
issued by the Magistrate; 
(b) By notified order direct the said person to appear before such officer, at such 
place and within such period as may be specified in the order, and if the said person 
fails to comply with such direction, he shall, unless he proves that it was not 
possible, for him to comply therewith and that he had within the period specified in 
the order informed the officer mentioned in the order of the reason which rendered 
compliance therewith impossible and of his whereabouts, be punishable with 
imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year or with fine or with both. 
(2) Not withstanding, anything contained in the Code of Criminal procedure, Samvat 
1989, every offence under clause (b) of sub-section (1) shall be cognizable. 
9. Advisory Boards. For the purposes of sub-clause (a) of clause (4) and sub-clause (c) 
of clause (7) of Article 22 of the Constitution-
(a) the Government shall, whenever necessary, constitute an Advisory Board which 
shall consist of a Chairman and two other persons possessing the qualifications 
specified in sub-clause (a) of clause (4) of Article 22 of the Constitution, 
(b) save as otherwise provided in section 10 the Government shall within five weeks 
from the date of detention of a person under a detention order, make a reference in 
respect thereof to the Advisory Board constituted under clause (a) to enable tlie 
Advisory Board to make the report under sub-clause (a) of clause (4) of Article 22 of 
the Constitution; 
(c) the Advisory Board to which a reference is made under clause (b) shall after 
considering the reference and the materials, placed before it and after calling for such 
further information as it may deem necessary from the Government or from any 
person called for the purpose through the Government or from the person 
concerned, and if, in any particular case, it considers it essential, so to do or if the 
person concerned desires to be heard in person after hearing him in person , prepares 
its report specifying in a separate paragraph thereof its opinion as to whether or not 
there is sufficient cause for the detention of the person concerned and submit the 
same within eleven weeks from the date of detention of the person concerned; 
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(d) When there is a difference of opinion among the members forming the Advisory 
Board, the opinion of the majority of such members shall be deemed to be the 
opinion of the Board. 
(e) a person against whom an order of detention has been made under this Act shall 
not be entitled to by any legal practitioner in any matter connected the reference to 
the Advisory Board and the of the Advisory Board and its report, except that part of 
the report in which the opinion of the Advisory Board is specified, shall be 
confidential; 
(f) in every case where the advisory Board has reported that there is in its opinion 
sufficient cause for the detention of a person, the Government may confirm the 
detention order and continue the detention of the person, concerned for such 
period as it thinks fit and in every case where the Advisory Board has reported that 
there is in. its opinion no sufficient cause for the detention of the person concerned, 
the Government shall revoke the detention order and cause the person to be released 
forthwith. 
10. Cases in which and circumstances under which persons may be detained for 
periods longer than three months without obtaining the opinion of Advisory Board. 
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, any person (including foreigner) 
in respect of whom an order of detention is made under this Act at any time before 
the 15th day of August, 1988 may be detained without obtaining in accordance with 
the provision of sub-clause (a) of clause (1) of Article 22 of the Constitution, the 
opinion of an Advisory Board for a period longer than three months but not 
exceeding six months fi'om the date of his detention, where the order of detention 
has been made against such person with a view to preventing him from engaging in 
illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, the Government or any 
officer of the Government not below the rank of Secretary to Government, specially 
empowered for- the purpose of this section by the Government, is satisfied that such 
person engages or is likely to engage in illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and 
psychotropic substances into, out of, or through any area highly vulnerable to such 
illicit traffic and makes a-declaration to that effect within five weeks of the detention 
of such person. 
Explanation: In this sub-sechon, "area highly vulnerable to such illicit traffic" means 
4:he inland area 100 kilometers in widtli from the India-Pakistan border 'in the State 
of Jammu and Kaslimir. 
(2) In the case of any person detained under a detention order to which the 
provisions of sub-section (1) apply, section 9 shall have effect subject to the following 
modification, namely: — 
(i) in clause (b), for the words "shall, within five weeks," the words "shall within four 
months and two weeks" shall be substituted; 
(ii) in clause (c) — 
(a) for the words "the detention of the person concerned", the words "the 
continued detention of the person concerned" shall be substituted; 
(b) for the words "eleven weeks" the words "five months and three weeks" 
shall be substituted; 
(iii) in clause (f) for the words "for the detention" at both the places where they occur 
the words "for the continued detention" shall be substituted. 
11. Maximum period of detention. The maximum period for which any person may 
be detained in pursuance of any detention order to which the provisions of section 10 
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do not apply and which has been confirmed under clause (f) of section 9 shall be one 
year from the date of detention, and maximum period for which any person may be 
detained in pursuance of any detention order to which the provisions of section 10 
apply and under clause (f) section 9, read with sub-section (2) of section 10, shall be a 
period of two years from the date of detention. 
Provided that notl-iing contained in this section shall affect the power of the 
Government in either case to revoke, or modify the detention order at any earlier 
time. 
12. Revocation of detention order. (1) Without prejudice of section 21 of General 
Clauses Act, Samvat 1977, a detention order made at any time, be revoked or 
modified notwithstanding that the order has been made by an officer of the Govern-
ment, by Government 
(2) The revocation of a detention order shall not bar the making of another order 
under section 3 against the same person. 
13. Temporary release of persons detained. (1) The Government may, at any time, 
direct that any person detained in pursuance of a detention order made by the 
Government or by an officer subordinate to it, may be released for any specified 
period either without condition or upon such conditions specified in the direction as 
the person accepts, and may, at any time, cancel his release. 
(2) In directing the release of any person under sub-section (1) the Government may 
require him to enter a bond with sureties for the due observance of the conditions 
specified in the direction. 
(3) Any person released under sub-section (1) shall surreiider himself at the time and 
place, and to the authority, specified in the order directing his release, or cancelling 
his release, as the case may be. 
(4) If any person falls without sufficient cause to surrender himself in the manner 
specified in sub-section (3), he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term 
which may extend to two years or with fine, or with both. 
(5) If any person released under sub-section (1) fails to fulfil any of the conditions 
imposed upon him under the said sub-section or in the bond entered into by him, the 
bond shall be declared to be forfeited and any be liable to pay the penalty thereof. 
(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law and save as otherwise 
provided in, this section, no person against whom a detention order made under tliis 
Act-Is in force shall be released whether on bail or bail bond or otherwise. 
14. Protection of action taken in good faith. No suitor other legal proceeding shall lie 
against the government and no suit, prosecution or legal proceedingshall lie against 
any person for anything in good faith done or intended to be done in pursuance of 
this Act. 
15. Repeal and saving. (1) The Jammu and Kashmir Prevention of Illicit Traffic in 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Ordinance, 1988 (Ordinance No. 1 of 
1988) is hereby repealed. 
(2) Notwithstanding such repeal, anything done, any action taken, any order or 
notification issued, under any of the provisions of law repealed under sub-section (1) 
shall be deemed to have been done, taken or issued under the corresponding 
provisions of this Act as if such provisions of this Act were in force on tlie day such 
thing was done, action was taken or order or notification was issued. 
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Reference: 
1. Published in tine Jammu and Kashmir Government Gazette, Extraordinary, Part III, 
dated 1st September, 1988, at pp. 1 to 8. 
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APPENDIX-XVII 
The Karnataka Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug-
offenders, Gamblers, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Slum-Grabbers 
Act, 19851 
[12 of 1985] (29th April, 1985) 
An Act to provide for preventive detention of bootleggers, drug-offenders, 
gamblers, goondas, imnaoral traffic offenders and slum-grabbers for preventing their 
dangerous activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. 
WHEREAS public order is adversely affected every now and then by the dangerous 
activities of certain persons, who are known as bootleggers, drug-offenders, 
gamblers, goondas, immoral traffic offenders and slum-grabbers; 
Be it enacted by the Karnataka State Legislature in the Thirty-sixth Year of the 
Republic of India as follows: 
1. Short title and commencement. (1) This Act may be called the Karnataka 
Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug offenders. Gamblers, 
Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Slum-Grabbers Act, 1985. 
(2) It shall be deemed to have come into force on the Fifteenth day of December, 
1984. 
2, Definitions. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires — 
(a) "acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order" means — 
(i) in the case of bootlegger, when he is engaged, or is making preparations for 
engaging, in any of his activities as a bootlegger, which affect adversely, or are likely 
to affect adversely, the maintenance of public order; 
(ii) in the case of a drug-offender, when he is engaged, or is making preparations for 
engaging in any of his activities as a drug offender which affect adversely or are 
likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order; 
(iii) in the case of a gambler when he is engaged or is making preparations for 
engaging in any of his activities as a gambler which affect adversely or are likely to 
affect adversely the maintenance of public order; 
(iv) in the case of a goonda when he is engaged or is making preparations for 
engaging in any of his activities as a goonda which affect adversely or are likely to 
affect adversely the maintenance of public order; 
(v) in the case of an immoral traffic offender when he is engaged, or is making 
preparations for engaging in any of his activities as an immoral traffic offender 
which affect adversely, or are likely to affect adversely, the maintenance of public 
order; 
(vi) in the case of a slum-grabber, when he is engaged or is making preparations, for 
engaging, in any of his activities as a slum-grabber, affect adversely or are likely to 
affect adversely the maintenance of public order: 
Explanation: For the purpose of this clause, public order shall be deemed to have 
been affected adversely or shall be deemed likely to be affected adversely inter alia if 
any of the activities of any of the persons referred to in this clause directly or 
indirectly, is causing or is calculated to cause any harm, danger or alarm or a feeling 
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of insecurity, among the general public or any section, thereof of a grave or 
widespread danger to life or public health. 
(b) "bootlegger" means a person, who distils, manufactures, stores, transports, 
imports, exports, sells or distributes any liquor, intoxicating drug or other intoxicant 
in contravention oi any of the provisions of the Karnataka Excise Act, 1965 
(Karnataka Act 21 of 1966) and the rules, notifications and orders, made thereunder, 
or in contravention of any other for the time being in force, or who knowingly 
expends or applies any money or supplies any animal, vehicle, vessel, or other 
conveyance or any receptacle or any other material whatsoever in furtherance or 
support of the doing of any of the above mentioned things by or through any other 
person or who abets in any other maraier the doing of any such things; 
(c) "detention order" means an order made under section 3; 
(d) "detenu" means a person detained under a detention order; 
(e) "drug-offender" means a person, who manufactures, stocks, import, exports, sells 
or distributes any drug or cultivates any plant or does any other thing in 
contravention of any of the provisions of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (Central 
Act XXIII of 1940), or the Dangerous Drugs Act 1930 (Central Act II of 1930) and the 
rules, notifications and orders made under either-Act, or in contravention of any 
other law for the time being in force, or who knowingly expends or applies any 
money in furtherance or support of the doing of any of the above mentioned things 
by or through any other person, or who abets in any other manner the doing of any 
such things; 
(i) "gambler" means a person, who commits or abets the commission of any offence 
punishable under Chapter VII of the Karnataka Police Act, 1962 (Karnataka Act 4 of 
1964) including an offence of gambling relatable to "matka" and punishable under 
the said Chapter; 
(g) "goonda" means a person who either by himself or as a member of or leader of a 
gang, habitually commits or attempts to commit or abets the commission of offences 
punishable under Chapter XVI, Chapter XVII or Chapter XXII of the Indian Penal 
Code (Central Act XLV of I860); 
(h) "immoral traffic offender" means a person who commits or abets the commission 
of any offence under the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 
1956 (Central Act 104 of 1956); 
(i) "slum-grabber" means a person, who illegally takes possession of any land 
(whether belonging to Goverranent, local authority or any other person) or enters 
into, or creates illegal tenancies or leave and licence agreements or any other agree-
ment in respect of such lands; or who constructs unauthorised structures thereon for, 
sale or hire, or gives such lands to any person on rental or leave and licence basis for 
construction or use and occupation, of unauthorised structures or who know ingly-
gives financial aid to any person for taking illegal possession of such lands, or for 
construction of unauthorised structures thereon, or who collects or attempts to 
collect from any occupier of such lands, rent, compensation or other charges by 
criminal intimidation, or who evicts or attempts to evict any such occupier bv force 
without resorting to the lawful procedure; or who abets in any manner the doing of 
anv of the above mentioned things; 
(j) "unauthorised structure" means any structure constructed witliout express 
permission in writing of the appropriate authority tinder, and in accordance witli 
any law for the time being in force in the area concerned. 
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3. Power to make order detaining certain persons. (1) The Slate Government may, if 
satisfied with respect to any bootlegger or drug-offender or gambler or goonda or 
immoral traffic offender or slum-grabber that with a view to prevent him from acting 
in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it is necessary so to do, 
make an order directing that such persons be detained. 
(2) If, having regard to the-circumstances prevailing or likely to prevail in any area 
within the local limits of the jurisdiction of a District Magistrate or a Commissioner 
of Police, the State Government is satisfied that it is necessary so to do, it may, by 
order in writing direct that during such period as may be specified in the order, such 
District Magistrate or Commissioner of Police may also, if satisfied as provided in 
sub-section (1) exercise the powers conferred by the sub-section. 
Provided that the period specified in the order made by the State Government under 
this sub-section shall not, in the first instance, exceed three months, but the State 
Government may, if satisfied as aforesaid that it is necessary so to do amend such 
order to extend such period from time to time by any period not exceeding three 
months at any one time. 
(3) When any order is made under this section by an officer mentioned in sub-
section (2), he shall forthwith report the fact to the State Government together with 
the grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as, in his 
opinion, have a bearing on the matter and no such order shall remain in force for 
more than twelve days after the making thereof, unless, in the meantime, it has been 
approved by the State Government. 
4. Execution of detention order. A detention order may be executed at any place in 
the State in the manner provided for the execution of warrants of arrest under the 
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Central Act 2 of 1974). 
5. Power to regulate place and conditions of detention. Every in respect of whom a 
detention order has been made, be liable — 
(a) to be detained in such place and under such conditions, including 
conditions as to maintenance, discipline and punishment for breaches of 
discipline, as the State Government may, by general or special order, 
specify; and 
(b) to be removed from one place of detention to another place of detention, 
within the State by order of the State Government. 
6. Detention orders not to be invalid or inoperative on certain grounds. No detention 
order shall be invalid or inoperative merely by reason; 
(a) that the person to be detained thereunder though within the State is 
outside the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of the officer making the 
order, or 
(b) that the place of detention of such person, though within lit State, is 
outside the said limits; 
2[6A. Grounds of detention severable. Where a person has been detained in 
pursuance of an order of detention under subsection (1) or sub-section (2) of section 
3, which has been made on two or more grounds, such order of detention shall be 
deemed to have been made separately on each cf such grounds, and accordingh; — 
(a) such order shall not be deemed to be invalid or inoperative merely because one or 




(iii) not relevant; 
(iv) not connected or not proximately connected with such person; or 
(v) invalid for any other reason whatsoever; and it is not, therefore, possible to 
hold that the Government or the officer making such order would have been 
satisfied as provided in sub-section (1) of section 3 with reference to the 
remaining ground or grounds and made the order of detention; 
(b) the Government or the Officer making the order of detention shall be deemed to 
have made the order of detention under the said sub-section (1) or sob-section (2), 
after being satisfied as provided in sub-section (1) with reference to the remaining 
ground or grounds.] 
7. Powers in relation to absconding persons. (1) If the State Government or an officer 
mentioned in sub-section (2) of section 3 has reason to believe that a person in respect 
of whom a detention order has been made has absconded, or is concealing himself so 
that the order cannot be executed, then the provisions of sections 82 to 86 (both 
inclusive) of the Code of Criminal-Procedure, 1973 (Central Act 2 of 1974), still apply 
in respect of such person and his property subject to the modifications mentioned in 
this sub-section, and, irrespective of the place where such person ordinarily resides 
the detention order made against him shall be deemed to be a warrant by a 
competent court Where the detention order is made by the State Government an 
officer, not below the rank of District Magistrate or Commissioner of Police 
authorised by the State Government in this behalf, or where the detention order is 
made by an officer, mentioned in sub-section (2) of section 3 such officer as the case 
may be, shall irrespective of his ordinary jurisdiction, be deemed to be empowered to 
exercise all the powers, of tlie competent court, under sections 82, 83, 84 and 85 of 
the said Code for issuing proclamation for such person, and for attachment and sale 
of his property situated in any part of the State and for taking any other action under 
the said section. An appeal from any order made by any such officer rejecting an 
application for restoration of attached property shall lie to tlie court of session having 
jurisdiction in the where the said person ordinarily resides, as provided in section 86 
of the said Code. 
(2) (a) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), if the State 
Government have, or an officer mentioned in sub-section (2) of section 3 has, reason 
to believe that a person in respect of whom a detention order has been made has 
absconded or is concealing himself so that the order cannot be executed, the State 
Government or the Officer, as the case may be, may, by order, notified in the official 
Gazette, direct the said person to appear before such officer, at such-place ,and 
period as may be specified in tlie order. 
(b) If such person fails to comply with.such order unless he proves that it was not 
possible for him to comply therewith, and that he had within the period specified in 
the order informed the officer mentioned in the order of the reasons which rendered 
compliance therewith impossible and of his whereabouts, or proves that it was not 
possible for him to so inform the officer mentioned in the order, he shall, on 
conviction, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to year, or 
with fine, or with both. 
(c) Notwithstanding anything contained in the said Code, under clause (b) shall be 
cognizable. 
8. Grounds of order of detention to be disclosed to persons affected by the order. (1) 
When a person is detained in pursuance of a detention order the authority making 
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the order shall, as soon as may be, but not later than five clays from the date of 
detention, communicate to him the grounds on which the order has been made and 
shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order 
to the State Government. 
(2) Nothing in subsection (1) shall require the authority to disclose facts which it 
considers to be against the public interest to disclose. 
9. Constitution of Advisory Boards. (1) The State Government shall, whenever 
necessary constitute one or more Advisory Boards, for the purpose of this Act. 
(2) The constitution of every such Board shall be in accordance with the 
recommendation of the Chief Justice of the High Court of Karnataka. 
(3) Every such Board shall consist of a Chairman and two other members and the 
Chairman shall be a serving judge of High Court of Karnataka and the other 
members shall be serving or retired judges of any High Court. 
10. Reference to Advisory Board. In every case where a detention order has been 
made under this Act the State Government 
eminent shall, within three weeks from the date of detention of a person under the 
order, place before the Advisory Board constituted by it under section 9, the grounds 
on which the order has been made and the representation, if any, made by the person 
affected by the order, and in case where the order has been made by an officer, also 
the report by such officer under sub-section (3) of section 3. 
11. Procedure of Advisory Board. (1) The Advisory Board shall, after considering the 
materials placed before it and, after calling for such further information as it may 
deem necessary from, the State Government or from any person called for the 
purpose through the State Government or from the person concerned, and if, in any 
particular case, the Advisory Board considers it essential so to do or if the person 
concerned desires to be heard, after hearing him in person, submit its report to the 
State Government, within seven weeks from the date of detention of the person 
concerned. 
(2) Tlie report of tiie Advisory Board shall specify in a separate part thereof tlie 
opinion of the Advisory Board as to whether or not there is sufficient cause for the 
detention of the person concerned. 
(3) When there is a difference of opinion among the members forming the Advisory 
Board, the opinion of the majority of such members shall be deemed to be the 
opinion of the Board. 
(4) The proceedings of the Advisory Board and its report, excepting that part of the 
report in which the opinion of the Advisory Board is specified, shall be confidential 
(5) Nothing in this section shall entitle any person against whom a detention order 
has been made to appear by any legal practitioner in any matter coruiected with the 
reference to the Advisory Board. 
12. Action upon report of Advisory Board. (1) In any case where the Advisory Board 
has reported that there is, in Its opinion, sufficient cause for the detention of a 
person, the Stale Government may confirm the detention order and continue the 
detention of the person concerned for such period, not exceeding the maximum 
period specified in section 13,. as they think fit. 
(2) In any case where the Advisory Board has reported that there is, in its opinion, no 
sufficient cause for the detention of the person concerned, the State Government 
shall revoke the detention, order and cause the person to be released, forthwith. 
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13. Maximum period of detention. The period for which any person may be 
detained, in pursuance of any detention order made under tWs Act which has been 
confirmed under section 12, shall be twelve months from the date of detention. 
14. Revocation o{ detention orders. (1) Without prejudice to the provisions of section 
21 of the Karnataka Cenbal Clauses Act, 1899, a detention order may, at any time, be 
revoked or modified by the State Government, notwithstanding that the order has 
been made by an officer mentioned in sub-section (2) of section 3. 
[3(2) The revocation or expiry of a detention order (hereinafter in this sub-section 
referred to as the earlier detention order) shall not, whether such earlier order has 
been made before or after the commencement of the Karnataka Prevention of 
Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug-offenders Goon-Traffic Offenders and 
Slum-grabbers (Amendment) Act 1987, the of another detention-order (hereinafter in 
this sub-section referred to as the subsequent detention order) imder section 3 
against the same person; 
Provided that in a case where no fresh facts have arisen after the revocation or expiry 
of the earlier detention order made against such person, the maximum period for 
which such person may be detained In pursuance of the subsequent detention order 
shall in no case, extend beyond, the expiry of a period of twelve months from the 
date of detention under the earlier 
detention order.] 
15. Temporary release of persons detained- (1) The State Government, may, at any 
time, direct that any person detained in pursuance of a detention order may be 
released for any specified period, either without conditions or upon such conditions 
specified in the direction as that person accepts, and may, at any time cancel his 
release. 
(2) In directing the release of any detenu under sub-section ; (1), the State 
Government may require him to enter into a bond, with or without sureties, for the 
due observance of the conditions specified in the direction. 
(3) Any person released under section (1) shall surrender himself at the time and 
place, and to the authorit}', specified in the order directing his release or canceling his 
release, as the case may be. 
(4) If any person fails without sufficient cause to surrender himself in the manner 
specified in sub-section (3), he shall, on conviction, be punished with imprisonment 
for a term which may extend to two years or with fine, or with both. 
(5) If any person released under sub-section (1), fails to fulfil any of the conditions 
imposed upon him under sub-section (1) or in the bond entered into by him, the 
bonds shall be declared to be forfeited and any person be liable to pay the penalty 
thereof. 
16. Protection of action taken in good faith. No suit, prosecution or other legal 
proceeding shall lie against the State Government or any officer or person, for 
anything in good faith done of intended to be done in pursuance of this Act. 
17. Detention order against any bootlegger, drug-offender, gambler, goonda, 
immoral traffic offender or slum-grabber to be made under tliis Act and not 
under the NaHonal Security Act. On and after the commencemeirt of this Act, no 
order of detention under the National Security Act, 1980 (Central Act 65 of 1980) 
shall be made by tlie State Government or any of- their officers under that Act, in 
respect of any bootlegger, drug-offender, gambler, goonda, immoral traffic offender 
or slum grabber in the State of Karnataka, on the ground of preventing him from 
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acting ill any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, which order of 
detention may be or can foe made against such person under this Act. 
18. Repeal and savings. (1) The Karnataka Prevention of Dangerous Activities of 
Bootleggers, Drug-offenders, Gamblers, Goondas, Immoral Traffic offenders and 
Slum-grabbers Ordinance, 1984 (Karnataka Ordinance 16 of 1984) is hereby 
repealed, 
(2) Notwithstanding such repeal anything done or any action taken under the said 
Ordinance shall be deemed to have' been done or taken under this Act 
References: 
1. Published in the Karnataka Gazette Extraordinary, dated 29* April 1985. 
2. Ins. by Act 22 of 1987. 
3. Subs, by Act 22 of 1987. 
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APPENDIX-XVIII 
The Maharashtra Prevention of Communal, Anti-social other Dangerous Activities 
Act, 19801 
[7 of 1981] 
(22"'' January, 1981) 
An act to provide for prevention of communal, anti-social and other 
dangerous activities in Maharashtra and for matters connected therewith. Whereas 
both Houses of the State Legislature were not in session; 
And whereas the Governor of Maharashtra was satisfied which rendered it necessary 
for him to take immediate action to make a law to provide for the prevention of 
communal, anti-social and other dangerous activities in the State of Maharashtra and 
for matters connected therewith; and, tlierefore, promulgated the Maharashtra Pre-
vention of Communal, Anti-social and otlier Dangerous Activities Ordinance, 1980 
on the 27th August 1980; 
And whereas it is expedient to replace the said Ordinance fey an Act of the 
Legislature, with modifications on account of certain corresponding provisions in 
the National! 930, promulgated by the President of which has come into force on 
the 23rd September 1980; it is thereby enacted in the Thirty-first Year of the Republic 
of India, as follows: — 
1. Short title, extent, commencement and application, (1) This Act may be called the 
Maharashtra Prevention of Communal, Anti-social and otlier Dangerous Activities 
Acts 1980, 
(2) It extends to the whole of the State of Maharashtra. 
(3) It shall be deemed to have come into force on the 27* Augustl980. 
(4) Section 2 to 16 of this Act shall, from the commencement of the National Security 
Ordinance, 1980, on the 23rd September 1980 apply, and shall be deemed to have 
applied, only to the orders of detention made or deemed to have been made this Act 
before the 23rd September, 1980. 
2. Definition. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, 
(a) "acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order" means-
(i) propagating, promoting, or attempting to create, or otherwise functioning in such 
a manner as to create feelings of enmity or hatred or disharmony on grounds of 
religion, race, caste, community or language of any persons or class of persons; 
(ii) making preparations for rising, or attempting to use, or using, or instigating, 
inciting or otherwise abetting tlie use of any lethal weapons (including firearms and 
explosives, inflammable or corrosive substances), where such preparations, using, 
attempting, instigating, inciting or abetting disturbs, or is likely to distm-b, public 
order; 
(lii) attempting to commit, or committing, or instigating, inciting or otherwise 
abetting the commission of, mischief within the meaning of section 425 of the Indian 
Penal Code in respect of public property or means of public transportation, where 
the commission of such mischief disturbs, or is likely to disturb, public order; 
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(iv) committing offences punishable with death or imprisonment -for life or 
imprisonment for a term extending to seven years or more, where the commission of 
such offences disturbs, or is likely to disturb, public order. 
Explanation: In this clause,— 
(A) "firearms" shall have the same meaning as in the Arms Act, 1959; 
(B) "explosive substances" shall have the same meaning as in the Explosive 
Substances Act, 1908; 
(C) "public property" means any property owned or controlled by the Government 
or by a Corporation owned or controlled by the Government or by a society 
financed wholly or substantially by the Government; 
(b) "'detention order" means an order made under section 3; 
(c) "detenu" means a person detained under a detention order. 
3. Power to make orders detaining certain persons. (1) The State Government may, if 
satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting 
in any marmer prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it is necessary so to do, 
make an order directing that such person be detained. 
(2) Any of the following officers, namely: — 
(a) District Magistrates, 
(b) Additional District Magistrates specially empowered in this behalf by the State 
Government, 
(c) Commissioners of Police, 
may also, if satisfied as provided in sub-section (1), exercise the powers conferred by 
the said sub-section. 
(3) When any order is made under this section by an officer mentioned in sub-
section (2), he shall forthwith report the fact to the State Government, together with 
grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as in his 
opinion have a bearing on the matter, and no such order shall remain In force for 
more than twelve days after the making thereof, unless in the meantime it has been 
approved by the State Government. 
4. Execution of detention orders. A detention order may be executed at any place in 
the State in the manner provided for the execution of warrants of arrest under the 
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 
5. Power to regulate place and conditions of detention. Every person in respect of 
whom a detention order has been made shall be liable — 
(a) to be detained in such place and under such conditions, including conditions as 
to maintenance, discipline and punishment for breaches of discipline, as the State 
Government may, by general or special order, specify; and 
(b) to be removed from one place of detention to another place of detention, within 
the State, by order of the State Government 
6. Detention orders not to be invalid or inoperative on certain grounds. No detention 
order shall be invalid or inoperative merely by reason — 
(a) that the person to be detained tliereunder though within the State is outside of the 
territorial jurisdiction of the officer making the order, or 
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(b) that the place of detention of such person through within the State is outside the 
said limits. 
7. Powers in relation to absconding persons. If the Government, or an officer 
specified in sub-section (2) of section 8, as the case may be, has reason to believe that 
a person in respect of whom a detention order has been made has absconded or is 
concealing himself so that the order cannot be executed, the Government or the 
officer may — 
(a) make a report in writing of the fact to a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial 
Magistrate of the First Class having jurisdiction in the place where the said person 
ordinarily resides, and thereupon the provisions of sections 82 to 86 (both inclusive) 
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 shall apply in respect of the said person and 
his property as if the order directing that he be detained were a warrant issued by 
the Magistrate; 
(b) By order notified in the official gazette direct the said person to appear before 
such officer, at such place and within such period as may be specified in the order, 
and if the said person fails to comply with such direction, he shall, unless he proves 
that it was not possible, for him to comply therewith and that he had within the 
period specified in the order informed the officer mentioned in the order of the 
reason which rendered compliance therewith impossible and of his whereabouts, be 
punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year or with fine 
or with both. 
(2) Not withstanding, anything contained in the Code of Criminal procedure, 1973, 
every offence under clause (b) of sub-section (1) shall be cognizable. 
8. Grounds of order of detention to be disclosed to persons affected by the order. (1) 
When a person is detained in pursuance of a detention order, the authority making 
the order shall, as soon as may be, but not later than five days from the date of 
detention, communicate to him the grounds on which the order has been made, and 
shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order 
to the Government. 
(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall require the authority to disclose facts which it 
considers to be against the public interest to disclose. 
9. Constitution of Advisory Board- (1) The State Government shall, whenever 
necessary, constitute one or more Advisory Boards for the purposes of this Act. 
(2) Every such Board shall consist of a Chairman and two other members, who are, 
or have been. Judges of the High Court, or who are qualified under the constitution 
of India to be appointed as Judges of the High Court. 
10. Reference to Advisory, Board, iii every case where a detention order has been 
made under this Act the State Government shall, within thirty days from the date of 
detention of a person under the order place before the Advisory Board constituted 
by it under section 9, the grounds on which the order has been made, the 
representation, if any, made by the person affected by the order, and in case where 
the order has been made by an officer, also the, report by such officer under sub-
section (3) of section 3. 
11. Procedure of Advisory Board. (1) The Advisory Board shall, after considering the 
material placed before it and, after calling for such furtl\er informalion as it may 
deem necessary front the State Government or from any person called for the 
purpose through the State Government or from the person concerned, and if, in any 
particular case, the Advisory Board considers it essential so to do or, if the person 
concerned desires to be heard, after hearing him in person, submit its report to the 
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State Government within seven weeks from the date of detention of the person 
concerned. 
(2). The report of the Advisory Board shall specify in a separate part thereof the 
opinion of the Advisory Board as to whether or not there is sufficient cause for the 
detention, of the person concerned. 
(3) When there is a difference of opinion among the members forming the Advisory 
Board, the opinion of the majority of such members shall be deemed to be the 
opinion of the Board. 
(4) The proceedings of the Advisory Boards and its reports, excepting that part of the 
report in which the opinion of the Advisory Board is specified, shall be confidential. 
(5) Nothing in this section shall entitle any person, against whom a detention order 
has been made to appear by any legal practitioner in any matter connected with the 
reference to the Advisory Board. 
12. Action upon the report of Advisory Board. (1) In any case where the Advisory 
Board has reported that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for the detention of a 
person, the State Government may confirm the detention order and continue the 
detention of the persoii concerned for such period as it thinks fit. 
(2) In any case where the Advisory Board has reported that there is, in its opinion, no 
sufficient cause for the detention of the person concerned, the State Government 
shall revoke the detention order and cause the person to be released forthwith. 
13. Maximum period of detention. (1) The maximum period for which any person 
may detained in pursuance of any detention order made under this act which has 
been confirmed under section 12, shall be six months from the date of detention. 
14. Revocation of detention orders. (1) Without prejudice to the provisions of section 
21 of the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904, a detention order may, at any time, be 
revoked or modified by the State Govermnent, notwithstanding that the order has 
been made by any officer mentioned in sub-section (2) of section 3. 
(2) The revocation or expiry of a detention order shall not bar the making of a fresh 
detention order under Section 3 against a same person in any case where fresh facts 
have arisen after tlie date of revocation or expiry on which the State Government or 
an officer, as the case may be, is satisfied that such an order should be made. 
15. Temporary release of persons detained. (1) The State Government may at any 
time, direct that any person detained in pursuance of detention order may be 
released for any specified period either without conditions or upon such conditions 
specified in the direction as that person accepts and may at any time cancel his 
release. 
(2) In directing the release of any detenu under sub-section (1), the State 
Government may require him to enter into a bond with of without sureties for the 
due observance of the conditions specified in the direction. 
(3) Any person released under sub-section (1) shall surrender himself at the time and 
place and to the authority, specified in the order directing his release or cancelling 
his release as tlie case may be. 
(4) If any person fails without sufficient cause to surrender himself in the manner 
specified in sub-section (3) he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term 
which may extend to two years or with fine, or with both. 
(5) If any person released under sub-section (1) fails to fulfil any of the conditions 
iinposed upon him under the said subsection or in the bond entered into by him, the 
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bond shall be declared to forfeited and any person bound thiereby shall be liable to 
the penalty thereof. 
16. Protection of action taken under this Act. No suit, prosecution or any other legal 
proceeding shall lie against any person for anything done or intended to be done in 
good faith in pursuance of the provisions of this Act. 
^17. Amendment of section 56 of Bom. XXII of 1951. 
18. Amendment of section 151 of Act II of 1974. In section 151 of the code of criminal 
procedure, 1973, in its application to tlie State of Maharashti-a,-
(a) in sub-section (2), after the words "required or authorised" the words, brackets 
and figure "under sub-section (3) or" shall be inserted; 
(b) after sub-section (2), the following sub-section shall be inserted; namely:-
"(3) (a) Where a person is arrested under this section and the officer making the 
arrest, or the officer-in-charge of the police station before whom the arrested person 
is produced, has reasonable grounds to believe that the detention of the arrested 
person for a period longer than twenty-four hours from the time of arrest (excluding 
the time required to take the arrested person from the place of arrest to the court of a 
judicial Magistrate) is necessary, by reason that-
(i) the person is likely to continue the design to commit, or is likely to commit, the 
cognizable offence referred to in sub-section (1) after his release; and 
(ii) the circumstances of the case are such that his being at large is likely to be 
prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, the officer making the arrest, or the 
officer-in-charge of the police station, shall produce such person before the nearest 
Judicial Magistrate, together with a report In writing stating the reasons for the 
continued detention of such person for a period longer than twenty-four hours. 
(b) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Code or any other law for the time 
being in force, where the Magistrate before whom such arrested person is produced 
is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for the temporary of such person in 
custody beyond the period of twenty-four hours, lie may, from time to time, by order 
remand such person to such custody as he may think fit: 
Provided that, no person shall be detained under this section for a period exceeding 
fifteen days at a time, and for a total period exceeding thirty days from the date of 
arrest of such person. 
(c) When any person is remanded to custody under clause (b), the Magistrate shall, 
as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which, the order has 
been made and such, and person may make a representation against the order to the 
Court of Session. The Sessions Judge may, on receipt of such representation, after 
holding such inquiry as he deems fit, either reject the representation, or if he 
considers tliat further detention of the arrested person is not necessary, or that it is 
otherwise proper and just so to do, may vacate the order and the arrested person 
shall then be released forthwith." 
19. Repeal Mah. VII of 1980 and saving, (1) The Maharashtra Prevention of 
Communal, Anti-social and other Dangerous Activities Ordinance, 1980 is hereby 
repealed. 
(2) Notwithstanding such repeal, anything done or any action taken (including any 
order made) under the said Ordinance shall be deemed to have been done, taken or 
made as the case may be, under the corresponding provisions of this Act. 
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Reference: 
1. Published in the Maharashtra Government Gazette, Part IV, dated 23rd January, 
1981. 
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A P P E N D I X - I X 
The Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers 
and Drug-Offenders Act, 1981i 
[This Act received assent of the President on 21st September 1981; assent was first 
published in the Maharashtra Government Gazette, Part IV, Extraordinary, on 
23rd September 1981.] 
An Act to provide for preventive detention of Slumlords, Bootleggers and 
Drug-offenders, for preventing their dangerous activities prejudicial to the 
maintenance of public order. Whereas public order was adversely affected every 
now and then by the dangerous activities of certain persons, who are known as 
Slumlords, Boot-leggars and Drug-offenders; 
And whereas both Houses of the State Legislature were not in session; 
AND WHEREAS having regard to the resources and influence of the persons by 
whom, the large scale on which, and the manner in which, the dangerous activities 
were being clandestinely organised and carried on in violation of law by them, as or 
Drug-offenders in the State of Maharashtra, and particularly in its urban areas, the 
Governor of Maharashtra was satisfied that circumstances existed which rendered it 
necessary for him to take immediate action to have a special law in this State to 
provide for preventive detention of these three classes of persons and for matters 
con-tlierewith and, therefore, promulgated the Maharashtra Prevention of 
Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers and Drug-offenders Ordinance, 1981, 
on the 11th June 1981; 
AND WHEREAS it is expedient to replace the said Ordinancel by an Act of the State 
Legislature; It is hereby enacted In Thirty-second Year of the Republic of India as 
follows: — 
1. Short title, extent and commencement (1) This Act may be called the Maharashtra 
Prevention of Dangerous, Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers and Drug-offenders 
Act, 1981. 
(2) It extends to the whole of the State of Maharashtra. 
(3) It shall be deemed to have come into force on the 11* June 1981. 
2. Definitions. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, 
(a) "acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order" means-
(i) in the case of a slumlord, when he is engaged, or is making preparation for 
engaging, in any of his activities as a slumlord, which affect adversely, or are hkely 
to affect adversely, the maintenance of public order; 
(ii) in the case of a bootlegger, when he is engaged, or is making preparations for 
engaging, in any of his activities as a bootlegger, which affect adversely, or are likely 
to affect adversely, the maintenance of public order; 
(iii) in the case of diug-offender, when he is engaged, or is making preparation for 
engaging, ir, any oF his activities as drug-offender, wWch affect adversely, or are 
likely to affect adversely, the maintenance of public order; 
Explanation: For tine purpose of this clause (a), public order shall be deemed to have 
been affected adversel)', or shall be deemed likely to be affected adversely, inter alia, 
if any of the activities of any of the persons referred to in this clause, direcdy or 
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indirectly, is causing or calculated o cause any harm, danger or alarm or a feeling of 
insecurity, among the general public or any section thereof or a grave or widespread 
danger to life or public health; 
(b) "bootlegger" means a person, who distils, manufactures, stores, transports, 
imports, exports, sells or distributes any liquor, intoxicating drug or other intoxicant 
in contravention of any provisions of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 and the rules 
and orders made thereunder, or of any other law for the time being in force or who 
knowingly expends or applies any money or supplies any animal, vehicle, vessel or 
other conveyance or any receptacles or any other materials whatsoever in 
furtherance or support of the doing any of the abovementioned things by or through 
any other person, or who abets in any other manner the doing of any such things; 
(c) "detention order" means an order made under section 3; 
(d) "detenu" means a person detained under a detention order; 
(e) "drug-offender" means a person, who manufactures, stocks, import, exports, sells 
or distributes any drug or cultivates any plant or does any other thing in 
contiavention of any of the provisions of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 or the 
Dangerous Drugs Act 1930 or the rules and orders made under either Act, or in 
contravention of any other law for the time being in force, or who knowingly 
expends or applies any money in furtherance or support of the doing of any of the 
above mentioned things by or through any other person, or who abets in any other 
manner the doing of any such things; 
(f) "slumlord" means a person, who illegally takes possession of any lands (whether 
belonging to Government, local authority or any other person) or enters into or 
creates illegal tenancies or leave and licence agreements or any other agreements in 
respect of such lands, or who constructs unauthorised structures thereon for sale or 
hire, or gives such lands to any persons on rental or leave and licence basis for 
construction, or use and occupation, of unauthorised structures, or who knowingly 
gives financial aid to any persons for taking illegal possession of such lands, or for 
construction of unauthroised sti'uctures thereon, or who collects or attempts to 
collect from any occupiers of such lands rent, compensation or other charges by 
criminal intimidation, or who evicts or attempts to evict any such occupiers by force 
without resorting to the lawful procedure, or who abets in any manner the doing of 
any other abovementioned things; 
(g) "unauthorised structure" means any structure constructed, without express 
permission in writing of the Municipal Commissioner in a Municipal Corporation 
area, and elsewhere of the Collector, or except in accordance with any law for the 
time being in force in the area concerned. 
3. Power to make orders detaining certain persons (1) The State Government may, if 
satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting 
in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it is necessary so to 
do, make an order directing that such person is detained. (2) If, having regard to the 
circumstances prevailing or likely to prevail in any area within the local limits of the 
jurisdiction of a District Magistrate or a Commissioner of Police, the State 
Government is satisfied that it is necessary so to do, it may, by order in writing, 
direct, that during such period as may be specified in the order such District 
Magistrate oi' Commissioner of Police may also, if satisfied as provided in sub-
section (1), exercise, the powers conferred by tlie said sub-section: 
Provided thai the period specified in the order made by the State Government under 
this sub-section shall not, in the first instance, exceed three months, but the State 
Government if satisfied as aforesaid that it is necessary so to do, amend such order to 
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extend such period from time to time by any period not exceeding three months at 
any one time. 
(3) When any order is made under this section by an officer mentioned in sub-section 
(2), he shall forthwith report the fact to the State Government, together with the 
grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as, in his 
opinion, have a bearing on the matter, and no such order shall remain in force for 
more than twelve days after the making thereof, unless in the meantime, it has been 
approved by the State Government. 
4. Execution of detention orders, A detention order may be executed at any place in 
the State in the manner provided for the execution of warrants of arrest under the 
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 
5. Power to regulate place and conditions of detention. Every person in respect of 
whom a detention order has been made shall be liable — 
(a) to be detained in such place and under such conditions, including conditions as 
to maintenance, discipline and punishment for breaches of discipline, as the State 
Government may, by general or special order, specify; and 
(b) to be removed from one place of detention to another place of detention, within 
the State by order of the State Government. 
6. Detention orders not to be invalid or inoperative on certain grounds. No 
detention order shall be invalid or inoperative merely by reason— 
(a) that the person to be' detained thereunder though within the State is outside the 
limits of the territorial jurisdiction of the officer making the order, or 
(b) that the place of detention of such person though within the State Is outside the 
said limits. 
7. Powers in relation to absconding persons. (1) If the State Government, or an officer 
mentioned in sub-section (2) of section 3, has reason to believe that a person in, 
respect of whom a detention order has been made has absconded, or is concealing 
himself so that the order cannot be executed, then the provisions of section 82 to 86 
(both inclusive) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, shall apply in respect of 
such person and his property, subject to the modifications mentioned in this sub-
section and, irrespective of the place where such person ordinarily resides, the 
detention order made against him shall be deemed to be a warrant issued by a 
competent Court. Where the detention order is made by the State Government, an 
officer, not below the rank of District Magistrate or Commissioner of Police 
authorised by the State Government in tliis behalf, or where the detention order is 
made b\' an officer mentioned in sub-section (2) of section 3, such officer, as the case 
may be, shall irrespective of his ordinary jurisdiction, be deemed to be empowered to 
exercise all tlie powers of the competent Court under sections 82, 83, 84 and 85 of the 
said Code for issuing a proclamation for such person and for attachment and sale of 
his property situated in any part of the State and for taking any other action under 
the said sections. An appeal from any order made by any such officer rejecting an 
application for restoration of attached property shall lie to the Court of Session, 
having jurisdiction in the place where the said person ordinarily resides, as provided 
in section 86 of the said Code. 
(2) (a) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), if the State 
Government or an officer mentioned in subsection (2) of section 3 has reason to 
believe that a person in respect of whom a detention order has been made has 
absconded or is concealing himself so that the order cannot be executed, the State 
Govermnent or the officer, as the case may be, may, by order notified in the Official 
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Gazette, direct the said person to appear before such officer, at such place and within 
such period as may be specified in the order. 
(b) If such person fails to comply with such order, unless he proves that it was not 
possible for him to comply therewith, and that he had, within the period specified in 
the order, informed the officer mentioned in the order of the reasons which rendered 
compliance therewith impossible and of his whereabouts, or proves that it was not 
possible for him to so inform the officer mentioned in the order, he shall, on 
conviction, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one 
year, or with fine, or with both. 
(c) Notwithstanding anything contained in the said Code, every offence under clause 
(b) shall be cognizable. 
8. Grounds of order of detention to be disclosed to persons affected by the order. (1) 
When a person is detained in pursuance of a detention order, the authority making 
the order shall, as soon as may be, but not later than five days from the date of 
detention, communicate to liim the grounds on which the order has been made and 
shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order 
to the State Government. 
(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall require the authority to disclose facts which it 
considers to be against the public interest to disclose. 
9. Constitution of Advisor Boards. (1) The State Government shall, whenever 
necessary, constitute one or more Advisory Boards for the purposes of this Act. 
(2) Every such Board shall consist of a Chairman and two other members, who are, 
or have been. Judges of any High Court or who are qualified under the Constitution 
of India to be appointed as Judges of a High Court. 
10. Reference to Advisory Board. In every case where a detention order has been 
made under this Act, the State Government shall, within three weeks from the date 
of detention of a person under the order, place before the Advisory Board 
constituted by it under section 9 the grounds on which the order has been made and 
the representation, it any, made by a person affected by the order, and in the case 
where the order has been made by an officer, also the report by such officer under 
sub-section (3) of Section 3. 
11. Procedure of Advisory Boards. (1) The Advisory Board shall, after considering 
the materials place before it and, after calling for such further information as it may 
deem necessary from the State Government or from any person called for the 
purpose through the State Government or from the person concerned, and if, in any 
particular case, the Advisory Board considers it essential so to do or if the person 
concerned desires to be heard, after hearing him in person, submit its report to the 
State Government, within seven weeks from the date of detention of the person 
concerned. 
(2) 1 he report of the Advisory Board shall specify in a separate part thereof the 
opinion oi the Advisory Board as to whether or not there is sufficient cause for the 
detention of the person concerned. 
(3) When there is a difference of opinion among the members forming the Advisory 
Board, the opinion of the majority of such members shall be deemed to be the 
opinion of the Board. 
(4) The proceedings of the Advisory Board and its report, excepting that part of the 
report in which the opinion oi: the Advisory Board is specified, shall be confidential. 
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(5) Nothing in this section shall entitle any person against whom a detention order 
has been made to appear by any legal practitioner in any matter connected with the 
reference to the Advisory Board. 
12. Action upon report of the Advisory Board. (1) In any case where the Advisory 
Board has reported that there is, in its opinion, sufficient cause for the detention of a 
person, the State Government may confirm the detention order and continue the 
detention of the person concerned for such period, not exceeding the maximum 
period prescribed by section 13, as it thinks fit. 
(2) In any case where the Advisory Board has reported that there is, in its opinion, no 
sufficient cause for the detention of the person concerned, the state concerned, the 
State Government shall revoke the detention order and cause the person to be 
released forthwith. 
13. Maximum period of detention. The maximum period for which any person may 
be detained, in pursuance of any detention order made under this act, which has 
been confirmed under section 12, shall be six months from the date of detention. 
14. Revocation of detention orders. (1) Without prejudice to the provisions of section 
21 of the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904, a detention order may, at any time, be 
revoked modified by the State Government, notwithstanding that order has been 
made by an officer mentioned in sub-section (2) of section 3. 
(2) The revocation or expiry of a detention order shall not bar the making; of a fresh 
detention order under section 3 against the same person, in any case, where fresh 
facts have arisen after the date of revocation or expiry, on which the State 
Government or an officer, as the case may be, is satisfied that such an order should 
be made. 
15. Temporary release of persons detained. (1) The State Government may, at any 
time, direct that any person detained in pursuance of a detention order may be 
released for any specified period, either without-conditions or upon such conditions 
specified in the direction as that person accepts^ and may, at any time, cancel his 
release. 
(2) In directing the release of any detenu under sub-section (1), the State 
Government may require him to enter into a bond, with of without sureties, for the 
due observance of the conditions specified in the direction. 
(3) Any person released under sub-section (1) shall surrender himself at the time and 
place, and to the authority, specified in. the order directing his release or canceling 
his release, as the case may be. 
(4) If any person fails without sufficient cause to surrender himself in the manner 
specified in sub-section (3), he shall, on conviction, be punished with imprisonment 
foi- a teim which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both. 
(5) If any person released under sub-section (1) fails to fulfil; any of the conditions 
imposed upon him under the said subsection or in the bond entered into by him, the 
bond shall be declared to be forfeited and any person bound thereby shall fee liable 
to pay the penalty thereof. 
16. Protection of action taken in good faith. No suit, prosecution or other legal 
proceeding shall lie against tlie State Government or any officer or' person, for 
anything in good' faith done or intended to be done in pursuance of this Act. 
17. Detention orders against any slumlord, bootlegger or drug-offender to be made 
under this Act and not under National Security Act On and after the commencement 
ot this Act, no order of detention under the National Security Act, 1980, shall be 
cxl JA-ppendhcII 
made by the State Government or any of its officers under that Act, in respect of any 
slumlord, bootlegger or offender in tlie State of Maharashtra, on the ground of 
preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public 
order, where an order of detention may be or can be or can be made against, such 
person under this Act. 
18. Repeal of Mah. Ord. Ill of 1981 and saving. (1) The Maharashtra Prevention of 
Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, and Drug-offenders Ordinance, 1981, is hereby 
repealed 
(2) Notwithstanding such repeal, anything done or any taken (including any order 
made) under the said Ordinance shall be deemed to have been done^ taken or made, 
as the case may be, under the corresponding provisions of this Act. 
Reference: 
1. Published in the Maharashtra Government Gazette, Part IV, Extraordinary, dated 
23rd September, 1981. 
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APPENDIX-X 
Tamilnadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug-offenders,i 
(Forest Offenders) Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Slum Grabbers Act, 
19822 
[14 of 1984] 
(12* March, 1982) 
An Act to provide for preventive detention of bootleggers, drug-offenders, 
3(forest offenders) goondas, immoral traffic offenders and slum-grabbers for 
preventing their dangerous activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. 
WHEREAS public order is adversely affected every now and then by the dangerous 
activities of certain persons, who are known as bootleggers, drug-offenders, goondas, 
immoral traffic offenders and slum-grabbers; 
AND WHEREAS having regard to the resources and influence of the persons by 
whom, the large scale on which, and the manner in which, the dangerous activities 
were being clandestinely organised and carried on in violation of law by them, as 
boot-leggers. Drug-offenders, goondas, immoral traffic offenders or slum grabbers 
in the State of Tamil Nadu, and particularly in its urban areas, ''and forest area^ it is 
necessary have a special law in the State of Tamil Nadu, to provide for preventive 
detention of these six classes of persons and for matters connected therewith. 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Tamil Nadu in the Thirty-third 
Year of the Republic of India as follows: 
1. Short title and commencement. (1) This Act may be called the Tamil Nadu 
Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug offenders, forest offenders, 
Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Slum-Grabbers Act, 1982. 
(2) It extends to the whole of the State of Tamil Nadu. 
(3) It shall be deemed to have come into force on the 5* January, 1982. 
2. Definitions. In tliis Act, unless the context otherwise requires — 
(a) "acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order" means — 
(i) in the case of bootlegger, when he is engaged, or is making preparations for 
engaging, in any of his activities as a bootlegger, which affect adversely, or are likely 
to affect adversely, the maintenance of public order; 
(ii) in the case of a drug-offender, when he is engaged, or is making preparations for 
engaging in any of his activities as a drug offender which affect adversely or are 
likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order; 
[(ii-A)] in the case of a forest-offender when he is engaged or is making preparations 
for engaging in any of his activities as a forest-offender, which affect adversely, or 
are likely to affect adversely, the maintenance of public order; 
(iii) in the case of a goonda when he is engaged or is making preparations for 
engaging in any of his activities as a goonda which affect adversely or are likely to 
affect adversely the maintenance of public order; 
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(iv) in the case of an immoral traffic offender when he is engaged, or is making 
preparations for engaging in any of his activities as an immoral traffic offender 
which affect adversely, or are likely to affect adversely, the maintenance of public 
order; 
(v) in the case of a slum-grabber, when he is engaged or is making preparations, for 
engaging, in any of his activities as a slum-grabber, affect adversely or are likely to 
affect adversely the maintenance of public order: 
Explanation: For the purpose of this clause (a), public order shall be deemed to have 
been affected adversely or shall be deemed likely to be affected adversely inter alia if 
any of the activities of any of the persons referred to in this clause (a) directly or 
indirectly, is causing or is calculated to cause any harm, danger or alarm or a feeling 
of insecurity, among the general public or any section, thereof of a grave or 
widespread danger to life or public health;'^  (or ecological system) 
(b) "bootlegger" means a person, who distils, manufactures, stores, transports, 
imports, exports, sells or distributes any liquor, intoxicating drug or other intoxicant 
in conhavention of any of the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Prohibition Act, 1937 
(Tamil Nadu Act X of 1937) and the rules, notifications and orders, made thereunder, 
or in contravention of any other for the time being in force, or who knowingly 
expends or applies any money or supplies any animal, vehicle, vessel, or other 
conveyance or any receptacle or any other material whatsoever in furtherance or 
support of the doing of any of the above mentioned things by or through any other 
person or who abets in any other manner the doing of any such things; 
(c) "detention order" means an order made under section 3; 
(d) "detenu" means a person detained under a detention order; 
(e) "drug-offender" means a person, who manufactures, stocks, import, exports, sells 
or distributes any drug or cultivates any plant or does any other thing in 
contravention of any of the provisions of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (Central 
Act XXIII of 1940), or ^the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, 
(Central Act 61 of 1985) and tlie rules, notifications and orders made under either-
Act, or in contravention of any other law for the time being in force, or who 
knowingly expends or applies any money in furtherance or support of the doing of 
any of the above mentioned things by or through any other person, or who abets in 
any other manner the doing of any such things; 
'^ [(ee)] "forest-offender" means a person, who commiys or attempts to commit or 
abets the commission of offences punishable under Chapter II or Chapter III or 
Chapter V or Chapter VI-B or Chapter VII of the Tamil Nadu Forest Act, 1882 (Tamil 
Nadu Act V of 1982) or under Chapter VI of the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972 
(Central Act 53 of 1972;] 
(f) "goonda" means a person who either by himself or as a member of or leader of a 
gang, habitually commits or attempts to commit or abets the commission of offences 
punishable under Chapter XVI, Chapter XVII or Chapter XXII of the Indian Penal 
Code (Central Act XLV of I860); 
(g) "immoral traffic offender" means a person who commits or abets the commission 
of, any offence under the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 
195b (Central Act 104 of 1956); 
(h) "slum-grabber" means a person, who illegally takes possession of any land 
(whether belonging to Government, local authority or any other person) or enters 
into, or creates illegal tenancies or leave and license agreements or any other agree-
ment in respect of such lands; or who constructs unauthorised, thereon for sale or 
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hire, or gives such lands to-any on rental or, leave and license basis for construction 
or use and occupation of unauthorized structures or who knowingly gives financial 
aid to any person for taking illegal possession of such lands, or for construction of 
unauthorised structures or who collects or attempts to collect from any 
occupier of such lands, rent, compensation or otlier charges by criminal intimidation 
or who evicts or attempts to evict any occupier by force without resorting to tlie 
lawful procedure; or who abets in any manner the doing of any of the above 
(i) "unauthorised- structure" means any structure constructed without express 
permission in writing of the appropriate authority under, and in accordance with, 
any law for the time being in force in the area concerned. 
3. Power to make orders detaining certain persons. (1) The Slate Government may, if 
satisfied with respect to any bootlegger or drug-offender9 or forest offender or 
goonda or immoral traffic offender slum-grabber that with a view to prevent him 
from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it is 
necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained. 
(2) Jf, having regard to the circumstances prevailing, or likely to prevail in any area 
within the local limits of the jurisdiction of a District Magistrate or a 
Commissioner of Police, the State Government is satisfied that it is necessary so to 
do, it may, by order in writing, direct, that during such period as may be specified in 
the order such District Magistrate or Commissioner of Police may also, if satisfied as 
provided in sub-section (1), exercise, the powers conferred by the said sub-section: 
Provided that the period specified in the order made by the State Government under 
this sub-section shall not, in the first instance, exceed three months, but the State 
Government if satisfied as aforesaid that it is necessary so to do, amend such order to 
extend such period from time to time by any period not exceeding three months at 
any one time. 
(3) When any order is made under this section by an officer mentioned in sub-section 
(2), he shall forthwith report the fact to the State Government, together with the 
grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as, in his 
opinion, have a bearing on the matter, and no such order shall remain in force for 
more than twelve days after the making thereof, unless in the meantime, it has been 
approved by the State Government. 
4. Execution of detention orders, A detention order may be executed at any place in 
the State in the mariner provided for the execution of warrants of arrest under the 
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cental Act 2 of 1974). 
5. Power to regulate place and conditions of detention. Every person in respect of 
whom a detention order has been made shall be liable — 
(a) to be detained in such place and under such conditions, including conditions as 
to maintenance, discipline and punishment for breaches of discipline, as the State 
Government may, by general or special order, specify; and 
(b) to be removed from one place of detention to another place of detention, within 
the State by order of the State Government. 
5-A. Grounds of detention severable.'" Where a person has been detained in 
pursuance of an order of detention (whether made before or after the 
commencem,ent of the I'amil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Achvites of Boot-
leggers, Drug-offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic offenders and Slum-grabbers 
(Amendment) Act, 1986) under section 3 which has been made on two or more 
grounds, such order oi detention shall be deemed to have been made separately on 
each of such ground and accordingly-
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(a) such order shall not be deemed to be invalid or inoperative merely because one 
or some of the grounds is or are-
(!) vague, 
(ii) non-existent, 
(iii) not- relevant, 
(iv) not-connected or not proximately connected with such person, or 
(v) invalid for any other reason whatsoever, and it is not, therefore, 
possible to hold that the Government or officer making, such order 
would have been satisfied as provided in section 3 with reference to 
the ground or grounds and made the order of detention; 
(b) the Government or officer making the-order of detention shall 'be deemed to 
have made the order of detention under the said section after being satisfied 
as provided in that section with reference to the remaining ground or 
grounds. 
6. Detention orders not to be invalid or inoperative on certain grounds. No 
detention order shall be invalid or inoperativemerely by reason— 
(a) that the person to be' detained thereunder though within the State is outside 
the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of the officer making the order, or 
(b) that the place of detention o{ such person though within the State Is outside the 
said limits. 
7. Powers in relation to absconding persons-
(1) If the State Government, or an officer mentioned in sub-section (2) of section 
3, has reason to believe that a person in, respect of whom a detentiorj order 
has been made has absconded, or is concealing himself so that the order 
caraiot be executed, then the provisions of section 82 to 86 (both inclusive) of 
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (Central Act 2 of 1974) shall apply in 
respect of such person and his property, subject to the modifications 
mentioned in this sub-section and, irrespective of the place where such 
person ordinarily resides, the detention order made against him shall be 
deemed to be a warrant issued by a competent Court. Where the detention 
order is made by the State Government, an officer, not below the rank of 
District Magistrate or Commissioner of Police authorised by the State 
Government in tliis behalf, or where tlie detention order is made by an officer 
mentioned in sub-section (2) of section 3, such officer, as the case may be, 
shall irrespective of his ordinary jurisdiction, be deemed to be empowered to 
exercise all tlie powers of tlie competent Court under sections 82, 83, 84 and 
85 of the said Code for issuing a proclamation for such person and for 
attachment and sale of his property situated in any part of the State and for 
taking any other action under the said sections. An appeal from any order 
made by any such officer rejecting an application for restoration of attached 
property shall lie to the Court of Session, having jurisdiction in tlie place 
where the said person ordinarily resides, as provided in section 86 of the said 
Code. 
(2) (a) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), if the State 
Government or an officer mentioned in subsection (2) of section 3 has reason 
to believe that a person in respect of whom a detention order has been made 
has absconded or is concealing himself so that the order cannot be executed, 
the State Government or the officer, as the case may be, may, by order 
notified in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette, direct the said person to 
appear before such officer, at such place and within such period as may be 
specified in the order. 
(b) If such person fails to comply with such order, unless he proves that it was 
not possible for him to comply therewith, and that he had, within the period 
specified in the order, informed the officer mentioned in the order of the 
reasons which rendered compliance therewith impossible and of his 
whereabouts, or proves that it was not possible for him to so inform the 
officer mentioned in the order, he shall, on conviction, be punished with 
imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with 
both. 
(c) Notwithstanding anything contained in the said Code, every offence 
under clause (b) shall be cognizable. 
8. Grounds of order of detention to be disclosed to persons affected by the order-
(1) When a person is detained in pursuance of a detention order, the authority 
making the order shall, as soon as may be, but not later than five days from 
the date of detention, communicate to him the grounds on which the order 
has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a 
representation against the order to the State Government. 
(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall require the authority to disclose facts which it 
considers to be agair\st the public interest to disclose. 
9. Constitution of Advisor Boards-
(1) The State Government shall, whenever necessary, constitute one or more 
Advisory Boards for the purposes of this Act. 
(2) Every such Board shall consist of a Chairman and two other members, who 
are, or have been. Judges of any High Court or who are qualified under the 
Constitution of India to be appointed as Judges of a High Court. 
10. Reference to Advisory Board. In every case where a detention order has been 
made under this Act, the State Government shall, within three weeks from tlie 
date of detention of a person under the order, place before the Advisory Board 
constituted by it under section 9 the grounds on which the order has been made 
and the representation, it any, made by a person affected by the order, and in the 
case where the order has been made by an officer, also the report by such officer 
under sub-section (3) of Section 3. 
11. Procedure of Advisory Boards. 
(1) The Advisory Board shall, after considering the materials place before it 
and, after calling for such further information as it may deem necessary 
from the State Goverrunent or from any person called for the purpose 
through die State Government or from the person concerned, and if, in any 
particular case, the Advisory Board considers it essential so to do or if the 
person concerned desires to be heard, after hearing him in person, submit 
its report to the State Government, within seven weeks from the date of 
detention of the person concerned. 
(2) The report of tlie Advisory Board shall specify in a separate part thereof the 
opinion of the Advisory Board as to whether or not there is sufficient cause 
for the detention of the person concerned. 
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(3) When there is a difference of opinion among the members forming the 
Advisory Board, the opinion of the majority of such members shall be 
deemed to be the opinion of the Board. 
(4) The proceedings of tlie Advisory Board and its report, excepting that part of 
the report in which the opinion of the Advisory Board is specified, shall be 
confidential. 
(5) Nothing in this section shall entitle any person against whom a detention 
order has been made to appear by any legal practitioner in any matter 
connected with the reference to the Advisory Board. 
12. Action upon report of the Advisory Board. 
(1) In any case where the Advisory Board has reported that there is, in its 
opinion, sufficient cause for the detention of a person, the State Government 
may confirm the detention order and continue the detention of the person 
concerned for such period, not exceeding the maximum period prescribed by 
section 13, as it thinks fit. 
(2) In any case where the Advisory Board has reported that there is, in its 
opinion, no sufficient cause for the detention of the person concerned, the 
state concerned, the State Government shall revoke the detention order and 
cause the person to be released forthwith. 
13.Maximum period of detention. The maximum period for which any person may 
be detained, in pursuance of any detention order made under this act, which has 
been confirmed under section 12, shall be six months from the date of detention. 
14. Revocation of detention orders. (1) Without prejudice to the provisions of section 
21 of tlie Tamil Nadu General Clauses Act, 1891 (Tamil Nadu Act 1 of 1891). A 
detention order may, at any time, be revoked modified by the State Government, 
notwithstanding that order has been made by an officer mentioned in sub-section 
(2) of section 3. 
'1(2) The revocation or expiry of a detention order ter in this sub-section referred 
to as the earlier detention order) shall not (whetiier such earlier detention order 
has been made before or after the commencement of the Tamil Nadu Prevention 
of Dangerous Activities of Bootieggers, Drug offenders Goondas, Immoral Traffic 
Offenders and Slum-grabbers (Amendment) Act, 1986) bar the making of another 
detention order (hereafter in this sub-section referred to as. the subsequent 
detention order) under section 3 against the same person; provided that in a case 
where no fresh facts have arisen after the revocation or expiry of the earlier 
detention order made against such person, the maximum period for which such 
person may be detained in pursuance of the subsequent detention order shall in 
no case extend beyond tlie expiry of a period of twelve months from the date of 
detention under the earlier detention order. 
15. Temporary release of persons detained. 
(1) The State Government, may, at. any time, direct that any person detained in 
pursuance of a detention order may be released for any specified period, 
either without conditions or upon such conditions specified in the direction 
as that person accepts, and may, at any time cancel his release. 
(2) In directing the release of any detenu under sub-section (1), the State 
Government may require him to enter into a bond, with or without sureties, 
for the due observance of the conditions specified in the direction. 
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(3) Any person released under sub-section (1) shall surrender himself at tlie time 
and place, and to the authority, specified in the order directing his release or 
cancelling his release, as the case may be. 
(4) If any person fails without sufficient cause to surrender himself in the maimer 
specified in sub-section (3), he shall, on conviction, be punished with 
imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with 
both, 
(5) If any person released under sub-section (1) fails to fulfil any of the conditions 
imposed upon him under the said subsection or in the bond entered into by 
him, tlie bond shall be declared to be forfeited and any person bound thereby 
shall be liable to pay the penalty thereof. 
16. Protection of action taken in good faith. No suit, prosecution or other legal 
proceeding shall lie against the State Government or any officer or person, for 
anything in good faith done or intended to be done in pursuance of this Act. 
17. Detention orders against any Bootlegger, drug-offender, immoral traffic offender, 
or slum-grabber to be made under this Act and not under National Security Act. 
On and after the commencement of this Act, no order of detention under the 
National Security Act, 1980 (Central Act 65 of 1980) shall be made by the State 
Government or any of their officers under that Act in respect of any Bootlegger, 
drug-offender, forest offender, immoral traffic offender, or slum-grabber in tlie 
State of Tamil Nadu, on tlie ground of preventing him from acting in any manner 
prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, where an order of detention may 
be or can be made against such person, under this Act. 
18. Repeal and saving. 
(1) The Tarnil Nadu Prevention Dangerous Activities of Boot-loggers, Drug-
offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and slum-grabbers 
Ordinance, 1982 (Tamil Nadu Ordinance I of 1982) is hereby repealed. 
(2) Notwithstanding such repeal, anything done or any action taken under the 
said Ordinance, shall be deemed to have been or taken under this Act. 
